Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Facts Austin
 
Books on Amazon
I 231
Fact / Austin: "fact" is just another term for "true statement" (pro Brandom, VsAyer) - to each true statement, there is one and only one and exactly corresponding fact.. (Ayer: but for every fact there are many (Davidson: infinitely many) true statements - but Brandom: T = true statement (in the sense of "aserted") (Brandom I 841) - AyerVsAustin AyerVsBrandom.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Idealism Ayers, M.
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 402
Ayers about Locke/Rorty: a striking example for the transmission of unsuitable problems. RortyVsAyers: Ayers book about Locke is only a pretext for his criticism of what he calls "linguistic idealism" (AyersVsSellars).


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Interpretation Ayers, M.
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 360
Interpretation/Bennett: Thesis: we can only understand Kant today by clearly indicating with the help of today's concepts what his problems were, which are still problems today, and what Kant did for their solution. ---
VI 361
M. AyersVsBennett: that means that it is impossible to understand a philosopher of the past today according to his own conceptuality. Ayers: Thesis: We should try to establish the same relationship between thinking and feeling as he himself did.
RortyVsAyers: one does not get far with this, if one no longer believes in terms like "mental capacity", etc. Ayers exaggerates the contrast between "our" and "his" terms.


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Meaning Change Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 293f
Meaning Change/Rorty: Question: Did the Greeks refer to prudence with the expression Sophrosyne? Rorty: This question can be rejected with the hint that there is for expectation; in a completely different culture this expression would be implantable; no particular reason. We have to make ourselves familiar with the exotic language game.   In the case of science, however, such an attitude seems unnatural. Here we want to say that out there is something, laws to which one should refer or at least one has referred to.
Rorty: "whiggistic" winner perspective: tells us, Aristotle spoke in reality of gravity, when he spoke of a natural settling movement, sailors would have, when they spoke of unicorns, referred to the horns of narwhals in reality, "heat flow" is a misleading description of the energy transfer between dancing molecules.
---
I 301
Meaning/truth/existence/Change of Theories/Meaning Change/Quine/Rorty: Quineans would say, the question, whether they meant the same back then, is not raised. - It's more about the truth values. - Rorty: a) Aristotle said something wrong about movement, or b) He said something true, but that was not movemnt. RortyVsAyers: with this, one will not get far if one does no longer believe in concepts like intellectual property etc. Ayers exaggerates the contrast between our and his concepts.
---
I 315 ff
Semantic change/change of theory/reference/Rorty: solution: the functioning of an expression should be better seen as the picking out of objects, than as the description of reality. - So either a) reference as a basis, or b) also accepting reference as conventional. - Searle-trawson-Criterion: "What would make most of his opinions true." ---
I 318
Solution: distinction reference: a) philosophical - b) "Speaking about" (common sense) - Rorty: it is only about existence. - Therefore, no criterion for reference possible. ---
I 321
RortyVsReference Theory/Theory of Reference: 1. Semantic search for the objects is hopeless. - 2. Hopeless: to strive for an epistemological refutation of skepticism. ---
III 103
Meaning Change: Adorno/Horkheimer/Rorty: pro - PutnamVs. ---
IV 131
Term/Meaning Change/Conceptual Change/Change of Theories/Rorty: terms that got a new twist through a thinker: E.g. Aristotle: ousia - Descartes: res - Hume: impression - Wittgenstein: Game - Einstein: simultaneity - Bohr Atom. ---
VI 361
Interpretation/Rorty: in such approximation efforts, the procedure is obviously anachronistic. But when that happens consciously, there is no objection.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Philosophy Ayers, M.
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 408
Philosophy/AyersVsRorty: the following theses are generally represented by the same people 1. Realism/antirealism is an important distinction
2. Dummett is right: these antirealism/realsim conflicts have been the most decisive in the history of philosophy.
---
VI 409
3. Wilson is right when it expresses doubts about the contingency of the problems. 4. Ayers is right, one must not allow one's own metaphysical and epistemic theories to be influenced by one's own politics and morality.
5. Color: the problem of "the nature of color" is not solvable. The same is true of the body-soul problem.
6. Descartes' skepticism is ahistorical.
7. Sellars and Davidson are wrong when they say that the sensory organs merely play a causal role. Pro McDowell: Revival of Empiricism.
8. Identity with oneself is not dependent on description, but on intrinsic, nonrelational features. Some terms are rigid.
9. Recognition of the unspeakable is praiseworthy intellectual modesty.
10. Locke's "Essay concern human understandig" is not a signpost, but a work still to be explored that contains not yet articulated truths.
RortyVsAyers: in all 10 theses above, Ayers and I have diametrically opposed views.
---
VI 410
Rorty: we will never be able to establish a "purely logical" argument for or against one of the ten theses. ---
VI 411
"Linguistic Idealism"/Rorty: conflict term of AyersVsSellars. RortyVsAyers: a lot has to be already in the language before a plausible appeal to the taste of onions is possible at all.
---
VI 412
This also includes the notion of an inner "Cartesian stage". This also includes the notion of "consciousness" (as a notion of the 17th century).


