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Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Completeness Cresswell I 69
Unvollständigkeit/Vollständigkeit/unvollständig/CresswellVsSituations-Semantik/CresswellVsBarwise/CresswellVsPerry: die Frage der Vollständigkeit ist weniger klar als sie scheint: 1. Wie soll man
u [[φ]] e

verstehen? „In Kontext u beschreibt φ die Situation e“.
e: haben wir bis jetzt als Proposition aufgefaßt. Aber man kann eine Situation genauso gut als Welt auffassen, so dass es dann heißen würde:

„im Hinblick auf Kontext u ist φ wahr in e“.

Bsp Disjunktion/BP/Cresswell: ihre Konstruktion erfordert, dass Situationen als mögliche Welten aufgefasst werden, aber damit wird die Situationssemantik zu einer Semantik möglicher Welten.

Unvollständigkeit/unvollständig/partiell/Proposition/Semantik möglicher welten/Cresswell: Bsp Disjunktion:

(1) Morgen früh zwischen 9 und 12 werde ich entweder zu Hause oder an der Uni sein.
Das ist zwar keine Satz-Disjunktion, aber es ist äquivalent zu

(2) Entweder werde ich zu Hause sein zwischen 9 und 12 morgen oder
ich werde an der Uni sein zwischen 9 und 12 morgen.

was eine Disjunktion ist von

(3) Ich werde zu Hause sein, zwischen 9 und 12 morgen

und

(4) Ich werde an der Uni sein zwischen 9 und 12 morgen.

Wenn wir außerdem Sprecher, Datum usw. haben, teilen sich die möglichen Welten in zwei Klassen auf, die, in denen (1) wahr ist und die in denen (1) falsch ist. ((s) es geht hier immer um (1) nicht um die einzelnen Alternativen!).
Unter den Welten, in denen (1) wahr ist, können auch welche sein, in denen ich an beiden Orten bin, wenn auch nicht zur selben Zeit!
I 70
Unvollständig/Disjunktion/Mögliche Welten/Cresswell: aber es werden natürlich auch solche Welten in der Menge sein, wo ich an dem einen Ort bin, aber nicht an dem anderen. In diesem Sinn ist (1) unvollständig. D.h. die Proposition kann auf verschiedene Weisen wahr gemacht werden. Situation/unvollständig/Cresswell: wenn eine Situation wie eine Proposition sein soll, dann muss, damit die Situation unvollständig ist, eine einzelne (einzige) Situation durch (1) beschrieben werden, was die Situation meines zu-hause-oder-an-der-Uni-seins ist ((s) „disjunktive Situation“, „alles in einem“) und nicht eine ((s) Disjunktion von Situationen), in der ich in Situation a) zu hause bin oder Situation b) an der Uni bin.
Jedes Element der Klasse ist entweder eine zu-Hause-Welt oder eine an-der-Uni-Welt aber es ist nicht wahr, dass jedes Element eine zu-hause-Welt oder jedes eine an-der-Uni-Welt ist.
D.h. die Proposition ist unvollständig. (partielle Proposition)..
Unvollständigkeit/ /Cresswell: Barwise/Perry kann man so verstehen (Perry 1986, S 85), dass sie Situationen für unvollständig halten. Begründung: eine Situation gibt keine Antwort auf jede Frage.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Decidability Hintikka I 7
Standard semantics/Kripke semantics/Hintikka: what differences are there? The ditch between them is much deeper than it first appears.
Cocchiarella: Cocchiarella has shown, however, that even in the simplest quantifying case, of the monadic predicate logic, the standard logic is radically different from its Kripkean cousin.
Decidability: monadic predicate logic is, as Kripke has shown, decidable.
Kripke semantics: Kripke semantics is undecidable.
Decidability: decidability implies axiomatizability.
---
I 208
Decision problem/predicate calculus/Hao Wang: thesis: the problem corresponds to the task of completely filling the Euclidean surface with square dominoes of different sizes. At least one stone of each size must be used.
E.g. Logical omniscience: now comes in in the following way:
At certain points I can truthfully say according to my perception:
(5) I see that this Domino task is impossible to solve.
In other cases, I cannot say that truthfully.
Problem/HintikkaVsBarwise/HintikkaVsSituation-Semantics/Hintikka: According to Barwise/Perry, it should be true of any unsolvable Domino problem that I see the unsolvability immediately as soon as I see the forms of available stones because the unsolvability follows logically from the visual information.
Solution/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: according to the urn model there is no problem.
---
I 209
Omniscience/symmetry/Hintikka: Situational semantics: situational semantics needs the urn model to solve the second problem of logical omniscience. Semantics of possible worlds: on the other hand, it needs situational semantics itself to solve the first problem.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

