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The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contract Theory | Buchanan | Brocker I 562 Contract Theory/Buchanan/Kersting: On the one hand, contract theories are individualistic in that they attribute the legitimacy of state rule and the recognition worthiness of normative principles to the consent of individuals; on the other hand, they are democratic, since they demand that power organisations and political-moral principles must answer equally to everyone. They are also proceduralistic: the criterion of legitimacy and justification is the possible contractual agreement of all. (1)(2) Brocker I 564 Contract Theory/Buchanan: Buchanan has developed a realistic contract theory that is consistently characterized by an economic reasoning and only accepts principles and institutions if they can only be traced back to the contractual harmony of subjective preferences. (see Kersting 2010) (3). Problem/Kersting: a contract is in a way a thought experiment, which cannot be understood by all concerned equally. Here there are arguments based on interests or situations (so-called "wisdom arguments"). Solution/Buchanan: his contract theory frees the economism of the contract content argument from the contractual moral bracketing and extends it to the entire structure of the contractualist argument. See Buchanan 1975 (4) See Anarchism/Buchanan. Brocker I 565 Contracts/Buchanan: Contract negotiations only take place when (...) it is advantageous for the natural state dweller with the best natural means of power. See Equilibrium/Buchanan. Brocker I 566 Negotiations/Buchanan: Negotiations are conducted to reduce unproductive defence costs. Both A and B recognize that they are better off if they can save on defence costs. Relationship: The "natural balance" (see Equilibrium/Buchanan) has a certain stability. The parties can only improve their position through a disarmament agreement. Brocker I 573 KerstingVsBuchanan: The starting position chosen by Buchanan is unsuitable (...) in terms of legitimation theory. On the basis of contract theories that operate with real, realistic, counterfactual idealizations and normative framework conditions, it is not possible to develop a satisfactory theory of justification or even one that does justice to the minimum conditions of justification theory. Brocker I 575 KerstingVsBuchanan: It is the violence in Buchanan that draws up the contracts. The coontract provides only the legal seal of natural power-sharing. 1. Wolfgang Kersting, Politische Philosophie des Gesellschaftsvertrags, Darmstadt 2005., S. 19-55 2. Wolfgang Kersting, Vertragstheorien. Kontraktualistische Theorien in der Politikwissenschaft, Stuttgart 2016, S. 9-34. 3. Wolfang Kersting, »Kritik des Wirtschaftsliberalismus«, in: ders. (Hg.), Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit. Die moralischen Grundlagen der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft, Frankfurt/M. u. a. 2010, 11-26. 4. James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago/London 1975. Dt.: James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit. Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan, Tübingen 1984. Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Contract Theory | Hobbes | Brocker I 575 Contract Theory/Hobbes/KerstingVsBuchanan/Kersting: Even Hobbes' theory is more acceptable than Buchanan's theory(1), because as a consequence of the descriptive-empirical - and in its truth content quite doubtful - assumption of an all-round threat symmetry (everyone must be careful of everyone) Hobbes receives a contractual situation that indirectly and directly realizes the fairness structure described by the above keywords. Hobbes' individuals are equal and act as equals in the contractual situation. This is the only reason why Hobbes' philosophy has been able to remain in the discussion for so long, because its natural state provides an empirical interpretation of a normative condition that we cannot do without if the contractual argument is to be of any theoretical justification relevance. Cf. >Contracts/Buchanan, >Contract theory/Buchanan. 1.Vgl. James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago/London 1975. Dt.: James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit. Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan, Tübingen 1984. Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Democracy | Surowiecki | I 331 Democracy/Surowiecki: we have a democracy, a) because it gives people a feeling of being involved in everything and being able to determine their own lives,... I 332 ...and that is why it contributes to political stability? Or b) Because citizens have the right to govern themselves, even if they use this right in a ridiculous way? Or c) Because democracy is an excellent instrument for making intelligent decisions and discovering the truth? What do voters think democracy is for? Can we understand this in the same way as a market? I 333 This contradicts the fact that politicians want to extend their power and be re-elected, which is not always to the benefit of the general public. Public Choice Theory/Politics/Economic Sciences/Buchanan/Surowiecki: thesis(1): the tendency is to suppress long-term problems in favour of short-term political interests. In reality, many regulations tend to serve regulated companies. >Public Choice-Theory, >J. Buchanan. I 334 SurowieckiVsBuchananan: the assumption that principles and public interest have no place in politics overlooks the fact that voters themselves did not think of broader goals and that interest groups exercise an almost complete control (...). James M. Buchanan/Gordon Tullock: Thesis: The average individual acts on the basis of the same overall value framework when he/she participates in the (...) market and is politically active. (2) SurowieckiVsBuchanan: this was simply an assumption that was not proven. The counterposition that different activities cause