Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Armstrong | ArmstrongVsBehaviorism - Armstrong per Locke. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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Aggression | Behaviorism | Slater I 176 Aggression/Behaviorism: according to behaviorism as conceptualized by Skinner (1953)(1). The main mechanism through which individuals were believed to learn aggression (or any behavior) was through operant conditioning. That is, if an individual’s behavior was reinforced by some form of reward, which could be something tangible such as money or possession of a desired object or intangible such as praise, this reinforcement would increase the likelihood that the individual would behave in that way again in the future. >Reinforcement sensivity theory. VsBehaviorism: behaviorism falls short in explaining how individuals come to behave in particular ways when they have received no previous reinforcement for that behavior. Miller/Dollard: To address that limitation, Miller and Dollard (1941)(2) introduced the idea that individuals could learn new behaviors by imitating others. However, in Miller and Dollard’s procedure for studying imitation, individuals witnessed a model being rewarded for engaging in a particular behavior, and they themselves then had the opportunity to engage in the same behavior, also receiving rewards for it. Bandura, Ross, and Ross (1961)(3) made a tremendous contribution to understanding learning by demonstrating that aggressive behavior could be learned even in the absence of any rewards and solely by observing the behavior of an adult model. >Aggression/Bandura, >About Behaviorism. 1. Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York: Macmillan. 2. Miller, N. E., & Dollard, J. (1941). Social learning and imitation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 3. Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of aggression through imitation of aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 575—582. Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
Behavior | Mead | Habermas IV 13 Behaviour/Interaction/Sociology/Behaviorism/G. H. Mead/Habermas: Mead introduces his theory under the name "Social Behaviorism" to emphasize the distance to the philosophy of consciousness. MeadVsBehaviorism/Habermas: However, Mead's approach differs from behaviorism in that it does not address the behavior of individuals but the interaction of groups. >Behaviorism, >Interaction. Behaviour/Mead: should not be restricted to observable behavioural reactions, but should also include symbolically oriented behaviour. Sense/Mead: the sense embodied in a social action is not external to the aspect of behavior. Nevertheless, it is publicly accessible as something objective in symbolic expressions. >Sense. |
Mead I George Herbert Mead Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967 German Edition: Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
Behaviorism | Black | II 220 BlackVsBehaviorism: we can understand signs without being moved to an action. >Signs. II 222 For example, what action should cause "testified"? Or "green"? II 78 Language/Behaviorism/Black: Thesis: Expressions like "purpose", "motive", "meaning" could be excluded because they refer to something that is not publicly observable. II 78/79 Vs: According to this, language would be no more than a "custom", comparable to taking off the hat in greeting. (Jespersen, 1924)(1). II 215 Mentalism/Black: "mental units": Images, ideas, thoughts, concepts, or conceptions. BehaviorismVsMentalism: such entities cannot be verified. >Mentalism. 1. Jespersen, O. (1924). The Philosophy of Grammar. London |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Behaviorism | Danto | I 267ff Experiment VsBehaviorismus:subjects had to recognize rotated figures. This led psychologists to distance themselves from behaviorism and the assumption that there could be such a thing as "internal rotation". Cf. >Rabbit-Duck-Head, >Mental states, >Inner states, >Thinking, >Thoughts. However, they rehabilitated not directly introspection, but rather the possibility of an internal representation. >Introspection, >Representation, >Self-knowledge, >Consciousness, >Behavior. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
Behaviorism | Frith | I 113 Pawlow/Pawlov/Frith: Pawlow's experiments differ strongly from behaviorism, even though they are often subsumed under it today. PawlowVsBehaviorism: Pawlow was interested in the physiological mechanisms underlying mental phenomena. I 114 Def absolute/unconditioned reflex/Pawlow: the absolute or unconditioned reflex is the formation of the salivation when hearing the bell or the process that causes the formation. Cf. >Conditioning. I 115 Def conditional reflex/conditioned reflex/Pawlow: this reflex consists in the fact that the dog took the bell as the signal for food and expected to be fed. It also turned his head in the direction from which the food normally came. Def conditioning/Frith: "classical conditioning": means only the association between the bell and the salivation - not the expectation and the head turn, more complex processes are here at work. I 116 Association/Pawlow/Frith: no association occurred when the bell sounded only five to 10 seconds after the feeding of the dog food. >Association. Stimulus: a stimulus is only interesting if it predicts an event. Later, it is uninteresting. >Stimuli. Learning/Pawlow/Frith: the learning that Pawlow discovered, is precisely the form of learning we need to survive. It is not sufficient to learn which things are good or bad, we also need to learn how to get them. >Learning. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
Behaviorism | Nagel | I 108 NagelVsReductionism/NagelVsBehaviorism: the internal perspective of the discourse or thought area which is to be returned, shows us something that does not include the reduction discourse. In the philosophy of the mind behaviorism does not work because the phenomena and intentional features cannot be explained by a purely external perspective. >Phenomena, >Description levels, >Levels/Order, >Perspective, >Interior/exterior. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
Behaviorism | Pinker | I 84/85 Beliefs/Behaviorism: thesis: beliefs have nothing to do with behavior - Skinner: the question is not whether machines think but whether people think - PinkerVsBehaviorism: Skinner defined completely intuitive concepts, he was completely satisfied with "danger" or "praise", "English" or "beauty" as a stimulus. >Stimulus, >Behavior, >Belief, >Thinking. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
