Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Individuation | Buridan | Geach I 134 Individuation/identification/Buridan/Geach: E.g. a horse dealer has exactly three horses: Brownie, Blackie and Fallow. The customer accepts the dealer's statement: "I will give you one of my horses". But the dealer does not deliver and denies that he owes the customer anything. His argument: "I should owe you either Brownie, or Blackie or Fallow. I 135 But what I said did not refer to Blackie any more as on Fallow or the other way around and just as little on Brownie. I owe you none of the three." GeachVsBuridan: a part of the difficulties that Buridan has himself comes from the fact that he allows the conclusion of "I owe you a horse" to "There is a horse I owe you"! But even if we cannot do it in general, it seems plausible in this particular case to allow "I owe you something", so "there is something ..." We can even accept this without accepting Buridan's invalid rule. Geach: many authors believe that any case of an invalid conclusion procedure is an invalid conclusion, but that is a great logical error! Horse dealer: "If I owe you a horse, I owe you something, and that can only be a horse of mine, you will not say because of my words that it is something else I owe you! Well then: Tell me which of my horses I owe you. Solution/Buridan: One can say that x owes me y, if and only if I am even with him by giving y! Whichever of the three horses should be y, by handing out the two they will be even! So: whichever x will be, the dealer owes the customer x. I 136 It is true of Brownie, it is true of Blackie and it is true of Fallow that it is a horse that the dealer owes the customer. If we now consider e.g. only Brownie and Blackie, we could say that the dealer owes these two. But Buridan himself warns us not to confuse collective and distributive use. >Distribution. Solution: it is not the case that "there are two horses ..." But "it is true of everyone that he owes it"! Buridan: according to his own principle, we cannot conclude from "there are two .." to "The dealer owes two ..". For that would be the wrong "ratio" (aspect), namely that the dealer would have had to say, in a sentence, that he owes the two. Similarly, we cannot conclude from "Brownie is a horse that the dealer owes" (Buridan: true) to "The dealer owes Brownie". To do so, the dealer would have had to explicitly express the sentence. >Aspects, >Propositions, >Sentences. GeachVsBuridan: that cannot be allowed! I cannot conclude from "I owe you something" to "There is something that I owe you"! Cf. >Someone. E.g. The bank has stored somewhere the money of people. From this I cannot conclude: some of it is mine! But this is anything but trivial. The problem is not limited to this example. E.g. From "b F't one or another A" I cannot conclude: "There is one or another identifiable thing that b F't". That is why we must rebuild Buridan's whole theory. I 137 E.g. Geach is looking for a detective story: according to Buridan it turns out: For an x, Geach searches for x under the aspect ("ratio") "detective story". Problem: even if I was looking exactly for a detective story, there was an identifiable x not necessarily a detective story I was looking for. (?). We rather need a dyadic relation between Geach and an aspect (ratio)! Geach sought something under the ratio "detective story". The bound words are an indivisible relative term. Clearer: Geach sought something under the ratio which is evoked (appellata) by the term "detective story" Then "search ... of" is a singular relative term. We can abbreviate it: "S'te" Then we have a quote rather than a "ratio". Then we do not need to quantify via "ratio". We can say: "There is a detective story that Geach seeks" as "For an x, x is a detective story, and for a w, w is a description which is true of x, and Geach S'te w ("sought something under the ratio evoked by the particular identifier w"). Here we quantify via forms of words whose identity criteria, if not quite clear, are clearer than those of rationes. >Identity criteria, >Description, >Identification. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Individuation | Geach | I 134 Intentionality/individuation/identification/Buridan/Geach: "I will give you one of my horses" - Problem: which one? VsBuridan: wrong conclusion to "There is a horse I owe you." Problem:> aspects, regard, "ratio", "under the description ...". - I 249 Identity/individuation/theory/Geach: identification criteria depend on what one identifies - but wrong: "the same in relation to language L". - Still: I 249 Relation/Geach: "higher" is logically the same relation, whether one means houses or sounds. But that does not mean we have only one relation to learn. >Identification, >Relations, >Identity, >Levels/Order, >Description levels. