Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Externalism Davidson Externalism/Putnam/Kripke: correct causal chains between word and object. > Causal theory.
Externalism/DavidsonVsKripke, DavidsonVsPutnam: complete sentences, interpretation.
I (a) 8
Def Externalism/Davidson: Events and objects by which a belief is evoked determine at the same time their content - DavidsonVs: (s) nothing outside the mind determines a belief - externalism: shows the correctness (not infallibility) of the majority of judgments - (Davidson Pro).
I (d) 72
Externalism/Davidson: pro variant: from twin earth, not from linguistic division of labor. Therefore no threat of the 1st person authority - Radical interpretation: interpreter has to find out the factors, by means of indirect evidence, that first determine the content of the thought of the others - there is no room for error for one's own content because the same factors determine both thoughts.
I (d) 74
Externalism/Burge: two forms: a): social, meaning from linguistic practice (community) - b) importance of causal history (learning history) dependent on the individual - Burge: causal relationship to the object in order to comprehend content - DavidsonVsBurge: does not protect against error.
Glüer II 185
Externalism/Putnam/Kripke: correct causal chains between word and object. > Causal Theory - Externalism/DavidsonVsKripke/DavidsonVsPutnam: whole sentences, interpretation - reference of single words/Davidson: theoretical construct - ((s) derived from whole sentences).
Frank I 626ff
Externalism/Davidson: it does not matter if mental states are individuated by something outside, just like sunburn ceases to be on the skin because it has an external cause.
Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984),
101-111
- - -
Frank I 663
Externalism/Authority: if thoughts are externally determined, then the subject does not necessarily need to know what it thinks of - if the externalism is correct, then VsFrege: thoughts cannot be completely comprehended - VsDescartes: inner states not certain - Burge: false use of terms: there is the possibility to not know one's own thoughts - DavidsonVsBurge: beliefs depend on other beliefs, therefore less strong possibility of error - DavidsonVsBurge: intent of successful communication has no necessary connection to the correct identification of meaning.
I 663-667
Externalism: Putnam: Distinguishing inner and "ordinary" external beliefs - Fodor: "methodological solipsism": is only observing internal states - Burge: external factors find their way into the determination of the contents via "thought experiments" - e.g. wrongly used terms: wrong beliefs about oneself possible e.g. arthritis) - DavidsonVsBurge: initially pro: the content is not determined by what is going on in the person, but: content is determined so strong holistically that individual confusion of ideas cannot be so decisive, and therefore no rigid rules for the attribution of thoughts, we are not compelled to ascribe to the words of another person the same meaning as that person him- or herself.
I 676
Mind/Tradition/DavidsonVsDescartes: if stage with alleged representatives of the objects, how can the mind pave its way out? - but the "objects" do not interest it, but their cousins, the propositions - but the mind has not the solution "in mind": externalism: all that helps to determine the object must likewise be grasped by the mind when it should know in which state it is.
Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Meaning (Intending) Davidson I (e) 101f
E.g. If I do not know the difference between a short-beaked echidna and a porcupine, it might be that I describe all the short-beaked echidnas which cross my path as porcupines. But since I have learned the word "porcupine" in a certain environment, my word "porcupine" does not refer to short-beaked echidnas, but to porcupins. It is the porcupine to which I am referring, and it is the porcupine, which I believe to have in front of me, when I sincerely assert, "This is a porcupine." My ignorance of the circumstances which determine what I mean is not the least to show that I do not know what I mean and think.
There is, indeed, no physical difference between my actual condition and the one I would be in if I had meant "short-beaked echdina or porcupine," but this does not mean that there is no psychological difference.
E.g. there may be no physical difference between mountain-sunburn and sunburn, but there is a difference, because the causation is different.

Glüer II 164f
Someone does not mean that p, if he did not intend to be interpreted as if he would mean p. Well, this is not a Humpty-Dumpty theory. It would only be one, if it was thought sufficient, to intend to be interpreted as if one would mean p to mean p. This is, however, a necessary condition and not a sufficient condition and therefore it is not a Humpty-Dumpty theory. Humpty-Dumpty says, "You cannot know it!".
II 164 f
Davidson: If he knows that she cannot know, then he cannot intend it, because one cannot intend what one does not consider possible.
McGinn I 111
Burge and Dummett mean what speakers mean with their words - it very strongly depends on how the community uses these words. DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsBurge: that is nonsense, because it has nothing to do with successful communication. If you talk differently than the community or someone else finds out, then you can communicate all day long. And this is happening all the time.
McGinn: Domestication theory: There is also another approach that refuses to answer the constitutional question regarding the meaning (to mean), and instead conceive the meant meaning as an essentially combination-conditioned phenomenon. (Davidson). In order to tame the intended meaning, we would have to show how semantic basic units connect according to determinable rules.

