Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 19 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Austin
 
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(laut Hungerland,. Grice/Meggle):
Austin/Prinzip: Keine Modifikation ohne Abweichung.
Meg I 290
Hungerland VsAustin: anderer Sinn von "normal". Bsp "Ich sitze ganz normal im Stuhl" Hier läßt sich weder sagen , daß ich absichtlich, noch daß unabsichtlich auf dem Stuhl saß. VsAustin: Wir verwenden Modifikatoren, wenn es einen Grund gibt, eine Norm zu beschwören, einen Maßstab, eine Skala.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Assertibility Stroud
 
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I 60ff
Assertibility/Stroud: for assertibility but not for truth relevance of reasons plays a role. - Skepticism/Descartes/Stroud: has to do with truth conditions - not to do with assertibility conditions. - StroudVsAustin: he would have to show that a wrong usage of "knowledge" is present, not merely a redefinition.

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

Conventions Strawson
 
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II 257
Convention/StrawsonVsAustin: does not create truth: Relation between the Prime Minister and the expression "the Prime Minister" is conventional, but those who use the expression speak no truth without the context - II 260 VsAustin: confuses semantic conditions with what was stated - II 268 E.g. the fact that a statement is exaggerated does not depend on a convention, but on a difference to a fact - II 269 existential statements and limited general statements do not make use of conventions
II 257
Truthmaker/Strawson: E.g. language with "plate" (Wittgenstein, PU) would be just as conventional, but those alleged pseudo-entities that make statements true (facts), would not be among the non-linguistic correlates - (s) but the world would be more empty because of it

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Correspondence Theory Austin
 
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Horwich I 185
Correspondence Theory / Austin: purified version: thesis: a proposition is true; 0 a speech (episode) is conventionally based on something outside itself - Correspondence / Austin:. Always conventional - StrawsonVsAustin: eliminate Corr-Th.! - StrawsonVsAustin. we cannot always equate statements with events (episodes) - Possibility of an event is enough.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Correspondence Theory Prior
 
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I 23
Correspondence theory / Austin: pro: facts are "in the world" - not only characters, but truth-makers - StrawsonVsAustin: no facts in addition to objects!

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Events Vendler
 
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Vendler Die Linguistik und das a priori
in Grewendorf/Meggle Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
I 264
Event/fact/VendlerVsAustin: assimilates both - Vendler: "collapse of the empire" - fact: can be contradicted - Event: can happen quickly or slowly - from the ambiguity does not follow that some facts are events.

Ven I
Z. Vendler
Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967

Facts Austin
 
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I 231
Fact / Austin: "fact" is just another term for "true statement" (pro Brandom, VsAyer) - to each true statement, there is one and only one and exactly corresponding fact.. (Ayer: but for every fact there are many (Davidson: infinitely many) true statements - but Brandom: T = true statement (in the sense of "aserted") (Brandom I 841) - AyerVsAustin AyerVsBrandom.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Facts Strawson
 
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Horwich I 189
Facts/StrawsonVsAustin: Incorrect alignment of facts and things. ---
Horwich I 190
Fact/StrawsonVsAustin: should go beyond the "beyond" of the statement. - But there is nothing. - This comes from Austin's need for a "truth maker". ---
I 191
The fact that the cat is sick, is not made true by the cat, but at most by the fact that is expressed by the sentence. - Reference/Strawson: a statement: is the material corollary, not its fact. - I can possibly measure the corollary with the clock, issue etc. - Fact: pseudo-material correlate of the entire statement. - Fact: not a thing, not even a composite object. ---
I 192
It is what the statement notes, not what it is. - Facts are not "beyond". ---
I 193
Facts and statements are in accordance with each other, they are made for each other, if one eliminates one, then also the other. But the world will not be poorer through that. ---
Seel2 III 104f
Fact/Strawson/Seel: if we call something a fact, we think it is real like the sentence says it. - A fact is nothing more than the contents of a true belief - the alleged facts are not even from this the world. ---
III 104/105
In contrast to actual processes facts are abstract objects - they relate to a real state, without being themselves an occurrence in the world. - E.g. the fact that Napoleon won the battle, is not the same as the battle - the images do not correspond with beings in the world. ---
Strawson II 20
Facts cannot burn, they do not wither - (timeless). ---
II 250
Fact/StrawsonVsAustin: equating fact and thing leads to equating of saying-something and relate-to-something. - Statement and sentence must not be equated. ---
II 253
Fact/thing/StrawsonVsAustin/StrawsonVsSpeech Act Theory: completely different types. - Fact: what is said. - Thing: about what something is said - VsAustin: believes, a statement would be something in the world - Confusion with the event of utterance (speech act). ---
II 254
Of course facts and statements correspond, they are made for each other - Facts, fact and situations are not seen but rather recorded or summarized. ---
II 255
E.g. being worried by facts, is not the same as being worried by a shadow. - He is worried because... . ---
II 259
Fact: already implies a discourse context - but we do not talk about this framework, also not with terms such as statement and true. ---
IV 150/51
Fact/Strawson: something to determine, nothing to be described. - There are always different descriptions possible.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Map Example Austin
 
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Horwich I 195
Map / Austin: is not "true" - Merely because the similarity of the landscape is not entirely conventional. Convention / StrawsonVsAustin: this is not the real reason: the relation between "the Minister" and the Minister is conventional, but nevertheless you always need the context. - Facts: for them the convention is not the problem, but the reification.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Redundancy Theory Strawson
 
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II 264
Redundancy theory/StrawsonVsAustin: it is not true that with "true" something is said about a statement - (per redundancy theory) - II 265 solution: simply checking if the cat is on the mat. (> ostension).

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Skepticism Austin
 
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Stroud I 41
AustinVsSkepticism: Descartes merely undertook a re-definition of "knowledge". - E.g. someone asserted there were no doctors in New York - in that, he performs a re-definition of "doctor": as someone who could cure within 2 minutes. StroudVsAustin: Descartes goes deeper. SomeVsDescartes: knowledge does not require what Descartes asserts: not dreaming and knowing that. - Knowledge/Stroud: if VsDescartes is right, then knowledge did not have to a) be entirely under logical consequence or b) penetrate all the logical consequences of our knowledge. (StroudVsVs)
Stroud I 45
AustinVsSkepticism: "Enough is enough": it is not necessary to prove everything at all times in order to be able to claim knowledge. - The skeptic only asserts a lack of information. - StroudVsAustin - Austin: a "real" goldfinch is no more than a goldfinch. - Stroud: it would be absurd to argue philosophically against our usual knowledge, but that is not true of Descartes. - Dream/Austin: There are recognized procedures for distinguishing it from wakefulness - otherwise we could not use the words.
I 47
Austin: it can be qualitatively distinguished whether you are actually being presented to the Pope, or just dreaming about it.
Stroud I 48
Strong Thesis/Skepticism/Terminology/Descartes: We cannot know that we are not dreaming. - Austin's central thesis: the questioning of knowledge is hardly ever permitted in everyday life (if we are dreaming) - there must be specific reasons. - Austin thesis: you cannot always fool everyone. - Then Weaker Thesis/Austin: there must be a reason to doubt that we are awake - stronger: we always have to doubt it.
I 57
Austin: E.g. what is considered inappropriate? -> Distinction truth/assertibility (because of the different conditions).
Stroud I 64/65
Skepticism/Descartes/Stroud: (deeper than the one disputed by Austin) - can neither accepted be in everyday life nor in science. - Emphasis on theory and practice. - Stroud: standards of justification vary from case to case - in the speech act there is no general instruction regarding what we need to consider.
Stroud I 74
Def "Paradigm-Case Argument"/Knowledge/Truth/Oxford/Terminology/Austin/Stroud: in the mid-50s it was thought the skeptic would have come to the conclusion that in certain situations both S and non-S apply. - StroudVsAustin: in order to question the concept of "knowledge" we have ask how and why it was used. - Airplane-E.g. "He does not know" is definitely correct before the aircraft is on the ground) - But that is not the distinction between knowledge and ignorance. - Therefore, we cannot draw a skeptical conclusion from our language use.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Speech Act Theory Searle
 
