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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Altruism | Sen | Brocker I 882 Altruism/Gary S. Becker: some economists, including Gary S. Becker, reinterpret moral expenditures in such a way that they appear as sophisticated forms of self-care - eager for social recognition or transcendent salvation (Becker 1976(1); Becker 1996(2)): With the help of secret motifs unknown to the actors, ordinary altruism is reconstructed as extraordinary egoism. >Egoism, >Unconscious, >Actions, >Behavior. SenVsBecker, Gary: But Sen is against it: If such, scientifically questionable, ad-hoc assumptions are necessary in order not to simply dismiss moral action as irrational to one's own disadvantage, what does this actually say about the theory applied here?(3) Shouldn't one rather renounce the dogma of self-interest than the plausibility of one's own statements? >Rationality, >Irrationality, >Theories, >Method. 1. Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, Chicago 1976 2. Gary S. Becker, Accounting for Tastes, Cambridge, Mass. 1996 3. Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen. Wege zu Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität in der Marktwirtschaft, München 2000, S. 332-334. Claus Dierksmeier, „Amartya Sen, Ökonomie für den Menschen (1999)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Discrimination | Alchian | Henderson I 31 Discrimination/Alchian/Henderson/Globerman: „Discrimination in choosing employees by reason of race, creed, sex, beauty, or age will be more pronounced in not-for-profit firms than in business firms.“(1) Costs of discrimination: [context: Private companies do not discriminate as strongly as public institutions]: The government-run City colleges of Chicago could discriminate against a high-quality applicant because no one owned the university and, therefore, no one bore a cost for this discrimination. But the ad agency was a for-profit company. If the company passed up the opportunity to hire someone Who would do a good job, it wouldn't do as well financially. >Private sector, >Public sector. By taking longer to find someone as good or by settling for someone less skilled, the company would suffer financially for its decision to discriminate, which is why the company that hired him didn't ask him about his political background - it didn't care enough to risk its profits. >Cost, >Rate of Profit, >Profit, >Racism, >Prejudice, >Discrimination/Becker. Henderson I 32 Alchian/Kessel: In their famous 1962 article, "Competition, Monopoly and Pecuniary Gain"(2), they asked, "But why do monopolistic enterprises discriminate against negroes more than do competitive enterprises?" AlchianVsBecker: They went on to point out that there was no good reason, or at least no reason that Becker gave, to expect monopolistic enterprises to discriminate more against black people than competitive enterprises did. Alchian and Kessel provided the missing logic. Monopolies: Monopolies, they noted, tend to get their monopoly power from the government. Governments often prevent other firms from competing. Public sector: Public utilities are an example. But often the government, in return for granting monopoly power, regulates the profits of the monopolies. Wrote Alchian and Kessel: "Their cardinal sin is to be too profitable."(2) In their article, Alchian and Kessel noted an important implication: "If regulated monopolists are able to earn more than the permissible pecuniary rate of return, then 'ineffciency' is a free good because the alternative to ineffciency is the same pecuniary rate of return and no 'ineffciency."'(2) Henderson I 33 In other words, once regulated monopolies bump up against the profit constraint imposed on them by government, they can't legally earn more and so they "spend" what would otherwise be the additional profits on things that can be considered consumption items. Alchian and Kessel, writing in a less politically correct era, gave a long list of these other items, a list that includes "pretty secretaries," "lavish offces," and "large expense accounts." Racism: Where does racial discrimination come in? As noted above, the cost of racial discrimination limits the amount of racial discrimination that will occur. But if the government constrains firms to earn Iower profits than they could otherwise earn, racial discrimination, like ineffciency, becomes a "free good." Therefore, we would expect to see more racial discrimination in monopolistic firms whose profits are regulated by governments. Test of the hypothesis: Alchian and Kessel tested their hypothesis by analyzing a sample of 224 non-Jewish and 128 Jewish MBA students Who had graduated from the Harvard Business School. The graduates were employed in 10 major industry categories. Of the 10, they wrote, the two industries with the greatest regulatory restrictions discouraging effcient production were "transportation, communication and other public utilities" and "finance, insurance and real estate." Although 36 percent of the MBAs were Jewish, their representation in the two most heavily regulated industries was only 18 percent. The probability of this outcome happening by chance, they noted, was less than 0.0005.* Attenuating the rights of the owners of the regulated companies to use their property to increase profits had the effect of encouraging anti-social behaviour and outcomes. *For an overview of this Study and several other seminal studies on property rights by Alchian, see Henderson (2019)(3). 1. Armen A. Alchian (2006), "Some Economics of Property," p. 48. 2. Alchian, Armen A., and Reuben A. Kessel (1962). Competition, Monopoly and Pecuniary Gain. In H.G. Lewis (ed.), Aspects of Labor Economics (National Bureau of Economic Research): 157-183. 3. Henderson, David (2019, May 6). Economics Works. Liberty Classics. Econlib. |