Glüer II 169f
Meaning/to mean/intention/intent/Grice/DavidsonVsGrice: pro: Feedback is very important - Vs: nevertheless, intention is probably a necessary but not sufficient condition for meaning. - Intention is at least as difficult to explain as meaning.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Mental States Davidson I (b) 30
Twin Earth/Davidson: Subjective states do not arise as a consequence of the state of the brain or the nervous system.
I (b) 35
False theory: the objects would be the meanings of sentences (Vs), that is, the propositions. DavidsonVs: with this, it would be so arranged that, e.g. if a Frenchman attributed the same state of consciousness to Paul as I do, the same subject would be named by us both, whereas this would not be the case in the theory under consideration, for the sentence in question of the Frenchman would not be the same as mine (falsely).
It should not concern us that the Frenchman and I use different words, it is similar to ounces and carats. (> Measuring).
My monism is ontological: it asserts that mental events and objects can also be described as physical.

I (e) 99
Mind/Davidson: if we consider the subjective or mental exclusively as a consequence of the physical characteristics of a person, meanings cannot be something purely subjective or mental. (Putnam: Meanings are not in the head).
Frank I 626
Mind/Davidson: does not work without language, both equal.
Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984),
101-111
- - -
Frank I 657ff
Mental states/external attribution/Davidson: "narrow" state/twin earth: "inner", is solipsistic, as in Descartes. The narrow states are the same for the twin earth. - BurgeVsPutnam: they do not exist. - SearleVsPutnam: narrow states are unnecessary, ordinary propositional attitudes suffice - DavidsonVsSearle/VsBurge: ordinary mental states are narrow (internal) and at the same time "non-individualistic", i.e. externally identifiable.

Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Paradoxes Burge Grover II 201
Paradoxies/Antinomies/Enhanced Liar/Burge/Grover: (Burge 1979, p. 178):
II 202
In all variants we started with a) an incident with a liar-like sentence.
b) then we argued that the sentence is pathological and concluded that it is not true in the wording of the pathological proposition. ((s) Here we are talking about "not true" and not "wrong").
Then we realized that this seems to come down to the following:
c) that the sentence is true at the end!
Burge: Thesis: there seems to be no change involved in the grammar or the linguistic meaning of the expressions.
Grover: that suggests that the changes in evaluation occur in pragmatic terms.
Burge: since the truth value changes without the meaning changing, an indexical element must be at work.
Paradoxies/Parsons/Grover: similar: Thesis: the use of "true" and other semantic expressions related to paradoxes brings about a change of the range (the discourse range).
KripkeVsBurge/Grover: (Kripke 1975): the changeover to b) takes place at a later point in the development of the natural language.
GroverVsBurge: there is actually a transition to be made, but if the prosentential approach (oro-sentence theory) is correct, the inference of Burge is not valid:
Burge/Grover: the transition to b) has the form:

"S" is pathological, hence "S" is not true.

This should be justified by the following:

If "S" is pathological, the sentence is not an assertion.

and

If "S" is not an assertion, then "S" is neither true nor false.

because then:

(14) If "S" is pathological, "S" is not true, and "S" is not false.

Problem/Grover: if "true" were property-attributive (truth was conceived as a property), namely the same property for "true" and "not true" ((s) the property is then attributed or denied) and a property for "false" and "not false", then we must be able to make the transition to "S" is not true".
((s) with "true" or "false" it would only be about attributing or denying a single property!) Grover: does not want any property, of course.
Grover: regardless of whether "true" is property-attributive, if (14) is a necessary condition for an expression to be pathological, then it looks as if Burge was right. For then we could infer that "S" is not true. But:
GroverVsBurge: Perhaps "true" and "false" are not property-attributive, and perhaps (14) is not a necessary condition for being pathological:
II 203
Then we can argue instead
If "S" is pathological, then "S" is not true,

We just have something like

Provided "S" is not pathological, either S or not S.

Expressibility/Important Point/Grover: then we do not need the expressibility ((s) completeness) that we seemed to need.
Paradoxies/Liar/GroverVsBurge: Thesis: we can conclude that liar-sentences are pathological, but that does not force us to assume that they are not true.
GroverVsBurge: I did say that his conclusion was not valid, but I think that actually there is no conclusion here, neither valid nor invalid: because if "true" is prosential, then ""S"is not true" does not express any proposition! ((s) Has no antecedent from "S" and that stands for any sentence and therefore for no content "all that he said").

