Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Autonomy Feyerabend I 43
Principle of Autonomy/Feyerabend: collecting the facts for examination purposes is the only thing left for the scientist to do. If facts exist and are available, regardless of whether alternatives to the theory under consideration are looked at. Principle of the relative autonomy of facts. (versus theories). >Theories, >Facts.
The principle does not mean that the discovery and description of facts is entirely theory-independent, but that the facts belonging to the empirical content of a theory are available, regardless of whether alternatives to this theory are taken into account.
>Discoveries, >Empirical content.
((s) I.e. that facts are autonomous, independent of theories.)
I 44
FeyerabendVsAutonomy Principle: this principle is far too simple a point of view. Facts and theories are much more closely linked than the principle of autonomy wants to admit. E.g. it is known today that the Brownian particles are a perpetuum mobile of the second kind, and that its existence refutes the second law of thermodynamics. (Henning GenzVs: that is not true.)
Could this relationship between movement and theory have been shown or directly discovered? Two questions:
1) Could the relevance of the movement have been discovered in this way?
2) Could it have been shown to disprove the 2nd law of thermodynamics? ((s) Nonsense: to »observe« relevance).
>Relevance.
Each thermometer is subject to fluctuations which are the same as the Brownian movement. The actual refutation came about in a completely different way: with the help of the kinetic theory and its use by Einstein in his calculation of the statistical properties of the Brownian movement. In this refutation the consistency condition was violated: the phenomenological theory was incorporated into the larger framework of statistical physics.

Feyerabend I
Paul Feyerabend
Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971
German Edition:
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997

Feyerabend II
P. Feyerabend
Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982
German Edition:
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979

Multiculturalism Liberalism Gaus I 256
Multiculturalism/Liberalism/Kukathas: (...) divisions exist not only between liberal defenders of multiculturalism and their critics but also among liberal theorists themselves. Two major interrelated issues have shaped debate among them: the extent to which diversity ought to be tolerated by liberals when minorities turn out to be illiberal in character, and the principled basis of liberal acceptance of cultural diversity.
Toleration: for some, the limits of liberal toleration are clear: toleration is not extended to illiberal minorities. For Kymlicka, for example, liberalism endorses group-differentiated rights which provide for external protection for groups, but does not permit 'internal restrictions': groups may not curb the basic civil rights of their members. >Minority rights/Kymlicka, >Group rights/Political philosophy, >Human rights/Kymlicka.
Indeed, for Kymlicka (1989(1); 1995a(2)) what liberalism protects, above all, is the individual's
capacity for autonomous choice; culture is important because it is the context within which indivi-
duals learn how to choose, but its value diminishes when it ceases to enable individuals to choose their lives for themselves.
Autonomy: a number of other liberal theorists concur with Kymlicka in this matter, arguing that liberalism protects autonomy, and that cultures that do not value or promote autonomy are less deserving of toleration or, at best, should be tolerated on pragmatic rather than principled grounds (Fitzmaurice, 1993(3); Levy, 1997(4); Gill 2001(5)) (...).
VsAutonomy: Other liberals, however, are less enamoured of autonomy. Some, like Jeff Spinner-Halev, consider autonomy to be valuable, but are critical of those who over emphasize its importance or define autonomy so strictly that many ways of living do not qualify (Spinner-Halev, 2000(6): 62—7; Spinner, 1994(7)).
Toleration: others, however, have been more critical still of autonomy, suggesting that toleration or respect for diversity are much more important considerations for liberals (Galston, 1995(8); Kukathas, 1992a(9); 1999(10); 2003a(11)) for an analysis of this liberal divide see Levy, 2003)(15).
Toleration/Kukathas: Kukathas (1997(12); 2001(13); 2003b(14)), in particular, has argued vigorously that toleration is so important a liberal virtue that a liberal order will tolerate a diversity of cultures even if some of them are highly illiberal.


1. Kymlicka, Will (1989) Liberalism, Community and Cultuæ. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Kymlicka, Will (1995a) Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Fitzmaurice, Deborah (1993) 'Autonomy as a good: liberalism, autonomy and toleration'. Journal of Political Philosophy, 1 1-16.
4. Levy, Jacob (1997) 'Classifying cultural rights'. In Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro, eds, Ethnicity and Gmup Rights: NOMOS XXXIX New York: New York University Press, 22—66.
5. Gill, Emily R. (2001) Becoming Free: Autonomy and Diversity in the Liberal Polity. Lawrence, KS:
University of Kansas Press.
6. Spinner-Halev, Jeff (2000) Surviving Diversity: Religion and Democratic Citizenship. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
7. Spinner, Jeff (1994) The Boundaries of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity and Nationality in the Liberal State. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
8. Galston, William (1995) 'Two concepts of Liberalism', Ethics, 105(3): 516-34.
9. Kukathas, Chandran (1992a) 'Are there any cultural rights?' Political Theory, 20 105-39.
10. Kukathas, Chandran (1999) 'Tolerating the intolerable'. Papers on Parliament, 33: 67-81.
11. Kukathas, Chandran (2003a) 'Responsibility for past injustice: how to shift the burden'. Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 2 (2): 165-88.
12. Kukathas, Chandran (1997) 'Cultural toleration'. In Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro, eds, Ethnicity and Group Rights: NOMOS XXXIX New York: New York University Press, 69—104.
13. Kukathas, Chandran (2001) 'Is Feminism Bad for Multiculturalism?' Public Affairs Quarterly, 15 (2): 83-98.
14. Kukathas, Chandran (2003b) The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
15.Levy, Jacob (2003) 'Liberalism's divide, after socialism and before'. Social Philosophy and Policy, 20 (l): 278-97.


Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications


Gaus I
Gerald F. Gaus
Chandran Kukathas
Handbook of Political Theory London 2004

The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Autonomy Principle Feyerabend Vs Autonomy Principle I 43
Autonomy Principle/Feyerabend: the collection of facts for inspection purposes is the only thing that is left to do for the scientist. If facts exist and are available, regardless of whether one takes alternatives to the theory to be tested into consideration. Principle of relative autonomy of facts. (Opposite theories). The principle does not say that the discovery and description of facts is completely independent of theories, but rather that the facts belonging to the empirical content of a theory are available, regardless of whether one considers alternatives to this theory.
((s) i.e. that facts are autonomous, regardless of the theories.)
I 44
FeyerabendVsAutonomy Principle: that’s a way too simple point of view. Facts and theories are far more closely linked than the principle of autonomy will admit. E.g. it is known now that the Brownian particle is a perpetual motion machine of the second kind, and that its existence refutes the 2nd law of thermodynamics. (GenzVs.)
Could this relationship between the movement and the theory have been demonstrated or discovered directly?.
Two questions:
1) Could the relevance of the movement have been detected in this way?
2) Could it have been shown that it refutes the 2nd law? ((s) nonsense: "observing" relevance.
Every thermometer is subject to fluctuations that are the same scale as the Brownian movement. The actual refutation came about in a different way: by means of the kinetic theory and its use by Einstein in his calculation of the statistical properties of Brownian movement. In this rebuttal, the consistency condition was violated: the phenomenological theory was incorporated into the broader framework of statistical physics.

Feyerabend I
Paul Feyerabend
Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971
German Edition:
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997

Feyerabend II
P. Feyerabend
Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982
German Edition:
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979