Behaviorism | Searle | I 57 LewisVsBehaviorism: behaviorismus consideres non-causal relationships. I 77 Beliefs and desires/Searle: beliefs and desires do not need to be postulated, they will be experienced consciously and not be in question. >Belief, >Wishes. I 48 ff Methodological behaviorism: psychology: encompases stimulus/response. >Stimulus/Reaction. Logical Behaviorism (Ryle, Hempel): only encompasses behavior. >Behavior/Ryle, >Behavior, >Hempel. SearleVsBehaviorism: the disposition is unclear. Circles: belief is only explainable by wishes and vice versa. Super SpartansVsBehaviorism. >SearleVsBehaviorism. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Experience | Lewis | I (a) 8 Experience/Lewis: the defining feature is its >causal role. - These then belong to certain physical states - identity: e.g. the combination of the positions within a lock is identical when the lock is open: they are introspectively perceptible processes or activities, not the alleged intentional objects of which experiences are knowledge. --- V 10 E.g. pain is not the same as the property of feeling pain! "Pain" is a contingent name, that means it and has different denotations in different possible worlds. (Not rigid). >Pain/Lewis. --- I (a) 13 LewisVsBehaviorism: experiences are something real. I (a) 18 They have to be causes and effects - nothing non-physical can be a cause. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
Introspection | Danto | I 259f Introspection/Strawson/Danto: we only know how much we weigh or what the temperature is by means of instruments. The mind is even more deceptive: memory deceives us, we repress our feelings and are capable of self-deception. >P.F. Strawson, >Self-knowledge, >Delusion, >Illusion. I 256 Introspection: For example, one can have pain on amputated limbs. There is no reason why an inner sense should be more authoritative than an outer one. >Privileged access, >First person, >Pain. I 263f VsBehaviorism: if we defined expressions like anger or love absolutely and totally in terms of behavior, then there would be no difference between these expressions and those we use to describe people: blonde, fat, tall etc. Now we do not apply these terms to ourselves on the same basis. Cf. >Behaviorism. I 264 In how we ascribe such expressions to ourselves and to others, there really are differences, whereas there are no such differences in terms of temperature or weight. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
Inverted Spectra | Churchland | Fodor IV 195 Qualia/Quality/Sensation/inverted spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green. If the change is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could reveal it. VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the inverted spectra appear to show that behaviorism is false. And also the functionalism. (Block/Fodor, Shoemaker). One might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been interchanged. And precisely the concept of the sensitive identity becomes ambiguous. VsChurchland: his approach does not help at all. The inscriptions of the points of the dice could also be inverted. ((s) One could always describe it, but one would not know which sensations are present in the other.) --- IV 195/196 Even though this frequency combination represents this particular pink, it is conceptually possible that something has the first property, but not the second. Inverted spectra/Qualia: Problem: there seems to be no property of a sensation except its qualitative content on which the qualitative content supervenes. In particular, there appears to be no proportioned or neurophysiological property on which supervenience is guaranteed. Inverted spectra/tradition: would say that Churchland's dimensions in the Qualia color dice represent by reference to properties that they do not necessarily possess. Or, if you think that it is "metaphysically necessary" that color sensations have the psychophysical properties that they have, then one would have to say that this necessity is not brought about by any necessity between sensual concepts and psychophysical concepts. One might well know that a sensation corresponds to a point in the color dice and still does not know how it is. The dimensions do not determine the content. Why not place a semantic space next to it, add the condition that the dimensions of the semantic space must be semantic? They would have to name content states through their content. E.g. Perhaps then one could identify uncle, aunt, president, Cleopatra etc. along these dimensions? --- IV 197 E.g. Cleopatra, as a politician, is closer to the president than to marriageability. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: that is what we are really interested in: a robust theory of the equality of content instead of identity of content that has been lost with the analytic/synthetic distinction. Problem: Equality presupposes identity and a corresponding theory. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
Inverted Spectra | Fodor | IV 195 Exchanged spectra: nothing in the behavior can uncover the permutation (VsBehaviorism). >Behaviorism. Representation of the frequencies does not represent the sensation. The descriptions can be changed at will. Tradition: sensation is not a necessary property of color. If there is a "metaphysically necessary" connection between perception and neurophysiology, then still none between color concept and psychophysical concept. >Sensation, >Colour. IV 195 State space/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: the problem of identity will always return. Ultimately, there is no other criterion than observational concepts. >Observation lnguage, >Observation sentences, >Identity, >Criteria. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
Learning | Behaviorism | Upton I 6 Learning/Behaviorism/VsBehaviorism/Upton: One area that behaviourist theories do not explain is the type of learning that takes place when someone learns by observing a model. Upton I 7 Social Learning/Bandura: Called social learning by Albert Bandura (1963)(1), this is the process by which someone imitates the behaviour observed in another person when it appears to have reinforcing consequences, and inhibits such behaviour when the observed consequence is punishment. >Reinforcement sensivity/psychological theories, >Punishment/Behavioral economics, >About Behaviorism. 1. Bandura, Albert/Ross, Dorothea/Ross, Sheila A. (1963): Imitation of film-mediated aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66, S. 3-11. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
Method | Chomsky | I 278 Method/theory/Chomsky: requirement: we must be able to describe what the person receives. - The percept itself is a construction of the first order. - Its properties are determined experiment. Grammar: Grammar is a construction of the second-order. For this one must abstract from the other factors involved in the use and understanding of language and refer to internalized knowledge of the speaker. VsBehaviorism: excludes the concept of "what is perceived" and "what is learned" from the outset. >Behaviorism. I 297ff Method/theory: PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered through routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not that impressive. ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact this refers to competence and not to performance - routine does not matter here, but the inherent correlation between sound and meaning. >Ambiguity. I 303 Chomsky: my universal grammar is not a "theory of language acquisition", but one element of it. - My thesis is an "all-at-once" proposal and does not try to capture the interplay between the tentative hypotheses constructed by the child and new data interpreted with them. >Grammar, >Hypotheses. --- II 316 Method/theory/Chomsky: "association", "reinforcement", "random mutation ": hide our ignorance. ((s) Something dissimilar may also be associated.) II 321 Method/theory/ChomskyVsQuine: his concept of "reinforcement" is almost empty. - If reinforcement is needed for learning, it means that learning cannot happen without data. Cf. >Psychological theories on reinforcement and reinforcement sensitivity, >Learning. II 323 Language Learning/ChomskyVsQuine: he does not explain it: if only association and conditioning, then the result is merely a finite language. >Language acquisition. II 324 VsQuine: concept of probability of a sentence is empty: the fact that I utter a particular German sentence is as unlikely as a particular Japanese sentence from me. >Probability. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
