Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Feminism Barry Gaus I 418
Feminism/Barry/Weinstein: Justice as impartiality (...) preserves the liberal public versus private goods distinction that feminists have claimed reinforces patriarchy. >Utilitarianism/Barry.
Barry nevertheless concedes that domestic violence and marital rape are public concerns.
Privacy: The personal is indeed largely political.
MendusVsBarry: But as Susan Mendus perceptively worries, 'what is to block the move to the kind of society which Barry fears - one in which very little is left to private judgement and almost everything to public scrutiny and censure?' (1998(1): 183).
Feminism: In short, Barry's feminism risks collapsing the private into the public, imperilling his liberalism.
BarryVsVs: Barry responds, accusing Mendus of 'alarmism' and denying that prohibiting domestic violence and marital rape would 'open the floodgates' to tyrannizing (utilitarian) impartiality.
He insists that rightful public intervention in some cases won't lead 'inexorably to public intervention in other cases where that is wrong' (Barry, 1998(2): 256).* Surely this begs the question.
>Impartiality/Barry.

* Also see Phillips (1999a)(3) for a liberal feminist account of the dangers of radically overpoliticizing the personal.

1. Mendus, Susan (1998) 'Some mistakes about impartiality'. In P. Kelly, ed., Impartiality, Neutrality and Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 176-85.
2. Barry, Brian (1998) 'Something in the disputation not unpleasant'. In P. Kelly, ed., Impartiality, Neutrality and Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 186-257.
3. Phillips, Anne (1999a) 'The politicisation of difference'. In John Horton and Susan Mendus, eds, Toleration, Identity and Diffeænce. London: Macmillan, 126-45.

Weinstein, David 2004. „English Political Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications

EconBarry I
Brian Barry
Sociologists,economists, and democracy Chicago 1970


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Multiculturalism Barry Gaus I 257
Multiculturalism/Barry/Kukathas: According to Barry, multiculturalism is inconsistent with liberalism and a respect for liberal values and should therefore be rejected. (Barry 2001)(1) Galston: [William] Galston has termed 'Reformation liberalism'. Unlike 'Enlightenment liberalism', which emphasizes the importance of individual autonomy, 'Reformation liberalism', Galston maintains, values diversity and sees the importance of 'differences among individuals and groups over such matters as the nature ofthe good life, sources of moral authority, reason versus faith, and the like' (1995(2): 521).
BarryVsGalston: Barry rejects this distinction, but is especially critical nonetheless of those who are members of the diversity-promoting liberalism camp. Barry rejects three major arguments advanced in support of Reformation liberalism.
1) The first is that liberal theory values respect for persons and this implies respect for the cultures to which individuals belong. To this Barry replies that illiberal cultures often violate the requirement of equal respect and to that extent they do not deserve respect (2001(1): 128).
2) The second argument is that liberalism values diversity because it increases the range of options
available to individuals. To this Barry responds that liberals prize individuality rather than diversity
(2001(1): 129).
3) The third argument is that liberalism attaches great importance to the public/private distinction, and so should be committed to nonintervention in the private realm. To this Barry replies that liberalism has historically challenged the sanctity of parental and paternal authority, and sought to
protect individuals from the groups to which they belong.
Individuals/Barry: Individuals must be free to associate in any way they like (consistent with the law protecting the interests of those outside the association). But there are two important conditions: all participants in the association should be sane adults, and their participation should be voluntary (2001(1): 148).
Group rights: Groups may then do as they please, provided those who do not like the way a group's affairs are run are able to exit without facing excessive costs (2001(1): 150).
Problems/VsBarry: Barry's view imposes serious constraints, then, on the operation of groups. In the end, what it tolerates is only what Fish calls 'boutique multiculturalism'. (>Multiculturalism/Fish). It requires that illiberal practices not be condoned, that parents be required to send their children to school, and that generally the state ensures that children are appropriately educated and not made the victims of creationists and religious zealots - even if they are their parents. >Religion/education/Multiculturalism.
Egalitarianism: In the end, Barry's view amounts to a reassertion of liberal egalitarianism as a doctrine that is simply incompatible with multiculturalism.
VsBarry: (For criticisms of Barry see the papers in Kelly, 2002(3);
Per Barry: for another defence of liberal egalitarianism see Kernohan, 1998(4).)


1. Barry, Brian (2001) Cultuæ and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. Oxford: Polity.
2. Galston, William (1995) 'Two concepts of Liberalism', Ethics, 105(3): 516-34.
3. Kelly, Paul, ed. (2002) Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Cultuæ and Equality and Its Critics. Oxford: Polity.
4. Kernohan, Andrew (1998) Liberalism, Equality, and Cultural Oppression. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications

EconBarry I
Brian Barry
Sociologists,economists, and democracy Chicago 1970


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004
Rawls Barry Gaus I 94
Rawls/Barry, Brian/Waldron: Some commentators (e.g. Barry, 1995)(1) have expressed doubts about Rawls’s self-criticism(2) that the adoption of this ‘thin theory’ ((s) >Good/Rawls) means that A Theory of Justice was rooted in a particular comprehensive conception. WaldronVsBarry: But it is pretty clear that large parts of Rawlsian justice would not work without this thin theory of the good and of the importance of self-respect. The thin theory of the good and the notion of self-respect are implicated in the non-negotiable status that Rawls accords to freedom of conscience, for example, as well as in the general doctrine of the priority of liberty, the doctrine of the priority of opportunity, and his argument to the effect that citizens in a well-ordered society will not be motivated by material envy.


1. Barry, Brian (1995) ‘John Rawls and the search for stability’. Ethics, 105 (4): 874–915.
2. Rawls, John (1980) ‘Kantian constructivism in moral theory’. Journal of Philosophy, 77 (9): 515–72.

Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications.

EconBarry I
Brian Barry
Sociologists,economists, and democracy Chicago 1970


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004


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