Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Bolzano | Mates I 284 Bolzano/Mates: (1781-1848): logical workings are scattered in his work. Analytics: relatively exact definition with the help of interpretation. Likewise for inference. Proposition/Bolzano: puts it against statements. One proposition can be obtained from another by substituting its constituents. MatesVsBolzano: "Replacement" is unclear here, --- I 285 because it is applied to types of objects that are not to be spatial and not temporal. Analyticity/Bolzano: Definition analytical/Bolzano: a proposition is generally valid with respect to a particular component if the result of any substitution of these parts by other terms is true. Definition analytical in a broad sense: if the proposition is generally valid or generally invalid. Otherwise, it is synthetic. Definition closely analytical: if the proposition in reference to all the components apart from the logical one is analytic. MatesVs: Problem of arbitrary distinction of logical/non-logical constants. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Conditional | Bolzano | Berka I 8 Conditional/ relationship/Conclusion/Bolzano: for Bolzano follows M, N, O..from A, B, C... only if (1) each (semantic) model of A, B, C ... is also a model of M, N, O .... That is, if each of the final sentences M, N, O, can be deduced separately from the assumptions A, B, C. and (2) the premises are the (s) content-related) reason for the conclusion. Berka: that is a very strong conclusion concept. TarskiVsBolzano: it is enough for him if the first condition is fulfilled. GentzenVsBolzano: for Gentzen it is sufficient if at least one of the final sentences is derivable from the set of premisses. Special case: if the claim quantity contains only one final sentence, the Bolzano's and the Gentzen's inference system are identical. Conclusion/Bolzano: additional condition: one must be able to decide which concepts are logical concepts. --- Berka I 20 f E.g. Entailment/Bolzano: (content-wise): if it is warmer in a place, then there are higher temperatures at the location - in reality, higher temperatures are shown, because it's warmer - the thermometer does not generate the temperatures. I.e. the entailment only exists in one direction: heat > temperature.(1) - different to Deducibility/Bolzano/(s): if the sentence "... higher temperatures" is true, the sentence "it's warmer" is true, and vice versa. Reversible relation of two true sentences. Content is not decisive here - entailment: only in one direction - derivability: goes in both directions, regardless of truth - Entailment/Bolzano: for reason - Derivability/>Mates: formal. 1. B. Bolzano, Wissenschaftslehre, Sulzbach 1837 (gekürzter Nachdruck aus Bd. II S. 113-115, S. 191 – 193; § 155; §162) |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Domains | Logic Texts | Read III 57 Substitution criterion/VsSubstitution criterion/VsBolzano: leads to absurd results: because it declares certain invalid inferences for valid. E.g. "there are at least two things." It is not a matter of logic, that there are at least two things - one can just as well say "there are two things, so there are 76 things". Solution/Tarski: establish a domain. - Then: "There are at least 2 things" might be falsified and is not a logical truth any more. >Domain, >Criteria, >Substitution. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Proof of God’s Existence | Bolzano | Simons I 321 Cosmological proof of God/unconditioned existence/Bolzano/Simons: (circumvents the problem of being founded by referring to classes. >Classes. A) there is something real, e.g. my thoughts that it is like that. B) Suppose there is some thing A that is absolutely essential in its existence, then we already have it C) Suppose A is conditional. Then form the class of all conditional real things A, B, C, ... This is also possible if this class is infinite D) the class of all conditioned real things is itself real. Is it conditional or unconditional? If it is absolute, we already have it E) Suppose it is conditional: every conditioned presupposes the existence of something else, whose existence it determines. Thus even the class of all conditional things, if conditioned, presupposes the existence of something that determines it. F) This other thing must be unconditioned, for if it were conditioned, it would belong to the class of all conditioned things G) Therefore, there is something unconditional, e.g. a god. Simons: this makes no use of being founded: C) leaves the possibility of an infinite chain open. >Foundation, >Justification, >Reasons, >Ultimate justification, >Conditions. 1. RussellVsBolzano/Simons: one might have doubts about the "class of all unconditioned things". >Paradoxes, >Russell's paradox, >Sets, >Set theory. Solution/Bolzano: it's about the real things from which we can assume spatial-temporal localization. >Localization. 2. SimonsVsBolzano: Step F) I 322 Why should the class of all conditioned things not be conditioned by something within? This would be conditioned itself, etc. but any attempt to stop the recourse would again appeal to being founded. ((s) The thing that conditions would be within the class of conditioned things, it would be conditioned and conditional at the same time). >Regress. Solution/Simons: we need additionally a conditioning principle. Definition Conditioning Principle/Simons: if a class C is such that each dependent element of it has all the objects on which it depends within X, then X is not dependent. (Simons pro). Simons: this allows infinite chains of dependencies. A kind of infinite dependence already arises e.g. when two objects are mutually dependent. >Dependence, >Causal dependence, >Ontological dependence. If the conditioning principle applies, why should the class X be still externally conditioned? Ad Bolzano: Suppose we accept his argument until e). Then it can go on like this: H) if the class of all conditioned things is conditioned, then there is an element of it that is dependent on something that is not an element of that class. (Contraposition to the conditioning principle) >Contraposition. I) Then such an (unconditioned) object is not an element of the class of all conditioned things, and is thus unconditional. J) Therefore, there is in any case something unconditioned. SimonsVsAtomism: that is better than anything that an atomism achieves. >Atomism. Conditioning principle/Simons: is the best extension of the strong rigid dependency (//), i.e. (N) (a // x ↔ (Ey) [x ε a u a // x] u ~ x ε a) >Rigidity. SimonsVsBlack: with the strong instead of the weak dependency, we can counter Black. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. I 323 God/Mereology/Ontology/Simons: in any case, the strong rigid dependence does not prove the existence of God. Only the existence of an unconditional, which Bolzano cautiously calls "a God". >God, >Existence, >Ontology. Independence/Simons: does not include divinity. >Independence, >Existence statement. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bolzano, B. | Tarski Vs Bolzano, B. | Berka I 8 Consequential Relation/Consequence/Bolzano: for Bolzano, M,N,O.. follows from A,B,C.. only if 1. Every (semantic) model of A,B,C... is also a model of M,N,O... I.e. if each of the final sentences M,N,O, from the premises A,B,C... is individually derivable. And: 2. The premises are the reason(s) for the final sentences. Berka: this is a very strong concept of inference. TarskiVsBolzano: for him it is enough if the 1. condition is fulfilled. GentzenVsBolzano: for Gentzen it is sufficient if at least one of the final clauses can be derived from the set of premises. Special case: If the receivable quantity contains only one final sentence, the Bolzano and Gentzen systems are identical. Conclusion/Bolzano: additional condition: you must be able to decide which terms are logical terms.(1) 1. B. Bolzano, Wissenschaftslehre, Sulzbach 1837 (gekürzter Nachdruck aus Bd. II S. 113-115, S. 191 – 193; § 155; §162) |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Bolzano, B. | Simons Vs Bolzano, B. | I 321 Cosmological proof of God’s existence/unconditional existence/Bolzano/Simons: avoids the problem of foundedness by referring to classes. a) There is something real e.g. my thoughts that it is so. b) Suppose there is any thing, e.g. A that is unconditional in its existence, then we have it already. c) Suppose A is conditional. Then the class of all conditional real things forms A, B, C, ... This is also possible if this class is infinite. d) The class of all conditional real things is itself real. Is it conditional or unconditional? If it is unconditional, we have it already. e) Suppose it is conditional: each conditional presupposes the existence of something else, the existence of which it requires. So even the class of all conditioned things, if conditional, requires the existence of something that it presupposes. f) This other thing has to be unconditional because if it were conditional, it would belong to the class of all conditional things. g) Therefore, there is something unconditional, e.g. a God. Simons: this does not use foundedness: c) leaves the possibility of an infinite chain open. RussellVsBolzano/Simons: one could have doubts about the "class of all unconditional things" (> paradoxes). Solution/Bolzano: it is exactly about the real things of which we can assume spatiotemporal localization. 2. SimonsVsBolzano: step f) I 322 Why should the class of all conditional things not be required by something within? This itself would be conditional, etc. but any attempt to stop the recourse would again appeal to foundedness. ((s) The conditional would be within the class of conditional things, it would be conditional and conditioning at the same time.) Solution/Simons: we need a conditioning principle in addition. Def Conditioning Principle/Simons: if a class C is such that each dependent member of her has all of the objects on which it depends within X, then X is not dependent (Simons pro). Simons: this allows infinite chains of dependencies. A kind of infinite dependence appears already if e.g. two objects mutually require each other. If the conditioning principle applies, why should the class X then be even conditioned from the outside? Ad Bolzano: suppose we accept his argument up to e). Then it can go on like this: h) If the class of all conditional things is conditional, then there is an element of it which is dependent on something that is not a member of this class (contraposition to the conditioning principle). i) Then such an (unconditional) object is no member of the class of all conditional things and therefore unconditional. j) Therefore, something unconditional definitely exists. SimonsVsAtomism: that is better than anything the atomism accomplishes. Conditioning Principle/Simons: the conditioning principle is the best extension of strong rigid dependence (7), that means that: (N) (a 7 x ≡ (Ey)[x ε a u a 7 x] u ~ x ε a) SimonsVsBlack: we can face Black with the strong rather than with the weak dependence. I 323 God/mereology/ontology/Simons: in any case, the strong rigid dependence does not prove the existence of God. Only the existence of something unconditional that Bolzano prudently called "a god". Independence/Simons: independence includes by no means divinity. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Bolzano, B. | Mates Vs Bolzano, B. | I 284 Bolzano/Mates: (1781 1848): logical elaborations can be found scattered throughout his work. Analyticity: relatively exact definition with the help of interpretation. Also for inference. Proposition/Bolzano: contrasts them with statements. One proposition can be obtained from another by substituting its components. MatesVsBolzano: "Replacement" is unclear here, I 285 because it is applied to object types that should not be spatial or temporal. Analyticity/Bolzano: Def analytical/Bolzano: a proposition is generally valid in relation to a particular constituent if the result of any replacement of those constituents by other terms is true. Def analytical in the broad sense: if the proposition is generally valid or generally invalid. Otherwise it is synthetic. Def closely analytical: if the proposition is analytical in inflection on all components except logical. MatesVs: problem of arbitrary distinction logical/non-logical constants. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
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