different values and behaviours in people was at least as plausible. We do not treat our family members like our customers. >Political Elections/Surowiecki, Political Elections/Buchanan, Political Elections/Riker. I 337 Politics/Information/Democracy/Surowiecki: although the Americans have been proven to have false information on many individual issues, it is likely that they will elect the candidate who makes the right decisions. Missing information is not a sign of lack of intelligence, but a sign of lack of interest in details. Surowiecki's thesis: An essential point of representative democracy is that it allows, politically in the cognitive sphere, the same Democracy/Surowiecki: is not an instrument for solving cognition problems, not a mechanism for recognising what is in the public interest. However, it is a system to deal with the most fundamental problems of coordination and cooperation. >Cooperation. 1. The Nobel Prize Lecture by James Buchanan (1986) offers an interesting view of the philosophical and conceptual foundations of the "public choice" theory, which Buchanan has elsewhere described as "politics without romanticism": http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1986/buchanan-lecture.html. 2. Mark Kelman, »On Democracy-Bashing – A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and ›Empirical‹ Practice of the Public Choice Movement«, Virginia Law Review 74/1988, S. 235, 252. |
Surowi I James Surowiecki Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005 |
| Efficiency | Constitutional Economics | Parisi I 205 Efficiency/constitutional economics/Voigt: Normative constitutional economics (…) reinterprets the >Pareto criterion in a twofold way: It is not outcomes but rules or procedures that lead to outcomes that are evaluated using the criterion. The evaluation is not carried out by an omniscient scientist or politician but by the concerned individuals themselves: "In a sense, the political economist is concerned with 'what people want' " (Buchanan, 1959(1), p. 137). In order to find out what people want, Buchanan proposes to carry out a consensus test. The specification of this test will be crucial as to which rules can be considered legitimate. In 1959, Buchanan had actual unanimity in mind and those citizens that expect to be worse off due to some rule changes would have to be compensated. This test would thus be equivalent to a modified Kaldor-Hicks criterion. Later in life, Buchanan seems to have changed his position: hypothetical consent deduced by an economist will do in order to legitimize some rule (see, e.g., Buchanan, 1977(2), 1978(3), 1986(4)). VsBuchanan: This position can be criticized because a large variety of rules seem to be legitimizable depending on the assumptions of the scientist who does the process. Scientists arguing in favor of an extensive welfare state will most likely assume risk-averse individuals, while scientists who argue for cuts in the welfare budgets will assume people to be risk-neutral. >Constitutional economics, >Costs/Buchanan, >Constitutions/constitutional economics, >Governmental structures/Constitutional economics, cf. >Judiciary/Constitutional economics, >Federalism/Constitutional Economics. 1. Buchanan, J. M. (1959). "Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy." Journal of Law and Economics 2: 124-138. 2. Buchanan, J. M. (1977). Freedom in Constitutional Contract - Perspectives of a Political Economist. College Station, TX/London: Texas A&M University Press. 3. Buchanan, J. M.(1978). "A Contractarian Perspective on Anarchy," Nomos 19: 29-42 4. Buchanan, J. M. (1986). "Political Economy and Social Philosophy," in: J. M. Buchanan; Liberty, Market and State—political Economy in the 1980s, 261—274. New York: Wheatsheaf Books. Voigt, Stefan. “Constitutional Economics and the Law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Law | Buchanan | Brocker I 567 Law/Contracts/Contract Theory/Buchanan: Law transforms only the uneven distribution that has arisen naturally into a legally fixed uneven distribution. That this transformation is taking place at all is due to the fact that those who are worse off in natural distribution also benefit from disarmament and the establishment of law. See Contract Theory/Buchanan, Equilibrium/Buchanan. Problem: there is still the danger of instability, because it is better for everyone to live in a contractual state and not in a pre-contractual one - nevertheless one profits from breaches of contract! And in two ways: a) you enjoy the contractual advantages and b) you benefit from a breach of the law. Solution/Buchanan: there must be a superordinate instance. The existence of the state owes its existence to this necessity. See Constitution/Buchanan. Brocker I 571 Finally, Buchanan is even considering the possibility of a slavery contract (1) (see Slavery/Buchanan). KerstingVsBuchanan/KerstingVsEconomism: This passage shows the immorality of economism. Economistic reductionism drives out the traditional normative meaning of the traditional concepts of the moral world. To speak of a slave's right to be left alive would have been condemned as intolerable cynicism. Economism is a twin brother of scientism. Buchanan's conceptual framework for the initial state of a philosophical theory of justification is so large and far-reaching that it itself can encompass the negation of all moral interpersonal relationships, apartheid and slavery, as constitutional-contractualist states. But then the question arises as to whether such a radically naturalized scenery can be suitable for the generation of social and political principles of assessment and design that can be accepted. If rights are the result of contractual agreement under realistic conditions - and an agreement generally only comes about if everyone hopes it will benefit - then contractual establishment of rights will only be achieved when the use of force becomes uneconomical, when blackmailing, intimidation and murder cost too much. But that only means that the law seals inequalities constituted by violence. It is characteristic of Buchanan's conception that the traditional opposition between violence and law has lost its leading function. 