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John R. Searle
II 25
Sincerity condition: internal to the speech acts. ---
IV 251
Speech act/Searle: rule-determined actions - has always constitutive (not regulatory) rules - Searle: speech act: is key to the meaning - VsSearle: controversial because language rules for e.g. singular term have fundamentally different nature than for actions. ---
V 68
Speech act is unequal game. - Explanation must presuppose rules - rules are not equal Convention: speaking rule-governed behavior - rules, not behavior is crucial.
---
V 207
Traditional speech act theory/Austin/Strawson/Hare: word W is needed to perform speech act A - then e.g. "good" recommends, "true" reaffirms, "knowledge" guarantees something - SearleVs: this only works with performative verbs such as "promise" but not with judgmental ones - does not satisfy the adequacy condition for semantic analysis: a word must mean in all grammatically different sentences the same - it cannot, if the meaning is supposed to be the execution of various acts. ---
V 213
Wrong: to assume that the conditions for the execution of a speech act follow from the meanings of the words. ( "fallacy of assertiveness") ---
IV 27
Speech act theory/SearleVsAustin: accepts verbs for acts - but one has to differentiate this - E.g. announcement of a command is not the command. ---
IV 78
Speech act theory/Searle: differs from other philosophical approaches in that it gives no set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the explicable phenomenon - (E.g. linguistics: structural rules). ---
VI 86
The illocutionary act is the function of the meaning of the sentence. ---
IV 86
Fiction/speech acts/Searle: fiction has no other speech acts but is a predetermined act - in literature, no other act than in newspaper - no semantic or syntactic property proves a text as fictional. ---
IV 204
Speech Act TheoryVsChomsky, VsRules, instead of semantics/pragmatics. ---
VII 99
Speech act/proposition/Searle: difference: from the propositional content does not follow that the assertion conditions are satisfied - the proposition rather implies that the speaker implies within the act that they are satisfied. ---
VIII 435
Speech act/Searle: is hold together by the semantic intentions of the speaker - VsChomsky: does not see the essential connection of meaning and speech acts.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Speech Act Theory Strawson
 
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II 272
StrawsonVsSpeech Act / StrawsonVsAustin: error: that we assert that the conditions are fulfilled by using the word "true" - "true" does not show some type of communication.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Speech Act Theory Hare
 
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Searle V 207
SearleVsTraditional speech act analysis. (SearleVsAustin, SearleVsHare) Thesis: "good" and "true" mean in different acts the same. They are not taken into account by traditional speech act theory) Good/True/Speech act theory/Tradition: Hare: E.g. "Good" is used to recommend something.
Strawson: "True" is used to reaffirm or acknowledge statements.
Austin: "Knowledge" is needed to give guarantees. (SearleVs).
In principle: "the word W is used to perform the speech act A".


S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Terminology Austin
 
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Grice I 292
Austin: No modification without deviation - HungerlandVsAustin: we use modifiers if there is a reason to call upon a norm, a scale. - E.g. a false clergyman is not a special kind of clergyman.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995

Gri I
H. Paul Grice
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Hg. Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1993
Truth Strawson
 
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Rorty VI 52
StrawsonVs "Make true": taunted "sentence-like things" ((s) Comparison of world with sentences is not possible in a non-linguistic way). ---
Ayer I 296
Truth/StrawsonVsAustin: "sure, we use the word 'true' if the semantic conditions described by Austin are satisfied - but by using this word, we do not say that they are fulfilled" (> Austin I 230). ---
Strawson II 261
Truth/StrawsonVsAustin: mistake: instead of asking, "how do we use the word "true" (use, convention) - he asks: "When ... "(conditions) - facts cannot be changed by changing the language conventions. ---
II 266
Truth is not property of a speech event.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Truthmakers Strawson
 
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Horwich I 194
Truthmaker / Strawson: if the situation is the subject, it is not the situation that makes the statement true. - Fact: is a non-linguistic term (therefore not subject).
Strawson II 20 ~
Truthmaker / Strawson: facts make assertions true, not things.
II 252
Truthmaker / VsAustin: that the cat has mange, is not made true by the cat (as a thing), but by the condition of the cat (the fact).
II 257
Truthmaker / Strawson: e.g. language with "plate" (Wittgenstein, PI) would be just as conventional, but those alleged pseudo entities that make the statements true (facts), would not be among the non-linguistic correlates. - ((s) the world wouldn’t be emptier.)

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Utterances Hungerland
 
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Meggle I 290
Utterances/Modification/Austin/Principle: No modification without deviation!
HungerlandVsAustin: there is another sense of "normal". E.g "I sit quite normally in the chair". Here I cannot say that I was sitting intentionally in the chair, or that I was sitting unintentionally in the chair.´
---
I 292
HungerlandVsAustin: We use modifiers when there is a reason to summon a norm, a benchmark, a scale. For example, a clergyman who is not a clergyman because he is a swindler is not a special kind of clergyman, he is not a clergyman at all.


Grice: > Meg I
G. Meggle (Hg)
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979
World Strawson
 
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Danto I 259
World/Strawson/Danto: two main components: people and things. (particular). - to this, M-predicates correspond: E.g. "weighs 100 kg" - P-predicates: "thinks of fame" - Nothing is describable with P-predicates alone. - That would be different if there were really disembodied ghosts. - People are described by both predicate types. ---
I 263
Behaviorism: attempts to blur the distinction between P- and M-predicates. ---
Strawson I 35
World/Strawson: seems to be constructed of particulars and events. - Are also other images possible? - When someone mentions something outside of space and time, we believe that it does not exist. ---
II 256
World/StrawsonVsWittgenstein: Thesis: Only things and events are part of the world. - VsAustin: otherwise temptation to talk about situation as about things.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


The author or concept searched is found in the following 26 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Austin, John L. Ayer Vs Austin, John L.
 
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I 296
AyerVsAustin: descriptive/demonstrative conventions. Austin asserts that a statement is called true "if the historical fact, with which it is correlated through the demonstrative conventions, belongs to a type with which the sentence correlates through the descriptive conventions. AyerVsAustin: not all meaningful statements relate explicitly to something! General and vague statements may well be expressed by sentences in which no ostensive signs appear at all. VSVs: it could be countered that the truth of such statements always depends on the truth of other statements. But: AyerVsAustin (with Strawson): Whenever one refers to a statement as true, one accepts a semantic version of the conditions under which it has a meaning at all. Austin himself criticizes the semanticists, because they make truth a property of sentences.
A.J.Ayer
I Ayer Wahrheit, aus "Wahrheitstheorien" Hrsg. Skirbekk Frankfurt/M 1996
II Hügli ()Hrsg.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993
Austin, John L. Derrida Vs Austin, John L.
 
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Rorty IV 106
DerridaVsAustin/Rorty: he is someone who accepts the traditional notion that meaning is something that is communicated "in a homogeneous element" "in which the unit, the integrity of the sense, would not be substantially affected". RortyVsDerrida: this is an unwarranted assumption. Austin says about language, though not about philosophy, the same as Derrida.

De I
J. Derrida
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Austin, John L. Dummett Vs Austin, John L.
 
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I 165
When Ryle s book was published, it was the basis for discussion for a long period of time. Dummett: Ryle s influence was not so positive, I was also strongly VsAustin.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Austin, John L. Lewis Vs Austin, John L.
 
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IV 222
Performative/Performatives/Lewis: It is not clear whether we should construe them as declarative sentences (declaratives)! If not, we can split sentence meanings in claiming and non-claiming (sentence meanings) with the latter being represented by commands and questions.
LewisVsAustin: but I would prefer to classify performative sentences as declarative sentences, and then this distinction is purely syntactic, concerning the surface structure.
 IV 224
Performative/Austin: Have no truth value. Neither true nor false, because statements are like bets in normal circumstances. Performative/LewisVsAustin: they can still have it. E.g. "I bet sixpence that it will rain tomorrow": is true on this occasion, because he betted.
Performatives/Austin: No truth value. They are neither true nor false, because statements are like bets in normal circumstances.
Lewis: granted, but why should the statement not be true then?
per Austin: could it be said that performative statements can just hardly do anything else, but be true! E.g. "I claim": it is then simply true that I claim something.
E.g. "I speak" is always true when I speak!
And yet, it is possible!
It is no wonder that the truth values are obscured by assertion performances:
E.g. "I claim that the earth is flat", here, of course, someone has claimed something, so the ((s) overall sentence) is true.
But you might be tempted to say that he said something wrong, because the embedded sentence is wrong.
LewisVsRoss: therefore, I do not propose to conceive normal assertions as paraphrased performative sentences like Ross. That would make the truth conditions wrong.
If there are syntactic reasons for Ross' proposal, I would semantically view it as one version of the method of sentence radicals.
IV 225
Truth Value: I propose a single truth value for sentences like e.g. "I order you to be late". Vs: you could say that this allows an ambiguity, because the sentence can be used in two ways:
a) paraphrase of "be late!" this is true, simply because it was said
b) as description of my own actions, then no paraphrased imperative, because it is hard to give a command awhile saying what I'm doing!
But it does not follow that there are two meanings here!
E.g. I am talking in trochaic hexameter
In hexameter trochaic am I talking
Only the latter can be used to speak in trochaic hexameters and is true at every opportunity.
The former is wrong on the occasion when it is emphasized correctly.
Nevertheless, both are obvious paraphrases.
Whether a sentence can be used to speak in hexameters is not a matter of its meaning. The distinction between hexameter use and not using hexameter is one thing.
Another thing is the distinction between performative and self-descriptive use. But the parallel is interesting:
A differentiation of use does not need to lead to a distinction of meaning. (>Use theory).