Alchian I Armen A. Alchian William R. Allen Exchange and Production: Competition, Coordination and Control Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 1977 Henderson I David R. Henderson Steven Globerman The Essential UCLA School of Economics Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2019 |
| Discrimination | Becker | Henderson I 31 Discrimination/cost/Gary Becker/Henderson/Globerman: In 1957, Gary Becker, then an economics professor at Columbia University, published a path-breaking book titled The Economics of Discrimination(1). Cost of discrimination: The book's most important message is that an employer who discriminates in hiring on the basis of race rather than on the basis of productivity gives up profits. In other words, there is a cost to discriminating. Henderson I 32 Racism: Becker was careful to note that that does not imply that there will be no discrimination. Some employers are willing to give up profits in order to exercise what Becker called their "taste for discrimination." But his point was that discrimination is costly for those who do it and that that cost limits the amount of discrimination. Demand: The law of demand, which says that when the price of something rises people buy less ofit, applies to discrimination as well. Alchian/Kessel: Alchian and co-author Reuben Kessel of the University of Chicago took Becker's insight and ran with it. Monopolies and discrimination: In his book(1), Becker had noted that black people were discriminated against more frequently by monopolistic enterprises. While Becker didn't see that fact as a puzzle, Alchian and Kessel did. Alchian/Kessel: In their famous 1962 article, "Competition, Monopoly and Pecuniary Gain"(2), they asked, "But why do monopolistic enterprises discriminate against negroes more than do competitive enterprises?" AlchianVsBecker: They went on to point out that there was no good reason, or at least no reason that Becker gave, to expect monopolistic enterprises to discriminate more against black people than competitive enterprises did. >Discrimination/Alchian. 1. Becker, Gary (1957). The Economics of Discrimination. University of Chicago Press. 2. Alchian, Armen A., and Reuben A. Kessel (1962). Competition, Monopoly and Pecuniary Gain. In H.G. Lewis (ed.), Aspects of Labor Economics (National Bureau of Economic Research): 157-183. |
Henderson I David R. Henderson Steven Globerman The Essential UCLA School of Economics Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2019 |
| Human Capital | Becker | Mause I 510f Human Capital/Becker: The homogeneity of the factor labor is dissolved into a new inhomogeneity (Becker 1992, 1993a, b.) (1)(2). Demanders for human capital, as well as demanders for other forms of capital and for the production factors work and land, are companies, the state and other employers. The core of human capital theory is the view that human capital increases the productivity of an actor and that increased productivity results in higher income for the actor and growth of the economy as a whole. Question: how is the amount of human capital and its overall economic impact determined? Solution: Comparison of costs and benefits of education expenditure. Narrow view: Investments in human capital are only those actions that will increase productivity in the future. Individual: an individual's human capital stock is the stock of productive skills and abilities that result in a flow of income. VsHuman Capital/VsBecker: the concept of human capital was criticized as inhuman after its introduction. In Germany, it was named "Un-word of the Year" in 2004. (3) Nowadays this rejection is overcome. >Capabilities, >Humans, >Knowledge, >Information, >Individuals. 1. Gary S. Becker, Menschliches Dasein aus ökonomischer Sicht. Nobel-Lesung vom 9. Dezember 1992. In Die Nobelpreisträger der ökonomischen Wissenschaft, Hrsg. Karl-Dieter Grüske, Bd. III, 206– 236. Düsseldorf 1992 2. Gary. S. Becker 1993Human capital. A theoretical and empirical analysis with special references to education, 3.ed. Chicago: NBER. 3. Jury Unwort des Jahres. 2004. Generelle Stellungnahme zum Unwort des Jahres „Humankapital“. http:// www. unwortdesjahres. net/ index. php? id = 18. |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Preferences | Stigler | Mause I 170f Preferences/Economy/Stigler/Becker: The standard theory assumes (...) constant preferences of all market players.(1) VsBecker, Gary S./VsStigler, George J.: There are adaptive preferences, i.e. those that change depending on previous consumption patterns. (2) e.g. sensitization for social misdevelopments, new environmental awareness. >G. Becker. 1. Stigler, George J., und Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum. American Economic Review 67 (2), 1977. S. 76– 90. 2. Weizsäcker, Carl Christian von. Adaptive Präferenzen und die Legitimierung dezentraler Entscheidungsstrukturen. In Behavioral Economics und Wirtschaftspolitik, Hrsg. Christian Müller und Nils Otter, Stuttgart 2015, S. 67– 99. |
EconStigler I George J. Stigler Gary S. Becker De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum 1977 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
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