Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Causation | Bigelow | I 276 Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we should understand it as a relation between events (in a broad sense). Speech of causation/causality/Davidson/Bigelow/Pargetter. We take over from Davidson (1980)(1): Problem: singular causal statements. E.g. "The short circuit caused the fire." >Causality, >Causes, >Observation sentences. Truth conditions: the statements can be true because the relation exists, even if it is clear that short circuits are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for fire. >Truth conditions. Generalization: can be true, but only if we reword the sentence. >Generalization/Bigelow. Causal Relation/Davidson/Bigelow/Pargetter: exists, if and only iff there is a way of describing the events so that they can be brought under a general causal law. >Causal relation. BigelowVsDavidson: (see above) the causal relation is rather local than global. BigelowVsDavidson: the nature of the causal relation is not derived from the existence of an underlying law. >Laws. I 277 Bigelow/Pargetter pro Davidson: however, the truth conditions of a singular causal statement require the existence of a relation (but not under a description). Causal statements/Bigelow/Pargetter: some must be rewritten: E.g. "The stone caused the window pane to break." Must be rewritten to: "That the stone touched the window pane caused the window pane to break." E.g. "Becker's easy victory over Lendl surprised the commentators." Must be changed: "Becker's victory surprised ... and if it had not been easy, it would not have been surprising." Bigelow pro Davidson: So far his theory is convincing. Causality/causal statements/Bigelow/Pargetter: sometimes we must also make general causal statements: For this, we need types of events or properties of events. Causal statements: must then be counterfactual conditionals: E.g. "If Lendl's defeat had not been so clear, it would not have been surprising." E.g. "The antidote slowed the death of Protheros." This seems to require causal relations between characteristics of events (e.g. lightness, slowing). I 278 Universals: are sometimes used here. Sometimes it is about unique events, sometimes about characteristics of events. >Universals, >Events. Problem: why should the relations between such different entities be summarized? Why should they all be causal? Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: we must assume that they all supervene on a basic causal relation. This can not be specified in modal terms. >Modalities. Causal Relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: is largely unknown to us. It is best to recognize it when it is encountered. I 279 Our task is now to figure out what it is. This is a metaphysical, not a semantic task. >Metaphysics, >Semantics. I 288 Causation/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Let's assume that we can close the gap between everyday forces and the fundamental forces. I 289 Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: how do we justify that we have chosen forces for the explanation? >Forces, >Forces/Bigelow. Explanation/David Fair/FairVsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Fair 1979)(2): he selects instead of forces energy flow. ((s) >Energy transfer/Gerhard Vollmer). Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: we take them because they occur in Newton's 3rd law. For us, there are two instances of causation then, because there are two forces. David Fair: for him it is an instance of energy flow and thus a causation. BigelowVsFair: his theory does not provide the right relations of higher levels between universals that we need. Energy flow/energy transfer/Fair/Bigelow/Pargetter: this term requires the identification of packages of energy in time. Energy/Cause/Effect/Fair/Bigelow/Pargetter: The energy present in the effect is numerically identical to the energy lost in the cause. Problem/BigelowVsFair: but there is also cause, where no energy is transmitted, but only impulse. Therefore, it needs a shared access. Then the causation is hardly a unifying element in any explanation. Problem: besides, there are cases where both energy and impulse are transmitted, and how should one choose then? The causation cannot be identified with both. ((s) also BigelowVsVollmer). >Single-case causation, >G.Vollmer. I 290 BigelowVsFair: besides, energy transmission and pulse transmission supervene on properties and relations. Therefore, according to Fair, there can be no Humean world, which coincides with a causal possible world in all properties of the 1st level. This should, however, be possible (see Chapter 5): a theory that allows this must also recognize causation as a relation of a higher level. Fair cannot do this. >Levels/order, >Description levels. 1. Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on actions and and events. Oxford University Press. 2. Fair, D. (1979). Causation and the flow of energy. erkenntnis 14, pp. 219-50 |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Conditions | Bigelow | I 270 Conditions/causation/cause/causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: therefore, we will not treat the necessary and sufficient conditions separately, but assume a general modal relation between cause and effect. It is this theory that we reject. >Causality, >Effect, >Causes. Conditions/sufficient/necessary/causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: general problem: corresponding theories are too strongly bound up with a determinism of nature. Determinism/Bigelow/Pargetter: is here meant only in a broader sense. >Determinism. VsDeterminism/Bigelow/Pargetter: from it would follow that there is no effect without sufficient conditions. And that would mean, to the extent that there is indeterminism, we would have to give up the conept of causation. Causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not have to give it up in the macroscopic world. >Causality. Causes/Bigelow/Pargetter: are not conditions. Cause/Probability/Bigelow/Pargetter: Representatives of causes as conditions could weaken their thesis and speak of probability rather than of sufficient conditions. >Probability, >Sufficiency. I 271 Probability/cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: thus sufficient and necessary conditions are brought together. This is very plausible for many cases. Nevertheless, it is wrong. >Necessity. Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a local feature of a cause-effect pair. It is a two-digit relation. No relation with undefined many places. However, we can leave the causal relation unchanged if we insert a different cause. For example, a backup system (see, for example, another slice of bread which has the same effect). Conditions/sufficient/necessary/Bigelow/Pargetter: are - unlike the causation relation - a global feature. For example, when the backup system occurs, what is a necessary condition ceases to be a necessary condition. However, the intrinsic character of the process is unchanged. >Process. Causal laws/causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: there are causal laws! And they are global. The truth of the causal laws rests on the character of the world as a whole, not of its constituents. But the truth supervenes on the existence of a pattern of causal transaction in the world. >Causal laws, >Supervenience. I 272 Causal Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: is (or includes) a generalization of causal transactions. It is even stronger than a generalization, because we believe that modality plays a role. >Modality, >Generality, >Generalization Causal/Bigelow/Pargetter: are not the transactions because the laws exist but vice versa. Conditions/sufficient/necessary/Bigelow/Pargetter: are supported by causal laws. Therefore, they are also global. Causal Reaction/Bigelow/Pargetter: is local, in contrast. Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: thus, it is also local. Causal process/Bigelow/Pargetter: is local. >Cause, >Effect. I 273 Effect/Bigelow/Pargetter. One and the same effect could have had different causes. E.g. pregnancy by different men. DavidsonVs. > BigelowVsDavidson: this is wrong, but we do not go into it. But even if he were right, it would not save the modal theory of causation ((s) which integrates necessary and sufficient conditions). Probability/probabilistic causation/theory/Bigelow/Pargetter. E.g. causing a pregnancy by an almost infertile man - could also be understood as the prevention of parthenogenesis. I 274 LewisVs: such counterexamples are implausible. >Prevention. 1. Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on actions and and events. Oxford University Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Effect | Bigelow | I 273 Effect/Bigelow/ Pargetter: one and the same effect could have had different causes. E.g. pregnancy by different men. DavidsonVs. > BigelowVsDavidson: this is wrong, but we do not pursue it further here. But even if he were right, the modal theory of causation ((s) that integrates the necessary and sufficient conditions) would not be saved. >Modality, >Necessity, >Sufficiency, >Conditions. Probability/probabilistic causation/theory/Bigelow/Pargetter. E.g. causing a pregnancy by an almost infertile man - could also be understood as the prevention of parthenogenesis. I 274 LewisVs: such counterexamples are implausible. >D. Lewis, >Causation/Lewis. 1. Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on actions and and events. Oxford University Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Feedback | Wright | I 28 Feedback/Teleology/Wright, G. H.: a key concept in the "causalist" theory of purposefulness is the concept of negative feedback. (Compare R. Taylor 1950a(1) - R. Taylor 1950b(2), - A. Rosenblueth and N. Wiener, Purposeful and Non-Purposeful Behavior(3), - A. Rosenblueth, N. Wiener and J. Bigelow 1968(4)) I 156 TaylorVsRosenblueth/TaylorVsWiener/TaylorVsBigelow/Wright: Taylor calls the views of Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow a "mechanistic" conception of purposefulness. >Goals, >Action, >Purposes, >Procedural rationality, >Purposive action. Wright: However, the term "mechanistic" must be used in a broader sense, that is I think, better understood by the expression "causal". >Causality, >Causal relation. The authors themselves do not call their view causal. They are on the contrary cautious... I 157 ...to differentiate between causality and their concept of teleology. >Teleology. WrightVsBigelow/WrightVsWiener: this seems to be a too strong limitation of the expression "causal". Teleology/Wiener/Bigelow/Wright, G. H.: Bigelow and Wiener want to restrict "teleological behaviour" to "targeted reactions controlled by trial and error". This means it becomes equal in meaning with behaviour controlled by negative feedback. (A. Rosenblueth, N. Wiener and J. Bigelow 1943 (5)). >John Bigelow. 1. R. Taylor Comments on a Mechanistic Conception of Purpusefoulness, 1950a 2. R. Taylor, Purposeful and Non-Purposeful Behavior: A Rejoinder, 1950b 3. A. Rosenblueth, N. Wiener and J. Bigelow „Behavior, Purpose and Teleology“; 1968. 4. A.Rosenblueth and N. Wiener, Purposeful and Non-Purposeful Behavior 5. A. Rosenblueth, N. Wiener and J. Bigelow „Behavior, Purpose and Teleology“, 1943, S. 23-24. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Forces | Bigelow | I 282 Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Lit: Bigelow, Ellis Pargetter 1988)(1) Thesis: forces are relations and a subspecies of causal relations. Here: stronger thesis all causes supervene on forces. Forces are higher-level relations between structures that involve individual events and their properties. Forces/tradition: intermediary between causes and effects. >Supervenience, >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Levels, >Events, >Forces/Tradition. Mediator between causes and effects. >Cause, >Effect. Mediation/middle position/intermediate position/BigelowVsTradition/ HumeVsTradition: Problem: Regress: if F is used as an intermediary between C and E, why is there not another mediator between F and E? Requirement for this argument is however: the assumption that C, E, and F are entities of the same type. Wrong solution: to assume that forces are "immediate causes". For this would again require immediate causes. >Regress. Wrong solution: to construct forces as dispositional properties: either dispositions of an object for changes or a field for any effects. Disposition/Bigelow/Pargetter: is not itself part of a causal chain. So we cannot close a gap in the chain with it. Therefore there is no threat of regression here. Nevertheless, dispositions simply do not have the right ontological category for forces. We can give a complete causal explanation without mentioning dispositions. For the causation is given by the physical basis of dispositions. >Ontology. I 283 Disposition/Bigelow/Pargetter: supervenes, but does not participate in the causal process. But they can be there if they are not active, while forces cannot do that. Forces: take part in the causal process. If they are not active, they do not exist - unlike dispositions. >Instantiation. Forces/Ellis/Bigelow/Pargetter (1988)(1): Thesis: they constitute causal relations. They are not themselves causes, but a relation between cause and effect. As a commonality between quite different phenomena. They should also show the commonality of laws, even if they are formulated very differently. Law/Forces/Ellis/Bigelow/Pargetter: inversely, similarly constructed laws may involve quite different forces, e.g. the proportion of the inversed square. New/Bigelow/Pargetter: recently, we no longer identify an instance of a causal relation with a single force (see below). New: different fundamental forces join forces to form fundamental causes. We keep the other arguments: Forces and fundamental causes must be relations of a higher level between events, for, as a relation of first level, they would make a Humean world impossible. Property complex/Bigelow/Pargetter: they are what is put into relation by forces. Each has as a constituent a number of properties and relations of 1st level. All will also be there in a Humean world. Only in the actual world there are the cohesive forces, and these are external relations. >Humean world. I 284 Actual world/Bigelow/Pargetter: even in our world there may be other instances of these property complexes which are not in these causal relations. This is due to the local nature of the causal relations. >Actual world. Camps: forces: realistic view: Bigelow/Pargetter, Ellis 1988(1): either the components or the resulting forces are real (not both, otherwise double causation). Vs: Cartwright 1980(3), 1983(4)) >N. Cartwright. Forces/Ellis/Bigelow/Pargetter: either, the components of forces are real or the resulting forces are real. For example, there may be a resultant force of 0, because forces neutralize if they deviate from 0. Problem: the components and the resulting forces cannot all be real, otherwise we would have overdetermination or double causation. >Overdetermination. Realistic view: must be decided from case to case whether it sees the components or the resulting forces as real. For example, we must sometimes assume different relative strengths of components to explain a resulting force. Reality/Bigelow/Pargetter: the reality of the components is sometimes forced upon us by our considerations. For example, three protons, shielded from interference from the outside, one in the middle of a line between the other two. The predicted movement of the outer towards the outside will involve forces that exist between the two outer as well as between them and that in the middle. Nevertheless, the principle of force and opposing force (here: action and reaction) demands that the middle proton is exposed to counter forces, which together cause it to remain at rest. I 285 On the other hand. For example, in a situation, a particle can only move perpendicular to a real force. Solution: we assume two fictitious forces, which are perpendicular to each other. This is imposed on us in the situation. The choice is arbitrary, as is orthogonality. And not all can be real, for otherwise we would have overdetermination. In this situation, the resulting force is real, not the components. Causal Relation/Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: since sometimes the resulting force must be assumed as real, sometimes the components (depending on the physical situation) the causal relation should be explained as a relation of higher level between aggregates of forces. >Causal relation. Forces/quantum mechanics/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the quantum mechanics one does not use forces. For example, one does not say that a photon exerts a force on an electron. >Quantum mechanics. Bigelow/Pargetter: however, we treat these cases as analogous because they appear to us to be similar enough. (See Heathcote 1989)(2). Field/Bigelow/Pargetter: also in the relation between field and particle, we allow ourselves to speak of forces and causation. >Fields. I 286 But we rather speak of interaction between two fields as between field and particle. Quantum mechanics/Bigelow/Pargetter: "Interactions" are the legitimate heirs of the traditional "forces". Field/VsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: there are also cases where a field does not interact with a particle, but is nevertheless produced. This seems to contradict our theory. If a field is formed from a particle, one cannot speak of forces. An electric particle exerts no force on its own electric field. Nevertheless, it precisely causes this field. BigelowVsVs: this is not a case of causation. The argument presupposes a separation of particle and field, which is not accepted by anybody. There is rather a unity. The field is part of the "essence" of the particle. This needs, however, to be examined in the light of further scientific development. >Essence, >Spacetime, >Space curvature. 1. Bigelow, J. Ellis, B., and Pargetter, R. (1988). Forces. Philosophy of Science 55. pp. 614-30. 2. Heathcote, A. (1989). A theory of causality: Causality = Interaction (as defined by quantum field theory). Erkenntnis 31 pp.77-108. 3. Cartwright, N. (1980). Do the laws of physics state facts? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61, pp.343-77. 4. Cartwright, N. (1983). How the laws of physics lie. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Geometry | Bigelow | I 360 Golden Section/Bigelow/Pargetter: this relation is all too real. Nevertheless, it is not a ratio in our sense. >Ontology, >Existence, >Relations. For example, if we create lines by stringing DF together we will never get a matching point with multiples of DC. Logical form/General/Incommensurability/Bigelow/Pargetter: n times DF will never be = m times DC. This also applies to the solution of Wiener (see above). Proportion: here is 2: (1 + √5), therefore it cannot be represented as ratio a:b for integers a and b. Incommensurability/proof: can be proven by raa: assuming DF and DC would be commensurable, i.e. there is a distance d that divides both DF and DC. Let's take a look at the rectangle (in the graphic above) FDC, d divides DF and DF equals EC. This divides both DC and EC. Therefore, it must also divide DE. Then the same size must divide both the larger and the smaller rectangle, which is not possible. d would then also have to divide the sides of the third rectangle in the drawing etc. ad infinitum. Therefore, no finite length can divide both sides of a golden rectangle. I 360 VsBigelow: incommensurability seems to be against our theory. >Irrational numbers. BigelowVsVs: Solution: we redefine "ratio" a little bit: we need a third relation: Definition Incommensurability/logical form/Bigelow/Pargetter: if two relations R and S are income-survable, then whenever x Rn y, follows that not: x Sm y, for whichever values of n and m are used. Repetition of n applications of R will never result in a match with m applications of S. N.B.: nevertheless, we can determine that the results of repeated applications of R and S are in a certain relation to each other. They are arranged in a linear order "<" ("smaller"). I.e. it can be, for an n and an m If x Rn y and x Sm z, then y < z. Golden Section/Bigelow/Pargetter: is clearly defined by the list of numbers n and m for which the above scheme applies. I 362 General: each proportion between two relations R and S can be unambiguously characterized by a list of natural numbers n and m for which the scheme applies. >Proportions. Proportion/Bigelow/Pargetter: this theory of proportions is based on Eudoxo's contribution to Euclid's Elements (Book 5 Def 5). Real Numbers/Bigelow/Pargetter: this theory of proportions as a theory of real numbers was developed by Dedekind and others at the end of the 19th century. >Real numbers. I 364 Geometry/Bigelow/Pargetter: geometry has to do with spatially instantiated universals. Therefore, it is vulnerable through empirical discoveries about space. It could be that we discover that space does not instantiate the geometric shapes that we had previously assumed to be instantiated like this. >Discoveries, >Space. Aristotle/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to him the forms would then be discarded. Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: he allows first the acceptance of a non-Euclidean space. ((s) But if it is not directly perceptible to us and if it is instantiated in the universe, for example, it is not a problem for Aristotle either.) I 365 Universals/Platonism/Bigelow/Pargetter: actually he doesn't believe in uninstantiated universals either, but he will find them or invent them. Above all, he will say that pure mathematics is autonomous. >Ideas/Plato. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Knowledge how | Chalmers | Chalmers I 142 Knowledge how/Qualia/primary/secondary intension/LoarVsJackson/LoarVsMaterialism/Loar/Chalmers: Loar (1990)(1) goes deeper in his critique than Horgan (1984b)(2) Tye (1986)(3), Churchland (1985)(4), Papineau (1993)(5), Teller (1992)(6), McMullen (1985)(7): the examples with water/H2O, Superman/Clark Kent etc. still allow the physical and/or phenomenal concepts to have different primary intensions. For example, heat and e.g. average kinetic energy designate the same property (secondary intension), but simultaneously introduce different properties (primary intensions)! But this is not known a priori. N.B.: then Mary's knowledge about the phenomenal qualities of colors... I 143 ... was already a knowledge of physical or functional properties, but they could not connect the two before. >Color researcher Mary, >Qualia, >Knowledge, >Propositional Knowledge, >Experience, >Intentions, >Primary Intension, >Terminology/Chalmers. VsJackson/Chalmers: further objections: (Bigelow/Pargetter (1990)(8)): BigelowVsJackson, PargetterVsJackson: even for an omniscient being there is a gap between physical and indexical knowledge (for example, Rudolf Lingens with memory loss reads his own biography in the library). I 144 ChalmersVsBigelow/ChalmersVsPargetter/ChalmersVsLoar: the lack of phenomenal knowledge is quite different from the lack of indexical knowledge. Knowledge/Indexicality/Nagel/Chalmers: (Nagel 1983)(9): there is an ontological gap here. ChalmersVsNagel: we can argue more directly: there is no imaginable world in which the physical facts are as in our world, but in which the indexical facts differ from ours. >Conceivability, >Possible worlds. 1. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108 2. T. Horgan, Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 1984: pp. 147-83 3. M. Tye, The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95, 1986: pp. 1-17 4. P. M. Churchland, Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy 82, 1985: pp. 8-28 5. D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford 1993 6. P. Teller A contemporary look at emergence. In: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim (Eds) Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin 1992 7. C. McMullen, "Knowing what it's like" and the essential indexical. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 211-33 8. J. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, Acquaintance with qualia. Theoria 56, 1990: pp. 129-47 9. Th. Nagel, The objective self. In. C. Ginet and S. Shoemaker (eds) Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essayys. New York 1983. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Knowledge how | Loar | Chalmers I 142 Knowledge how/Qualia/primary/secondary intension/LoarVsJackson/LoarVsMaterialism/Loar/Chalmers: Loar (1990)(1) goes deeper in his critique than Horgan (1984b)(2) Tye (1986)(3), Churchland (1985)(4), Papineau (1993)(5), Teller (1992)(6), McMullen (1985)(7): the examples with water/H2O, Superman/Clark Kent etc. still allow the physical and/or phenomenal concepts to have different primary intensions. For example, heat and e.g. average kinetic energy designate the same property (secondary intension), but simultaneously introduce different properties (primary intensions)! But this is not known a priori. N.B.: then Mary's knowledge about the phenomenal qualities of colors... I 143 ... was already a knowledge of physical or functional properties, but they could not connect the two before. VsJackson/Chalmers: further objections: (Bigelow/Pargetter (1990)(8)): BigelowVsJackson, PargetterVsJackson: even for an omniscient being there is a gap between physical and indexical knowledge (for example, Rudolf Lingens with memory loss reads his own biography in the library). I 144 ChalmersVsBigelow/ChalmersVsPargetter/ChalmersVsLoar: the lack of phenomenal knowledge is quite different from the lack of indexical knowledge. Knowledge/Indexicality/Nagel/Chalmers: (Nagel 1983)(9): there is an ontological gap here. ChalmersVsNagel: we can argue more directly: there is no imaginable world in which the physical facts are as in our world, but in which the indexical facts differ from ours. 1. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108 2. T. Horgan, Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 1984: pp. 147-83 3. M. Tye, The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95, 1986: pp. 1-17 4. P. M. Churchland, Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy 82, 1985: pp. 8-28 5. D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford 1993 6. P. Teller A contemporary look at emergence. In: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim (Eds) Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin 1992 7. C. McMullen, "Knowing what it's like" and the essential indexical. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 211-33 8. J. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, Acquaintance with qualia. Theoria 56, 1990: pp. 129-47 9. Th. Nagel, The objective self. In. C. Ginet and S. Shoemaker (eds) Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essayys. New York 1983. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Natural Laws | Bigelow | I 113 Natural Laws/Counterfactual Conditional/Bigelow/Pargetter: are often formulated in terms of "ideal systems". To do this, they need the counterfactual conditionals. I 114 Similarly, thought experiments need counterfactual conditionals. I 214 Law/Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: For example,"What goes up must fall". Lucrez: what consists mainly of soil or water has to move downwards. "Down" was a marked direction. Atomism: Representative: Lucrez: Little astronomical knowledge yet. Aristotle/Ptolemaios: believed that everything that consists mainly of earth or water moves to the center of the cosmos, and since it moves to the center of the earth, it must be the center of the cosmos. I 215 Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: in one respect Aristotle is closer to the truth, in other respects it is Lucrez. He was right that the center of the earth is not marked. Natural Laws/Physics/Biology/Bigelow/Pargetter: a one-sided diet with examples from physics does not necessarily lead to a correct view of the natural laws. Instead, here are some examples from biology: Generalization/Biology: For example, a living being has father and mother of the same species as it itself. (Today we know that this has some exceptions). I 216 It was a surprise to discover that this also applies to some plants. I 217 Generalization: most of them have an exception. For example, without exception: perhaps the generalization "All mammals have a mother". Exceptions/counter-examples/Bigelow/Pargetter: one should not overestimate the threat posed by exceptions to laws. Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: we are looking for two things: a) something that is more than regularity, on the other hand b) less than a regularity without exception. It may be that we have discovered with a law an important property of the cases that are sufficient for it, even if not all cases satisfy it. Modal/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: the commonalities that satisfy the law are modal. Law/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not always need a law, for example to know that our cat is pregnant. >Generality, >Generalization. I 220 Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are improved: e.g. Aristotle - Copernicus - Newton. Copernicus: still thought that the material of the moon does not fall towards the earth, but towards the moon center. Therefore the moon is round. Newton/(s): first explained the circular motion of the moon. Aristotle: thesis: everything (earthly and watery) falls to a center and this is coincidentally the center of the earth. N.B.: thus he fulfils the quasi-copernican theory! I 221 VsAristotle: his theory was nevertheless wrong. But not because any movement would have been different, but because the reasoning was wrong: it is about gravity, Aristotle considered the center of the earth to be the center of the cosmos. Error: was not that Aristotle thought that no object would fall in a different direction, but because he thought that no object could fall in a different direction. (Necessity). I 221 Law/Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are generalizations (description of regularities) plus attribution of necessity. (Dretske 1977(1), Tooley 1977(2), Armstrong 1978(3), 1983(4)) >Possibilia, >Counterfactual conditional. Bigelow/Pargetter: if they are wrong, they must be strictly wrong or empty. (Cartwright 1983(5), Hacking 1983(6)). I 222 Definition Laws/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: are truths about Possibilia. Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: Actualia cannot be fully understood without understanding Possibilia. ((s) Here understanding is associated with objects, not sentences.) >Understanding. Possible Worlds/Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: we understand the actual world only by locating it in the logical space of possible worlds. >Possible worlds, >Possible worlds/Bigelow, >Actual world. Natural Law/Laws of nature/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: cannot be adequately described in a non-modal language. Because a natural law is not just a regularity. >Regularities, >Regularity theory, >Modalities, >Theory language. Logical form: i.e. a natural law cannot be merely defined as (x)(Fx > Gx). Logical form: of a natural law will often be a universal generalization (UG). >Universal generalization. But it can also be another generalization or other form of sentence. >Universal generalization. >Generality, >Generalization We assume, however, that natural laws (UG) will be involved and therefore have the following form: I 223 natN (x)(Fx > Gx). Natural necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: entails that natural laws involve counterfactual conditionals. Because they are about what would happen, not just what already happens. And even if things were different in certain respects. I.e. in addition to regularity (x)(Fx > Gx) it will be true that every F would be a G ((s) Logic of 2nd level!) Logical form/(s) counterfactual conditional instead of quantification of 2nd level: (x) Fx would be > would be Gx) we take this together as a truthmaker of the proposition natN (x)(Fx > Gx) (see above). >Truthmakers. Natural Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: this is the view of natural laws that we defend. LewisVsBigelow: (Lewis, 1979)(7) the theory is circular. >Natural laws/Lewis. I 226 Non-modal Theory/Natural Laws/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: (instead of relative necessity:) most non-modal theories of natural law are derived from Hume. Then we can accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity, without falling into a circle. >Necessity, >Necessity/Bigelow, >Necessity/Hume. N.B.: then we can simply accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity and rely on it being based on independent access to laws! Explanation: so it makes sense to use laws to explain nomic necessity rather than vice versa. And this is much less obscure than modal arguments. >Modalities. I 227 BigelowVsVs: modal explanations are not so mysterious. BigelowVsHume: Humean theories are not able to explain these non-modal properties of the laws, they have less explanatory power. >Explanations, >Causal explanation. 1. Dretske, F.I. (1977). Laws of nature. Philosophy of Science 44, pp. 248-68 2. Tooley, M. (1977). The nature of laws. Canadian Journal of Philosphy 7, pp. 667-98. 3. Armstrong, D.M. (1978). Universals and scientific realism. Cambridge University Press. 4. Armstrong, D.M. (1983). What is a law of nature? Cambridge University Press. 5. Cartwright, N. (1983). How the laws of physics lie. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 6. Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and intervening: Introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science. Cambridge University Press. 7. Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Predicates | Bigelow | I 93 Predicates/Bigelow/Pargetter: which entities do they correspond to? (If anything at all?). >Correspondence, >Reference, >Properties. Predicate/Bigelow/Pargetter: can we name the rest of the sentence after we have sorted out the name? >Names, >Descriptions, >Sentences. Referent/Predicate/Bigelow/Pargetter: with a predicate, there does not necessarily have to be something that is its referent. In any case, nothing where a quantification of the first level is possible. >Reference, >Quantification, >Ontology, >Existence. I 94 Predicate/Bigelow/Pargetter: represents the thing "somehow" as being. But this does not have to correspond to the "anything" of the individual. Quantification of the 2nd order/Bigelow/Pargetter: is required by the "somehow". >Second order logic. Predicate/Bigelow/Pargetter: Does not have to mean anything at all. Mackie: (1973)(1) ditto. Armstrong: ditto. Strawson: ditto. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantification of higher level. Predicate/Bigelow/Pargetter: however, there are often things that need to be done in order for the predicate to be applied. Predicates often correspond to universals. And the better our science is, the more universals that exist in nature - quantities, relations, etc. >Universals, >Quantities, >Relations. ((s) ConceptualismVsBigelow: only inventions of the mind - BigelowVsConceptualism). >Conceptualism. I 101 Def predicate/Bigelow: at the end we will say that predicates refer to sets constructed from universals and possibilia. >Quantities, >Possibilia. 1. Mackie, J.L. (1973). truth, probability. and paradox. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Relation-Theory | Bigelow | I 55 Quantity/relational theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantities are general relations between objects. They seem to be consequences of the intrinsic properties of objects. But one would not have to postulate an intrinsic relation "greater than", but only e.g. the size. >Quantity, >Sizes/Physics, >Relations, >Objects, >Intrinsic, >Properties. Greater than/relational property/problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: one might wonder if there really is an intrinsic property to be that and that big. Cf. >Haecceitism. Relational property/Bigelow/Pargetter: one might be tempted to assume that everything is based on relational properties, rather than vice versa. But we are not going to go into that here. Intrinsic property/Bigelow/Pargetter: we think that in the end they can be defended against relational properties as a basis. Nevertheless, we certainly need relational properties, e.g. for the order of events. These do not just stand in time. So we definitely need relations. Relations/Bigelow/Pargetter: we definitely need relations. Because events never stand for themselves. >Events. I 56 Also for expressions such as "twice the size" etc. Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quantities cannot be based on properties alone, but need relations. For example, having this or that mass is then the property of being in relation to other massive objects. Participation/BigelowVsPlato: Plato has all things in a more or less strong relation to a single thing, the form. We, on the other hand, want relations between things among themselves. >Methexis, >Plato. BigelowVsPlato: we can then explain different kinds of differences between objects, namely that they have different relational properties that other things do not have. E.g. two pairs of things can differ in different ways. I 57 Relational Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: can handle differences of differences well. Question: can it cope well with similarities? For example, explain what mass is at all? Problem: we need a relation between a common property and many relations to it. There are many implications (entailments) which are not yet explained. Property/Bigelow/Pargetter: 1. in order to construct an (intrinsic) property at all, we must therefore specify the many possible relations it can have to particalur. Solution: one possibility: the sentence via the property of the 2nd level. 2. Problem: how can two things have more in common than two other things? Ad 1. Example Mass Common/Commonality/Bigelow/Pargetter: must then be a property of relations (of the many different relations that the individual objects have to "mass"). I 58 Solution: property of the 2nd level that is shared by all massive things. For example, "stand in mass relations". >Comparisons, >Comparability, >Similarity, >Identity. Entailment/N.b.: this common (2nd level property) explains the many relations of the entailment between massive objects and the common property of solidity. Problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: our relational theory is still incomplete. Problem: to explain to what extent some mass-relations are closer (more similar) than others. Relations/common/Bigelow/Pargetter: also the relations have a common: a property of the 2nd level. Property 2. Level/difference/differentiation/problem/Bigelow/Pargetter: does not explain how two things differ more than two other things. >Levels/order, >Description levels. It also does not explain how, for example, differences in masses relate to differences in volume. For example, compare the pairs "a, b" "c, d" "e, f" between which there are differences in thicknesses with regard to e.g. length. Then two of the couples will be more similar in important respects than two other pairs. I 59 Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: the relation of proportion. This is similar to Frege's approach to real numbers. Real numbers/Frege: as proportions between sizes (Bigelow/Pargetter corresponds to our quantities). >Real numbers, >Quantity/Bigelow. Bigelow/Pargetter: three fundamental components (1) Individuals (2) Relations between individuals (3) Relations of proportions between relations between individuals. Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: divide the relations between individuals into equivalence classes. >Proportions/Bigelow. Mass/Volume/Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: N.b. all masses are proportional to each other and all volumes are proportional to each other, but masses and volumes are not proportional to each other. Equivalence classes/Bigelow/Pargetter: arrange objects with the same D-ates into classes. So they explain how two things ((s) can be more similar in one respect, D-able) than in another. >Determinates/Determinables, >Equivalence classes. Level 1: Objects Level 2: Properties of things Level 3: Proportions between such properties. Proportions/Bigelow/Pargetter: are universals that can introduce finer differences between equivalence classes of properties of the 2nd level. Different pairs of mass relations can be placed in the same proportion on level 3. E.g. (s) 2Kg/4kg is twice as heavy as 3Kg/6Kg. N.b.: with this we have groupings that are transverse to the equivalence classes of the mass relations, volumetric relations, velocity relations, etc. Equal/different/Bigelow/Pargetter: N.B:: that explains why two relations can be equal and different at the same time. E.g. Assuming that one of the two relations is a mass relation (and stands in relation to other mass relations) the other is not a mass relation (and is not in relation to mass relations) and yet... I 60 ...both have something in common: they are "double" once in terms of mass, once in terms of volume. This is explained on level 3. Figures/Bigelow/Pargetter: this shows the usefulness of numbers in the treatment of quantities. (BigelowVsField). >Hartry Field, >Numbers, >Mathematical Entities, >Ontology. Real numbers/Frege: Lit: Quine (1941(1), 1966(2)) in "Whitehead and the Rise of Modern Logic") Measure/Unit/Measuerment Unit/To Measure/Bigelow/Pargetter:"same mass as" would be a property of the 2nd level that a thing has to an arbitrary unit. >Measurement, >Equality. Form/Plato/Bigelow/Pargetter: his theory of forms was not wrong, but incomplete. Objects have relations to paradigms (here: units of measurement). This is the same relation as that of participation in Plato. I 61 Level 3: the relations between some D-ates can be more complex than those between others. For mass, for example, we need real numbers, other terms are less clear. Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: are divided into different types, which leads to interval scales or ratio scales of measurement, for example. >Scales. Pain/Bigelow/Pargetter: we cannot compare the pain of different living beings. Level 3: not only explains a rich network of properties of the 2nd level and relations between objects,... I 62 ...but also explain patterns of entailments between them. NominalismVsBigelow: will try to avoid our apparatus of relations of relations. >Nominalism. BigelowVsNominalism: we need relations and relations of relations in science. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not claim to have proven it here. But it is the only way to solve the problem of the same and the different (problem of the quantities with the 3 levels). >Realism/Bigelow, >Problem of quantities. Simplicity/BigelowVsNominalism: will never be as uniform as our realistic explanation. Nominalism would have to accept complex relational predicates as primitive. >Simplicity. Worse still, it will have to accept complex relations between them as primitive. 1. Quine, W.V.O. (1941). Whitehead and the rise of modern logic. In: The philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (ed. P.A. Schilpp). pp.125-63. La Salle, Ill. Open Court. 2. Quine, W.V.O. (1966). Selected logic papers. New York: Random House. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Similarity | Bigelow | I 228 Accessibility/Lewis: Accessibility between possible worlds: their degrees should be understood as degrees of similarity. >Accessibility, >Possible worlds. Similarity/possible worlds/Lewis: here we have to recognize the relevant similarity. More important is the one concerning certain laws! This presupposes laws in the explanation. (Lewis 1979(1),1986a(2) - JacksonVsLewis: Jackson 1977a(3): Causality instead of similarity) >Relevance. Accessibility/Bigelow/Pargetter: Example 3 worlds 1. World u: Darwin asks his father for permission to sail away, receives it and writes his book, of which we have all heard 2. World w: Darwin does not get permission, does not sail away and does not write his book. 3. World e v: Darwin does not get permission to sail away, but still sails off... and his father forgot what he said. Accessibility/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to our semantics (and that of Lewis) the corresponding counterfactual conditional is only true in w, if possible worlds like u are the most accessible of w (next world most similar possible world). >Similarity metrics. Lewis: so u has to be more similar than w v is similar. u and w must be closer to each other. If v and w were closer together, the following counterfactual conditional would be true: If Darwin's father had not given permission, Darwin would not have obeyed and his father would have forgotten. And that is not true in w. So u w is closer than v u is close. >Counterfactual conditional. I 229 Similarity/possible worlds/relevance/Bigelow/Pargetter: what kind of similarity is the relevant one? It cannot be about certain facts (as in this story). That would not be enough. Solution/Lewis: Def Similarity/similarity metrics/possible world/Lewis: by fewer exceptions in a possible world with laws that apply in the other possible world. > Miracles. For example, Darwin: "Miracles" would be the false acoustic transmission of the father's statement and the forgetting through the father. >Miracles. Miracles/Lewis: but also world u could contain miracles: the prehistory is the same as in v, but the father's decision is different, but the causal situation would be the same and the miracle of the other decision would perhaps be