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Austin, John L. Putnam Vs Austin, John L.
 
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Hacking I 179
AustinVsMoore: there is an independent opportunity to pick out facts: ostension. Then we put on assertions by combining referring expressions and names for properties and relations. PutnamVsAustin: he must now accept that this approach of Austin is scuppered by Löwenheim because there is no possibility of independent reference.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Austin, John L. Quine Vs Austin, John L.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
II 114
Austin's: "How to do Things with Words" afterthought at the end of the book: finishing off a) the true/false fetish b) the values/facts fetish.
QuineVsAustin: the whole book would have been different if Austin had been more open-minded in terms of Tarski's concept of truth.

Quine: there are two ways to react to problems:
a) to wreck your mind over disturbances (for example, planetary motions before Einstein);
b) to explain it away with faults in the observation instruments.

Austin's attitude was of the negative type, method of overcoming metaphysics.
II 115
According to Tarski's theory of truth what is considered true is language.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Austin, John L. Searle Vs Austin, John L.
 
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John R. Searle
SearleVs Traditional Speech act analysis. (SearleVsAustin,SearleVsHare) Thesis: "Good", "true" mean the same in different acts. Ignored by the traditional speech act theory)
good/true/speech act theory/tradition: Hare: E.g. "Good" is used to recommend something.
Strawson: "True" is used to confirm or acknowledge statements.
Austin: "Knowledge" is used to provide guarantees. (SearleVs).
In principle: "the word W is used to perform the speech act A".
- - -
IV 17
illocutionary act/Austin: five categories: verdictive, expositive, exercitive, conductive, commissive) speech acts/SearleVsAustin: Distinction between illocutionary role and expression with propositional content:
R(p).
The various acts performed in different continua! There are at least 12 important dimensions.
IV 18
1. Differences in joke (purpose) of the act. (However, not to every act a purpose has to belong).
IV 19
The illocutionary joke is part of the role, but both are not the same. E.g. a request may have the same joke as a command. 2. Differences in orientation (word to the world or vice versa).
Either, the world needs to match the words, or vice versa.
IV 20
Example by Elizabeth Anscombe: Shopping list with goods, the same list is created by the store detective.
IV 21
3. Differences in the expressed psychological states E.g. to hint, to regret, to swear, to threaten. (Even if the acts are insincere).
Def sincerity condition/Searle: You cannot say, "I realize that p but I do not believe that p." "I promise that p but I do not intend that p"
The mental state is the sincerity condition of the act.
IV 22
These three dimensions: joke, orientation, sincerity condition are the most important. 4. Differences in the strength with which the illocutionary joke is raised.
E.g. "I suggest", "I swear"
5. Differences in the position of speaker and listener
E.g. the soldier will make not aware the general of the messy room.
IV 23
6. Differences of in which the utterance relates to what is in the interest of speaker and listener. E.g. whining, congratulating
7. Difference in relation to the rest of the discourse
E.g. to contradict, to reply, to conclude.
8. Differences in propositional content, resulting from the indicators of the illocutionary role
E.g. report or forecasts
IV 24
9. Differences between those acts that must always be speech acts, and those that can be carried out differently. E.g. you need not to say anything to classify something, or to diagnose
10. Differences between those acts, for which the extra-linguistic institutions are needed, and those for which they are not necessary
E.g. wedding, blessing, excommunication
IV 25
11. Differences between acts where the illocutionary verb has a performative use and those where this is not the case E.g. performative use: to state, to promise, to command no performative: "I hereby boast", "hereby I threaten".
12. differences in style
E.g. announcing, entrustment.
IV 27
SearleVsAustin: the list does not refer to acts but to verbs. One must distinguish between verb and act!
E.g. one can proclaim commands, promises, reports but that is something else, as to command, to announce or to report.
A proclamation is never merely a proclamation, it also needs to be a determination, a command or the like.
IV 30
Searle: E.g.iIf I make you chairman, I do not advocate that you chairman
IV 36
Def Declaration/Searle: the successful performance guarantees that the propositional content of the world corresponds. (Later terminology: "institutional facts) Orientation: by the success of the declaration word and world match to each other () No sincerity. Overlapping with assertive:... The referee's decisions. SearleVsAustin: Vs Distinction constative/performative.
- - -
VII 86
Cavell: "Must we mean what we say?" defends Austin and adds: The deviation can be "really or allegedly" present.
Austin: it is neither true nor false that I write this article voluntarily, because if there is no deviation, the concept of free will is not applicable.
SearleVsAustin: that's amazing.
VII 88
SearleVsAustin: Five theses to see Austin in a different light: 1. Austin exemplifies an analysis pattern that is common today as it is also used at Ryles' analysis of "voluntarily".
Ryle thesis of "voluntary" and "involuntary" can be applied only to acts, "you should not have done." Again, it is absurd to use it in an ordinary use.
VII 89
Neither true nor false: Wittgenstein: e.g. that I "know that I am in pain" E.g. that Moore knows he has two hands. etc. (> certainty).
Austin: E.g. it is neither true nor false, that I went out of free will to the session.
VII 90
The use of "voluntary" required certain conditions are not met here. Words in which they are not met, we can call "A-words", the conditions
"A-Conditions". We can create a list.
2. the conditions that are exemplified by the slogan "No modification without deviation", penetrate the whole language and are not limited to certain words.
E.g. The President is sober today.
Hans breathes. etc.
VII 91
3. Negation/Searle: the negation of an A-word is not in turn an A-word! E.g. I bought my car not voluntarily, I was forced to.
I did not volunteer, I was dragged here.
He does not know whether the object in front of him is a tree.
Considerable asymmetry between A-words and their opposite or negation.
VII 92
SearleVsAustin: according to him, in both cases a deviation is required. 4. A deviation is generally a reason to believe that the claim that is made by the statement to the contrary is true, or could have been, or at least could have been held by someone as true.
An A-condition is simply a reason to believe that the remark could have been false.
SearleVsAustin: his presentation is misleading because it suggests that any deviation justifies a modification.
E.g. if I buy a car while strumming with bare toes on a guitar, which is indeed a different way to buy a car, but it does not justify the remark "He bought his car voluntarily."
VII 93
SearleVsAustin: we can come to any list of A-words, because if word requires a deviation, will depend on the rest of the sentence and on the context. Then Austin's thesis is not about words but about propositions.
VII 94
Standard situation/circumstances/SearleVsAustin: notice that there is a standard situation, is to suggest that this fact is remarkable and that there is reason to believe that it could also be a non-standard situation.
VII 95
SearleVsAustin: his thesis even is not on propositions: to make an assertion means to specify that something is the case. If the possibility that the situation does not exist, is excluded, it is meaningless. Austin's slogan should be formulated to:
"No comment, which is not remarkable" or
"No assertion that is not worth to be claimed".
VII 96
SearleVsAustin: this one has seen it wrong. This is connected with the concept of intention: Intention/Searle: Thesis: the oddity or deviation which is a condition for the utterance
"X was deliberately done" represents, at the same time provides a reason for the truth of the statement by
"X was not done intentionally".
assertion condition/utterance condition: it is the utterance condition of an assertion precisely because it is one reason for the truth of the other.
SearleVsAustin: the data must be explained in terms of the applicability of certain terms. So my view is simple and plausible.
(VII 98): In Austin's slogan "No modification without deviation" it is not about the applicability of these terms, but rather about conditions for putting up claims generally.
Negation/SearleVsAustin: then the negations of the above, are not neither true nor false, but simply false!
E.g. I did not go voluntarily to the meeting (I was dragged). etc.
VII 98
Example The ability to remember ones name is one of the basic conditions ...

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Austin, John L. Strawson Vs Austin, John L.
 
