Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Correctness Wright I 272f
Def "Correct"/Wright: here: T-predicate for minimally truth-enabled discourses.
Wright I 276
Correctness/Negation/Logics/Truth/Wright: when both truth and correctness are at play, there is a distinction between the a) actual, strict negation: transforms any true or correct sentence into a false or incorrect one that gives another form of negation:
b) Negation: works in such a way that a true (or correct) sentence is constructed exactly when its argument reaches no truth.
Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposal (>Nonfactualism) actually assumes that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense.
A perfectly reasonable counterproposal, however, is that A should be much more complementary to the strict concept of the former negation.
Then, in the event that A is merely correct, the assessment of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the predicate of truth will generally be conservative.
WrightVsVs: but there are problems elsewhere now: the transition from (i) to (ii): the seemingly unassailable principle that only a sentence with a truth condition can be true would have the form of the conditional:

(II) "A" is true > "A" has a truth condition

I 276/277
And any conservative matrix for "A" is true jeopardizes this principle in the case where A is not truthful but correct. Because then the conservative matrix will rate ""a" is true" as correct.
The consequence (II) that "A" has a truth condition (a fact that makes it true) will then probably be incorrect.
Meaning Minimalism/Correctness/Wright: cannot regard certain sentences (e.g. about primary qualities of material bodies) as candidates for substantial truth.
The attribution of a truth condition can therefore be correct (?) for such a proposition.
Thus, even in a conservative matrix, the assertion

"S has the truth condition that P" is true

can be correct. But the whole basis of the argumentation is that minimalism of meaning has no choice but to view

"S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition

as inevitably at least incorrect otherwise there is no affirmation of (i) as a premise. ((i): It is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition).
The insertion of "S" has the truth condition that "P" for "A" in (II) consequently produces, in a conservative matrix for meaning minimalism itself, a correct antecedence, but an incorrect consequence.
I 277/278
WrightVsBoghossian: Summary: If the matrix (truth table) for "true" is not conservative, then the disquotation scheme fails in the decisive direction for the transition from (ii) to (iii), if, on the other hand, the matrix is conservative, the principle that only a sentence with a truth condition is true fails in view of premise (i). (The proposition is incorrect).
Finally, if premise (i) is not allowed, there is no argumentation at all.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Deflationism Brandom I 466
Deflationism: Brandom pro: propositional elimination of unnecessary assumptions - Problem: D undermines itself - not a fact is claimed when "it is true that snow is white" - Definition Deflationism: denies that content can be explained in concepts of truth conditions and compliance with the facts - Problem: D cannot deny that properties are expressed by predicates. ---
I 468
BrandomVsVs: "is true" is a pro-sentence forming operator, not a predicate. ---
I 469
Deflationism/Non-Factualism (BoghossianVs): Brandom: a fact does not make a fact true, only in the derived sense - not semantic fact together with physical fact - facts do not depend on the assertion - BrandomVsBoghossian: there is no situation in which there are no facts. >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Negation Wright I 275/76
Negation/logic/truth/correctness/correct: if both truth and correctness are playing a role, there is a distinction (see above > Neg) between the   a) proper, strict negation: turns any true or correct sentence in a false or incorrect - another negation form:
  b) negation: acts so that a true (or correct) sentence is constructed exactly then when his argument does not reach truth.
---
I 276
Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposal does indeed assume that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense.         A perfectly reasonable counterproposal is, however, that A should be rather complementary to the strict notion of the former negation.
        Then, for the case that A is only correct, the valuation of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the truth predicate will be generally conservative.
WrightVsVs: but the (DB) carpet now throws elsewhere wrinkles
  (See Conservativeness).
---
I 88
Negation: Definition negation operator "Neg": "Neg A" is true if A is false and false in all other cases (e.g. with a lack of assertibility or Super-assertibility) - incorrect solution: then with low validity of A <> B: negation equivalence "Neg (P) is true" <> Neg ("P" is true)? - WrightVs: that will not work, even with "assertible" instead of "true".

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Negation Boghossian Wright I, 276
Negation/Logic/Truth/Correctness/correct: If both truth and correctness are involved, there is a distinction between the A) real, strict negation: it transforms every true or correct sentence into a false or incorrect one, another negation form:
B) Negation: it acts so that a true (or correct) sentence is constructed exactly when its argument does not reach any truth.
Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposition (> nonfactualism) actually assumes that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense.
        A perfectly reasonable counter-proposal, however, is that A should rather be complementary to the strict concept of the former negation.
Then, in the case that A is merely correct, the valuation of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the truth predicate will be generally conservative.

WrightVsVs: but there are problems at a different end now: the transition of (i) to (ii): the seemingly unassailable principle that only one sentence with a truth condition can be true would have the form of the conditional:

(II) "A" is true> "A" has a truth condition
---
I 276/277
And any conservative matrix for ""A" is true" endangers this principle in the case where A is not true but correct. For then the conservative matrix ""a" is true" is evaluated as correct.
The consequent (II) that "A" has a truth condition (a fact that makes it true) will then probably be incorrect.

