Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Biconditional Geach I 189f
Equivalence/Biconditional/GeachVsBlack: "is materially equivalent" is not synonymous with "if and only if" - "Three line" is often read as "materially equivalent" - equivalence only between sentences, not names of sentences - Problem: Tom loves Mary ↔ Mary loves Tom "only significant if "↔" (thee line) is read as "iff" rather than "materially equivalent".

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Community Blackburn Esfeld I 119
Community/Individual/Simon Blackburn: (S. Blackburn,"The Indivdual strikes back", Synthesis, vol 58, No. 3,1984 pp. 281-301): Thesis: Members of a community behave to each other like temporal phases of an individual. (Corrections are possible). Private language/rule order/BlackburnVsKripke/BlackburnVsWittgenstein: Therefore, when viewed in isolation, an individual can follow rules in the same way as a community.
KripkeVs: Someone could have followed the addition yesterday and today follow the quaddition. In the light of the rule she is now trying to follow, she can judge previous actions as correct/incorrect, but whatever you now seem to be correct/incorrect in these judgments is correct or incorrect.
I 120
EsfeldVsBlackburn: a social solution is not available for the isolated skeptic (>sanctions). Convergence cannot be negotiated. The present dispositions always have a privileged position! The same applies to the simulation of another person: they cannot give feedback.
I 121
Private language/rule sequence/field: second reason why an individual in isolation cannot determine a disagreement: I may not be scheduled to predetermine a property F now, but earlier but already (although the thing in question has not changed). Problem: why is this not a case of disagreement with myself?
Pointe: what counts as a change of a thing is not independent of the fact that conceptual content is determined. To determine the change, conceptual content must be defined.

Blckbu I
S. Blackburn
Spreading the Word : Groundings in the Philosophy of Language Oxford 1984


Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Equivalence Geach I 189f
Equivalence/Biconditional/GeachVsBlack "is material equi" is not synonymous with "if and only if" - (symbol with three lines) is often read as "materially equivalent" - equivalence only between sentences, not the names of sentences - Problem: "Tom loves Mary ↔ Mary loves Tom" is only significant if "↔" (three lines) is read as "iff" rather than "materially equi".

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

I, Ego, Self Blackmore Pauen I 244
I/Ego/Blackmore/Pauen: Blackmore thesis: Beliefs are only accumulations of memes that change constantly. VsMinsky, VsDennett: The self also has no pragmatic value. >Memes. Unencumbered by it, we can have an unbiased access to the present. (Th. NagelVs.)
I 245
I: the I is not the origin of our desires, but the function of bundling. PauenVsBlackmore: how should continuity be preserved at all? >Personal identity.
Vs: Individuals can behave very differently to desires, even if they belong to the same social group.

Blckmo I
S. Blackmore
Consciousness London 2010


Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Proof of God’s Existence Bolzano Simons I 321
Cosmological proof of God/unconditioned existence/Bolzano/Simons: (circumvents the problem of being founded by referring to classes. A) there is something real, e.g. my thoughts that it is like that.
B) Suppose there is some thing A that is absolutely essential in its existence, then we already have it
(B) Suppose A is conditional. Then form the class of all conditional real things A, B, C, ... This is also possible if this class is infinite
D) the class of all conditioned real things is itself real. Is it conditional or unconditional? If it is absolute, we already have it
(E) Suppose it is conditional: every conditioned presupposes the existence of something else, whose existence it determines. Thus even the class of all conditional things, if conditioned, presupposes the existence of something that determines it.
(F) This other thing must be unconditioned, for if it were conditioned, it would belong to the class of all conditioned things
G) Therefore, there is something unconditional, e.g. a god.

Simons: this makes no use of being founded: c) leaves the possibility of an infinite chain open.
RussellVsBolzano/Simons: one might have doubts about the "class of all unconditioned things" (> paradoxes).
Solution/Bolzano: it's about the real things from which we can assume spatial-temporal localization.
2. SimonsVsBolzano: Step f)
---
I 322
Why should the class of all conditioned things not be conditioned by something within? This would be conditioned itself, etc. but any attempt to stop the recourse would again appeal to being founded. ((s) the thing that conditions would be within the class of conditioned things, it would be conditioned and conditional at the same time).
Solution/Simons: we need additionally a conditioning principle.
Definition Conditioning Principle/Simons: if a class C is such that each dependent element of it has all the objects on which it depends within X, then X is not dependent. (Simons pro).