Morality | Behaviorism | Slater I 166 Morality/Behaviorism: Prior to Kohlberg and Piaget, (>Morality/Kohlberg, >Morality/Piaget) the dominant views of moral development were the behaviorist approach, which focuses on how behaviors are acquired through conditioning, the socialization approach, which emphasizes the internalization of social norms, and the psychodynamic approach, which emphasizes the role of unconscious motives in human behavior. Each of these approaches depicts children as passive recipients of values and norms that are imposed on them either externally, or internally via unconscious processes. KohlbergVsBehaviorism: In contrast, Kohlberg characterized children’s moral reasoning as evolving as they interact in complex social environments and gain experience with social roles (Turiel, 2008)(1). Kohlberg argued that even young children have the mental and emotional capacity to make sense of their social environment and reflect upon the moral implications of their behavior. >About Behaviorism. 1. Turiel, E. (2008). The development of children’s orientations toward moral, social, and personal orders: More than a sequence in development. Human Development, 51, 21—39. Gail D. Heyman and Kang Lee, “Moral Development. Revisiting Kohlberg’s Stages“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
Personality Traits | Behavioral Genetics | Corr I 287 Personality traits//Behavioral Genetics/Munafò: Investigation of the association between DNA variants and psychological phenotypes has the potential to determine which genes influence heritable psychological traits, such as personality (Ebstein, Benjamin and Belmaker 2000(1); Eysenck 1977)(2). Such research has a long history, beginning with the observation that behavioural phenotypes (including personality) tend to show greater similarity between pairs of individuals as genetic similarity increases. Problems: molecular genetic studies have so far been characterized more by the inconsistency of their results than by the provision of novel biological information. Given the large number of candidate genes that can be hypothesized to influence psychological traits, the extent of DNA sequence variation and the numerous, often conflicting, methods of measuring phenotypic variation in psychological and behavioural science, the task of evaluating competing statistical hypotheses is likely to be onerous. (VsMolecular genetics, VsBehavioral genetics). Traits/psychology: Most trait psychologists argue that a small number of factors can be used to account for individual differences in personality. For example, there is strong agreement that the dimensions of Extraversion-Introversion and Neuroticism-Stability are fundamental parts of any personality taxonomy. >Personality traits/psychological theories. Causality: Causal theorists of personality have attempted to go further and associate known neurobiological mechanisms with personality dimensions, measured using a range of instruments. >Causality/Developmental psychology. Behavior: Following Revelle’s typology (Revelle 1995)(3), three fundamental behavioural dimensions have been proposed to correspond to differential activity in neurotransmitter systems (Ebstein, Benjamin Benjamin and Belmaker 2000(1); Munafò, Clark, Moore et al. 2003(4)): dopamine for approach behaviours, serotonin and noradrenaline for avoidance behaviours, and serotonin, noradrenaline and GABA for aggressive or fight-flight behaviours. There is considerable consensus over the construct validity of the first two of these dimensions, but there remains equally considerable debate over the third. 1. Ebstein, R. P., Benjamin, J., Belmaker, R. H. 2000. Personality and polymorphisms of genes involved in aminergic neurotransmission, European Journal of Pharmacology 410: 205–14 2. Eysenck, H. J. 1977. National differences in personality as related to ABO blood group polymorphism, Psychology Reports 41: 1257–8 3. Revelle, W. 1995. Personality processes, Annual Review of Psychology 46: 295–328 4. Munafò, M. R., Clark, T. G., Moore, L. R., Payne, E., Walton, R. and Flint, J. 2003. Genetic polymorphisms and personality in healthy adults: a systematic review and meta-analysis, Molecular Psychiatry 8: 471–84 Marcus R. Munafò,“Behavioural genetics: from variance to DNA“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.)2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press Corr I 329 Personality traits/Behavioral Genetics: Behaviour genetic analysis has shown that the two meta-traits have genetic origins (Jang et al. 2006)(1), and evidence is accumulating that Stability (>Personality traits/neurobiology) is related to serotonin, whereas Plasticity may be related to dopamine (DeYoung 2006(2); DeYoung, Peterson and Higgins 2002;(3) Yamagata, Suzuki, Ando et al. 2006)(4). Serotonine and dopamine act as diffuse neuromodulators affecting a wide array of brain systems, and their broad influence is consistent with a role in the broadest level of personality structure. 1. Jang, K. L., Livesley, W. J., Ando, J., Yamagata, S., Suzuki, A., Angleitner, A., Ostendorf, F., Riemann, R. and Spinath, F. 2006. Behavioural genetics of the higher-order factors of the Big Five, Personality and Individual Differences 41: 261–72 2. DeYoung, C. G. 2006. Higher-order factors of the Big Five in a multi-informant sample, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 91: 1138–51 3. DeYoung, C. G., Peterson, J. B. and Higgins, D. M. 2002. Higher-order factors of the Big Five predict conformity: are there neuroses of health? Personality and Individual Differences 33: 533–52 4. Yamagata, S., Suzuki, A., Ando, J., Ono, Y., Kijima, N., Yoshimura, K., Ostendorf, F., Angleitner, A., Riemann, R., Spinath, F. M., Livesley, W. J. and Jang, K. L. 2006. Is the genetic structure of human personality universal? A cross-cultural twin study from North America, Europe, and Asia, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90: 987–98 Colin G. DeYoung and Jeremy R. Gray, „ Personality neuroscience: explaining individual differences in affect, behaviour and cognition“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