Situation Semantics Barwise Cresswell II 169
Situation semantics/Barwise/Perry/Cresswell: (Barwise/Perry, 1983): here it is explicitly denied that logically equivalent sentences in contexts with propositional attitudes are interchangeable. (1983, 175, 1981b, 676f) - e.g. double negation in the attribution of propositional attitudes. - Solution: partial character of situations. - Not everything has to be given - or the speaker may have to suspend judgment. ("do not ...") - Definition sentence meaning/Barwise/Perry: a relation between situations.
Cresswell I 63
Situation SemanticsVsPossible World Semantics/knowledge/meaning/Barwise/Perry/BarweiseVsCresswell/ PerryVsCresswell/Cresswell: the possible worlds are too big to explain what the speaker knows when he/she utters a meaningful sentence. Possible worlds: are complete possible situations.
Situation semantics: we need a more partial type of entity. ((s) partial, nothing complete).
CresswellVsSituation Semantics: (Cresswell 1985a, 168 ff, 1985b, Chapter 7)
Solution/Cresswell: Thesis: The situations only have to be partial in the sense that they are small worlds.
Definition Abstract Situation/Barwise/Perry: (1983,57 ff): are theoretical constructs used for an adequate semantic modeling of reality consisting of real situations.
Cresswell: I ignore this distinction here. The semantics of possible worlds is better here, even if one differentiates between reality and theoretical representation.
What we need to compare are abstract situations and worlds.
I 64
Setting-SemanticsVsPossible World Semantics/BarwiseVsCresswell: there are often two proposition, one of which is believed by the person, but the other is not, but both are still true in the same worlds - for example, all logical and mathematical truths - but they are not all known, otherwise there could be no progress.
I 65
CresswellVs: the situations should play roles that cannot be played at the same time - solution: -Semantics of possible worlds: the roles are played by entities of different kinds. Solution: Context with space-time specification - incorrect sentences: describes non-actual situations.
I 66
Sentences describe situations in a context - context is itself a situation that provides the listener with time, place, etc. - Interpretation/Barwise: Meaning of sentences in a context. Meaning/CresswellVsSituation Semantics/CresswellVsBarwise/CresswellVsPerry: Meaning: = set of worlds in which they are true.
Problem: Meanings are often equated with proposition, and then there are problems in playing roles that they cannot play at the same time.
I 67
On the other hand, some of the other things that Barwise and Perry ask for from situations behave like worlds! For example: Mollie barks
e*: = in I, Mollie, yes.
That describes a situation e iff e* < e. ((s) Subset of situations where Mollie barks otherwise? Or where Mollie exists and someone barks?).
Definition Generation property/terminology/Cresswell: (generation property): sentences that describe a situation have a situation property ((s) that is part of a set of situations). A sentence ? has the generation property in terms of a context u, iff there is a situation e*, so that
u[[φ]] e iff e* < e.
((s) If there is a sentence that is more general than the sentence "Mollie barks in the space-time situation I" Or: Generation property is the property that embeds the sentence in the context, because proposition as sets of worlds must not be limited to a single situation.
The sentence φ has the generation property (simpliciter) iff it has it in every context.
Atomic sentence/BP: Thesis: all atomic sentences have the generation property.
Cresswell: if situations are to be understood as proposition, all sentences should have the generation property. And that is because the generating situation e* can be understood as the proposition expressed by the sentence ? in context u.
In fact, we do not need the other situations at all! We can say that e* is the only situation described by ? in u. But that doesn't matter, because each e* determines the only class of e's, so e* < e, and each class generated by an e* determines that e* uniquely.