1. James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago/London 1975. Dt.: James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit. Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan, Tübingen 1984. Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Majorities | Buchanan | Brocker I 569 Majorities/State/Constitution/Economic Theory/Buchanan: (see State/Buchanan, Constitution/Buchanan): Change. Buchanan leaves no doubt that unanimity is for him the only acceptable normative yardstick on which the legitimacy of any decision-making process regarding the creation and financing of public goods must be based. That therefore (...) only state service beyond legal protection is legitimate which is in everyone's interest; for only if it is in everyone's interest can it be assumed that they would have agreed to it. ((s) Cf. Reflective Equilibrium/Rawls, Veil of Ignorance/Rawls.) Brocker I 570 Amartya SenVsBuchanan: this is precisely what reinforces existing inequalities: because the burdens on the financing of public goods beyond legal protection also affect those who do not benefit from them. (1) 1. Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco u. a 1970, S. 25. Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Political Elections | Buchanan | Surowiecki I 333 Political Elections/Buchanan/Surowiecki: Public Choice Theory/Politics/Economic Sciences/Buchanan: Thesis: the tendency is to suppress long-term problems in favour of short-term political interests. In reality, many regulations tend to serve regulated companies. (1) Surowiecki I 334 SurowieckiVsBuchananan: the assumption that principles and public interest have no place in politics overlooks the fact that voters themselves did not think of broader goals and that interest groups exercise an almost complete control (...). James M. Buchanan/Gordon Tullock: Thesis: The average individual acts on the basis of the same overall value framework when he/she participates in the (...) market and is politically active. (2) >J. Buchanan, >Political Representation, >Electoral Systems. 1. The Nobel prize lecture by James Buchanan (1986) offers an interesting view of the philosophical and conceptual foundations of "public-choice" theory, which Buchanan has described elsewhere as "politics without romanticism": http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1986/buchanan-lecture.html. 2. Mark Kelman, »On Democracy-Bashing – A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and ›Empirical‹ Practice of the Public Choice Movement«, Virginia Law Review 74/1988, S. 235, 252. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Surowi I James Surowiecki Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005 |
| Slavery | Buchanan | Brocker I 570 Slavery/Contract Theory/Economic Theory/Buchanan: Buchanan's starting point is the state of nature (see Natural State/Buchanan) with a natural inequality (differently distributed talents). This is the basis of Buchanan's assumption that contracts must be concluded to deal with this inequality and give everyone the opportunity to improve their situation. Since this type of contract (see Contracts/Buchanan, Contract Theory/Buchanan) leads to instability, another type of contract is necessary: post-constitutional contracts (see also Constitution/Buchanan). In the situation of inequality, even slavery is conceivable as the most extreme case: "Under such conditions, similarities can arise between the disarmament contract, which may be negotiated, and the contract of slavery, in which the 'weak' agree to produce goods for the 'strong' in exchange for a little more than the naked existence, which they do not have for sure under anarchist conditions. A contract of slavery - like the other contracts - would define individual rights, Brocker I 571 and to the extent of its mutual recognition, mutual benefits would be guaranteed if, as a result, the costs of defence and conquest were reduced. (1) KerstingVsBuchanan: this passage shows the immorality of economism. Economistic reductionism drives out the traditional normative meaning of the traditional concepts of the moral world. To speak of a slave's right to be left alive would have been condemned as intolerable cynicism. Economism is a twin brother of scientism. 1. James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago/London 1975. Dt.: James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit. Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan, Tübingen 1984, S. 85f. Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| State (Polity) | Buchanan | Brocker I 568 State/Buchanan: Buchanan's approach leads to a separation of law and state. The state only stands for the validity of the legal system. See Constitution/Buchanan. According to Buchanan, the state becomes the embodiment of the arbitrator who controls the parties, assuming that everyone tries to cheat. (1) Buchanan cites the universal desire for disarmament as the reason for the conclusion of contracts in order to reduce costs. Brocker I 569 Protective State/Buchanan: a protective cover to ensure the exchange of private goods. Problem: this does not secure the handling of public goods. Productive State/Buchanan: Question: Which regulatory system must be introduced to ensure the possible and reasonably desired improvement in the situation compared to natural distribution or to a society consuming only private goods? Solution/Buchanan: the post-constitutional contract (which presupposes the constitutional contract to secure private property) creates a genuinely political system for the creation and distribution of public goods. >Majorities/Buchanan, >Public Goods. Brocker I 570 Amartya SenVsBuchanan: this is precisely what reinforces existing inequalities: because the burdens on the financing of public goods beyond legal protection also affect those who do not benefit from them.