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Realism Ayers, M.
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 407
Realism/Antirealism/Davidson: the affirmation of the slogan, the real and the truth are "independent of our beliefs," is as idle as its affirmation. RortyVsAyers: so we can also throw the distinction realism/"idealism" into the rubbish of history.


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Sense Data Theory Ayer
 
Books on Amazon
Sellars I 16
Ayer: Proposal: that the speech of the sensory data is merely another language. Thus, no increase in importance in comaprison to our everyday speech. E.g. "the tomato facing is confronting S with an arched red sense-datum" is actually the same as "the tomato seems to be red and arched for S" (Sellars I 5!) SellarsVsAyer: a code does not add anything.
A.J.Ayer
I Ayer Wahrheit, aus "Wahrheitstheorien" Hrsg. Skirbekk Frankfurt/M 1996
II Hügli ()Hrsg.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993

The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Ayer, A. J. Austin Vs Ayer, A. J.
 
Books on Amazon
I 231
Fact / Austin: "fact" is just another term for "true statement" (VsBrandom, VsAyer) for every true statement there is one and only one and exactly corresponding fact. (Ayer: but for every fact there are many (Davidson: infinitely many) true statements.
(Brandom pro, AyerVs).
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Ayer, A. J. Black Vs Ayer, A. J.
 
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III 25
Rationality/Circularity/Self-justification/Reasoning/RationalityVsVs/Black: what we need is proof that what we regard as rational practice (procedure), is truly rational. That our idea of good evidence is correct. Problem: purely formal evidence would not be applicable for it, and everything else would not answer the question. That does not mean that the inductive method is irrational within science. It just might be irrational if there were a standard of rationality which would not be achieved. In fact, rationalitysets the standard itself according to which arguments are valued as rational or irrational. (Baltimore, 1956, S 75). Ayer/Black: does not speak explicitl about of our problem with rationality, but his argument can be transferred to it. He could then say: Rationality/Ayer/Black: he might say: no proof is possible, because nothing is allowed at this stage as evidence. Ayer: if it is clear that there can be no logical superior law, then it should not be worrying that something can be decisive in its own right. III 26 Science/Rationality/Justification/Self-affirmation/Ayer/Black: Ayer’s view then leads to the following: scientific method is what scientists accept as what justifies the conclusions accepted by them. Belief/Justification/Standard/Black: Our standard for the justification of our beliefs (in science) is an appeal to good reasons. ((s)> "good scientific practice"). Standard/Evidence/Justification/Ayer: but there is no proof for the quality of the standard itself.
Important argument: the result is that even if experience shows that relying on reasons is not sufficient in some areas, that our ongoing reliance on reasons was not even discredited by that in the same area.
BlackVsAyer: unlike himself, I find that indeed very troubling! Because I believe that it supports the irrationalist.
Irrationalism/VsRationalism/Black: From this position, one can say that if there are no reasons for rationality, there is no reason against irrationality. Then there is also no possibility for relativism (cultural relativism), to defend itself against a serious revolt against the standards (i.e. also against culture-specific standards).