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010

Burge II
Tyler Burge
"Two Kinds of Consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996


Grover I
D. L. Grover
Joseph L. Camp
Nuel D. Belnap,
"A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Principle of Charity Davidson Glüer II 42
Def Principle of Charity: Consider the fact that the speakers of a language consider a sentence (under observed conditions) to be true as prima facie evidence that the sentence is true under those conditions.
Glüer II 63f
Principle of charity/Wilson/Quine: the identification of the logical constants: it must be translated so that the logical laws are not violated.
Glüer II 72f
Principle of charity/e.g. Champagne: (the person with the champagne is angry - but the person intended drinks only water) if a true statement is assumed, the principle is questionable.
I 74
DavidsonVsBurge: 1. It is wrong that our intuitive notions would suggest that the linguistic utterances and thoughts of an actor would be in the sense of what others mean by the same words.
I 75
Problem: which group should determine the standards? Another reason: we best understand the speaker as he or she intends to be interpreted (charity). 2 According to Burge, what the speaker means should be tied to the possibly unconscious use of an elite: Contradiction with the authority of the first person.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Thinking Burge Frank I 691f
Denken/Externalismus/Burge: welche Gedanken man haben kann, hängt davon ab, in welchen Beziehungen man zu seiner Umgebung steht - eine Person braucht ihre Umgebung nicht zu erforschen, um zu wissen, welches ihre Gedanken sind - (eben deshalb nicht). Internalismus/DescartesVsBurge: die Möglichkeit der Täuschung soll beweisen, dass wir die Welt bezweifeln können, während wir unsere Gedanken autoritativ kennen - also angeblich Unabhängigkeit von der Welt.
Lösung: ArnauldVsDescartes: Selbst-Wissen nicht hinreichend um zu wissen, dass mentale Ereignisse von Objekten unabhängig sind. - Das cogito liefert kein Wissen über die (indexikalischen, externen) Individuationsbedingungen.


Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of
Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010

Burge II
Tyler Burge
"Two Kinds of Consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Triangulation Davidson I 12
Learning/Language Acquisition/Davidson: we now have three classes of events or items instead of two: The child finds tables similar in a relevant way. We also find tables similar, and we find each of the child's reactions to tables similar. Form of triangulation: a line from child to table, one of us to the table, one of us to the table. The attraction is where the line from child to table intersects with the line from us to the table.
So far nothing in this picture proves that anyone has the concept of lenses.
Triangulation has not proved the concept, but it has proven the need for there to be an answer at all, which is conceptually captured by the concepts of this living being.
I 50
Both the child and the educator must see red, and he must also see that the other also sees it. (Basis for triangulation).
I 81
Triangulation/Language learning/Davidson: By triangulation I do not mean that one or the other being is endowed with the concept of objectivity. Only communication can provide this term. This requires an awareness that we share our thoughts and our world with others. This is the reason why we cannot look at the question of the content of mental states from the standpoint of a single being.
I 116
Externalism/Language learning/DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsBurge: that with triangulation he puts the everyday situation so strongly in the foreground distinguishes him from the externalism of Putnam and Burges.
II 131
Triangulation/Davidson/Glüer: two of the sides of the triangle, consisting of causal hypotheses, are epistemologically irrelevant, i.e. even if we have to presuppose a world, nobody can invoke its causal genesis to justify his conviction.
II 171
Triangulation/Self/Davidson: the triangulation scenario makes it clear that one can have neither the idea of one's own self nor of anything else until one has the idea of other subjects and a common world. So the perspective is fundamental.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Burge, T. Davidson Vs Burge, T. I (d) 74
Burge: Two types externalism: a) Social: Meaning depends on social practices (community - b) on the causal history of the person. DavidsonVsBurge: a) our intuition does not suggest that the meaning of a speaker is determined by other speakers. b) Which group should be outstanding? c) an unconscious elite in the background is problematic. Cf. >externalism, >internalism.
Burge: in order to have a thought about water, you just have to be in contact with water, you don’t have to prove anything.
DavidsonVsBurge: even a false thought about water is one about water. - VsBurge: Community not causally involved
Burge: radiation patterns or physically described stimuli make everything infinitely complicated. DavidsonVs: Complicated for whom? It is us humans who make all these classifications and groupings! We group according to similarities that are obvious to ourselves.
I (e) 116
DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsBurge: The fact that he focuses so strongly on the everyday situation through the triangulation sets him apart from the externalism of Putnam and Burge.
Glüer II 53
DavidsonVsSocial character of meaning: even idiolect interpretable in principle (via causal hypotheses).
Glüer II 167
Burge and Dummett think that what speakers mean by their words depended very much on how the community used those words. DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsBurge: Complete nonsense, because it has nothing to do with successful communication! If you speak differently than the community, and someone finds out, then you can communicate all day long. And that happens all the time.