Simons: this allows infinite chains of dependencies. A kind of infinite dependence already arises e.g. when two objects are mutually dependent.
If the conditioning principle applies, why should the class X be still externally conditioned?
Ad Bolzano: Suppose we accept his argument until e). Then it can go on like this:
H) if the class of all conditioned things is conditioned, then there is an element of it that is dependent on something that is not an element of that class. (Contraposition to the conditioning principle)
I) then such an (unconditioned) object is not an element of the class of all conditioned things, and is thus unconditional.
J) Therefore, there is in any case something unconditioned.

SimonsVsAtomism: that is better than anything that an atomism achieves.
Conditioning principle/Simons: is the best extension of the strong rigid dependency (7), i.e.

(N) (a 7 x ↔ (Ey) [x e a u a 7 x] u ~ x e a)

SimonsVsBlack: with the strong instead of the weak dependency, we can counter Black.
---
I 323
God/Mereology/Ontology/Simons: in any case, the strong rigid dependence does not prove the existence of God. Only the existence of an unconditional, which Bolzano cautiously calls "a God". Independence/Simons: does not include divinity.


Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Quotation Marks Geach I 88
"It"/Geach: non-referential expression: E.g., the only one who ever stole a book from Snead made a lot of money by selling it - problem: cannot be replaced salva veritate by "Robinson" because then "it" meaningless - in the original also not replaceable by "a book", then also meaningless. ---
I 110f
Fake event/Geach: the philosopher, whose student was Plato, was bald. - Fake: "Plato was bald" - E.g. "A philosopher smoked and drank whiskey": fake: "A philosopher smoked" - "and he (or the philosopher!) drank ... - Solution: "casus": two smoking philosophers, one of which does not drink - sentence does not show which is true - but no psychologizing: ("what the speaker thought of" -) what he said is true, even if not all thoughts were true. False question: to what the subject refers to: "he" or "this philosopher" is not a subject at all. - "And" (conjunction) connects here two predicates, not two sentences.
Def fake predicate: if the question is irrelevant to what it is applied to - for example, "everyone loves him or herself" can be true even if "every man loves ---" does not appeal to anyone. -> Anaphora.

I 189f
Equivalence/Biconditional/GeachVsBlack: "is material equivalent" is not synonymous with "iff and only if" - "three-dash" ≡ is often read as "material equivalent" - equivalence exists only between sentences, not between names of sentences. - Problem: "Tom loves Mary ↔ Mary loves Tom" is only designating when "↔" (three-dash, ≡) is read as "exactly when" and not as "material equivalent". ---
I 199, 200
Quotation marks/Geach: E.g. Carnap: If "A" is false, then for every "B" "A > B" is true (quotation marks only on the outside) - This does not contain "B", but "B" directly included in inverted commas. > variables / >constants. ---
I 208
Quotation marks/Geach: not a functor that makes the name "Cicero" out of an expression, but an indicator that creates an intentional point of argument into which "Cicero" is inserted. - Thus, iterated quotes have no place in our logic: "name of a name": false. Solution: simple symbol, e.g. "tonk" for the name "Cicero". - Then e.g. for an x, [Tonk] is a name of [x] and [x] is a proper name. - Quasi-quotation: but is no name.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Terminology Putnam IV 146ff
"Not different"/use/terminology/Putnam: direct connection command/output/state. "I am in state A" - alternate use: "Pain is an irritation of C-fibers" (BlackVsFeigl) - gives new meaning to words, cannot be used to claim - PutnamVsBlack: could be a normal sentence.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000