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983
Ayer, A. J. Brandom Vs Ayer, A. J.
 
Books on Amazon
Ayer I 285
Basis sentences / Ayer: with which are they confronted? With facts. But what are the facts? Fact / AyerVs: false equivalence of facts with true propositions. (BrandomVsAyer)
Brandom facts = true statements - Ayer: facts are not the same as true statements.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Ayer, A. J. Davidson Vs Ayer, A. J.
 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 639
Asymmetry/Authority/Perspective first person/third person/Ayer: (The Concept of a Person): similar to Ryle: self-attributions may be erroneous. Authority/Ayer: self-atrributions similar to those of eyewitnesses, compared with second-hand reports.
DavidsonVsAyer: unsatisfactory:
1) this does not tell us why the first person should rather be in the position of an eyewitness
2) the comparison does not show what the first person authority actually is.
Self-attribution/Davidson: often has no clues! (Like Wittgenstein).
At best, the eyewitness has induction available, he can also be unreliable.
But a person never loses its right
I 640
to be right in terms of their own attitudes.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Ayer, A. J. Russell Vs Ayer, A. J.
 
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Bertrand Russell
VI 85
Description/sentence/Russell: occurs an (certain) identification in a sentence, this sentence does not have a constitutive element, which corresponds to the labeling as a whole. ---
VI 86
Example Three parts: "Scott," "is" "the author". Here "the author" is not a constitutive part of the sentence. reason: Usefully is a sentence which can be negated.
E.g. useful: "The unicorn does not exist", "the largest finite number does not exist".
But one could not say if the unicorn would be a constitutive part of the sentence.
Russell: Then the unicorn cannot be part of any fact.
So statements are no facts. (VsAustin, VsAyer, VsBrandom).

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996
Ayer, A. J. Sellars Vs Ayer, A. J.
 
Books on Amazon
I 16
Sense-data/Ayer: proposal: that the talk about the sense-data is simply another language. Thus, no increase in meaning relative to our everyday speech.
I 17
E.g. "The tomato faced S with a curved red sense datum" is actually the same as "The Tomato seems to be red and curved for S."
Sense-data/code/Sellars: one could accumulate a code now so much until it is no mere code anymore. Then you have to deny terms such as "quality", "is", "red", "color", "determined", "all" etc. the full status of their counterparts in the everyday speech, if they occur in the speech on the sense-data! They act more as evidence! The expressions from which the two "descriptions"
(D) all sense-data is red
and
I 18
(E) some sense-data is not red exist, remind us thus of the logical inconsistency of propositions like
E.g. All elephants are grey and some elephants are not grey.
But beware! While it is all right if you derive "Some elephants have a certain "pink shading" from the proposition "Some elephants are pink", it would certainly be wrong
wanting to derive from
some sense-data is pink"
the proposition
"Some sense-data have a certain "pink shading".
I 20
SellarsVsAyer: a code adds nothing, the understanding of the sense-data language as a code, neither. Data/Sellars: empirical - content/Sellars: theoretical entities.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999
Ayer, A. J. Hempel. Vs Ayer, A. J.
 