Frank I 665
Contents/Thoughts/Externalism/Burge/Davidson: Content is not determined by what is happening in the person, or by what is easily accessible for them through careful reflection. (E.g. incorrectly used terms, information gaps). DavidsonVsBurge: I’m not sure how these assertions are to be understood, because I’m not sure how serious talk of a "direct acquaintance" with a content is to be taken.
But the first person authority is seriously compromised by that.
Therefore, I must reject one of the premises of Burge.
1) I agree that content is not only determined or "fixed" by what is going on inside me.
2) VsBurge: Vs representation of the way in which social and other external factors control the contents.
Fra I 665/666
DavidsonVsBurge: His characteristics are not as relevant as he makes them look: E.g. Suppose I believe that "arthritis" is only used for calcium-induced arthritis. My friend Arthur knows better. We both say honestly to Smith: "Carl has arthritis’.
Burge: Then our words mean the same thing, we mean the same and express the same belief. My mistake is irrelevant for what I thought on this occasion.
Reason: that’s what everyone (who is not tainted by philosophy) would say about Arthur and me.
DavidsonVsBurge: I doubt that he is right, but even if he were right, it would not prove his point:
Ordinary attributions of meanings and attitudes are based on far-reaching and vague assumptions about what speaker and listener have in common.
If some assumptions are not confirmed, we can change the words we used often change drastically.
We usually choose the easy way: we take a speaker by his word, even if that does not fully account for one aspect of his thought.
E.g. if Smith informs a third party about what Arthur and I both believe about arthritis, then he may mislead its listeners!
Fra I 667
If he is careful, he would add, "But Davidson thinks arthritis is calcium-induced". The fact that this addition is necessary shows that the simple attribution was not right.
BurgeVs: could reply that the report is literally correct ((s) because also the wrong-believer sincerely believes that it is arthritis).
DavidsonVsBurge: That overlooks the extent to which the contents of a belief depend on of the contents of other beliefs. Therefore, there can be no simple rigid rule for the attribution of a single thought.
Burge: social determination of contents also leads to the fact that we usually mean what others mean in the community. "certain responsibility towards the group practice".
DavidsonVsBurge: I do not deny it, but that does not show what is supposed to show:
a) It is often reasonable to make people responsible for ensuring that they know the meaning of their words. But this has nothing to do with what they want to say!
b) As a good citizens, we want to increase the opportunities for communication, but that only explains our "legalistic" attribution of meanings and beliefs.
((s) that the meanings are not so).
c) A speaker who wants to be understood, must have the intention that his words are interpreted in a certain way, and consequently the way others do. And vice versa, the listener wants to interpret the words as the speaker does. This has moral weight, but it has no necessary connection with the determination of what anyone thinks.
I 667/668
Externalism/Social community/Meaning/Meaning/DavidsonVsBurge: We are not forced to give the words of a person the meanings that they have in their language community. It is also not true that we cannot help but to interpret their propositional attitudes on the same basis.
Donald Davidson (1987) : Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441 -4 58

Frank I 710
Self-knowledge/Burge: Error excluded (immune), because reflection in the same act. DavidsonVsBurge: that only shows that you cannot make a mistake in identifying the contents.
It does not show why you cannot be wrong about the existence of the attitude.
Worse: Burge cannot show that the two kinds of knowledge (1st and 2nd order) have the same subject.
As long as the asymmetry is not explained by recourse to the social situation (relationships between the speakers), I doubt that a non-skeptical solution is possible.
I 711
Representation/Perceptual knowledge/Burge: It cannot generally be wrong that the representations represent that from which they usually originate and to which they are applied. DavidsonVsBurge: I have long been of this view, but I do not understand why Burge is of this view.
How do we decide where representations usually originate? Circular: "from what they represent."
But which of the many possible causes is the right one? Incidents in the nervous system, stimulation patterns of nerve endings, or a little further out? (proximal/distal).
Burge: We should be watch out for the relation of different observers: they have similar perceptions. Perception is "impersonal".
DavidsonVsBurge: But that is exactly what should be proved!
We need not only causal interaction between different observers and the same objects, but the right kind of causal interaction.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Burge, T. Descartes Vs Burge, T. Frank I, 691f
Thinking/Externalism/Burge: what thoughts we can have depends on the relationships in which we are with our surroundings; a person does not need to explore their surroundings, to know what their thoughts are (not for that reason) Internalism/DescartesVsBurge: the possibility of deception is to prove that we can doubt the world while we know our thoughts authoritatively, i.e. supposedly independence from the world. Solution: ArnauldVsDescartes: even knowledge is not sufficient to know that mental events are independent of objects. Cogito does not provide knowledge about the (indexical, external) conditions of individuation.
Burge, T. Verschiedene Vs Burge, T. Sainsbury V 189/190
Indexicality / SainsburyVsBurge: it is difficult to justify the claim that "true" is indexical, regardless of the apparent need to meet the paradoxes with indexicality, while we have independent reasons to believe in indexicality in conjunction with self-reference.