Personality Traits | Deary | Corr I 89 Personality traits/Deary: There are still issues about how psychologists know whether traits, and any given model of traits, are the right way to construe human personality differences, and their nature is still largely mysterious. Corr I 91 Temporal stability/traits/developmental psychology/Deary: The stability of personality trait ratings has been questioned. A review of over 152 longitudinal studies with over 3,000 correlation coefficients found that trait stability increased from childhood to adulthood, rising from about 0.3 to over 0.7 (Roberts and DelVecchio 2000)(1). This supported earlier research with traits from the Five Factor Model (Costa and McCrae 1994(2)) and Eysenck’s factors (Sanderman and Ranchor 1994)(3), which had found stability coefficients of well above 0.6, rising to above 0.8, for periods of between six and thirty years. The stability of individual differences among children can be high, given an appropriate measurement instrument. Using the Berkeley Puppet Inventory, in which identical puppets make opposite statements, and the children choose which applies better to them, the stability coefficients between age six and seven years were often well above 0.5, and considerably higher when corrected for period-free unreliability (Measelle, John, Ablow et al. 2005)(4). Traits are stable aspects of people’s (including children’s) make-up. Heritability of traits: There is (…) the well-supported heritability of traits including those of the Five Factor Model (Bouchard and Loehlin 2001)(5). However, in ten years of molecular genetic studies of personality, there are still no solid associations between genetic variations and personality traits (Ebstein 2006)(6). Animals/traits: There is evidence that other species, including primates (Weiss, King and Perkins 2006)(7) and others (Gosling 2001)(8), have something like a Five-Factor Model of personality. See >Five-Factor model, >personality traits. Some milestones in the research on personality traits: Corr I 99 The starting point for Tupes and Christal (1961)(9) was the thirty-five trait variables developed by Cattell (1947)(10), whose work in turn derived from the identification of dictionary trait terms by Allport and Odbert (1936)(11). The result (Tupes and Christal 1961(9), p. 232): from their eight heterogeneous studies ‘five fairly strong rotated factors emerged’: Surgency (Extraversion), Agreeableness, Dependability (Conscientiousness), Emotional Stability (opposite of Neuroticism) and Culture. This was a breakthrough in dispelling some uncertainty about the structure of personality trait ratings. At about the same time, citing the same empirical history and with a similar aim, Norman (1963)(12) found similar results. The focus was on clarifying the observational language of personality, arguing that research into personality ‘will be facilitated by having available an extensive and well-organised vocabulary by means of which to denote the phenotypic attributes of persons’ (Norman 1963, p. 574). Corr I 100 One of Norman’s (1963) conclusions was that researchers should go back to the pool of trait items to search for traits beyond the five. By this stage, one can discern three processes (there might be more) going on in the trait approach to personality. (1) There was good progress in identifying traits for measurement and predictive validity. (2) There was the process of defending the trait approach from whatever was the zeitgeist in psychology (Freudiansim, behaviourism, situationism, etc.). (VsPsychoanalysis, VsBehaviorism, VsSituationism). (3) There was the process of thinking about and studying what traits actually were, beyond scores from an inventory or rating scales. Meehl (1986)(13) addressed the third issue by going back to Cattell’s (e.g. 1945)(14) surface traits and source traits distinction. He gave a good account of how, in everyday language we make trait attributions, and how these generalize from narrow to broader traits. He gave a good account of how, in everyday language we make trait attributions, and how these generalize from narrow to broader traits. These are from observed behaviours, and they are surface traits. Narrow traits that go to make up broader traits are ‘related by a) empirical covariation and b) content similarity’ (p. 317). For today’s discussion see >Personality traits/Tellegen, >Personality traits/McCrae. 1. Roberts, B. W. and DelVecchio, W. F. 2000. The rank-order consistency of personality from childhood to old age: a quantitative review of longitudinal studies, Psychological Bulletin 126: 3–25 2. Costa, P. T., and McCrae, R. R. 1994. Set like plaster? Evidence for the stability of adult personality, in T. Heatherton and J. Weinberger (eds.), Can personality change?, pp. 21–40. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association 3. Sanderman, R. and Ranchor, A. V. 1994. Stability of personality traits and psychological distress over six years, Perceptual and Motor Skills 78: 89–90 4. Measelle, J. R., John, O. P., Ablow, J. C., Cowan, P. A. and Cowan, C. P. 2005. Can children provide coherent, stable, and valid self-reports on the Big Five dimensions? A longitudinal study from ages 5 to 7, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 89: 90–106 5. Bouchard, T. J. and Loehlin, J. C. 2001. Genes, evolution, and personality, Behaviour Genetics 31: 243–73 6. Ebstein, R. P. 2006. The molecular genetic architecture of human personality: beyond self-report questionnaires, Molecular Psychiatry 11: 427–45 7. Weiss, A., King, J. E. and Perkins, L. 2006. Personality and subjective well-being in orangutans, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90: 501–11 8. Gosling, S. D. 2001. From mice to men: what can we learn about personality from animal research?, Psychological Bulletin 127: 45–86 9. Tupes, E. C. and Christal, R. E. 1961. ASD Technical Report (reprinted in 1991 as Recurrent personality factors based on trait ratings), Journal of Personality 60: 225–51 10. Cattell, R. B. 1947. Confirmation and clarification of primary personality factors, Psychometrika 12: 197–220 11. Allport, G. W. and Odbert, H. S. 1936. Trait-names: a psycho-lexical study, Psychological Monographs 47: No. 211 12. Norman, W. T. 1963. Toward an adequate taxonomy of personality attributes, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 66: 574–83 13. Meehl, P. E. 1986. Trait language and behaviourese, in T. Thompson and M. Zeiler (eds.), Analysis and integration of behavioural units, pp. 315–34. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 14. Cattell, R. B. 1945. The principal trait clusters for describing personality, Psychological Bulletin 42: 129–61 Ian J. Deary, “The trait approach to personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