Bogh I
Paul Boghossian
Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism Oxford 2007

Boghe I
Peter Boghossian
A manual for Creating Atheists Charlottesville 2013

Nonfactualism Brandom I 469
Deflationism/Non-Factualism (BoghossianVs): Brandom: a fact does not make another fact true - only in the derived sense - no semantic facts in addition to physical facts - facts do not depend on assertion - BrandomVsBoghossian: there is no situation in which there were no facts...

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Boghossian, Paul Wright Vs Boghossian, Paul I 270
Boghossian: let us consider a non factualism exclusively related to meaning (not truth): there is no property of the kind that a word means something, and consequently no such fact.
Since now the truth condition of a proposition is a function of its meaning, non-factualism regarding meaning necessarily requires a non-factualism regarding truth conditions. Then it results:

(5) For all S,P: "S has the truth condition P" is not truth conditional.

after disquotation:

(4) For each S: "S" is not truth conditional.

"Fascinating consequence"/Boghossian: of a non-factualism of meaning: a global non-factualism. And this is precisely where a non-factualism of meaning differs from a non-factualism with reference to any other object...
I 271
WrightVsBoghossian: many will protest against his implicit philosophy of truth, but there is nothing against the use of the word alone. Global Minimalism/WrightVsBoghossian: Problem: 1. Can the required notion of substantial truth be completely understandable if there are no examples of it at all?
((s) Because that is just denied by the thesis).
2. The status of the justification is even more difficult. Does an advocate not have to demand that the reasoning be valid? Such a justification, however, must at least show cognitive coercion and thus exceed minimalism.
I 273
WrightVsBoghossian: with the principle that only a sentence with a truth condition can be true, we can go over to it:
(iv) It is not the case that S is true

and then, by using (i) - the premise of reasoning - for S

(v) It is not the case that (i) is true.

From this follows the "disquotation properties":

(vi) It is not the case that it is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition.

But is this a reductio ad absurdum of (i)? This is not a stupid question!
If truth is understood as substantial, and contrasted with an inferior surrogate, then the denial of truth is not necessarily inconsistent with the assertion of its correctness.
A correct reductio should show that (i) is not even correct.
Boghossian is thus faced with a dilemma:
a) if it is a reductio of (i), it shows that the minimalism of meaning is incoherent,
I 274
b) if it is not reductio - if the negation in (vi) rejects a substantial truth and not merely negates correctness - then (iii) can no longer be an expression of global minimalism (meaning and truth), for (iii) is consistent with the correctness of the assertion that certain propositions possess substantial truth conditions. (iii) Can at most require that any statement that can only be correct cannot itself be considered correct. WrightVsBoghossian: the "fascinating consequence" is nowhere in sight. 1. Minimalism of meaning does not cancel itself out.
2. There is also not logically necessary a minimalism regarding the distinction between discourses that are suitable for substantial truth and those that are not.
Problem: that Boghossian has to work with different truth predicates ("true" and "correct"). Of course, this is important for his differentiation, but it has a potential effect on the disquotation, which is so important for him.
Wright: "strong need": a philosophy that distinguishes between the substantially true and the merely correct must itself be substantial.
I 275
WrightVsBoghossian: the details: the move from (ii) to (iii) is a modus tollens on the right left section of the disquotation scheme (DS):
(I) A > "A" is true.
Question: can we safely assume that this principle is at least correct when both truth and correctness are involved? No: if A is just correct, the claim that "A" is true will at best reflect its status incorrectly!
Decisive: for the transition from (ii) to (iii) is the relevant substitute for "A": "S" has the truth condition that "P" is a sentence which, according to minimalism of meaning, allows only correctness and not truth.
Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposal actually assumes that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense.
A perfectly reasonable counterproposal, however, is that A should be much more complementary to the strict notion of the former negation.
Then, in the event that A is merely correct, the assessment of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the truth predicate will generally be conservative.
WrightVsVs: but now there are problems to be found elsewhere: the transition from (i) to (ii): the seemingly unassailable principle that only a sentence with a truth condition can be true would have the form of the conditional:

(II) "A" is true > "A" has a truth condition

I 276/277
And any conservative matrix for ""A" is true" jeopardizes this principle in the case where A is not truthful but correct. Because then the conservative matrix will rate ""a" is true" as correct.
The consequence (II) that "A" has a truth condition (a fact that makes it true) will then probably be incorrect.
I 277/278
WrightVsBoghossian: Conclusion: If the matrix (truth table) for "true" is not conservative, then the citation scheme fails in the decisive direction for the transition from (ii) to (iii), If, on the other hand, the matrix is conservative, the principle that only a sentence with a truth condition is true fails in view of premise (i). (The sentence is incorrect).
Finally, if premise (i) is not allowed, there is no argument at all.
I 293
Deflationism: any significant sentence (i.e. a sentence with a truth condition) is suitable for deflationary truth or falsehood. But if truth is not deflationary, "true" must refer to a substantial property of statements.
(Deflationism: Truth is not a property).
WrightVsBoghossian: his problem is that he must reconcile both. Is the reasoning not simply a game of "refers to a property"? (to avoid truth as property.)

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008