Sai I
R.M. Sainsbury
Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995
German Edition:
Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993
Burge, T. Loar Vs Burge, T. Stalnaker II 202
That-Sentence/Psychological Content/Loar: Thesis: psychological content is not always identical to what is captured by a that-sentence. There is only one loose match. Ascription/attribution/content/Principle/attribution principles/ascription principles/Loar/Stalnaker: there are two principles that Loar wants to prove false:
1. equality (Sameness) de dicto or indirect ascriptions implies equality of psychological content.
2. differences de dicto and indirect ascriptions imply differences in psychological content.
LoarVsBurge: he accepts these two principles when he says that in normal declarations of conduct we actually attribute broad content.
LoarVsBurge: if we negate the two principles, we can avoid assuming that it is further content that we attribute.
StalnakerVsLoar: I do not understand his two principles because I do not see how to distinguish the content of normal belief ascriptions from the references of that-sentences.
One could at best say
a) the expressions (that-sentences) are either the same or different,
b) the referencces (the that-sentences) are the same or different.
Ad a): then the principles have no sense at all. The 1st principle (that the equality of belief ascriptions requires equality of content) would be wrong if the that-sentences are context-dependent. Loar forbids index words here, but also general terms can be context dependent, then the principle is wrong even for broad content!
II 205
Privileged Access/Loar/Stalnaker: Loar's phenomenological argument for his internalism is the privileged access we have to ourselves. We know what our thoughts are about. LoarVsBurge/LoarVsExternalism: privileged access is incompatible with anti-individualism. (Camp: Loar pro internalism, Loar pro individualism).
II 206
Loar: Thesis: it is hard to see how I could be wrong about my purely semantic judgment that my thought about Freud is about Freud - provided Freud exists timelessly.

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981

Loar II
Brian Loar
"Two Theories of Meaning"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Burge, T. Stalnaker Vs Burge, T. II 171
Positive assertion/VsExternalism/VsBurge/VsAnti-Individualism/Stalnaker: how can you define an individualistic analogous to a relational term?
II 187
Negative approach/Revisionism/VsExternalism/VsAnti-Individualism/VsBurge/Individualism/Stalnaker: the negative approach has different descriptions: (>terminology): methodological solipsism: Putnam 1975, Fodor 1981a
Individualism: Burge, also Fodor 1987
Principle of autonomy: Stich 1983.
Thesis: all states and properties that are attributed and described in psychology should be intrinsic states.
Behavior explanation: should only deal with properties that are relevant to the causal powers of the subjects.
Indistinguishability/theory: things that are indistinguishable in terms of causal powers should not be included in the explanation.
II 188
Def Individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/Fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically.
Important argument: thus it is then not excluded that mental states are individuated because of relational properties.
Relational properties/Fodor: are taxonomical when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence
StalnakerVsFodor:
a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers.
But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal forces. Therefore Fodor represents only the weaker thesis.
Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger thesis.
StalnakerVsFodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (FodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of strong with the weak thesis.
Stalnaker: to eliminate that psychological states are individuated by normal wide content, you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. Example Fodor:
Individualism/Fodor/Stalnaker: Fodor defends his version of individualism with the example of a causally irrelevant relational property: E.g.
h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with the head up,
II 189
t-particle: we call this the same particle if the coin shows the tail. Fodor: no reasonable theory will use this differentiation to explain the particle's behavior.
StalnakerVsFodor: But from this it does not follow that psychological states have to be purely internal (intrinsic).
II 193
Mental state/psychological/internal/head/StalnakerVsBurge: e.g. O’Leary believes that there is water in the basement. Is this state in his head? Of course! ((s) Against: Putnam: refers to the meaning of words such as basements and water). Stalnaker: and in the sense like a mosquito bite on his nose is on his nose.
II 194
Narrow content/Stalnaker: is accepted as what is completely internal. Psychology: various authors: say that narrow content is necessary for every psychological explanation. They agree with Burge that normal content is often not narrow.
Anti-Individualism/Burge/StalnakerVsBurge: seems to conflict with the everyday understanding that I, when I instead of talking about the world talk about how me things appear that I am then talking about myself.
Narrow content/StalnakerVsBurge: it is less clear than it seems what narrow content is at all and
II 195
I believed that there is such a great conflict between the individualist and anti-individualist. Narrow content/Stalnaker: 1. in which sense is narrow content at all narrow and in which sense is it in the mind purely internal?
2. Which role shall narrow content play at the explanation of mental phenomena? How is the ascription of narrow content referred to the one of wide content?
3. Do we need narrow content at all for the behavior explanation? Or rather the access that we have to the content of our own thoughts?