Theories | Waltz | Brocker I 625 Theory/Politics/Waltz: A theory should explain the emergence of regularities (1). For Waltz, a theory is not a "series of laws concerning a certain behavior or phenomena". Nor do theories have the function of explaining laws. (2) Laws/Waltz: are obtained by observation. Theories: are obtained through speculative processes designed to explain laws. Theories are speculations. Therefore, they are only loosely connected to the real world. N.B.: from this definitional separation of laws and theories it follows that theories cannot be judged by whether they are true. Solution/Waltz: a good theory is characterized by the fact that it is coherent in its structure and other scientists take it seriously. (3) Laws/Waltz: Laws, on the other hand, can be judged according to the criteria "true" and "false". WaltzVsEmpirism: Waltz propagates a sharp separation between theory and reality. But it also applies: WaltzVsRationalism. Brocker I 626 Pragmatism/Waltz/Masala: Waltz has a pragmatic position close to Sellars and Quine. Reality/Waltz: For Waltz, theories construct a reality without anyone ever being able to say that this is reality (4). ((s) However, this position cannot be easily attributed to Quine). See Theories/Quine, Reality/Quine, Laws/Quine, Empiricism/Quine. Criteria/Waltz: for the formation of theories: 1. Criterion: Theories must discriminate. Reality/Realism/Waltz: Thesis: there is a reality independent of language and theories. ((s) contradiction to the thesis above, according to which there should be several "realities"). ((s) This is a position of extreme realism). The proximity to Quine and Sellars mentioned by Masala cannot be fully understood: See Realism/Quine, Reality/Sellars, Theory/Sellars. Method/WaltzVsPopper: Waltz advocates a pluralistic process of falsification and verification. (5) 2. Criterion for theory building: (WaltzVsBehavioralism): WaltzVsInduction: the inductive method of political theories of the 1960s and 1970s is wrong, since it wants to formulate laws from existing correlations. With the method of correlation, each variable can be related to another one in a statistically significant way. Complexity/WaltzVsInduction: the complexity of the real world cannot be explained by theories. For these theories are not descriptions, but instruments to explain parts of the real world. Brocker I 627 Theories/Waltz: should be simpler than reality; they should be "elegant". (6) To achieve this, a theory must ignore certain factors. Terms/Meaning/WaltzVsSocial Sciences: Problem: not only do meanings vary with viewers, this makes every social science theory inherently black. But even the attempt to specify the meaning of a term by operationalizing definitions is no way out, because any term can be operationalized in any discourse context. (7) See also Concepts/Quine. Solution/Waltz: we have to specify causalities. Brocker I 628 Social Sciences/Waltz: if causal connections and the interaction of variables can be explained, hard social science theories are possible. Theories/Waltz: cannot be tested - only the hypotheses derived from them. Therefore, a theory should not be rejected if one of its hypotheses is not confirmed. (8) 1. Kenneth N. Waltz, „Theory of International Relations“, in: Fred Greenstein/Nelson W. Polsby (Hg.) International Politics: Handbook of Political Science, Reading, Mas. 1975, p. 4 2. Ibid. p. 3. 3. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Assaying Theories: Reflections on Imre Lakatos”, in: Colin Elman/Miriam Fendius Elman (Ed.) Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, Cambridge, Mass.2003, S. xii. 4. Kenneth N. Waltz Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mas. 1979, p. 9. 5. Kernneth N. Waltz “Response to my Critics” in: Robert O. Keohane (Ed.) Neorealism and its Critics, New York 1986, p. 336. 6. Waltz 1975, p. 9. 7. Ibid. p. 11 8. Ibid. p. 13. Carlo Masala, „Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolWaltz I Kenneth N. Waltz Man,the State and War New York 1959 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Turing-Test | McGinn | II 211 McGinnVsTuringtest: so leveling it may seem, it is a poor criterion for machine's own consciousness: 1. It provides no necessary condition for consciousness, because many conscious beings would fail miserably in the Turing-test. (E.g. cats, which cannot speak but have a consciousness). The test is too strong linguistically oriented. 2. The criterion is moreover not sufficient: the test is obliged to a behaviorist conception of consciousness. >Consciousness. II 212 Behavior/consciousness/McGinnVsBehaviorism: consciousness states cause behavior, but they are not reducible to behavior. Evidence, based on behavior, is always fallible. E.g. an actor can pretend to be in pain. In this way, behavior testifies of consciousness, but it does not guarantee it. II 213 McGinnVsTuring-test: tries to tell when something has consciousness, without saying what consciousness is. It could be that we could build a machine that passes the test, but the darned thing would not have the slightest consciousness. II 214 Therefore calculators are possible, they do our work without consciousness. We could even assume that any cognitive task that we do with the help of intelligence, understanding and consciousness, could be done by a machine without intelligence, understanding and consciousness. ((s) Thus the poor behaviorism triumphs). Each piece of rational mental activity could thus have a computational counterpart. The counterpart reaches through a not mental way, what we achieve through a mental way. II 215 If we can do in principle X without having Y, then, the fact that we can do X proofs not that we have Y. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|
Behaviorism | Armstrong Vs Behaviorism | ArmstrongVsBehaviorism - Armstrong per Locke |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
Behaviorism | Black Vs Behaviorism | II 221 BlackVsBehaviorism: we can understand a sign without being moved to any action. II 222 E.g. which action is to cause "proven"? Or "green"?. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Behaviorism | Block Vs Behaviorism | (I 161) Vsbehaviorism / Block: the desire to achieve the goal Z can not be identified with the disposition A in input environments where A leads to Z, since the agent can not know that A leads to Z. He could therefore not be disposed to do A. Solution: functionalism adds causal relations to other internal states. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
Behaviorism | Carnap Vs Behaviorism | VI 81 CarnapVsBehaviorism/Carnap: it is not certain whether the claim to reflect the cognitive relationship properly with this arrangement (with physical basis) is justified. VI 186 Behaviorism/Other Minds/Carnap: 1. The attribution of behavior happens in relation to the body, it is not attributed to the soul! 2. The ascribed states are states of the observer. Not experiences of the other! The whole series of experiences of the other person consists of nothing other than a rearrangement of my experiences and their components. VI 187 There is no other mind without a body. And there is one in which processes of expression occur that are similar to those of my body. VII 160 Intension/Robot/VsBehaviorism/Carnap: in the case of robots we can assume that we have much detailed knowledge of the internal structure. Therefore we can use structural analysis instead of the behavioristic method. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
