Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Cooperation Surowiecki I 163
Cooperation/SurowieckiVsAxelrod/Surowiecki: Robert Axelrod's assumption of a "shadow of the future" in which previous experience with cooperation partners determines our future behaviour does not explain why we trust foreigners, buy on eBay, give tips. (See Cooperation/Axelrod). Solution/Robert Wright/Surowiecki: Wright's thesis: because over time we have learned that trade and exchange are games where everyone wins, not just one wins and one loses. According to this thesis, cooperation is not a zero-sum game. (1). (Robert WrightVsAxelrod).
---
I 234
Groups/cooperation: it can happen in small groups that employees do not become smarter but dumber in the course of the collaboration. One example of this is the Columbia disaster, in which a piece of styrofoam that had been broken out damaged the heat shield of the space shuttle Columbia to such an extent that it burned up upon re-entry into the Earth's atmosphere. The group disregarded clues and ignored opportunities to obtain information. ---
I 235
Small groups: the relationship between members of small groups is completely different from that of larger groups. They feel that they belong to their team rather than, for example, as market participants in a larger event. Judgments within the group are more unpredictable due to strong mutual influence. ---
I 248
The results of group discussions are largely determined by the order of the contributions to the discussion. The earlier people request to speak, the greater their influence on the course of the discussion: as a rule, they set the framework for further arguments. (See also Information/Sunstein).

1. Robert Wright, Nonzero – The Logic of Human Destiny (Pantheon, New York 2000).

Surowi I
James Surowiecki
Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005

Cooperation Axelrod Surowiecki I 161
Cooperation/Axelrod/Surowiecki: Why do most people not proceed in such a way that they always assert their own advantage above all else? It must actually make more sense for them to benefit from the efforts of others who are stupid enough to think and act cooperatively.
Surowiecki I 162
Axelrod thesis: the foundation of cooperation is not actually trust, but the durability of relationships. It is a question of whether the circumstances allow a pattern of cooperation to be established. People have to be mature for that. (1) Solution/Axelrod/Surowiecki: the temporal level, i. e. repeated cooperation. Axelrod's expression for this is the "shadow of the future". People recognize the advantages of cooperation and know that business partners are capable of taking punitive action.
Cooperation: presupposes that the partners treat each other nicely at the beginning and at the same time show the will to punish uncooperative behaviour.
Surowiecki I 163
Problem/SurowieckiVsAxelrod: This only applies to cooperation between the same partners. (See Ultimatum Game/Surowiecki). Why do we donate, buy things on eBay without looking at them first and give tips?
1. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, New York 1984).
Für neuere Ansätze von Axelrod in Bezug auf andere Erklärungen für das Entstehen von Kooperation:
Rich L. Riolo, Michael D. Cohen und Robert Axelrod, »Evolution of Cooperation Without Reciprocity«, Nature 414/2001, S. 441ff.; Cohen, Riolo und Axelrod, »The Role of Social Structure in the Maintenance of Cooperative Regimes«, Rationality and Society 13/2001, S. 5-32; und Axelrod, »On Six Advances in Cooperation Theory«, Analyse und Kritik 22/2000, S.130-151. All diese Arbeiten sind auch zugänglich unter http://wwwpersonal.umich.edu/≈axe/research_papers.html.

EconAxel I
Robert Axelrod
The Evolution of Cooperation: Revised Edition New York 2006


Surowi I
James Surowiecki
Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005

The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Various Authors Dawkins Vs Various Authors I 34ff
Aggression/Lorenz: (The so-called evil): Thesis: Aggression is a species-preserving function. Thus only the most suitable individuals propagate.
I 121
DawkinsVsLorenz: Sample example for a circular conclusion. Circular. It is also contrary to Darwinism, which he does not seem to have noticed. Animal/Lorenz: (The so-called evil) Thesis: stresses the moderate and fair character of the battles between animals. They practically fight according to rules and prefer the bluff to the deadly blow. Submission gestures are recognized by the victor. Animals fight with a "gloved fist."
DawkinsVsLorenz: this interpretation can be disputed, and man is not the only creature that kills his own fellow-human beings.
I 135
 In fact, unreserved fighting rage also entails costs  DawkinsVsLorenz: the "gloved fist" turns out to be an ESS. The "open-minded redeemer".
I 358
DawkinsVsAxelrod: the distinction between "simple" and "repeated prisoner dilemma" is too simple.
Dennett I 347
SterelnyVsDawkins: assumes that a similarity of 5 % is better than one of 4 %! Is the selection really so fine-grained? Dennett I 347

Da I
R. Dawkins
The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976
German Edition:
Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996

Da II
M. St. Dawkins
Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993
German Edition:
Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005