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Burge, T. Newen Vs Burge, T. NS I 129
VsBurge/VsExternalism/Newen/Schrenk: if supervenience, i.e. a close relation between thoughts and brain states, exists, there cannot be an equally close relation between the thoughts and the community. This is because brain states (in contrast to thought content) are determined regardless of the surroundings and the language community. Namely with view to the activation of brain areas. Supervenience/Newen/Schrenk: no difference in content without difference in the brain states, but not vice versa: the same thought can be implemented through different brain states. I.e. one-sided dependence of thought content on the brain states. Terminology: then they say: thought contents supervene on brain states. Burge's thesis is inconsistent with supervenience. Or rather, the following three statements cannot be simultaneously true: 1) thought contents are determined depending on community and surroundings. 2) brain states independent from... 3) Thought contents supervene on brain states. NS I 130 But if thought contents do not supervene on brain states, it becomes difficult to understand how thought contents can be causally effective. VsBurge: E.g. Twin Earth/TE: if Karl was transported to Twin Earth without even noticing anything, he would have other thought contents. Because the objective content of expressions of thoughts would be different. But that would not cause any difference to the behavioral dispositions of Karl. The content change would be causally irrelevant. Externalism/Newen/Schrenk: Two varieties: 1) for the dependence of the content of statements from the surroundings (Putnam) 2) for the dependence of the thought contents from the surroundings (Burge). VsBurge: if he were to be right, we need a second concept of thought contents, namely a subjective content. (Narrow/Wide) narrow content: only considered in the way it is perceived by the subject. Only it is relevant for behavior explanations. Wide content: as the content is usually interpreted in the language community. It is decisive for what I have fixed myself on by utterances. Externalism: Frege: can there be a wide (objective) content of a thought so that you can understand the causal relevance of this entire content or is the causal relevance only to be understood for narrow (subjective) contents?

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Description Theory Craig Vs Description Theory II 156
Synonymie/Burge: er akzeptiert, daß „vixen“ und „weiblicher Fuchs“ synonym sind und argumentiert, daß daher ein ersetzen durch synonyme Wahrheit in Glaubenskontexten nicht erhalten muß. Kripke: (1979. 274, n12) gibt ein ähnliches Beispiel mit Nervenärzten und Psychiatern.
Pointe: VsBeschreibungstheorie: hier scheint es nicht gut zu sein, „vixen“ als „wird vixen genannt“ zu analysieren.
Kompositionalität/Glauben/Burge: Kompositionalität schlägt in Glaubenskontexten fehl.
CresswellVsBurge: wenn wir die Kompositionalität erhalten wollen, müssen wir annehmen, daß „vixen“ lexikalisch mehrdeutig ist.
Oder es muß (evtl. Nicht-Standard-) Kontexte geben, in denen es tatsächlich bedeutet „wird „vixen“ genannt“.
Pointe: wenn das hier erlaubt ist, dann vielleicht doch auch für Fälle mit „Phosphorus“!
II 166
PutnamVsBeschreibungstheorie/natürliche Art-Begriffe/Cresswell: (Putnam 1975, 148) (ebenso wie KripkeVsBeschreibungstheorie der Namen). Problem/Cresswell: Bsp Der Satz „Es gibt Wasser auf der Zwillingserde." (ZE). Angenommen, auf der ZE gibt es kein H2O, dann sollte der Satz, geäußert auf der Erde, falsch sein. Aber da etwas – nämlich XYZ – auf der ZE die Rolle von Wasser spielt, dann scheint die Beschreibungstheorie den Satz wahr zu machen.
Lösung/Fodor: (Fodor 1982, 111-113): Ein Wort wie „Wasser“ ist in gewisser Weise kontextuell beschränkt. D.h. indem wir es auf der Erde äußern, meinen wir mit dem Wort „Wasser“ so etwas wie „das, was auf der Erde die Rolle von Wasser spielt“.
Fodor/Cresswell: seine Idee ist, daß diese Beschränkungen, nicht Teil des Glaubens sind! Dann kann Oscars Zwilling auf der ZE dasselbe Glauben, wenn er das Wort „Wasser“ in einem Satz gebraucht.
Pointe: damit bleibt der methodologische Solipsismus gewahrt, daß eine prop Einst ohne externe Faktoren klassifiziert werden sollte.
II 174
Situation/sprachunabhängig/Barwise/Perry/Cresswell: (Barwise/Perry, 1981b, 679): Bsp man kann nicht jemand küssen, ohne ihn zu berühren. sprachunabhängig: nun kann man für „küssen“ jedes andere Wort einsetzen und ebenso für „berühren“. D.h. das hat nichts mit Bedeutungspostulaten oder anderen semantischen Tatsachen zu tun.
CresswellVsSituations-Semantik/CresswellvsBarwise: Barwise/Perry setzen das aber einfach nur fest, sie können es nicht erklären.
MöWe-Semantik/Cresswell: diese kann es erklären: die Eigenschaft des Küssens wird eine Funktion von Paaren von Individuen auf Mengen von MöWe sein. Dasselbe wird wahr sein von der Eigenschaft des Berührens. Aber für jedes Paar von Individuen (a, b) wird die Menge der MöWe in denen a b küßt eine Teilmenge der Menge der MöWe sein, in denen a b berührt. Dazu brauchen wir also keine Bedeutungspostulate.
Dummett, M. Davidson Vs Dummett, M. Brandom II 15
Concept/DavidsonVsDummett: relational view. Use of the concept is not understandable in a context that does not include the language, but language can only be made intelligible by recourse to beliefs.
Brandom II 16
Brandom pro Davidson: Asserting and believing are two sides of a coin, one cannot be made understandable without the other.
Davidson I (c) 58
Putnam and Dummett show that the concept of truth itself can be given a knowledge-related twist. Yet all three have given evidence precedence over the truth (as the primary status of the meaning determination)
Davidson I (c) 59
DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsPutnam: I think this is a mistake: This leads to the difficulties of the proximal theories: to a concept of truth relativized to individuals and to skepticism. The proximal theories are always somehow Cartesian. DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsDummett: VsProximal theory: skepticism, relativism on individuals
Evidence: The only insightful concept of evidence is that of a relationship between sentences. Or between beliefs. >Proximal theory.

