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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tax Competition | Brennan | Saez I 113 Tax Competition/Buchanan/Brennan/Saez/Zucman: [there is a] view that tax competition in and of itself is a good thing—without it, governments would be too big. According to this world view, defended by political scientist Geoffrey Brennan and economist James Buchanan among others,4 democratically elected majorities tend to overtax property owners, who then become victims of the tyranny of the majority. To prevent this risk, governments need to be subject to powerful constraints, such as the one imposed by international competition. The idea fits into a long intellectual tradition that seeks to curtail democracy - especially the democratic regulation of property - via nondemocratic institutions, such as constitutional rules and courts.(1) According to this view, when it comes to taxation, people are unable to govern themselves rationally. Saez/Zucman: Although it can be tempting to dismiss this theory as a fringe libertarian fantasy and an American oddity, it would be a mistake to underestimate its influence. Saez I 114 SaezVsBuchanan/SaezVsBrennan: In the real world, the costs of tax competition far outweigh its supposed benefits. >Tax Competition/Saez/Zucman, >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Taxation. 1. Brennan, Geoffrey, and James M. Buchanan. Collected Works: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. The Power to Tax. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000. |
EconBrenn I Geoffrey Brennan James A. Buchanan The power to tax. Analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution Cambridge 1980 |
| Tax Competition | Buchanan | Saez I 113 Tax Competition/Buchanan/Brennan/Saez/Zucman: [there is a] view that tax competition in and of itself is a good thing—without it, governments would be too big. According to this world view, defended by political scientist Geoffrey Brennan and economist James Buchanan among others,4 democratically elected majorities tend to overtax property owners, who then become victims of the tyranny of the majority. To prevent this risk, governments need to be subject to powerful constraints, such as the one imposed by international competition. The idea fits into a long intellectual tradition that seeks to curtail democracy - especially the democratic regulation of property - via nondemocratic institutions, such as constitutional rules and courts.(1) According to this view, when it comes to taxation, people are unable to govern themselves rationally. Saez/Zucman: Although it can be tempting to dismiss this theory as a fringe libertarian fantasy and an American oddity, it would be a mistake to underestimate its influence. Saez I 114 SaezVsBuchanan/SaezVsBrennan: In the real world, the costs of tax competition far outweigh its supposed benefits. >Tax Competition/Saez/Zucman, >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Taxation. 1. Brennan, Geoffrey, and James M. Buchanan. Collected Works: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. The Power to Tax. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000. |
EconBuchan I James M. Buchanan Politics as Public Choice Carmel, IN 2000 |
| Tax Competition | Saez | Saez I 109 Tax Competition/Saez/Zucman: In 2019, the International Monetary Fund asked a slate of experts for their views on the future of corporate taxation and tax competition. Most of the fund’s interlocutors answered that tax competition was “likely to intensify” in the foreseeable future.(1) Some countries, the experts agreed, will always offer lower taxes than their neighbors (...) Saez I 110 SaezVS/ZucmanVs: This view is wrong. There is nothing in globalization that requires that the corporate tax should disappear. The choice is ours. Saez I 111 To see how we could escape our current predicament, we must start by understanding why we have failed, so far, to address the fiscal challenges presented by globalization. 1) Financial globalization is a recent phenomenon. Close to 20% of the world’s corporate profits are made by companies outside of the country where they are headquartered today.(2) Before the 2000s, that figure was less than 5%. 2) (...) the activities of multinational corporations are opaque. Companies are generally not required to publicly disclose in which countries they book their profits. 3) (...) successful lobbying by the tax-dodging complex. The transfer pricing industry lives by the system of corporate taxation created in the 1920s; it has a vital stake in preserving it. For example, if companies, instead of being taxed subsidiary by subsidiary, were taxed as consolidated entities, there would be no point in computing the prices of transactions between subsidiaries. The transfer pricing industry would become obsolete overnight. >Tax Competition/Buchanan. Saez I 114 SaezVsBuchanan/SaezVsBrennan: In the real world, the costs of tax competition far outweigh its supposed benefits. (...), there is no progressive income tax possible without a strong enough corporate tax, because with low corporate rates, rich people morph into companies and transform the income tax into a (hardly enforceable) consumption tax. >Tax Avoidance, >Tax Competition, >Tax Compliance, >Tax Evasion, >Tax Havens, >Tax Incidence, >Tax Loopholes, >Tax System, >Taxation. 1. International Monetary Fund. “Corporate Taxation in the Global Economy,” IMF Policy Paper no. 19/007, March 2019. Appendix 1, p. 47. 2. Tørsløv, Thomas, Ludvig Wier, and Gabriel Zucman. “The Missing Profits of Nations.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 24701, 2018. |
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