Barw I
J. Barwise
Situations and Attitudes Chicago 1999


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Situation Semantics Cresswell I 63
Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry: possible worlds (poss.w.) are too big to explain what the speaker of a sentence knows. Possible World: complete possible situations. CresswellVsBarwise: Situations need only be partial in the sense that they are small possible worlds.
---
I 69
CresswellVsBarweise/Perry: disjunction: their construction requires that situations are considered as possible worlds: E.g. I am at home or at the university: as a proposition incomplete, because both made true. - The situation can only be one of the two. Making true/turhmaker: the total (disjunction) does not have to be made true by an alternative, because it can also be made true by another alternative.
---
I 72
Situations seem incomplete. (E.g. Does the dog bark loudly or quietly?) - But they are not as incomplete as propositions. ---
I 71
Problem: Total situation: The machine is working (shows red or green). - still contradiction: is the situation described by a or by b? If the signal was neither showing red nor green, the incompleteness would be too radical. ---
I 73
Incomplete/situation/Barwise/Perry: E.g. naked infinitives with "see". Joe saw Fred coming in and Sally was smoking or not smoking. Cresswell: so everything possible - but then possible world - Everything that can be a possible world is a possible world. Possible worlds do not have to be large, they can be as small as situations at Barwise/Perry - different: aspect/Hintikka: (= incompleteness of possible world): all facts about who slept during the lecture.
CresswellVsHintikka: we do not want lists, these are metaphysical here. - Solution/Cresswell. "Everything that interests us in the situation". ((s) So lists after all.) Thus the truth of the propositions can be determined.
---
I 74
Definition essentially incomplete/Cresswell: is a situation when it only needs to be part of an accumulation of situations (disjunction) CresswellVsBarwise: but this does not work with naked infinitives with "see": E.g. of "Ralph saw Ortcutt or Hortcutt hide the letter" - at "Ralph saw... or saw... ". (This is not a that-sentence!) - This is not possible if seeing should be a relation between subject and situation. - ((s) Then only one of the two.)
---
I 77
Situation Semantics/CresswellVs: knows only one kind of entities (situations). - instead: possible world semantics: three types: 1. possible world, single and complete (assessed with regard to truth) 2. Propositions: classes of possible worlds, are in logical relations and are the meanings of sentences in a context
3. Individuals (individuals) among them events.
Situations/Cresswell: can be considered as one of each of these kind of entities.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Situation Semantics Hintikka II XVII
Situation semantics/Barwise/Perry/Hintikka: situation semantics is not so far away from the semantics of possible worlds. Possible worlds/Hintikka: possible worlds are often more like situations, they are not always closed worlds. They are rather event progresses in a small corner of the universe and related to situations.
Difference: alternative situations could occur in one and the same world.
---
II XVIII
Situation semantics/Hintikka: situation semantics is not a serious rival of the semantics of possible worlds. ---
II 206
Situation semantics/Barwise/Perry/B/P/Hintikka: their situation semantics is a welcome addition to the semantics of possible worlds. Situation/Hintikka: an interesting question is how small egocentric situations can be put together to form a larger comprehensive "world view".
Relations: There should be at least three types of relations between situations:
1. spatial
2. temporal 3. the distinction between fine-grained and coarse-grained situations.
It is best to study these separately.
II 207
Situation semantics/Barwise/Perry/Omniscience/Hintikka: how can situation semantics solve the problem of logical omniscience? Barwise/Perry: give the following example:
(1) a sees how b X-t
therefore (2) a sees how b Y-t
If X-en implies logically, to Y-en. ((s) e.g. to go, to move).
Solution/Barwise/Perry: they assume that there are richer and poorer situations and relations between them.
HintikkaVsBarwise/HintikkaVsSituation semantics/Hintikka: but this is not a triumph over the semantics of possible worlds, for two reasons:
1. because it is now about the relation fine/coarse (fine-grained/coarse-grained), it is nothing with which the semantics of possible worlds has to do.
2. The semantics of possible worlds has solved the problem by Rantala's urn models (changing worlds depending on whether drawn balls are returned or not).
Barwise/Perry: they consider only instances of omniscience, which arise through the introduction of new descriptive terms into the conclusion,...
II 208
...and go beyond what is mentioned in the premises. Hintikka/Rantala: we have both looked at cases which require the introduction of new individuals in order to ensure the validity of the inference.
E.g.
(3) Robert saw someone giving each boy his own book.
(4) Robert saw every boy how a book was given him by someone.
Question: entails (3) logically (4)?
Situation semantics/Barwise/Perry: according to situation semantics, yes it does.
Semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: according to semantics of possible worlds it is at least questionable.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989