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Ayer I 296
StrawsonVsAustin: surely we use the word "true" when the semantic conditions described by Austin are met. But by using this word, we do not say that they are met. - - -
Searle III 211
Correspondence theory/StrawsonVsAustin: (Debate over 40 years ago. It is generally agreed that Strawson won this debate.) Strawson: the correspondence theory must not be cleaned, it must be eliminated.
III 212
It gave us a false picture of the use of the word "true" and the nature of the facts: that facts are a kind of complex things or events or groups of things and that truth constitutes a special relationship of correspondence between statements and these non-linguistic structures. (Traces back to the copy theory of the Tractatus). - - -
Strawson II 248
Speech act theory/StrawsonVsAustin: if he was right that we ascribe the predicate "true" substantially to speech acts it should be possible to "reduce" assertions about the truth of statements in a not to speech acts related sense on assertions about the truth of speech acts. Austin: you can make different statements with the same proposition.
Strawson: you can also make the same statment with different propositions.
II 249
Example about Jones: "He is sick." to Jones: "You are sick." (Even different meaning). Def "true"/Strawson: fallacy: we could say that different people then make the same statement if the words they use in their specific situation must either preserve all or lead all to false statements. But if we say that we use "true" to clarify the expression "the same statement".
II 252
Fact/"to make true"/world/Strawson: but the said fact is not something in the world. It is not an object! By this it is of course not denied that there is something in the world about which a statment of this kind is, to which it relates, which it describes and which corresponds to the description. StrawsonVsAustin: he seems to overlook the fact that "fact" and "thing" belong to completely different types. The thing, the person, etc., to which the statements refer are the material correlate of the referring part of the statements. The condition or property is the pseudo physical correlate. The fact is the pseudo physical correlate of the statement as a whole.
II 253
Fact/Strawson: is closely associated with "that"-propositions. Facts are known, be asserted, believed forgotten, overlooked, commented, notified or noticed. Facts are what statements assert; they are that of which something is asserted! It is wrong to equate facts with true statements. Nevertheless, their roles overlap.
Fact/StrawsonVsAustin: he believes a statement and a fact are something in the world.
II 254
E.g. but I cannot think of any occasion in which I would neglect the difference between the fact that my wife Mia bore me twins (at midnight) and what I say (10 minutes later), namely that my wife bore me twins. Correspondence/Austin: there is no theoretical limit to what could be truthfully said about the things in the world but there are very significant practical limits to what people can actually say about them.
Statement/fact/StrawsonVsAustin: but what could better correspond to the fact that it is raining than the statement that it is raining? Of course, statements and facts correspond. They are made for each other.
If one removes the statements from the world one would also remove the facts from the world. But the world would not be poorer by this. By this you do not get rid of the world of which something is asserted. (> world)
A symptom of Austin's uncertainty is his preference for the terms "situation" and "issue". Neither situations nor issues (just as facts) can namely be seen or heard, but rather are summarized or detected at a glance.
II 255
Fact/Strawson: e.g. to be worried by a fact is not the same as to be as frightened by a shadow. It means to be worried because....
II 256
World/Strawson/Strawson: why should we insist that only things and events are part of the world? Why can we not also ascribe situations and facts to the world? Answer: the temptation to talk about situations in a way that is appropriate for things and events, is overwhelming.
StrawsonVsAustin: Austin does not resist it: he smuggles the word "feature" as a synonym for "fact" in. Justification: maps are not in the same way "true" as statements because they are not entirely conventional, photographs not conventional at all.
II 260
StrawsonVsAustin: when he says that the relationship between a statement and the world is purely conventional then there are two confusions between: a) the semantic conditions and b) what is asserted. It is as absurd to say that someone who confirmed a statement confirmed that semantic conditions are fulfilled as if to say that the speaker would have said that.
II 261
Conditions/use/Strawson: by using a word we do not say that the conditions are fulfilled. StrawsonVsAustin: mistake: instead of asking: how do we use the word "true"? he asks When do we use it?
- - -
II 267
StrawsonVsAustin: "exaggerated" is not a relation between a statement and some of these different things in the world. (Too simple).
II 268
Then the difficulties of correspondence occur again. Austin would not say that it e.g. corresponds to a relation between a glove and a hand that is too big. He would speak of a conventional relationship. But the fact that the statement that p, is exaggerated, is not conventional in any sense! (It is perhaps the fact that 1200 people and not 2000 were there. The criticism of an exaggeration requires a previous statement.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Austin, John L. Verschiedene Vs Austin, John L. Grice I 290
Austin / Principle: No modification without deviation. HungerlandVsAustin: the other meaning of "normal". E.g. "I am sitting on the chair as usual" here we can not say that I intentionally nor unintentionally that sat on the chair.
I 292
VsAustin: We use modifiers if there is a reason to summon a norm, a scale. E.g. A clergyman, who is not a clergyman, because he is a swindler, is not a special kind of priest, he is no priest!





Gri I
H. Paul Grice
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Hg. Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1993
Austin, John L. Schiffer Vs Austin, John L.
 
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I 266
Austin: the expression : "the meaning of a word" is almost always a dangerous nonsense. (1961, 24, also Wittgenstein 1953 Ryle 1957) so all VsFrege. DavidsonVsSchiffer/DavidsonVsAustin/DavidsonVsWittgenstein : speaks of an entity that is designated by the "that" as in for example "that snow is white". (Davidson 1968).

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Austin, John L. Brendel Vs Austin, John L.
 
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I 56
Sachverhalt/Wahrheit/VsAustin/wahr/Brendel: andere Autoren nehmen an, dass eine Proposition wahr ist, wenn der entsprechende Sachverhalt (SV) besteht.

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Austin, John L. Vendler Vs Austin, John L.
 
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I 264
Ereignis/Tatsache/Austin: hat die Tendenz, beides zu assimilieren auf der Grundlagen dessen "was man sagen kann": Bsp der "Zusammenbruch des Deutschen Reiches" kann sowohl eine Tatsache als auch ein Ereignis sein.
Vendler: nur die Transformationsgrammatik kann hier zeigen, dass "Zusammenbruch des deutschen Reiches" mehrdeutig ist
I 265
entweder unvollständig oder vollständig nominalisierter Satz. Tatsache: dass das Reich zusammengebrochen ist. (Kann bestritten werden).
Ereignis: das Zusammenbrechen. (Kann schnell oder langsam gehen).
Tatsache/Ereignis/VendlerVsAustin: aus der Mehrdeutigkeit folgt aber nicht, dass dann, gewisse Tatsachen Ereignisse sind! Das übersieht Austin!

Ven I
Z. Vendler
Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967
Ayer, A. J. Russell Vs Ayer, A. J.
 
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VI 85
Description/sentence/Russell: occurs an (certain) identification in a sentence, this sentence does not have a constitutive element, which corresponds to the labeling as a whole. ---
VI 86
Example Three parts: "Scott," "is" "the author". Here "the author" is not a constitutive part of the sentence. reason: Usefully is a sentence which can be negated.
E.g. useful: "The unicorn does not exist", "the largest finite number does not exist".
But one could not say if the unicorn would be a constitutive part of the sentence.
Russell: Then the unicorn cannot be part of any fact.
So statements are no facts. (VsAustin, VsAyer, VsBrandom).

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996
Brandom, R. Strawson Vs Brandom, R.
 
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Horwich I 193
Fact/statement/StrawsonVsAustin/StrawsonVsBrandom: it is never irrelevant to distinguish between a fact and a corresponding true statement. Example of the fact that my wife bore me at midnight twins and the statement that I made 10 minutes later about this birth. Statement/Strawson: there are natural, practical limits to the ability to produce statements.
Correspondence: what is more natural to correspond to the fact that it is raining than the statement that it is raining? ((s) Interestingly, Strawson does not say it reversely! He wants to avoid that facts appear as necessary postulates).
Fact/Strawson: Z of course they correspond to each other: they are made for each other. If one removes statements from the world one also removes the facts. But by this the world is not poorer.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Correspondence Theory Strawson Vs Correspondence Theory
 