Behaviorism | Chomsky Vs Behaviorism | Dantos2 I 268 Rotating figuresVsBehaviorism > Mental representation (inner r.)Vsintrospection (ChomskyVsBehaviorism) - FodorVsBehaviorism Chomsky I 278 ChomskyVsBehaviorism: has proven to be quite unfruitful. It excludes the concept of "what is perceived" and of "what is learnt" from the start. II 351 ChomskyVsBehaviorism: is just as if you were to call physics the "science of reading scales". Searle VIII 404 ChomskyVsBehaviorism: fundamental confusion between data and object of investigation. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Behaviorism | Danto Vs Behaviorism | Behaviorism: according to it, our externally observable behavior can attract any number of descriptions. Which one is the right one remains completely uncertain. DantoVsHolism/Mind: this holistic dimension fails as a distinguishing feature for the structure of the mind, because it is analogous to the corresponding view that any statement about the world can be true as long as we are willing to make corrections somewhere else and to make concessions. I 154 VsBehaviorism: if we defined expressions such as anger or love absolutely and totally in terms of behavior, there would be no difference between these terms and those with which we describe people: blond, fat, tall, etc. I 264 Now, we do not apply those terms to ourselves on the same basis! The real differences are in how we ascribe such terms to ourselves and others, whereas in terms that relate to temperature or weight such differences are not a question. (Introspection). VsBehaviorism: its scheme of the stimulus-response pattern merely led to mutual attributions and did not explain the reactions of individuals in any way. ExperimentVsBehaviorism: subjects had to recognize turned figures. This brought the psychologists to distance themselves from behaviorism and to believe that there could indeed be something like "internal rotation" in the mind. This did not directly rehabilitate introspection, but the possibility of an internal representation. I 267 Functionalism/Behaviorism: where is room for exactly the kind of representation that makes up the two directions at all? I 277 |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
Behaviorism | Fodor Vs Behaviorism | Danto I 268 Rotary FiguresVsBehaviorism > Mental Representation (inner r) VsIntrospection (ChomskyVsBehaviorism), FodorVsBehaviorism. Fodor/Lepore IV 56 VsBehaviorism/Fodor/Lepore: E.g. assuming "dog" and "shmog" are two words with which speakers react to exactly the same stimuli, namely dogs. Then for e.g. Skinner would follow that "dog" and "shmog" are synonymous. Then, the following sentence would be analytical in the language of the speaker: "Whatever is a dog, is a shmog." QuineVs: there are neither synonyms nor analytic sentences! IV 57 So Skinner’s semantics must be wrong. VsVs: it is namely a priori! Even worse: all the semantics must be wrong, a priori, because this nihilistic theory will say that there are no semantic properties at all. Fodor/Lepore: what went wrong this time? We have taken literally, that Quine has not shown in Two Dogmas (TD) (and also has not argued) that there are no semantic facts and no analytic truths. Meaning/Fodor/Lepore: what we rather concede is that if meaning is to have any sense at all, then it cannot be reconstructed by reference to the sentences to which the speaker agrees. Meaning/Two Dogmas/TD/Quine: meaning cannot be reduced to the inferences to which one is willing to agree. Reason: what inferences you agree to only depends on how you see the world, i.e. what you intend your words to mean. ((s)> interest, intention, meaning). Important argument: it is impossible to detect which of his/her views the speaker accepts a priori! So there are no analytic sentences. IV 195 Qualia/quality/sensation/exchanged spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green. If the exchange is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could uncover it. VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the reversed spectra thus seem to indicate that behaviorism is wrong (and also functionalism: Block/Fodor, Shoemaker). You might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been exchanged. And it is precisely the concept of the perceptual identity that becomes ambiguous because of that. VsChurchland: his approach does not help at all. The labels of the dots on the dice could be exactly reversed. ((s) You could always describe them without knowing what feelings are present in the other.) |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
Behaviorism | Functionalism Vs Behaviorism | Block I 161 FunctionalismVsBehaviorism: replaces the "sensory input" by "sensory inputs and mental states." Furthermore, the "action dispositions" of behaviorism by "Dispositions to act and presence of certain mental states." Functionalism = behaviorism plus mental states. Avra I 147 Def Functionalism/Avramides: every type of mind state is a state consisting of a disposition to act in certain ways and to have certain mind states ((s) tokens) if certain sensory outputs (?) and certain mind states are given. (?) (39). FunctionalismVsBehaviorism: does not deny that mind states can be a real part of causal explanations. It tries to explain what mind states are at all. If they are dispositions at all, then in a very broad sense (Ryle: "multi-traced dispositions"). VsFunctionalism: does not solve all the problems of behaviorism: because every attribution of propositional attitudes requires an indefinite number of other attributions of propositional attitudes (e.g., according to the different possibilities to make wishes come true). We cannot attribute a mind state without attributing other mind states. I 148 Holism/Avramides: therefore it is sometimes said that behaviorism is not able to find access to the holism of the mental. Solution: functionalism: was specially designed to take account of this holism. Frank I 130 FunctionalismVsBehaviorism: here it is recognized that the internal states of the system must play an important role. But they do not need to be physiologically explored! It is sufficient to characterize them abstractly (functionally). Therefore, also the primacy of behavioral observation is understandable. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Behaviorism | Identity Theory Vs Behaviorism | Lanz I 279 Identity theory: the attempt to defend the status of mental phenomena as inner episodes in light of the weaknesses of behaviorism (RyleVs), without falling back into dualism. Elements of conscious experience are identical to processes and states in the brain. Lanz I 281 Identity theory VsBehaviorism (Place / SmartVsRyle: sensations = physical states) - later: Lewis / Armstrong: even thoughts). |
Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
Behaviorism | Lewis Vs Behaviorism | I (a) 15 LewisVsBehaviorism: My principle (that events are defined by their >causal roles) is better: 1. Events can become real. 2. It also allows us to include other events to typical causes and effects, through which an event is defined. ((s)VsLewis: one can can interpose as many descriptions as one wants between catalyst and effects. But it is not possible to do so for as many phenomenons as one wants. 3. We are not forced to define an event by stating all causes and effects of every one of his occurrences. (The typical ones are sufficient). I (a) 15 > href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?concept=Introspection">Introspection: When events are defined by their causal role, there are accessible for introspection. And this accessibility is an important characteristic of each event. This means that the event preferably causes other events which are intentionally directed at it. VsBehaviorism: According to Behaviorism,the liberty to define events through other events does not exist. Such definitions are only acceptable here if they principally be eliminated. (Hierarchy). I (a) 15 LewisVsBehaviorism: He does not acknowledge that the event is something different because of its defining causes and manifestations. By using his criteria, he can only partially explain what an event is. It always leads to an assumption. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