Books on Amazon
II 112
Demand for Partial Confirmability/(2.3)/Ayer: his criterion is supposed to determine by content that a statement S has an empirical sense if observation statements can be derived from S together with suitable auxiliary hypotheses, which cannot be derived from the auxiliary hypotheses alone. HempelVsAyer: Although this is more similar to the logical structure of the verification, it is much too permeable. ((s) >Quine-Duhem Thesis/QDT: allows just any auxiliary hypothesis).
Hempel: E.g. "If the absolute is perfect, then this (!) apple is red". This allows the derivation of the observation statements, which obviously does not follow from the auxiliary hypothesis.
((s) But it does not allow to call a green apple red).
Stace: "principle of observable species": "The facts that are denied or affirmed, must be of a type or class so that it is logically possible to observe some facts immediately, which are cases of that class or species. If a statement asserts or denies facts about a class, so that it is not logically possible to observe them directly, then the statement is not significant.
II 113
HempelVsStace: this is undecided, he does not say how we determine those classes. And that is precisely what the criterion was supposed to do. Moreover, we can always form a class that contains the fact f together with the fact which is expressed by an observation statement at our discretion, which makes f a member of a basically observable class!. Therefore, the first part of the principle, like Ayers original wording, already includes everything.
Criterion of Meaning/Ayer: Additionally: a statement has a meaning if it can be derived from observation statements together with an auxiliary hypothesis. HempelVsAyer: too permeable ((s) >"fake theories".)
Modification of 2.3/Ayer: limits the auxiliary hypothesis to statements that are either analytical or can be verified independently.
Conjunction/HempelVsAyer: this new criterion fulfills the demand for full falsifiability of an arbitrary conjunction S u N and thus has unintended empirical significance for this one.
ChurchVsAyer: Suppose there are any three observation statements, none of which implies any of the others alone, then follows for an entirely arbitrary statement S that either itself or its negation has an empirical sense according to Ayers new criterion.
Ayers, M. Rorty Vs Ayers, M.
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
VI 408
Philosophy/Rorty: we have distinguish clear clearly between questions of the tasks of philosophy and content-related topics such as e.g. knowledge, and express ourselves as clearly as possible about their mutual relationship. Philosophy/Rorty: the following theses tend to be represented by the same people
1) Realism/Anti-Realism important distinction
2) Dummett is right: these A/R struggles have been decisive in the history of philosophy.
VI 409
3) Wilson was right to express doubts about the contingency of problems. 4) Ayers is right to say that we must allow our own metaphysical and epistemological views to be influenced by our politics and morals.
5) Color: the problem of the "essence of color" is not solvable. The same is true, consequently, for the body-mind problem.
6) Descartes' skepticism is ahistorical.
7) Sellars and Davidson are wrong when they say that the senses merely play a causal role. Pro McDowell: revival of empiricism.
8) self-identity is not dependent on description, but on intrinsic, non-relational features. Some terms are rigid.
9) Recognition of the unspeakable is laudable intellectual modesty.
10) Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding`" is not a guide, but a work that is yet to be studied and still holds not yet articulated truths.
RortyVsAyers: in all 10 theses above, Ayers and I represent diametrically opposed views.
VI 410
Rorty: we will never be able to establish a "purely logical" argument for or against one of the 10 theses.
VI 411
"Linguistic Idealism"/Rorty: battle cry of AyersVsSellars. RortyVsAyers: a lot it must be established in language before a plausible reference to the taste of onions is at all possible.
VI 412
     This includes the notion of ​​an inner "Cartesian stage".       This includes the notion of ​​"consciousness" - (As 17th century notion).

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Brandom, R. Ayer Vs Brandom, R.
 
Books on Amazon
I 285
Basis sentences: what are they are confronted with? With facts. But what are the facts? Fact / AyerVs: false equivalence of facts with true propositions (BrandomVsAyer!).
Brandom: facts = true statements - Ayer: Facts are not the same as true statements.
A.J.Ayer
I Ayer Wahrheit, aus "Wahrheitstheorien" Hrsg. Skirbekk Frankfurt/M 1996
II Hügli ()Hrsg.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Interpretation Bennett, J.
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 360
Interpretation/Bennett: These wir können Kant heute nur verstehen, indem wir klar mit Hilfe heutiger Begriffe angeben können, welches seine Probleme waren, welche davon heute noch Probleme sind, und was Kant zu ihrer Lösung beisteuerte.
VI 361
M. AyersVsBennett: das hieße, daß es unmöglich ist, einen Philosophen der Vergangenheit heute nach seiner eigenen Begrifflichkeit zu verstehen. Ayers: These "wir sollten versuchen, die gleiche Beziehung zwischen Denken und Empfinden herzustellen, wie er selbst".
RortyVsAyers: damit kommt man nicht weit, wenn man an Begriffe wie "geistiges Vermögen" usw. nicht mehr glaubt. Ayers übertreibt den Gegensatz zwischen "unseren" und "seinen" Begriffen. DF.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997