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Horwich I 196
StrawsonVsCorrespondence theory: he problem with it is not that the corresponding relations are conventional but that the facts which are the referents are considered to be things or objects. Fact/statement/StrawsonVsAustin: e.g. 1. the description of a chess position can not be moved or jumbled.
2. there is no event of the determination (statement) about the chess position that represents an object which would be equivalent to the chess position itself e.g. that you could spill coffee over it.
- - -
Strawson IV 112/113
StrawsonVsCorrespondence theory: the majority of our conviction is not at all based on personal experience with reality. Most do not even come from second hand.
E.g. when the fuel gauge reads zero my ability to make this observation depends on many things outside the situation for which this situation provides absolutely no clue. (>convention)
IV 114/115
Correspondence theory/Strawson: reality includes the possession of experience.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Descartes, R. Austin Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Stroud I 42
AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes/Stroud: (Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, 1962, 4-5) Thesis: the source of Descartes' skeptical conclusion is obtained by uncovering a series of misunderstandings and (especially verbal) errors and fallacies.
---
I 43
StroudVsAustin: Descartes goes much deeper than the example doctors in New York with its simple redefinition. It is also not about linguistic errors concerning the meaning of the terms dream and knowledge. But: Suppose that Descartes was wrong and there was no need to know that you were not dreaming to know that you know something about the world:
Problem: how could we know that this is true? What would show that Descartes is misunderstood?
Knowledge/VsDescartes/Stroud: if his critics are right that the term "knowledge" does not require what Descartes claims (not to dream and to know that),
then
A) Knowledge is not "closed under logical consequence", or
B) The word "knowledge" does not penetrate all the logical consequences of what we know, or
C) It does not penetrate to what we know as logical consequences (of our knowledge) or even
D) To what we know, what the logical consequences of this are in turn.
---
I 44
Stroud: But how are these assertions supported? ---
I 47
Method/Verification/Skepticism/StroudVsAustin: Austin does not say much about these "procedures", he seems satisfied with the idea that they must exist because otherwise our language usage could not always differentiate between the terms ("here" always "words"). ---
I 64
StroudVsAustin: The accusation AustinVsSkepticism (AustinVsDescartes) that the meaning of "knowledge" in everyday use would have been distorted can only be raised if it can be shown that a certain linguistic usage, a certain concept, and the relation between them was misunderstood. This would be much more than reproaching a simple "redefinition" of a single concept, namely, of knowledge.
Stroud: Thesis: that's what I meant by the fact that the source of Descartes' demand reveals something deep and important.
---
I 74
... .Stroud: something similar could be applied to Austin's question: "How should we use the words "wakefulness" and "sleep" if we have unrecognized methods to say in certain situations that we are not dreaming?" StroudVsAustin: that fails because it does not take into account how and why these terms are used in these situations. (Why question).
Dream/StroudVsAustin: there could be easily distinguishable characteristics for different situations and we could apply a term or its negation due to these characteristics.
Stroud pro Skepticism/StroudVsAustin: N.B.: (analog to the plane-example): if there are widespread but untested methods (like the manual of the soldiers) then it could be that the distinction we make is not the distinction between situations in which S is true in those in which it is not true. Then again we have no knowledge.
Correctness/Plane-Example: "He does not know it" is definitely correct.
---
I 75
But this distinction was not between knowledge and non-knowledge. Because even the careful spotter can be wrong, "he knows it is an F" is wrong as long as he did not see the plane on the ground. Conclusion/skepticism/usage theory/StroudVsAustin: we cannot draw an anti-skeptical conclusion from the mere fact that we use the terms "I know ..." and "I do not know ..." as we use them. ((s) It does not follow from the language use that we know when we know something (>plane-example), because we can still have information without knowing that they are missing).
---
I 76
Platitudes/StroudVsAustin/N.B.: if one would disprove skepticism by arguing that it changes the meaning of the term "knowledge" must show that the most common platitudes are false, and these appear to be obvious truths. (... + ...) Moore's hands/Stroud: so Moore's proof gains philosophical importance and power.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Descartes, R. Quine Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
I 56
The truth attributions are in the same boat as the true propositions themselves. QuineVsDescartes: Even if we are in the midst of in philosophizing, we retain and use - unlike Descartes - our present beliefs until we improve them here and there because of the scientific method.
- - -
Stroud I 227
Deception/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: the concept of illusion itself is based on science, because the quality of deception is simply in the departure from external scientific reality. (Quine, Roots of reference, 3) Illusions only exist relative to a previously held assumption of real objects.
Given Facts/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: This may be the reason to assume a non-binding given fact. (SellarsVsQuine).
QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: Important Argument: then it might seem impossible to refer to the possibility of deception, because a certain knowledge of external reality is necessary to understand the concept of illusion!
Stroud: We have treated arguments of this form earlier (see above >distortion of meaning). Violation of the conditions necessary for the application of certain concepts.
Quine/Stroud: he could now be answered in line with StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin, but Quine will not make these mistakes.
Language/Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: his approach to the language (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) leaves him no way to refer to what the meaning of a particular term is.
StroudVsQuine: but if he thinks that the scientific origins do not lead to skepticism, why does he think that because the "skeptical doubts are scientific doubts"
I 228
the epistemologists are "clearly" entitled to use empirical science? The question becomes even more complicated by Quine's explicit denial that:
Skepticism/Quine: I'm not saying that he leaves the question unanswered, he is right in using science to reject science. I merely say that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts.
TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: this is important for the defense of the traditional epistemologist: if it is not a logical error to eventually disprove doubts from the science itself so that at the end there is certainty, what then is the decisive logical point he has missed?
StroudVsQuine: if his "only point" is that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, then epistemology becomes part of science.
SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: but the skeptic might respond with a "reductio ad absurdum" and then epistemology would no longer be part of science:
"Reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: either
a) science is true and gives us knowledge or
b) It is not true and gives us no knowledge. Nothing we believe about the external world is knowledge.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Hare, R.M. Searle Vs Hare, R.M.
 
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John R. Searle
V 207
SearleVsTraditional speech act analysis: (SearleVsAustin,SearleVsHare) Thesis: "Good", "true" means the same in different acts. Ignored by the traditional speech act theory) good/true/speech act theory/tradition: Hare: E.g. "Good" is used to recommend something.
Strawson: "True" is used to confirm or acknowledge statements.
Austin: "Knowledge" is used to provide guarantees. (SearleVsSpeech act theory).

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Ordinary Language Dummett Vs Ordinary Language
 
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Dummett III 185
Oxford Philosophy/Dummett: strongest influence: by Ryle. RyleVsCarnap: false methodology VsHeidegger: Laughing stock - Ryle: influence of Husserl.
III 196
Particularism/Utility Theory/Oxford/Dummett: supposedly, the UT could only explain each sentence. The philosopher should not want to discover a pattern where there is none. DummettVs: we do not learn language sentence by sentence, either!
However, right: It is the sentences and not the words which have a "use" in the general sense.
III 196/197
Everyday language: here the Oxford philosophy could not contribute anything (because of their anti systematic approach) to the better understanding of those principles on the basis of which we obviously learn the language so quickly. (> Chomsky). DummettVsOxford: continuously used psychological and semantic terms that a theory of meaning must not assume but explain! E.g. "Express an attitude" "reject a question", etc. (DummettVsAustin).
Likewise "truth" and "falsehood" were constantly used unexplained.
III 198
DummettVsParticularism: disregarded the distinction semantic/pragmatic. Anyone who is not in the claws of theory would initially tend to distinguish what a sentence literally says from what one might try to communicate with it in special circumstances.
According to the "philosophy of everyday language" only the latter term is considered to be legitimate. "literal meaning" was considered an illegitimate byproduct.
III 199
DummettVsOxford, DummettVsStrawson: artificially introduced new concepts such as "presupposition" or "conversation implicature" or DummettVsAustin: the distinction between "illocutionary" and "perlocutionary" acts (DummettVsSpeech act theory) took the place of the general semantic concepts, and without anyone noticing the "normal language" (everyday language) ceased to exist.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Ordinary Language Positivism Vs Ordinary Language
 