Glüer II 167
Burge and Dummett mean what speakers mean with their words, it depends very much on how the community uses those words. >Externalism. DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsBurge: Pretty much nonsense, because it has nothing to do with successful communication! If you speak differently than the community, and someone finds out, then you can communicate all day long. And that happens all the time.

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Loar, B. Stalnaker Vs Loar, B. II 195
Narrow Content/Loar/Stalnaker: (Loar 1987, 1988): Loar has an ingenious thesis and good examples that allow us to better understand the internalism. StalnakerVsLoar: his defense of internalism is, however, not entirely convincing.
Stalnaker: I believe that something like Loar's narrow content will play a role in intentional explanation but that it will not be narrow content!

II 203
Content/that-clause/Loar/Stalnaker: "loose connection": here there shall be a certain way how the world appears to the thinker and this be a purely internal characteristic of the thinker. Language/content/problem/Loar: our language is permeated by social and causal presuppositions so it can only inaccurately detect our internal content.
Stalnaker: pro, but I do not think that the belief states are themselves infected one whit less causally and socially!
II 204
"loose connection"/Loar: (e.g. Paul, arthrite) Problem: what things about the world of which Paul believes that he is in make Paul's convictions true? The ascription of "I have arthrite in the ankle" expresses something else than the ascription of "J’ai l’arthrite dans ma cheville".
StalnakerVsLoar: I also think that this is a mystery, but about ascription. I do not think that supports an internalism.
Truthmaker/conviction/possible World/poss.w./Stalnaker: are the facts about the world as it appears to Paul internal or facts on the language use in Paul's environment?
Ascription/to make true/Stalnaker: to answer the question, we need a theory on what makes belief ascriptions (ascriptions of content) true or false.
Solution/Stalnaker: we need a causal information-theoretical approach that uses counterfactual conditionals. And I do not see how this could go internalistic.
Counterfactual conditional/co.co./Stalnaker: (externalistic) one might assume that Paul would be in another state when the world would be different. Or Paul is in his internal state iff the world is actual in this certain way. ((s) But that excludes illusions).
externalistic: that would be non-internalistic because it is based on general causal regularities.
Problem/Stalnaker: the same problems arise that already appeared in Loar's belief ascription.

Content/Loar/Stalnaker: after Loar there are two dimensions, which are connected to a mental state:
a) a purely internal content – the way how the world appears to the thinker – with it behavior is actually explained.
II 205
b) a social content (to what the ascriptions refer). Stalnaker: it is not clear to me what role b) shall play.

Content/StalnakerVsLoar: thesis: if we describe it properly psychological and social content fall together.
Loar's examples do not show that psychological content is narrow.
Loar: thesis: there are phenomenological reasons why the way the world appears to the thinker must be an internal property of the thinker.

II 205
privileged access/Loar/Stalnaker: Loar's phenomenological argument for his internalism is the privileged access we have to ourselves. We know what our thoughts are about. LoarVsBurge/LoarVsExternalism: privileged access is incompatible with the anti-individualism. (Team: Loar per internalism, Loar per individualism).
II 206
Loar: thesis: it is hard to see how I could be wrong about my purely semantic judgment that my thought about Freud is about Freud - assuming Freud exists timelessly. StalnakerVsLoar: this is true but why is this in conflict with the externalism?
LoarVsExternalism/Stalnaker: Loar's arguments are based on observations of the externalist analysis of the reference relation.
logical form: (of the argument);: I do not judge that I stand in relation R to x ("R") be an externalist conception of this relation of aboutness or reference).
aboutness/"about"/Loar/Stalnaker: therefore "R" cannot be a correct analysis of the aboutness relation to which I have privileged access.
aboutness/"about"/Loar: it is implausible that I, to know that my thoughts are about Freud, need an opinion on a causal-historical relation to him. Such a relation has no one properly characterized yet.
StalnakerVsLoar: two things are wrong about this:
1. a philosophical analysis of a concept may be correct, even if a competent user of the concept does not know the analysis.
2. the externalism does not specify that the aboutness-relation is analyzable.
Burge: proposes no analysis
Kripke: (in his defense of the causal theory) does not assert that this is reductionist.
Loar/StalnakerVsLoar: he is right that my "pre-critical" perspective, "that my thought that my thought about Freud is a thought about Freud" does apparently not need an externalist concept. ((s) "drastic content". see below).