(2) 1. James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago/London 1975. Dt.: James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit. Zwischen Anarchie und Leviathan, Tübingen 1984, S. 96f. 2. Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco u. a 1970, S. 25 Wolfgang Kersting, „James M. Buchanan, Die Grenzen der Freiheit“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Tax Competition | Brennan | Saez I 113 Tax Competition/Buchanan/Brennan/Saez/Zucman: [there is a] view that tax competition in and of itself is a good thing—without it, governments would be too big. According to this world view, defended by political scientist Geoffrey Brennan and economist James Buchanan among others,4 democratically elected majorities tend to overtax property owners, who then become victims of the tyranny of the majority. To prevent this risk, governments need to be subject to powerful constraints, such as the one imposed by international competition. The idea fits into a long intellectual tradition that seeks to curtail democracy - especially the democratic regulation of property - via nondemocratic institutions, such as constitutional rules and courts.(1) According to this view, when it comes to taxation, people are unable to govern themselves rationally. Saez/Zucman: Although it can be tempting to dismiss this theory as a fringe libertarian fantasy and an American oddity, it would be a mistake to underestimate its influence. Saez I 114 SaezVsBuchanan/SaezVsBrennan: In the real world, the costs of tax competition far outweigh its supposed benefits. >Tax Competition/Saez/Zucman, >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Taxation. 1. Brennan, Geoffrey, and James M. Buchanan. Collected Works: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. The Power to Tax. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000. |
EconBrenn I Geoffrey Brennan James A. Buchanan The power to tax. Analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution Cambridge 1980 |
| Tax Competition | Buchanan | Saez I 113 Tax Competition/Buchanan/Brennan/Saez/Zucman: [there is a] view that tax competition in and of itself is a good thing—without it, governments would be too big. According to this world view, defended by political scientist Geoffrey Brennan and economist James Buchanan among others,4 democratically elected majorities tend to overtax property owners, who then become victims of the tyranny of the majority. To prevent this risk, governments need to be subject to powerful constraints, such as the one imposed by international competition. The idea fits into a long intellectual tradition that seeks to curtail democracy - especially the democratic regulation of property - via nondemocratic institutions, such as constitutional rules and courts.(1) According to this view, when it comes to taxation, people are unable to govern themselves rationally. Saez/Zucman: Although it can be tempting to dismiss this theory as a fringe libertarian fantasy and an American oddity, it would be a mistake to underestimate its influence. Saez I 114 SaezVsBuchanan/SaezVsBrennan: In the real world, the costs of tax competition far outweigh its supposed benefits. >Tax Competition/Saez/Zucman, >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Taxation. 1. Brennan, Geoffrey, and James M. Buchanan. Collected Works: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. The Power to Tax. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 |
| Tax Competition | Saez | Saez I 109 Tax Competition/Saez/Zucman: In 2019, the International Monetary Fund asked a slate of experts for their views on the future of corporate taxation and tax competition. Most of the fund’s interlocutors answered that tax competition was “likely to intensify” in the foreseeable future.(1) Some countries, the experts agreed, will always offer lower taxes than their neighbors (...) Saez I 110 SaezVS/ZucmanVs: This view is wrong. There is nothing in globalization that requires that the corporate tax should disappear. The choice is ours. Saez I 111 To see how we could escape our current predicament, we must start by understanding why we have failed, so far, to address the fiscal challenges presented by globalization. 1) Financial globalization is a recent phenomenon. Close to 20% of the world’s corporate profits are made by companies outside of the country where they are headquartered today.(2) Before the 2000s, that figure was less than 5%. 2) (...) the activities of multinational corporations are opaque. Companies are generally not required to publicly disclose in which countries they book their profits. 3) (...) successful lobbying by the tax-dodging complex. The transfer pricing industry lives by the system of corporate taxation created in the 1920s; it has a vital stake in preserving it. For example, if companies, instead of being taxed subsidiary by subsidiary, were taxed as consolidated entities, there would be no point in computing the prices of transactions between subsidiaries. The transfer pricing industry would become obsolete overnight. >Tax Competition/Buchanan. Saez I 114 SaezVsBuchanan/SaezVsBrennan: In the real world, the costs of tax competition far outweigh its supposed benefits. (...), there is no progressive income tax possible without a strong enough corporate tax, because with low corporate rates, rich people morph into companies and transform the income tax into a (hardly enforceable) consumption tax. >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Taxation. 1. International Monetary Fund. “Corporate Taxation in the Global Economy,” IMF Policy Paper no. 19/007, March 2019. Appendix 1, p. 47. 2. Tørsløv, Thomas, Ludvig Wier, and Gabriel Zucman. “The Missing Profits of Nations.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 24701, 2018. |
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