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Fodor II 118
PositivismusVsOrdinary Language/PositivismVsOxford: the philosophy of ordinary language has no system. A representation of natural language, which does not specify its formal structure, cannot comprehend the production principles for the syntactic and semantic properties.
II 123
FodorVsOrdinary Language: that forces the philosophers of ordinary language to seek refuge more and more with the intuitions.
II 124
In particular, he will claim to detect anomalies intuitively and to say that a philosophical problem is solved if anomalies are detected. (Cavell asserts that!). FodorVsCavell: Contradiction: so he thinks that in philosophical practice it is important not to use words wrongly, and at the same time he thinks that he can decide with the help of intuition when a word is misused.
Even though it may be clear intuitively when a word is abnormal, it is not enough for philosophical purposes to know that it is abnormal, it may be abnormal for many reasons, some of which are not faulty!
E.g. If you accuse a metaphysicist that he uses language wrongly, he will answer rightly: "So what?"
Moreover, we cannot demand of a theory of meaning that any expression which is called abnormal by a theoretically untrained speaker is also evaluated as such by the theory.
II 125
The theory should rather only determine semantic violations.
II 126
FodorVsIntuitions: decisions about unusualness (anomalies) cannot be extrapolated in any way if they are based only on intuitions. Then we have no theory, but only overstretched intuitions. OxfordVsFodor/Ordinary LanguageVsFodor: could counter that we have ignored the principle of treating similar cases with similar methods.
FodorVsVs: that is beside the point: specifying relevant similarity means precisely to accurately determine the production rules.
III 222
Ordinary Language/Cavell: here there are three possible types to make statements about them: Type I Statement: "We say..., but we do not say...." ((s) use statements)
Type II Statement: The supplementation of type I statements with explanations.
Type III Statement: Generalizations.
Austin: E.g. we can make a voluntary gift. (Statement about the world).
Cavell: conceives this as "substantive mode" for "We say: 'The gift was made voluntarily'". (Statement about the language).
Voluntary/RyleVsAustin: expresses that there is something suspicious about the act. We should not have performed the act.
Cavell Thesis: such contradictions are not empirical in any reasonable sense.
III 223
Expressions of native speakers are no findings about what you can say in a language, they are the source of utterances. ((s) data). Also without empiricism we are entitled to any Type I statement that we need to support a Type II statement.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Prosentential Theory Verschiedene Vs Prosentential Theory Horwich I 344
Zitat/VsProsatz Theorie/Camp, Grover, Belnap/VsCGB: man wirft der Prosatz Theorie vor, Fälle zu ignorieren, wo Wahrheit von Zitaten, d.h. Namen von Sätzen ausgesagt wird. Bsp (27) „Schnee ist weiß“ ist wahr.
CGB: wir könnten hier mit Ramsey sagen, dass (27) einfach bedeutet, dass Schnee weiß ist.
CGBVsRamsey: das verschleiert wichtige pragmatische Merkmale des Beispiels. Sie werden deutlicher, wenn wir eine fremdsprachige Übersetzung heranziehen. Bsp
(28) If „Schnee ist weiß“ is true, then…
Warum (28) anstatt von
If it’s true that snow is white, then
Oder
If snow is white, then…
CGB: hier gibt es mehrer mögliche Gründe. Es kann sein, dass wir deutlich machen wollen, dass der Originalsatz auf Deutsch geäußert wurde. Oder es könnte sein, dass es keine elegante Übersetzung gibt, oder wir kennen die Grammatik des Deutschen nicht gut genug. Oder Bsp „Schnee ist weiß „muss wahr sein, weil Fritz es gesagt hat und alles was Fritz sagt, ist wahr.
I 345
Angenommen, Englisch* hat eine Möglichkeit, einen Satz formal zu präsentieren: Bsp „Betrachte __“ („consider).
(29) Betrachte: Schnee ist weiß. Das ist wahr.
CGB: warum soll das nicht genauso funktionieren wie „Schnee ist weiß ist wahr“ in normalem Englisch?
VsCGB: man könnte einwenden, dass damit eine Referenz auf Sätze oder Ausdrücke verlangt wird, weil Anführungszeichen namenbildende Funktoren sind.
Anführungszeichen/CGB: wir weichen von dieser Darstellung ab! Anführungszeichen sind keine namen bildenden Funktoren. ((s) bei CGB nicht).
Zitat/CGB: sollte im normalen Englisch vielleicht nicht als Referenz auf Ausdrücke betrachtet werden. Aber das wollen wir hier nicht weiterverfolgen.
I 346
VsCGB: man hat der Prosatz Theorie Tunnelblick vorgeworfen: Vielleicht haben wir bestimmte, grammatisch ähnliche Konstruktionen übersehen? Bsp (30) John: es gibt sieben beinige Hunde
Mary: das ist überraschend, aber wahr.
(31) John: das Sein von Wissen ist das Wissen von Sein
Mary: das ist tiefgründig und es ist wahr.
Ad (30): natürlich ist die erste Hälfte, „das ist überraschend“ in keiner Weise prosentential. Es ist eine Charakterisierung!
VsCGB: Ad (31) „ist tiefgründig“ drückt eine Eigenschaft aus, die Mary dem Satz zuschreibt. Warum sollte man „wahr“ nicht in der gleichen Weise auffassen?
CGB: es liegt nahe, „das“ hier als auf einen Satz referierend aufzufassen. Aber das würde die Sache komplizierter machen, weil wir dann „das“ und „es“ unterschiedlich behandeln müssten in „das ist wahr“ und „es ist wahr“.
CGBVsVs: 1. es ist einfach nicht wahr, dass das „das“ in „das ist überraschend“ auf eine Äußerung referiert (in dem Sinn dessen, was gesagt wurde, bzw. eine Proposition).
Was ist hier überraschend? Tatsachen, Ereignisse oder Zustände (states of affairs).
Aussage/Überraschung/CGB: eine Aussage kann nur als Akt überraschend sein.
I 347
Das Überraschende an der Aussage ist die berichtete Tatsache. ((s) Aber dann doch der Inhalt eher als der Akt des Aussagens.)
CGBVs(s): es ist nicht die Tatsache, dass es sieben beinige Hunde gibt, die in (30) als wahr behauptet wird, denn diese Tatsache kann nicht wahr sein!
Proposition/CGB: (ad (31) Propositionen sind nicht tiefgründig. Tiefgründig können Akte sein. Bsp Einsichten oder Gedanken.
Wahrheit/Akt/Handlung/Aussage/CGB: aber Aussagen im Handlungssinn sind nicht das, was man wahr nennt. ((s) siehe auch StrawsonVsAustin, dito).
Referenz/Prosatz/CGB: selbst wenn wir Bsp „das ist überraschend, aber es ist wahr“ als referierend ansehen, referieren die beiden Teile nicht auf dieselbe Sache! Und dann ist die Theorie nicht mehr ökonomisch.
Referenz/Prosatz Theorie/CGB: gibt es vielleicht andere Fälle, wo es plausibel ist, dass ein Pronomen auf eine Proposition referiert? Bsp
(32) John: Einige Hunde fressen Gras.
Mary: Das glaubst Du, aber es ist nicht wahr.
Proposition: wird oft als Träger von Wahrheit aufgefaßt, und als Glaubensobjekt. (CGBVs).
I 348
Allerdings, wenn „das“ hier als referierendes Pronomen aufgefaßt wird, dann muss der Referent eine Proposition sein. CGBVs: wir können „das glaubst du“ auch anders auffassen: als prosententiale Anapher (wie oben bei Bsp „das ist falsch“, mit vorgeschaltetem Negations Präfix). Dann haben wir keine pronominale Referenz.
Pointe: es geht darum, dass keine Eigenschaft zugeschrieben wird. Wahrheit ist keine Eigenschaft.
VsCGB: anderer Einwand: es sei ebenso ein „Tunnelblick“, dass wir nur „das ist wahr“ aber nicht Bsp „das ist richtig“ im Blick haben. Oder das Bsp „übertrieben“ von Austin.
Bsp ein Kind sagt
Ich habe 15 Klötze
Das ist richtig.
I 349
Frage: sollte das (und Bsp „Das ist eine Übertreibung!“) prosentential aufgefaßt werden? CGBVsVs: „das ist richtig“ ist hier die Feststellung, dass das Kind richtig gezählt hat, dass es etwas richtig ausgeführt hat. Manchmal kann sich das überlappen mit der Feststellung, dass eine Äußerung wahr ist. Das Überlappen muss es geben, weil es keine klare Grenze zwischen Sprachlernen und Sprachgebrauch gibt.
I 349
Anapher/Prosatz Theorie/VsCGB: könnte man nicht den Prosatz doch aufsplitten und das einzelne „das“ als Anapher nehmen? CGBVsVs: dann müsste man auch „ist wahr“ abspalten und nicht mehr als referierend, sondern als charakterisierend auffassen ((s) Und damit als eigenschafts zuschreibend).
CGBVs: dann müssten wir unsere These aufgeben, dass Rede über Wahrheit vollkommen verständlich ist ohne „Träger von Wahrheit“ oder „Wahrheits Charakteristik“.
Außerdem:
Referenz/CGB: es ist bekannt, dass nicht jede Nominalisierung referierend sein muss ((s) Bsp Einhorn).
Prädikation/CGB: auch muss nicht jede Prädikation charakterisierend sein.
- - -
göttliche Perspektive//außen/PutnamVsGottesstandpunkt/Rorty: Putnam amüsiert sich wie James und Dewey, über solche Versuche.
Rorty: er hat aber ein Problem, wenn es um PutnamVsDisquotationalismus geht: dieser riecht ihm zu reduktionistisch, zu positivistisch, zu „behavioristisch“ (transzendentaler Skinnerismus“).
Wahrheit/Putnam: wenn ein Philosoph sagt, Wahrheit sei etwas anderes als Elektrizität weil es wohl Raum für eine Theorie der Elektrizität aber keinen für eine WT gebe,
I 456
und dass die Kenntnis der WB alles sei, was man über Wahrheit wissen könnte, dann leugnet er, dass Wahrheit eine Eigenschaft ist. Damit gibt es dann auch keine Eigenschaft der Korrektheit oder Richtigkeit ((s) >Deflationismus, PutnamVsDeflationismus, PutnamVsGrover.) PutnamVs: das heißt zu leugnen, dass unsere Gedanken Gedanken sind und unsere Behauptungen Behauptungen.
Theorie/Existenz/Reduktion/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam nimmt hier an, dass der einzige Grund dafür zu leugnen, dass man eine Theorie für ein X braucht, ist, zu sagen, dass das X „nichts als Y“ sei ((s) eliminativer Reduktionismus).
PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson muss zeigen, dass Behauptungen auf Geräusche reduziert werden können. Dann müsste der Feldlinguist Handlungen auf Bewegungen reduzieren.
Davidson/Rorty: aber dieser sagt nicht, dass Behauptungen nichts als Geräusche seien.
Statt dessen:
Wahrheit/Erklärung/Davidson: anders als Elektrizität ist Wahrheit keine Erklärung für etwas. ((s) Ein Phänomen wird nicht dadurch erklärt, dass ein Satz, der es behauptet, wahr ist).





Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Quine, W.V.O. Stroud Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
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I 183
Intern/extern/Carnap/StroudVsQuine: in Carnaps Unterscheidung muss noch etwas anderes geben. Dass sie als interne Frage beantwortbar ist, als (gleichlautende) externe jedoch nicht, zeigt, dass die beiden nicht verwechselt werden dürfen. Sprache/Carnap/Stroud: daher unterscheidet Carnap verschiedene "Sprachen" oder "Systeme". Diese beantworten jeweils nur interne Fragen.
Ausdruckskraft: dass eine "philosophische" (externe) Frage dann sinnlos ist, liegt nicht bloß an der Terminologie.
I 184
Die Terminologie ist jeweils bedeutungsvoll. Bsp innerhalb der Mathematik ist "Es gibt Zahlen" sinnvoll. - - -
I 223
Wissen/Skeptizismus/Quine: wenn alles Wissen zugleich auf dem Prüfstand steht, kann man sich auf keinen Teil des Wissens berufen. ((s) > Bsp "Alles was er sagte ist wahr"). Empirie/Wissen/Lösung/Quine: das ist der Grund, warum Wissen auf Basis der Sinneserfahrung gerechtfertigt werden muss.
Psychologie/Wissen/Erklärung/Rechtfertigung/Quine: eine Preisgabe der Erkenntnistheorie an die Psychologie führt zur Zirkularität. ((s) Weil die Psychologie selbst über das bloße Feststellen von Reizen hinausgeht).
StroudVsQuine/StroudVsNaturalised Epistemology: ist genauso eine Preisgabe der Erkenntnistheorie an die Psychologie. Und damit genauso zirkulkär!
Erkenntnistheorie/Stroud: kann es sein, dass damit wohl die traditionelle Erkenntnistheorie widerlegt ist, nicht aber Quines naturalisierte Erkenntnistheorie selbst? Liegt die Lösung in der Relation zwischen beiden?
Quine: legt manchmal nahe, dass die beiden Standpunkte (naturalisierteVstraditionelle Erkenntnistheorie) sich unterscheiden: die "doktrinäre" Frage sollte als falsche Hoffnung ad acta gelegt werden.
Bewusstsein/Kenntnis/Tradition/Erkenntnistheorie/Rechtfertigung/Stroud: die traditionelle Erkenntnistheorie insistiert auf einer Isolation gewisser Objekte des Bewusstseins, um unzweifelhafte Information zu identifizieren.
Bewusstsein/QuineVsTradition: wir können die Frage des Bewusstseins umgehen und einfach versuchen zu erklären,
I 224
wie unser reichhaltiger Output aus den Ereignissen entsteht, die an unserer sensorischen Oberfläche (Nervenenden) geschehen. Pointe: das kann man wissenschaftlich angehen.
Dann kann man zwei Arten von Ereignissen in der beobachtbaren physikalischen Welt unterscheiden, und das ist dann das wissenschaftliche Ziel.
StroudVsQuine: das sieht nun so aus, als hätte Quine nur das Thema gewechselt. Skeptizismus droht dann noch immer. Und das will Quine nicht.
„befreite“ Erkenntnistheorie/Quine: (Wurzeln der Referenz, 3): ist nicht dasselbe wie empirische Psychologie, es ist eher ein "erleuchtetes Fortbestehen" (enlightened, "Erleuchtung") des traditionellen epistemischen Problems.
Empirie/Wissen/Rechtfertigung/Begründung/Zirkel/Quine: (s.o.) Tradition: unser Wissen kann nicht empirisch gerechtfertigt werden, weil sonst zirkulär.
QuineVsTradition: diese Angst vor Zirkularität ist unnötige logische Schüchternheit.
„Erleuchtung“/“befreite“ Erkenntnistheorie/Quine: die Einsicht in die Tatsache, dass der Skeptizismus aus der Wissenschaft selbst entspringt. Und um ihn zu bekämpfen sind wir berechtigt, wissenschaftliches Wissen einzubringen.
QuineVsTradition: hat die Stärke ihrer Position gar nicht erkannt.
I 225
Wissen/Skeptizismus/QuineVsTradition: die traditionelle Erkenntnistheorie hat nicht erkannt, dass die Herausforderung des Wissens aus dem Wissen selbst heraus entstand. These: die Zweifel an seiner Verlässlichkeit waren immer wissenschaftliche Zweifel. Bewusstsein/Quine: die Verwirrung beruhte auf der Konzentration auf das Bewusstsein.
Introspection/Tradition: dachte, Fakten über unseren "mageren" Input würden durch Introspektion ans Licht gebracht.
QuineVsIntrospection: die Gründe dafür, den Input mager zu finden, kommen aus der Wissenschaft.
I 227
Täuschung/Skeptizismus/QuineVsTradition: der Begriff der Illusion beruht selbst auf der Wissenschaft, denn die Qualität der Täuschung besteht einfach in dem Abweichen von externer wissenschaftlicher Realität. (Quine, Roots of reference, RR 3) Illusionen gibt es nur relativ zu einer vorher akzeptierten Annahme echter Körper.
Gegebenes/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: das kann der Grund sein, ein unverbindliches Gegebenes anzunehmen. (SellarsVsQuine).
QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: Pointe: dann könnte es so scheinen, dass es unmöglich ist, sich auf die Möglichkeit der Täuschung zu berufen, weil ein gewisses Wissen über die äußere Realität notwendig ist, um den Begriff der Illusion zu verstehen!
Stroud: wir haben Argumente dieser Form schon früher behandelt (s.o. >Verzerrung der Bedeutung). Verletzung der notwendigen Bedingungen für die Anwendung gewisser Begriffe.
Quine/Stroud: ihm könnte man jetzt analog zu StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin antworten, aber Quine macht diese Fehler nicht.
Sprache/Skeptizismus/Quine/Stroud: sein Ansatz in Bezug auf die Sprache (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) lässt ihm keine Möglichkeit, sich auf das zu berufen, was in der Bedeutung eines bestimmten Terms liegt.
StroudVsQuine: aber, wenn er denkt, dass die wissenschaftlichen Ursprünge nicht zum Skeptizismus führen, warum denkt er, dass weil die "skeptischen Zweifel wissenschaftliche Zweifel" sind,
I 228
der Erkenntnistheoretiker "klarerweise" berechtigt ist, empirische Wissenschaft einzusetzen? Die Frage wird noch schwieriger durch Quines explizite Leugnung, dass:
Skeptizismus/Quine: ich sage nicht, dass er die Frage unbeantwortet lässt, er hat Recht darin, Wissenschaft zu bemühen, um Wissenschaft zurückzuweisen. Ich sage eben bloß, dass skeptische Zweifel wissenschaftliche Zweifel sind.
TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: das ist wichtig für die Verteidigung des traditionellen Erkenntnistheoretikers: wenn es kein logischer Fehler ist, Zweifel aus der Wissenschaft selbst heraus letztlich zu widerlegen, so dass am Ende Gewissheit steht, was ist denn dann noch der entscheidende logische Punkt, den er verfehlt hat?
StroudVsQuine: wenn sein "einziger Punkt" ist, dass skeptische Zweifel wissenschaftliche Zweifel sind, dann wird Erkenntnistheorie ein Teil der Naturwissenschaft.
SkeptizismusVsQuine/Stroud: aber der Skeptiker könnte mit einer "reductio ad absurdum" antworten, und dann wäre Erkenntnistheorie nicht mehr Teil der Wissenschaft:
"reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: entweder
a) Wissenschaft ist wahr und gibt uns Wissen oder
b) Sie ist nicht wahr und gibt uns kein Wissen. Nichts was wir über die äußere Welt glauben, ist Wissen.
I 230
Moore/Stroud: auch Moore soll damit nicht verleumdet werden. Nach Kant und Carnap ist es völlig legitim was er sagt. Skeptizismus/StroudVsQuine: Pointe: die Ergebnisse einer unabhängig durchgeführten wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung wären im selben Boot wie Bsp Moores Hände. Sie wären "wissenschaftliche" Versionen von Moores Argument mit dem Common Sense.