II 209
Context dependency/ascription/Loar/Stalnaker: Loar shows us, however, correctly that belief-ascriptions are context-dependent. And he is also right to accept realization conditions for it. Realization conditions/StalnakerVsLoar: but these give us no opportunity to come to purely internal properties of the believer
Def content/Stalnaker: (whether psychological or social) is a way to put us in touch with others and to our environment.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Putnam, H. Davidson Vs Putnam, H. I (b) 29
Twin Earth/: The question is whether it follows that the person concerned does not know what they think? DavidsonVsPutnam: Answer: this does not follow: it would only follow if the object that is used to identify my thoughts were something which I would have to be able to distinguish in order to know what I think. However, we had abandoned this assumption. What I see in front of me I believe to be water, I do not run the risk of thinking it was twin earth water, because I do not know what twin earth water is.
I (b) 30
Even more: I also believe that I think I see water, and I am right with that, although it is probably not to water but twin earth water.
I (c) 59
Putnam and Dummett show that the concept of truth itself can be given a knowledge-based twist. Yet all three have given the evidence precedence over the truth (as the primary status for the determination of meaning). DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsPutnam: I think this is a mistake: This leads to the difficulties of the proximal theories: to a concept of truth relativized to individuals and to skepticism. The proximal theories are always kind of Cartesian.
I (d) 73
DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsDummett: Vsproximal theory: skepticism, relativism to individual evidence: The only insightful concept of evidence is that of a relation between sentences. Or between beliefs! Davidson: My externalism is excited not by "linguistic division of labor" but by the "Twin Earth". Therefore, I do not believe that Putnam’s externalism threatens the authority of the first person. But I do not quite agree for other reasons.
DavidsonVsPutnam: his externalism applies primarily to words for natural species such as "water" and "leopard". The idea is that I identify these objects henceforth through the microstructure. ((s) why?)
DavidsonVsPutnam: but I do not see why the equality of the microstructure necessarily should be the decisive similarity, through which the reference of a word such as water should be determined.

I (e) 116
There is no reason to limit externalism to a single, or small number of categories. For language and thought it is generally characteristic that their link with the world emerge from the kind of causal connections I discussed. Putnam: microstructure provides similarity for determining the reference (DavidsonVs)
Davidson: causal connections generally relevant for language and reference
DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsBurge: The fact that he emphasizes the everyday situation so strongly with the triangulation sets him apart from Putnam’s and Burge’s externalism.

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Externalism Versus Davidson I 116
DavidsonVsPutnam, DavidsonVsBurge: Dass er mit der Triangulation die Alltagssituation so stark in den Vordergrund rückt, unterscheidet ihn von dem Externalismus Putnam's und Burge's.
Davidson II 185
Externalismus/DavidsonVsKripke,DavidsonVsPutnam: ganze Sätze, Interpretation.
Davidson I 72f
Externalismus: pro: Putnam, Burge, Davidson (modifiziert: Triangulation setzt Alltagssituation stärker in den Mittelpunkt). Vs: Searle - Quine: nicht eindeutig Vertreter des Externalismus.
II 185
Externalismus/Putnam/Kripke: richtige Kausalketten zwischen Wort und Gegenstand. >Kausaltheorie. Externalismus/DavidsonVsKripke, DavidsonVsPutnam: ganze Sätze, Interpretation.
Frank I 661ff
Aber Davidson pro Volkspychologie, VsStich.

Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Paradox Burge, T. Grover II 201
Paradoxes/Antinomies/Amplified Liar/Burge/Grover: (Burge 1979, p. 178):
II 202
In all variants we started with a) an incident with a liar-like sentence.
b) then we argued that the proposition is pathological and concluded that it is not true in the wording of the pathological proposition. ((s) Here we are talking about "not true" and "not false").
Then we realized that this seems to be fixed at the following:
c) that in the end the sentence is true!
Burge: Thesis: there seems to be no change in the grammar or linguistic meaning of the expressions involved.
Paradoxes/Parsons/Grover: similar: Thesis: the use of "true" and other semantic expressions in connection with paradoxes brings about a change of area (discourse area).
KripkeVsBurge/Grover: (Kripke 1975): the change to b) takes place at a later stage in the development of natural language.
II 203
Paradoxes/Liar/GroverVsBurge: Thesis: we can conclude that sentences by liars are pathological, but that does not force us to assume that they are not true.

Grover I
D. L. Grover
Joseph L. Camp
Nuel D. Belnap,
"A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Mental State Davidson, D. Fra I 657
DavidsonVsBurge/DavidsonVsSearle: Thesis: gives no reason to assume that ordinary mental states do not fulfill both conditions, (I) and (II). They are "inner" in the sense that they are identical to states of the body and are therefore identifiable without reference to objects and events outside the body.
At the same time, they are "non-individualistic" because they can and usually become identified in part by their causal relationships to objects and events outside.

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994