The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Barwise, J. Hintikka Vs Barwise, J. II 207
Situation Semantics/Barwise/Perry/B/P/Omniscience//Hintikka: how can it solve the problem of logical omniscience?. B/P: bring the following E.g.
(1) a sees how b X-t
therefore (2) a sees how b Y-t
If Xing logically implies to Y. ((s) E.g. walking implies moving).
Problem/(s): from this follows a lot more of which one cannot always assume that a) it is seen, b) that it is known.
Solution/B/P: assume that there are richer and poorer situations and relations between them.
HintikkaVsBarwise/HintikkaVsSituation Semantics/Hintikka: but that’s not a triumph over the possible world semantics, for two reasons:
1) because it is now about the relation fine/coarse (fine-grained/coarse) ((s) of the description), it is nothing with which the semantics of possible worlds has to do.
2) The semantics of possible worlds has solved the problem with Rantala urn models (see above changing possible worlds).
B/P: they consider only cases of omniscience that arise in the wake of the introducing new descriptive terms in the conclusion.
II 208
and go beyond what is mentioned in the premises. Hintikka/Rantala: we both have seen cases that require the introduction of new individuals to ensure the validity of the inference.
E.g.
(3) Robert saw someone giving every boy his own book.
(4) Robert saw every boy as he was given a book by someone.
Question: does (3) logically entail (4)?
Situations Semantics/B/P: according to her it does.
Semantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: according to her, it is at least questionable.
Decision Problem/Predicate Calculus/Hao Wang: Thesis: it corresponds to the task of filling out the Euclidean space with square dominoes of different sizes without leaving gaps.
At least one piece of every size must be used.
E.g. logical omniscience: comes in as follows now:
At certain points, I can say truthfully according to my perception:
(5) I see that this domino task is impossible to solve.
In other cases I cannot truthfully say that.
Problem/HintikkaVsBarwise/HintikkaVsSituation Semantics/Hintikka: according to B/P it should be true of any unsolvable domino problem that I see the insolubility as soon as I see the shapes of the available stones, because the insolubility follows logically from the visual information.
Solution/Semantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: according to the urn model, there is no problem.
II 209
Omniscience/Symmetry/Hintikka: Situation Semantics: needs the urn model to solve the second problem of logical omniscience Semantics of possible worlds: needs situations semantics in turn to solve the first problem.
II 211
HintikkaVsBarwise/HintikkaVsSituation Semantics/Hintikka: you can find many problems solved with semantics of possible worlds, but not the situation semantics. Opacity/Hintikka: besides the one that is understood as the failure of substitutivity (the identity), there is one that is understood as the failure of the existential generalization (even if it is about non-existence) (see above).
Questions/Hintikka: We still need a semantics for direct questions along with criteria for complete answers. (see below, see above).
Direct object: can also be an event or a particular.
Problem: Questions that contain a (external) quantifier.
Problem: semantics for questions with T-constructions with epistemic verbs.
Question: Why are W-constructions not found under the relevant verbs?.
II 212
HintikkaVsSituation Semantics/HintikkaVsBarwise/Hintikka: Barwise and Perry introduce a "function c" (p 671): this seems obscure: Semantics/Hintikka: intended to provide a model that shows how speakers can refer to anything they want and can mean what they mean.
Function/Semantics of Possible Worlds: here, the speaker or the listener detects a function of possible worlds on speakers.
Situation Semantics/B/P: explains meaning from facts of reference-in-situation: "... a component implicitly represents the connections c between certain words and things in the world in the meaningful use of these words".