The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Antirationalism Black Vs Antirationalism III 33
Cause/Reason/Rationality/Black: Reasons must also be applied correctly! They must be "good reasons". Irrationality/Anti-Rationality/Black: the punishment for it can be damage, injury or extinction.
III 34
VsAnti-Rationalism/Black: Just because our Skepticus is still alive we can now assume that he applies at least proto-rationality. Canonical form: (of this argument): "You should respect fundamental reasons, because otherwise you expose yourself to frustration, pain or death."
Skepticus/Black: has the choice to "imitate" an animal with its reflexes. Namely, by trusting his own reflexes.
VsAnti-Rationalism/Black: consequently, he would have to be completely weak-willed, and distrust all social ties. He would be without friends!
Circularity/Black: so far, there is nothing circular about our argument.
Reasoning/Black: for us here the first step (the assumption of proto-rationality) is of extreme importance. We can then infer on wider rationality. ((s)VsBlack: Why actually, animals also stop after quasi-rationality? His argument therefore leads to the difficulty of distinguishing humans and animals or finding a reason why intelligent life has developed.)
BlackVsVs: for expansion we assume social skills.
III 35
That means that something is involved in his dealings with others.
III 36
Rationality/Black: As a child you had no choice of wanting to be rational or not, but as an adult you do. VsAnti-Rationality/Black: the price for this is high, but: one would have to become the pet of someone else. Cleansing oneself of reason would lead to a catatonic (apathetic) state. You would only live in the immediate present.

Black I
Max Black
"Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979

Black II
M. Black
The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978
German Edition:
Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973

Black III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Black IV
Max Black
"The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Black, Max Dummett Vs Black, Max III (a) 7
Truth Value/Tr.val./BlackVsFrege: if two seentences are materially equivalent, they have the same truth value. Problem: according to Frege certain sentences would have a meaning that they would not have according to normal conception:
E.g. "If oysters are inedible, then the wrong thing".
DummettVsBlack: if sentences stand for truth value, but there are also expressions (not sentences) for Truth Value, then this is a grammatical problem, not a logical one.
Truth Value/Grammar/Dummett: we can easily transform it from a noun into an adjective: "make true".

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982
Black, Max Field Vs Black, Max II 365
Justification/"Good" Circle/Circular/Field: (Black, 1958, Dummett 1978, Friedman 1979, van Cleve 1984) should we exclude circular justifications of this kind? Black/Dummett/Friedman/Cleve: No.
Field: at least some aspects of their assertion seem indisputable at first glance: a deductive explanation of deduction gives us a kind of reasonable explanation as to why we should prefer it to alternatives.
FieldVsDummett/FieldVsBlack: but it is not obvious that this should count as a justification! Dummett and Friedman concede that they would not have to turn a convinced representative of an alternative around.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Black, Max Putnam Vs Black, Max IV 168
BlackVsFeigl: the set
(1) pain is identical to stimulation of C-fibers. This sentence is a >deviating sentence. (See above) Under normal circumstances it cannot be used to make an assertion. It gives words a new meaning. We could begin to only speak of fibers anymore. But this is not understandable, as long as the words retain the meanings that they currently have.
PutnamVsBlack: the sentence may be deviating at the moment, but it could become a normal sentence.
---
IV 169
Linguistics: Putnam: in reality, it is not about synchronic but diachronic linguistics. It is not easy to see when a change in meaning actually occurred. 1) In any case, the utterance of a sentence never uttered before does not lead to a change in meaning.
E.g. "on my desk there is a purple Gilamonster" has certainly never uttered, but does not change the meaning of a single word.
2) A change in meaning does not necessarily have to take place when a formerly divergent sentence slowly gets a standard use.
---
IV 169/170
E.g. "I am 1000 km away from you" certainly is a deviating sentence (or its translation into ancient Greek), certainly was a deviating sentence before the invention of scripture or the phone. Of course, it obtained a normal use without being "given" it. a) The new use is not arbitrary.
b) The meaning of a sentence is generally a function of the meaning of the individual words. So the the question arises of which word has a different meaning?
Change in meaning, concept transformation: of course, new theoretical insights can have an impact on the language. E.g. "he went around the whole world" is a deviating sentence in a culture where it is not known that the earth is round.
New scientific findings could lead to a sentence like e.g. "he is half finished with his dream" is no longer a deviating sentence (as it still is today).

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Black, Max Thomson Vs Black, Max Horwich I 161
Material Equivalent/T-Schema/Thomson: "material equivalent" is itself defined in terms of truth! "Principle of Definition"/PdD/Black/Thomson: we must not confuse it with what we understand when we understand the T-scheme! Also not with a general T-Def, which cannot be formulated. A "principle of definition" probably).
Tarski/Black: "we only seem to see that the assertion of a proposition is true, logically equivalent to the assertion of the proposition itself". (see above redundancy theory).
ThomsonVsBlack: he makes a mistake when he says this is pointless. It is simply wrong! (Group: ThomsonVs Redundancy Theory? BlackVs Redundancy Theory?).
For example, suppose we do not know anything about number theory and someone tells us:
(5) 43 ε prime ⇔ any number that divides 43 is either 43 or 1 (ε: epsilon, is element of)
Now we could think, either 43 is a prime number and... or 43 would not be a prime number and....
But we would definitely think that (5) is the consequence of some definition of "prime number" (whatever that would be).
And then we would say that (5) shows an equivalence between "43 ε prime" and "any number...".
And we would not say that this is a coincidence, that 43 and the class of prime numbers are mentioned on the left and 43 again on the right, but not the class of prime numbers.
For if it were a coincidence, perhaps we could also get the following:
(6) 43 ε Prime ⇔ Ramanujan is dead
Thomson: but here we would not assume that there would be a general formula from which this is a consequence.
Now we could assume that the rule that is fulfilled in the case of (5) and not in (6) is also fulfilled for (1) and the other T-sentences. And that the T-sentences exemplify a relation of logical equivalence. (see below: but do not make explicit!).
Thomson: but this is wrong!
Example in
(1) "London is a city" is true ⇔ London is a city
are
right: London and the class of cities (mentioned)
left: one sentence and the class of true sentences (mentioned).
Thomson: why do we accept (1) as true? Because we assume that "London is a city" is used as the name of the phrase "London is a city". (> name of sentence). And we assume this because we assume that the sentence mentioned to the left is the same sentence,
Horwich I 162
that is needed on the right. And that is almost certainly what we are supposed to understand. Problem: whoever expresses (1) cannot tell us what we should assume here!
In other words:
We assume that (1) is a sentence of the meta-language for which there is a designation rule that states that "London is a city" is the name of the sentence "London is a city". N.B.: (1) itself does not tell us that this rule exists! ((s) because it needed a sentence in meta meta language).

ThomsonJF I
James F. Thomson
"A Note on Truth", Analysis 9, (1949), pp. 67-72
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

ThomsonJJ I
Judith J. Thomson
Goodness and Advice Princeton 2003

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Blackmore, S. Pauen Vs Blackmore, S. Pauen I 244
I/Blackmore/Pauen: beliefs are merely accumulations of memes that are constantly changing. VsMinsky, VsDennett: The self has no pragmatic value either. Unencumbered by this, we can have a more unbiased approach to the presence. (NagelVs.)
I 245
I: no source of our desires, but a function of bundling. PauenVsBlackmore: how should continuity be maintained then?
Vs: individuals can behave very differently to desires, even if they belong to the same social group (controlled by memes).