Behaviorism | McGinn Vs Behaviorism | II 212 Behavior / consciousness / McGinnVsbehaviorism: states of consciousness cause behavior, but they are not reducible to behavior. Evidence, based on behavior, is always fallible. E.g. An actor may feign pain. In this way behavior testifies consciousness, but it is not guaranteed. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
Behaviorism | Pinker Vs Behaviorism | I 85 Stimulus/PinkerVsBehaviorism: Sally did not run out of the house because of the stimulus of heat, but because she had the wish to survive. She would not have run had she known that the smoke came out of the toaster. Stimulus/Skinner: He defined stimulus by his intuition. He was fully satisfied with "danger" or "praise", "English" or "beauty" as stimuli. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
Behaviorism | Putnam Vs Behaviorism | Lanz I 289 Functionalism/PutnamVsBehaviorism: > href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=275345&a=t&first_name=Hilary&author=Putnam&concept=Turing-Machine">Turing machine: Identity conditions for psychological states (function without physical details) (VsType-Type-Identity/VsBehaviorism). >Type/Type-Identity, >Functionalism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
Behaviorism | Searle Vs Behaviorism | I 30 Searle: the ontology of mental states is an ontology of the first person. (SearleVsBehavoirism). I 49 SearleVsBehaviorism: two types of objections: 1. objections of common sense. 2. Technical objections. 1. VsLogical Behaviorism: technical objections: behaviorism never succeeded to fully explain the concept of a "disposition". Circle: if one wants to analyze the belief through behavior then you have to obviously also make reference to the wishing; if one wants to analyze the wishing by behavior, then you have obviously also have to make reference to the belief (Chisholm 1957)(1). I 50 LewisVsBehaviorism: technical objection: behaviorism ignores the causal relationships between mental states and behavior (Lewis 1966)(2). The objections of common sense are ultimately the most embarrassing. The absurdity lies in the denial of the existence of all the inner states of mind. This is against our ordinary experience of how it is to be a human being. I 57 Functionalism: what makes two neurophysiological states relating to occurrences of the same state of mind type, is that they perform the same function throughout the life of the organism. The two mind states must then stand on the following three things in the same causal relations: 1. To the stimulus that the organism receives as input, 2. To the various other "mental" states and 3. To the behavior that the organism produces as output. Note that by the causal relationships two objections are avoided that were put forward VsBehaviorism: the first said that behaviorism neglects the causal relationship of mental states, the other said that in it a circularity was contained, and as convictions against recourse to requests and wishes had to be analyzed by resorting to convictions. VIII 428 Grammar/language/SearleVsBehaviorism/SearleVsEmpiricism: Dilemma: a) Either he relies solely on stimulus-response mechanisms (stimulus response) then he can not explain the acquisition of grammar. Or b) He admits à la Quine that there are innate mechanisms. But once the mechanisms are rich enough, the stimulus-response part is not interesting! 1. R. Chisholm, Perceiving Ithaca, NY, 1957 2. D. Lewis, An argument for the identity theory, Journal of Philosophy 63, 1966: pp.17-25 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Behaviorism | Sellars Vs Behaviorism | I 89 Behaviorism/Sellars: does not analyze existing psychological concepts but constructs new concepts. Also does not deny the privileged access. Also does not deny that these mental states can be adequately described with everyday words such as "Belief", "Doubt", "Desires" and so on. It also does not deny that there is such a thing as introspection, nor that it is at least halfway reliable. (However, not according to the image of perception). It works on the basis of everyday mental concepts. I 90 Besides that behaviorism recommends to start all over again with the conceptualization. The scientific behaviorism does not defend the thesis that folk psychological concepts can be attributed to behavioral concepts ("Philosophical" behaviorism). It rather says: maybe not mentalistic concepts, but the concepts used by me can be attributed to behavior. SellarsVsBehaviorism: e.g. just as little as chemistry was calculated on the basis of concepts that can be explicitly defined by recourse to the observable properties and behavior of chemical substances. I 91 That concludes that some behaviorist concepts must be introduced as theoretical concepts! Theoretical Termini/Sellars: are not only not defined in behaviorist psychology in terms of open behavior but also just as little in terms of nerves, synapses, neurons irritation, etc.! A behaviorist theory of behavior is not already as such a physiological explanation of behavior. So that a structure of theoretical concepts is suitable to provide explanations for behavior, the theoretical concepts do not have to be identified with the concepts of neurophysiology. However, it operates under a certain regulative ideal, the ideal of a coherent system. The behavioral theory is not fixed from the start to a physiological identification of all their concepts. I XXIX Methodological Behaviorism/Sellars: VsLogical Behaviorism. I XXX Logical Behaviorism/Sellars: is essentially a thesis on the importance of mental terms. Carnap, Hempel: they concentrated mainly on "pain" as a psychological predicate. PutnamVsLogical Behaviorism: e.g. "Superspartans" who never express their pain in any form. I XXXI Ryle: tried to analyze all mental predicates as the expressions of behavioral dispositions. However, as theoretical concepts disposition expressions cannot easily be identified with the conditions for verification of a disposition. Carnap: intelligence test: someone may fail without us denying him at once any intelligence. Carnap here VsLogical Behaviorism: otherwise you would indeed be forced to define the intelligence through test conditions as the logical behaviorism had assumed. Def Methodological Behaviorism/SellarsVsRyle/Sellars: admittedly introduces mental terms in reference to the observable behavior but does not hold onto the fact that these terms should be defined in reference to the behavior. (Or, what is the same: that psychological statements must be fully translated into statements about observable behavior). |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