HintikkaVsBarwisse/HintikkaVsSituation Semantics/: it should be the reverse: a realistic theory of meaning and reference should show how such a function c is determined by the meanings. For understanding means to detect the meanings c determined.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Description Theory Craig Vs Description Theory II 156
Synonymie/Burge: er akzeptiert, daß „vixen“ und „weiblicher Fuchs“ synonym sind und argumentiert, daß daher ein ersetzen durch synonyme Wahrheit in Glaubenskontexten nicht erhalten muß. Kripke: (1979. 274, n12) gibt ein ähnliches Beispiel mit Nervenärzten und Psychiatern.
Pointe: VsBeschreibungstheorie: hier scheint es nicht gut zu sein, „vixen“ als „wird vixen genannt“ zu analysieren.
Kompositionalität/Glauben/Burge: Kompositionalität schlägt in Glaubenskontexten fehl.
CresswellVsBurge: wenn wir die Kompositionalität erhalten wollen, müssen wir annehmen, daß „vixen“ lexikalisch mehrdeutig ist.
Oder es muß (evtl. Nicht-Standard-) Kontexte geben, in denen es tatsächlich bedeutet „wird „vixen“ genannt“.
Pointe: wenn das hier erlaubt ist, dann vielleicht doch auch für Fälle mit „Phosphorus“!
II 166
PutnamVsBeschreibungstheorie/natürliche Art-Begriffe/Cresswell: (Putnam 1975, 148) (ebenso wie KripkeVsBeschreibungstheorie der Namen). Problem/Cresswell: Bsp Der Satz „Es gibt Wasser auf der Zwillingserde." (ZE). Angenommen, auf der ZE gibt es kein H2O, dann sollte der Satz, geäußert auf der Erde, falsch sein. Aber da etwas – nämlich XYZ – auf der ZE die Rolle von Wasser spielt, dann scheint die Beschreibungstheorie den Satz wahr zu machen.
Lösung/Fodor: (Fodor 1982, 111-113): Ein Wort wie „Wasser“ ist in gewisser Weise kontextuell beschränkt. D.h. indem wir es auf der Erde äußern, meinen wir mit dem Wort „Wasser“ so etwas wie „das, was auf der Erde die Rolle von Wasser spielt“.
Fodor/Cresswell: seine Idee ist, daß diese Beschränkungen, nicht Teil des Glaubens sind! Dann kann Oscars Zwilling auf der ZE dasselbe Glauben, wenn er das Wort „Wasser“ in einem Satz gebraucht.
Pointe: damit bleibt der methodologische Solipsismus gewahrt, daß eine prop Einst ohne externe Faktoren klassifiziert werden sollte.
II 174
Situation/sprachunabhängig/Barwise/Perry/Cresswell: (Barwise/Perry, 1981b, 679): Bsp man kann nicht jemand küssen, ohne ihn zu berühren. sprachunabhängig: nun kann man für „küssen“ jedes andere Wort einsetzen und ebenso für „berühren“. D.h. das hat nichts mit Bedeutungspostulaten oder anderen semantischen Tatsachen zu tun.
CresswellVsSituations-Semantik/CresswellvsBarwise: Barwise/Perry setzen das aber einfach nur fest, sie können es nicht erklären.
MöWe-Semantik/Cresswell: diese kann es erklären: die Eigenschaft des Küssens wird eine Funktion von Paaren von Individuen auf Mengen von MöWe sein. Dasselbe wird wahr sein von der Eigenschaft des Berührens. Aber für jedes Paar von Individuen (a, b) wird die Menge der MöWe in denen a b küßt eine Teilmenge der Menge der MöWe sein, in denen a b berührt. Dazu brauchen wir also keine Bedeutungspostulate.

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Situation Sem. Cresswell, M.J. I 65
CresswellVsSituation Semantics/CresswellVsBarwise/CresswellVsPerry: Thesis: The so-called "situations" should play roles that cannot be played at the same time. Solution/Cresswell: Possible world semantics/semantics of possible worlds: here the different roles are played by entities of very different kinds.
Context: that the meaning of a sentence in meta language is the set of worlds in which the sentence is true, must be related to a context. I.e. they need information about place, time, speaker, etc.
I 77
CresswellVsSituation Semantics/CresswellVsBarwise/CresswellVsPerry/Possible World Semantics: Conclusion: Situational semantics: knows only entities of a single species (situations).
Possible world semantics: assumes three types of entities:
1. possible worlds, which are single and complete and are assessed against the truth.
2. propositions - classes of possible worlds - are in logical relations and are the meanings of sentences in a context.
3. individuals (single things) among them events.
Situations/Cresswell: can be considered as one of any of these entities!
Problem: only occurs if you assume only one type of entity that should play all these roles.