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Bolzano, B. Simons Vs Bolzano, B. I 321
Cosmological proof of God’s existence/unconditional existence/Bolzano/Simons: (avoids the problem of foundedness by referring to classes. a) There is something real e.g. my thoughts that it is so.
b) Suppose there is any thing, A that is unconditional in its existence, then we have it already
c) Suppose A is conditional. Then the class of all conditional real things forms A, B, C, ... This is also possible if this class is infinite
d) The class of all conditional real things is itself real. Is it conditional or unconditional? If unconditional, we have it already.
e) Suppose it is conditional: each conditional presupposes the existence of something else, the existence of which it requires. So even the class of all conditioned things, if conditional, requires the existence of something that it presupposes.
f) This other thing has to be unconditional because if it were conditional, it would belong to the class of all conditional things
g) Therefore, there is something unconditional e.g. a God.
Simons: This does not use foundedness: c) leaves the possibility of an infinite chain open.
RussellVsBolzano/Simons: one could have doubts about the "class of all unconditional things" (> paradoxes).
Solution/Bolzano: it is exactly about the real things of which we can assume spatiotemporal localization.
2. SimonsVsBolzano: step f)
I 322
Why should the class of all conditional things not be required by something within? This itself would be conditional, etc. but any attempt to stop the recourse would again appeal to foundedness. ((S) the conditional would be within the class of conditional things, it would be conditional and conditioning at the same time).
Solution/Simons: we need in addition a
Def Conditioning Principle/Simons: if a class C is such that each dependent member of her has all of the objects on which it depends within X, then X is not dependent. (Simons pro).
Simons: this allows infinite chains of dependencies. A kind of infinite dependence appears already if e.g. two objects mutually require each other.
If the conditioning principle applies, why should the class X then be even conditioned from the outside?
ad Bolzano: Suppose we accept his argument up to e). Then it can go on like this:
h) if the class of all conditional things is conditional, then there is an element of it which is dependent on something that is not a member of this class. (Contraposition to the conditioning principle)
i) then such an (unconditional) object is no member of the class of all conditional things and therefore unconditional.
j) Therefore definitely something unconditional exists.
SimonsVsAtomism: that is better than anything the atomism accomplishes.
Conditioning Principle/Simons: is the best extension of strong rigid dependence (7), that means that
(N) (a 7 x ≡ (Ey)[x ε a u a 7 x] u ~ x ε a)
SimonsVsBlack: we can face Black with the strong rather than with the weak dependence.
I 323
God/mereology/ontology/Simons: in any case the strong rigid dependence does not prove the existence of God. Only the existence of something unconditional that Bolzano prudently called "a god". Independence/Simons: includes by no means divinity.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Grice, P.H. Black Vs Grice, P.H. I 52
Max Black: Causal theory (also Stevenson, Morris) - BlackVsIntentionality theories (Grice, Searle, Strawson?).
I 58
BlackVsGrice: The conditions of Grice are neither necessary nor sufficient. a) Not sufficient: there are situations in which it is not true that someone "says that...", although the conditions are met, b) not necessary: ​​someone says something, although the conditions are not met.
I 60
The whole theory becomes suspicious when it is so complicated.
I 65
BlackVsGrice: he must constantly make modifications (negative conjunctions or corresponding positive disjunctions). This defensive strategy is too flexible on the one hand, while being too rigid on the other hand. (Sticking to the intended effect).
I 67
BlackVsGrice: Insufficient: 1) His reference to standard effects - 2) his confidence that the speaker’s intention brings about such effects.
I 68
BlackVsGrice: Every concrete manifestation usually has numerous effects. One would have to be "semantically relevant". The one that is necessary and sufficient to be communicated successfully. ((s) VsBlack: this is trivial and does not explain what is going on in successful communication or what is meant by an utterance).
I 70
BlackVsGrice: a belief of the listener or a prop. att. induced in the listener are apparently perlocutionary. They are of practical importance, but irrelevant for a philosophical analysis of the concept of communication or the derived concept of speaker meaning.
I 74
This applies mutatis mutandis also to the imperative case. When I have understood the request, my role as a listener and interpreter ends!. BlackVsGrice: he does not discuss how according to the principles of the basic model it can be expected of the listener that he discovers the speaker meaning. E.g. a beggar in a foreign country gestures to me that he is hungry.
I 76
BlackVsGrice: no interposition of "discovering". - (The theory must cover as many cases as possible.) BlackVsGrice Thesis: not detecting the speaker’s intention to elicit an effect in the listener allows the listener to determine the meaning, but rather the reverse: the discovery of the speaker meaning allows the listener to infer the speaker’s intention.

Black IV
Max Black
"The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994