Behaviorism | Verschiedene Vs Behaviorism | Chris Frith Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2010 I 113 Pawlow/Pawlov/Frith: his experiments differ greatly from behaviorism, even though they are often subsumed under it today. PawlowVsBehaviorism: Pawlow was interested in the physiological mechanisms underlying psychological phenomena. I 114 Def unconditional/unconditioned Reflex/Pawlow: Saliva flow formation when listening to the bell. The process that causes the formation. I 115 Def Conditional Reflex/Conditioned Reflex/Pawlow: that the dog took the bell as the signal for food and expected to be fed. Also turned the head in the direction the food normally came from. Def Conditioning/Frith: "classical conditioning": only the association between the bell and the salivary flow. Not the expectation and the head turning, here more complex processes are at work. I 116 Association/Pawlow/Frith: no association occurred when the bell did not sound until five to 10 seconds after the feed was administered. Stimulus: is only interesting if it predicts an event. Later it is uninteresting. Learning/Pawlow/Frith: the learning that Pawlow discovered is exactly the form of learning that we need to survive. It is not enough to learn which things are good or bad, we must also learn how to get them. |
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Behaviorism | Parsons, Ta. Vs Behaviorism | AU Kass 11 Action/Luhmann: what is actually not meant by this? How do I distinguish them? Action theory: causes difficulties: in the literature there are various exclusion experiments. E.g. Behavior is something that even animals can do, perhaps a little more sophisticated in humans. Excludes the subject to a certain extent. Talcott ParsonsVsBehaviorism: has always seen himself as the leader of an uprising against behaviorism. VsComparison of students and guinea pigs. Thus Parsons was considered as almost European or philosophical by the Americans. Action Theory/New: insistence on rationality (comes from Max Weber). Action/Weber: first, means and ends must be distinguished. LuhmannVsWeber: this brings the problem of what is to be excluded. Is a certain action then no action anymore, but rather behavior? Today: rational choice theory: no longer a problem: it is believed that if someone opts prospects at expected benefit, it is rational action which is amenable to theoretical treatment. Weber: relies more on ideal types than on a concrete description of reality. Action/Luhmann: two other problems: external and internal demarcation of action. External demarcation: unclear which consequences belong to action and which do not. E.g. does my talking take place in their minds, how far does it go? When you start with that, you tend to include more and more. Internal demarcation: question of motivation. Usually you want to fix the intention to speak of an action. That's why there is a tendency to conceive action attribution-theoretically: action must be attributed by the actor to himself. Problem: what are the motives then, are they real? One can cite anything that is obvious to oneself. One is prepared. Question: did the Neanderthals have motives already? Action Theory/Luhmann: could be regarded as a kind of glue between individual and society, action is something that cannot be cut into an individual part and a social part. |
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Churchland, P. | Fodor Vs Churchland, P. | IV 189 Mind/brain/Churchland: thesis: the brain represents different aspects of reality through a position in an appropriate state space. IV 191 FodorVsChurchland/LeporeVsChuchland: Churchland also seems to be guilty of the illusion, that there could ultimately be something empirical, so that conceptual relations could in the end be reduced to relations between observation concepts. Churchland: semantic identity goes back to the special place in the network of semantically relevant sentences (and that is of the whole language). Translation: therefore, we can speak of the equality of sentences across languages! IV 192 Equivalent expressions occupy the same (corresponding) places in the corresponding network of the other language. Nevertheless, translation should always take observability into account. IV 193 Churchland/Fodor/Lepore: Churchland surprisingly begins with feelings, not with intentionality (e.g. with propositional attitudes or concepts). Thesis: if we had adequate access to feelings, it could be generalized to a general mental representation. Churchland: the qualitative nature of our sensations is generally considered as inaccessible for the neurobiological reduction. But even so, we find that a determined attempt to find an order here revealed a sizable chunk of expressible information, e.g. color cubes with frequencies. IV 194 Fodor/Lepore: Churchland actually assumes that this is an access to the sensations (through frequencies!), not only to the discrimination ability of the nervous system. Churchland: thus, the inexpressible can be expressed! The "unspeakable rose" can be grasped by indication of the frequency. This is perhaps a way to replace everyday language. IV 195 Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: how plausible is this story in terms of sensations? Does it provide a robust notion of equality in general? Qualia/quality/sensation/exchanged spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green. If the exchange is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could uncover it. VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the exchanged spectra thus seem to indicate that behaviorism is wrong and functionalism, too (Block/Fodor, Shoemaker). One might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been exchanged. And it is precisely the concept of the perceptual identity that becomes ambiguous because of that. VsChurchland: Churchland's approach does not help at all. The labels of the dots on the dice could be exactly reversed. IV 196 Why should a semantic space not be put beside it and the condition added that the dimensions of the semantic space must be semantic? They must designate content states through their contents. E.g. Perhaps we could then identify uncle, aunt, President, Cleopatra, etc. along these dimensions? IV 197 E.g. Cleopatra as a politician is closer to the president in terms of marriageability. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: that is what we are really interested in: a robust theory of the equality of content rather than identity of content that has been lost with the analytic/synthetic distinction. Problem: equality presupposes identity and a corresponding theory. >State semantics: deals with the question of how the identity of the state spaces is fixed. IV 200 Representation/neurophysiological/mind/brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies. IV 201 Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: two different interpretations of his diagrams would also interpret neighborhoods very differently. --- Metzinger II 466 "Eliminative Materialism"/Churchland: eliminative materialism means two things: 1) Materialism is most probably true. 2) Many traditional explanations of human behavior are not suitable for understanding the real causes. II 467 "Request"/"conviction"/Churchland: Paul and Patricia Churchland: we will probably have to drop these "categories" (FodorVsChurchland, SearleVsChurchland). |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Behaviorism | Rorty, R. | Fra I 592 Armstrong: he had presented a real alternative to behaviorism. RortyVsArmstrong: the alternative MaterialismVsBehaviorism does not make sense, as it is set up by Armstrong. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |