Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Emotions Bentham Corr I 56
Emotions/Bentham/ReisenzeinVsBentham/Reisenzein: Even radical hedonist theorists usually do not claim that humans are slaves to their momentary emotions but instead emphasize, for example, that people can decide to tolerate a current unpleasant feeling if they believe that this will spare them greater pain in the future (e.g., Bentham 1789/1970)(1). And if, as most contemporary motivation theorists believe, people are also motivated by other than hedonistic concerns (e.g., Reiss 2000)(2), possible reasons for emotion regulation multiply (see also, Parrott 1993(3); Tamir, Chiu and Gross 2007(4)).

1. Bentham, J. 1789/1970. An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. London: Athlone Press
2. Reiss, S. 2000. Who am I: the 16 basic desires that motivate our actions and define our personality. New York: Tarcher Putnam
3. Parrott, W. G. 1993. Beyond hedonism: motives for inhibiting good moods and for maintaining bad moods, in D. M. Wegner and J. W. Pennebaker (eds.), Handbook of mental control, pp. 278–305. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall
4. Tamir, M., Chiu, C.-Y. and Gross, J. E. 2007. Business or pleasure? Utilitarian versus hedonic considerations in emotion regulation, Emotion 7: 546–54


Rainer Reisenzein & Hannelore Weber, “Personality and emotion”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Benth I
J. Bentham
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation Mineola, NY 2007


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Ethics Putnam III 113f
Ethics/concepts/Williams/Murdoch: ethical concepts are 1. porous: E.g. "good and right" - more descriptive, less abstract: E.g."cruel", "chaste", and so on - Murdoch: also descriptive components are interest-relative. - VsNon-cognitivism: his division into descriptive/prescriptive does not succeed because one cannot name the components, without even using a word like "cruel" (circular) - Murdoch: World not analyzable into facts and values - Williams: pro, but we can transfer our concepts to each society.
III 116
"Dense"/Williams: E.g. "chaste" can function both as a rating as well as a description.
III 117
PutnamVsWilliams: absurd and still relativistic when "grass is green" is not to be the absolute truth (because I'm projecting colors like values) - values/Putnam: even worse off than colors, because after we figured out that we project them, we lose our ability to use them.
III 128
PutnamVsWilliams: too complicated metaphysical. - Definition ratings/Dewey: arise from a critique of various problem-solving processes.
V 190
Ethics/language/meaning/values/Putnam: E.g. Superbenthamian: Approves the most cruel acts for "the good of the majority" - after a while the language use in reference to "sincere" separates between him and us. - That does not mean that we and the superbenthamian agree about the facts and disagree with respect to the values - we live in different worlds.
V 208
PutnamVsBentham: we have a reason to prefer the poetry to the flea-hopping: the experience of great poetry and its aftermath.
V 282
Ethics/PutnamVsBentham: (E.g. flea-hopping): there is no prejudice to prefer the poetry. The idea that values do not belong to the blocks in the world, and the idea that "value judgments" express "prejudices" are two sides of the same coin - PutnamVsSolipsism: immoral, not everyone is trapped in a solipsistic hell, but we should participate in the discourse.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Preference Utilitarianism Singer I 13
Definition Preference Utilitarianism/P. Singer/SingerVsBentham/SingerVsMill/SingerVsSidgwick: my utilitarianism is not about the growth of happiness and the reduction of suffering, but about promoting the preferences of those involved. General Public/ethics/P. Singer: Preference Utiliarianism cannot be inferred from the universal aspects of ethics.
Preference: the preferences of the individual must be weighed against the preferences of others and the community.
---
I 14
Where do we get a theory from that governs this? We approach simple, pre-ethical choices. However, we cannot rely on intuitions because they can be inherited evolutionarily and therefore be unreliable in terms of what is right. Preferences: can be for different individuals at quite different levels. Someone who would like to be a poet may forgo other forms of happiness. This cannot be pursued further here.
---
I 80
Killing/Preference Utilitarianism/Animals/P. Singer: for the preference utilitarianism, killing a person is worse than killing another being (which could still be a member of the Homo Sapiens species!). The reason for this is that people are more orientated towards the future. Beings with no sense for the future have no preferences regarding them. Of course, such creatures can still fight their deaths like a fish on a hook. Preference Utilitarianism has no reason, however, to reject a more painless method of killing fish when it is available. The fight against pain in an instant does not prove that the fish would be able to compare different perspectives for the future.
---
I 81
This argument, however, only holds in connection with considerations of what is wrong with killing a person (with prospects for the future). ---
I 81
Life/Preference Utilitarianism/P. Singer: does a person have the right to life according to preference utilitarianism? According to the preference utilitarianism a right cannot be offset against the preferences of others.

SingerP I
Peter Singer
Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011

SingerP II
P. Singer
The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015

Values Bentham Singer I 86
Values/Utilitarianism/Bentham: Thesis: Benefit, Pleasure, Advantage, Good or Happiness all result in the same thing, if it leads to maximization of pleasure or reduction of discomfort. (J. Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), chap. 1 pars. II, V). VsBentham/Peter Singer: some authors argue, something can be in my interest...
---
I 87
...whether it causes pleasure or less pain. BenthamVsVs/P. Singer: to defend Bentham, we would have to accept pleasure and pain as objective values. To do this, however, we would have to determine the nature of these objective values and explain how we can know about them.

Benth I
J. Bentham
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation Mineola, NY 2007


SingerP I
Peter Singer
Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011

SingerP II
P. Singer
The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Utilitarism Versus Dennett I 700
Utilitarianism: Founder: Bentham. DennettVsBentham "greedy reductionist". A Skinner of his time. DennettVsutilitarianism.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005