just as great as that of erasure of memory and mishearing. I 230 Natural Laws/Worlds/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: so it could be that other laws apply there as well. Obey/Laws/Possible Worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: we can also say that a world obeys the laws of another possible world to a certain extent. For example, there might be a possible world z that obeys the laws of w better than u? z: assuming there are laws here that make the refuse of the permission probable. Suppose the father has heard of a conflict with France in the sea area. This does not require any change in the laws. Then we would be forced to assume that the following counterfactual conditional is true in w: (according to our semantics and that of Lewis): If Darwin's father had refused, war would have broken out between England and France or there would have been another factor that would have led to rejection. However, it is wrong in w in at least one way of reading. Similarity metrics/relevance/similarity/Lewis: this shows that similarity of laws is not the only relevant factor. Solution/Lewis: Similarity between worlds must be explained a) by similarity in terms of laws, b) by similarity in relation to certain facts. Weighting/Lewis: For example, the same facts over a long period of time have more weight than obeying the same certain laws. But compliance with laws has more weight than certain consistent facts. I 231 LewisVsBigelow: VsModal theory. Bigelow/Pargetter: we explain laws by accessibility Lewis: explains accessibility by law. Bigelow/Pargetter: if Lewis is right, our theory is circular. >Circular reasoning. Solution/Lewis: see above. BigelowVsVs/BigelowVsLewis: we deny that accessibility must be explained by similarity. The easiest accessible world does not have to be the most similar world! This is shown by the above examples (Darwin's father). But even if it were not the case, it would not refute the modal theory of the laws of nature. Similarity/Possible World/Bigelow/Pargetter: we are challenged to construct a better theory than Lewis. 1. Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76 2. Lewis, D. K. (1986a) On the plurality of worlds,. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 3. Jackson, F. (1977a) A causal theory of counterfactuals. Australasian Journal of Philosphy 55, pp.3-21 |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Universals | Forrest | Bigelow I 89 Structural universals/Peter Forrest/Bigelow/Pargetter: (similar to our higher level relations): Forrest: thesis: there is a quasi-mereological n-part operation that takes n quasi-parts and assembles them into a quasi-whole: Operation ‹a1,…an› = an+1. Bigelow/Pargetter: that is equivalent to the fact that we have a (n+1)-digit relation: R(a1,…an, an+1). BigelowVsForrest: our differences lie in the fact that we do not accept the quasi-mereology. >Mereology, >Parts, >Whole, >Mereological Sum, >J. Bigelow. Entailments/VsBigelow: one could object that we have explained the entailments between 1st level properties by appeal to higher level properties. >Entailment. In doing so, we have practically assumed that there are also entailments between them (this is circular). I 90 Bsp Necessary (being methane R (being carbon) Entailment: then because of this relation the entailment is valid, between the methane-being of something and the fact that this thing has a part which is carbon: (I) Necessarily, for any F and G, if (F) R (G), then every instance of F has a part that is an instance of G. The principle (I) involves necessity. This must be grounded in the essence of universals to avoid modal basic concepts. But is not the appeal to essences itself modal (and modal magic)? >Essence, >Modality, >Necessity, >Modal Logic. BigelowVsVs: yes and no. We all need a little magic sometimes. But this is white magic. You just argue sometimes about what is white and what is black. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Armstrong, D. | Bigelow Vs Armstrong, D. | I 39 Universals/ArmstrongVsBigelow: all universals are at least potentially multiply localized. BigelowVsArmstrong: there are some that can only be in one place at a time. Def Repetition/Recurrence//Bigelow/Pargetter: are paradigmatic universals which are actually multiply located. Individual/Existence/: instantiates a universal. The individual exists. Universal/Existence/Bigelow/Pargetter: what is instantiated by an individual also exists. I 46 Universals/Armstrong: "a-posteriori realism". It will turn out which universals actually exist - - against: QuineVsArmstrong/GoodmanVsArmstrong/BigelowVsArmstrong. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Bigelow, J. | Davidson Vs Bigelow, J. | Bigelow I 273 Effect/Bigelow/Pargetter: one and the same effect could have had various causes. E.g. pregnancy by various men. DavidsonVs. Identity/Incident/DavidsonVsBigelow: (Davidson 1980) Identity of incidents: Thesis: a criterion of identity makes necessary, because various causes cause numerically different incidents. BigelowVsDavidson: this is wrong, but we will not go into that here. But even if he was right, that would not save the modal theory of causation ((s) which includes necessary and sufficient conditions). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Bigelow, J. | Lewis Vs Bigelow, J. | Big I 222 Laws of Nature/LoN/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: cannot be described adequately in a non-modal language. And this because NG is not only a regularity. logical form: i.e. a NG cannot only be represented in this form: (x)(Fx > Gx) logical form : a NG will often be a universal generalization (Gen)[universelle Generalisierung (UG)]. But it may also be a different generalization or a different form of sentence. But we are assuming here that laws of nature involve universal generalizations, and will therefore have the following form: I 223 natL(x)(Fx > Gx). (x) Fx would > would Gx) ((s) If something were an F, it would be a G). LoN/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: this is the view on NG which we defend. LewisVsBigelow (1979): the theory is circular. I 231 LewisVsBigelow: Vsmodal theory. Bigelow/Pargetter: We explain laws through accessibility Lewis: explains accessibility through laws. Bigelow/Pargetter: If Lewis is right, our theory is circular. Lösung/Lewis: s.u. BigelowVsVs/BigelowVsLewis: We deny that accessibility must be explained through similarity. The world that has the easiest access is not necessarily the world which resembles the other one the most. >Similarity metrics. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Bigelow, J. | Verschiedene Vs Bigelow, J. | Bigelow I 288 Causation/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: so let us assume that we can close the gap between everyday forces and fundamental forces. I 289 Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: how can we justify having chosen forces for explanation? Explanation/David Fair/FairVsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Fair 1979): he chooses energy flow instead of forces ((s) energy flow > Gerhard Vollmer). Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: we assume them because they occur in Newton's 3rd law. For us then there are two instances of causation because there are two forces. Fair: for him it is an instance of energy flow and thus a causation. BigelowVsFair: his theory does not give the right relations of higher level between universals that we need. Bigelow I 360 VsBigelow: the incommensurability seems to speak against our theory. BigelowVsVs: Solution: we slightly redefine "relation": we need a third relation: Def Incommensurability/logical form/Bigelow/Pargetter: if two relations R and S are incommensurable, then whenever x Rn y, follows that not: x Sm y, for whatever values of n and m. Repetition of n applications of R will never result in a match with m applications of S. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Bigelow, J. | Martin Vs Bigelow, J. | Armstrong II 181 Wahrheit/Bigelow: (The Reality of Numbers, Oxford, 1988, S.132f,158f) "superveniert auf Sein". Gesamtheit/Teil/Ganzes/Universalien/Lewis: ich bin nicht auf Universalien festgelegt, ich würde eine neutrale Formulierung vorziehen: Wahrheit superveniert darauf, was für Dinge es gibt und welche vollständig natürlichen Eigenschaften und Relationen sie instantiieren. Wahrmacher/MartinVsBigelow: Wahrheit ohne Wahrmacher hat einen üblen Geruch. Lewis: das lenkt Verdacht nicht nur auf verseuchte kontrafaktische Konditionale sondern auch auf unschuldige negative Existenzsätze und negative Prädikationen. Jedenfalls ist etwas Falsches an phänomenalistischen kontrafaktischen Konditionalen zu finden. ((s) „Meine Wahrnehmung wäre anders gewesen“). |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Conceptualism | Bigelow Vs Conceptualism | I 94 Predicate/Bigelow/Pargetter: yet there are often things that have to exist so that the predicate can be applied. Predicates very often correspond to universals. And our science is all the better, the more universals that exist in nature - quantities, relations, etc. ((s) ConceptualismVsBigelow: only inventions of the mind - BigelowVsConceptualism). |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Fair, D | Bigelow Vs Fair, D | I 289 Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: how can we justify that we have chosen forces as an explanation?. Explanation/David Fair/FairVsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Fair 1979): He choses energy flow instead forces ((s) energy transmission> Gerhard Vollmer). Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: we use them, because they appear in Newton’s 3rd law. So there are two instances of causation for us, because there are two forces. Fair: for him it is one instance of energy flow and thus a causation. BigelowVsFair: his theory does not provide the proper relations between universals of a higher level that we need. Energy flow/energy transmission/Fair/Bigelow/Pargetter: this concept requires the identification of units (packages) of energy in time. Energy/Cause/Effect/Fair/Bigelow/Pargetter: the energy that is present in the effect is numerically identical with the energy that is lost in the cause. (Strand). Problem/BigelowVsFair: there are also causations, where no energy is transmitted, but only momentum! Therefore, he needs a divided approach. Then the causation is hardly a unifying element in an explanation. Problem: furthermore: there are cases where both energy and momentum are transferred, and how should one decide then? Causation cannot be identified with both. ((s) also BigelowVsVollmer). I 290 BigelowVsFair: furthermore, energy transmission and momentum transmission supervene over properties and relations. Therefore, there can be no Humean world according to fair, which coincides with a causal possible world in all 1st stage properties. However, this should be possible (see above Chapter 5): A theory which allows that must recognize causation as a relation of a higher level. Fair cannot do that. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Hume, D. | Bigelow Vs Hume, D. | I 226 Non-modal theory/Laws of Nature/LoN/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: most non-modal theories of the LON descended from Hume. Then we can assume nomic necessity to be a relative necessity without falling into a circle. Important argument: then we can just assume nomic necessity as a relative necessity and rely on it being based on an independent approach to laws! Explanation: So it makes sense to make use of laws to explain nomic necessity, rather than vice versa. And that’s much less obscure than modal arguments. I 227 BigelowVsVs: modal explanations are not so mysterious. BigelowVsHume: Hume’s theories are unable to explain these non-modal properties of the laws, they have less explanatory power. I 233 "Full generality"/"Pure" generality/Hume/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: may not contain any reference to an individual: This is too weak and too strong: a) too strong: E.g. Kepler’s laws relate to all the planets, but therefore also to an individual, the sun. b) too weak: it is still no law. E.g. that everything moves towards the earth’s center. I 235 LoN/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: in our opinion, it has nothing to do with them, E.g. whether they are useful, or whether they contradict our intuitions. Counterfactual conditional/Co.co/LoN/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: for the Humean, Counterfactual Conditional are circular, if they are to represent LoN. We ourselves only use a Counterfactual Conditional when we have recognized something as a law! When we ask ourselves whether something is a law, we ask ourselves not whether it fulfils a Counterfactual Conditional. I 236 HumeVsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: our modal approach for LoN is circular. BigelowVsVs: it is not! BigelowVsHume: most of Hume’s theories of the LON are circular themselves, with one exception: the theory that Lewis reads out of Ramsey. Ramsey/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: this theory is based on the logical relations of laws among each other (coherence). (Ramsey 1929, 1931, Lewis 1973a, Mellor 1980). I 237 BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: if theories are sets of propositions, propositions must not be sets of possible worlds! For then the best theory for a possible worlds would have to be an axiom: the one-class of this possible worlds All facts of the world are then theorems of the axiom. There would be only one law for each world. No two possible worlds would have a law in common. I 267 BigelowVsHume: went too far in his rejection of necessity in laws. But not far enough in his rejection of the necessity approach to causality. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Nominalism | Bigelow Vs Nominalism | I 62 NominalismVsBigelow: will try to avoid our apparatus of relations of relations. BigelowVsNominalism: we need relations and relations of relations in science. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not claim to have proved him here. But he is the only way to solve the problem of the similar and the different (problem of quantities) (namely with the 3 levels). Simplicity/BigelowVsNominalism: will never be able to be as uniform as our realistic explanation. Nominalism would have to assume complex relational predicates as primitive. I 97 Quantities/BigelowVsNominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: if he eliminated quantities, they would come back in through the back door because of the rules of composition. I 98 E.g. instead of refering to the quantity of rabbits, he might say it applies to all and only rabbits. BigelowVsNominalism: one could say this is just an abbreviation for "the quantity of all and only the rabbits". Be true/BigelowVsNominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter. "Is true" must be discussed further before this paraphrase could proof something ontological. ((s) BigelowVsQuine, > semantic ascent). Quantities/Bigelow/Pargetter: whether one believes in it, is not sure. The semantics does certainly not decide that. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
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