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Intentionality | Buridan | Geach I 129 Intentionality/Buridan/Geach: (14th century). It is meant to be about intentional verbs between two proper names. E.g. "search for", "fire at",... --- I 130 ..."hope, ___ will be a better man than his father", "believes ___ is a scoundrel". Definition salva congruitate: Replacing where the sentence structure is preserved. In the sentence structure here it is about whether "any A", "every A", "the only A", is preserved or whether "A" still represents a simple or complex term. Possibility/possible/modality/modal logic/Buridan/Geach: there are obscure passages in Buridan, in which is quantified via possibilities: e.g. possible horses. A general term is "stretched" so that it stands simultaneously for real and possible objects. E.g. "Someone is necessarily condemned": a real or possible man is condemned. Intentionality/Buridan/Geach: E.g. "owe": "I owe you a horse". Problem: is there a specific horse I owe you? Here, no "possible horses" are mobilized. Intentional objects/Geach: do not have to be introduced here as a "sense" of expressions, as if their possessions could satisfy somebody instead of the real horse. However, the meaning (Buridan: "ratio") is somehow important in intentional verbs. Buridan: the expression, "appeal to" (appellat) --- I 131 Its own "ratio". (Evokes them). That is, the truth value could change if the "ratio", the "meaning" of the intentional expression changes. ((s) While the expression literally remains the same). Even if the expression still refers to the same thing in the world. E.g. Buridan: If something is white and sweet, I can say truthfully, "I have seen something white" but not "I have seen something sweet". Geach: I can say, "there is something sweet, which I have perceived with the sense of sight." (Or, "there is something sweet that I have seen"). I differentiate something with "ratio" that... Difference: "b f't an A" ("B sees an A") or "There is an A, the b f't". (In Latin, this does not correspond to anything). Reference/Intentionality/Austin/Geach: Difference: E.g.: "I saw a man born in Jerusalem" "I saw a man who passed through Oxford". --- I 132 Intentionality/Buridan: from "there is an A that "b F't A", one cannot conclude: ""b F't A", since one cannot be sure that it is under this aspect (ratio) that b perceives A (thinks of it, etc.) However, from "b F't A" to There is something that b F't". GeachVs: Buridan accepts even more, but even this is doubtful. Intentionality/Geach: must be assumed as a three-digit relation: between a person, a verb, and an object. For a z, b F't z under the ratio: A For a z, and for a w: z is an A and b F't z under the ratio w. For the example of Austin: For a z, z is a man and I saw z in Oxford under the aspect: "ran past". For a z, z is a man and z is born in Jerusalem, and for a w, I saw z under the aspect w. GeachVsBuridan: Problem: with him one has to quantify via rationes (aspects)! I'm not at all impressed when there is talk about mysterious entities, but what are they? It is all right to quantify via anything if one can provide identification criteria (an individuation principle). But for rationes, we do not get any evidence of such criteria in Buridan. --- I 133 This gap makes Buridan's approach at best schematic. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Intentionality | Geach | I 132 Intentionality/Geach: three-digit relation: person-verb-object. E.g. For a z, z is a man and I saw z in Oxford under the aspect: "ran past". GeachVsBuridan: "ratio", "appeals to", "regard": here there are no identity conditions. >Identity conditions. There is no need for the subject to be perceived under this aspect. >Aspects. E.g. Buridan: Socrates knows that some stars are above the horizon." Geach: Suppose, Socrates is in the jungle, from which does he know? Buridan: "of those who are it". GeachVs: only of "some", not e.g. from the constellation Aries (false aspect). Incorrect complex expression: "Socrates, knows that Aries is over ..." GeachVsBuridan: Buridan exploits here the peculiarity of "know" (from knowledge follows truth). >Knowledge, >Truth, >Knowledge paradoxes. I 137 Intentional Identity/Intentionality/Geach: E.g. 1. "There is a poet whom Smith and Brown admire" - or 2. "Smith and Brown admire both the same poet" The latter would also be true if it was a high-stacker. "Under the description"/Aspect: Problem: E.g. Smith dreamed of the world's fattest woman, who is actually red-haired, but in the dream she was bald. The medieval problems are still not solved today. de dicto, >de re, >Proposition, >Intensional objects, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mental objects, >Medieval philosophy. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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