Philosophie/Wissenschaft/Quine: beide gehen kontinuierlich in einander über.
Stroud: damit könnten sich Descartes und andere traditionellen Philosophen einverstanden erklären.
StroudVsQuine: Problem: dann haben wir eben vielleicht auch gar kein wissenschaftliches Wissen. Wir haben nicht mehr Grund daran zu glauben, wie nicht daran zu glauben. Keine wissenschaftliche Untersuchung könnte hier Klarheit verschaffen.
I 231
Es wäre auch keine Herausforderung "von innen" denkbar. Also würde der Skeptizismus folgen.
I 233
Skeptizismus/StroudVsQuine: aber ob er korrekt ist oder nicht, ist nichts, was durch zukünftige Erfahrung oder durch Experimente entschieden wird! Wenn die erkenntnistheoretische Frage richtig gestellt sie - so wie Quine sie stellt – dann wissen wir schon jetzt, wie zukünftige Erfahrung geartet sein wird! Wir werden immer mit der Frage nach dem Überschuss unseres reichhaltigen Outputs über den mageren Input konfrontiert sein. Sicher, wenn wir heute mit einer Erfahrung konfrontiert werden, die unseren Glauben unterminiert, wird der Skeptizismus heute gerechtfertigt. Aber: Pointe: genauso war er schon 1630 gerechtfertigt!
I 234
Naturalismus/StroudVsQuine: wird nicht genug sein, wenn der Skeptizismus mit der reductio ad absurdum argumentiert. Wir müssen eben das Schiff auf hoher See umbauen. Der traditionelle Erkenntnistheoretiker kann das Stück aus dem Schiff heraussägen (identifizieren!), das den mageren Input repräsentiert.
I 240
Wissen/StroudVsQuine: selbst wenn ich den „mageren „Input dafür verantwortlich machte, dass er eine "Projektion" angenommen hat, wäre das keine Erklärung seines Wissens oder wahren Glaubens.
I 245
Wissen/Wissenstheorie/Erklärung/Projektion/StroudVsQuine: Angenommen, ich nehme mit Quine an, dass alle meine Glaubenseinstellungen nur "überfließender Output aus magerem Input" (also Projektion) sei, dann heißt das nicht, dass ich nicht denken könnte, dass ich wahre Glaubenseinstellungen habe, in dem Sinn, dass es nichts gibt, was meinen Glauben davon abhalten könnte, wahr zu sein. Problem: selbst wenn sie alle wahr wären, wäre ich nicht in der Position erklären zu können, oder auch zu verstehen, wie eine Wissenstheorie sie erklären und verstehen sollte. Ich kann nicht erklären, wie mein ((s) zufällig) wahrer Glauben zum Wissen beiträgt.

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Redundancy Theory Austin Vs Redundancy Theory
 
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I 19
AustinVsRedundancy theory: a statement has other functions than just being true or false. Statements, not propositions (as in Tarski), are candidates for the predicates "true" and "false". "Is true" describes a satisfactory relationship between words and the world. (StrawsonVs). ---
I 234
AustinVsRedundancy theory: it has been argued that saying that an assertion is true is not another assertion. It is logically redundant. Austin: but that’s not true. DAdA refers to the world outside of dAdA. That is, to everything except this statement itself! DAdAW refers to the world including dAdA, although the statement itself, i.e. dAdAW, in turn is excluded! DadAW is appropriate only if one imagines that dAdA is already made and verified.
---
I 236
AustinVsRedundancy theory: a statement that says that it is true is just as absurd as one with the content that it is wrong itself! The crreation of hierarchies formation is not a solution either. ---
Strawson II 263
AustinVsRedundancy Theory: AustinVsRamsey and StrawsonVsRamsey: we contradict the thesis that the expression "is true" is logically superfluous. "True" has its own tasks. When we use it, we do not simply assert that something is so, we assert it as we could not do it if certain conditions were not fulfilled. We can also grant, deny, confirm something etc. StrawsonVsAustin: but that does not mean the assumption of the thesis that we assert something about a statement by the use of "true". It is not a new assertion at all!
---
II 265
By looking ((s) by pointing) one can also determine whether a statement is true without the performative use of "true". E.g. someone reported, "he saw that the statement was true". What does he report? He reports that I've seen a cat on the mat. But only in certain circumstances. This also means that one has heard such a statement.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Ryle, G. Dummett Vs Ryle, G.
 
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I 165
When Ryles’ book was published, it was the basis for discussion for a long time to come. Dummett: Ryles’ influence not so positive, I was also very VsAustin.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Strawson, P. F. Prior Vs Strawson, P. F.
 
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I 23
Correspondence Theory/Austin/Prior: Austin defended it in the 50s: These facts are "in the world", not only signs, so communication can take place. There must be something else in addition to the signs! True-Making/Austin: if a statement is to be true, then there must be something beyond this statement ("in the world"), which makes it true.
StrawsonVsAustin: "in the world" are only objects to which our statements refer ("about which they are") and not also "facts" (like Geach, camp).
Facts/Strawson: are what statements (if true) find, they are not "about what" statements (sentences) are.
The only plausible candidate as truthmaker of statements is the fact that states them, but this fact is nothing in the world. It is not an object.
Strawson/Prior: seems to say with this that the facts are logical constructions. So far so good, but there still seems to be more that is not clear: he means:
Strawson: of course statements and facts go together. They were made for each other: if we (prise) eliminate the statements from the world (prise), then (prise) we also eliminate the facts from the world. It would not become poorer because of this!
PriorVsStrawson: that seems to imply that there are no facts without statements, or that there would be no facts without statements, and if that is the case, then it is
a) certainly wrong,
b) not the result of facts being logical constructions (Chapter 2).
And there is certainly a close relationship between a fact, and its being in the world!
Reality/Realism/Prior: idioms like "in the world" get their strength from the confrontation with "all in the head" or "only in Homer".
I 24
It suggests the idea of ​​different boxes, in which this could be sorted. That should not be taken too seriously: "In Homer" means that Homer says that such and such is a fact.
To say that gods exist only in the mind, means that it is merely a thought that they exist.
And saying that something is a fact in the world, simply means omitting all these prefixes and saying that it is a fact. (That it is the case).
Facts/Wittgenstein: are the world! Not in the world.
Nor are they "in" sentences.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Wittgenstein, L. Strawson Vs Wittgenstein, L.
 
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Horwich I 195
Fact/situation/VsStrawson: it could be argued that they (because they are connected to that-sentences) are used as placeholders for yet to be specified expressions. Just as E.g. "thing" for nouns E.g. "event " for certain verbs, etc. StrawsonVsVs: the answer is twofold:
(I)
World/StrawsonVsWittgenstein: the world is the totality of things, not of the facts. All the charm of these expressions like "situation", "state" (state of affairs), "fact", etc. is that we look at them as things or quantities of things. (StrawsonVs). StrawsonVsAustin: this urge is overwhelming. Austin does not resist it. He needs for concealment "feature" (feature) as a substitute for "fact".
Definition feature/feature/Strawson: E.g. nose can be a feature of a face. E.g. a mountain feature a landscape.
---
Strawson II 265
StrawsonVsWittgenstein: the world is the totality of things, not of the facts. ---
Wittgenstein VI 172
StrawsonVsWittgenstein/Schulte: actually one should only talk in very specific cases of the meaning of names: E.g. "Peter" (Pierre) means "stone". Schulte: that is quite foreign to Wittgenstein.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Facts Versus Prior I 23
StrawsonVsAustin: "in the world" are just objects to which our statements relate ("through which they are") and not also "facts", additionally. (Geach ditto).

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Statement Austin, J.L.
 
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Horwich I 189
Aussage/Austin: jede Aussage involviert beides. Referenz ("Demonstration") und Charakterisierung ("Kennzeichnung"). StrawsonVsAustin: es ist fraglich, daß alle Aussagen das tun, wenn auch sicher einige es tun.
Die These entspricht ungefähr der, daß alle Aussagen Subjekt-Prädikat-Aussagen sind, oder diese involvieren.

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Vs Skepticism Austin, J.L.
 
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Stroud I 42
AustinVsSkeptizismus/AustinVsDescartes/Stroud: (Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, 1962, 4-5) an die Quelle von Descartes skeptischer Konklusion gelangt man durch die Aufdeckung einer Reihe von Mißverständnissen und (vor allem verbaler) Irrtümer und Fehlschlüsse.
I 44
Wissen/Philosophie/Alltag/Austin/Stroud: (Austin Other Minds, (Phil.Papers) 1961,45) These die typische philosophische Untersuchung weicht von unserer normalen (Alltags-) Praxis ab.
I 45
Austin These: "genug ist genug": d.h. es muß nicht alles gesagt werden. Es muß nicht immer bewiesen werden, Bsp daß dieser Goldfink kein ausgestopfter Vogel ist. (OM 52).
I 48
Traum/AustinVsSkeptizismus/AustinVsDescartes: es geht um die starke These von Descartes, daß wir nicht wissen können, ob wir nicht träumen. Ohne sie wäre der Skeptizismus entwaffnet. Austin Kernthese
Methode/Alltagssprache/AustinVsDescartes: kann es gezeigt werden ((s) >Manifestation), daß Descartes mit seiner starken These die normalen Standards oder Bedingungen für Wissen verletzt?
I 51
Irrtum/Täuschung/Austin: These -ždu kannst nicht alle Leute immer täuschen-œ.
I 64
StroudVsAustin: der Vorwurf AustinVsSkeptizismus (AustinVsDescartes), daß die Bedeutung von -žWissen-œ im Alltagsgebrauch verzerrt worden wäre, kann nur erhoben werden, wenn gezeigt werden kann, daß ein bestimmter Sprachgebrauch, ein bestimmter Begriff und die Relation zwischen ihnen falsch aufgefaßt wurde. Stroud: das ist es was ich damit meinte, daß die Quelle von Descartes Forderung etwas Tiefes und Wichtiges zum Vorschein bringt.
I 76
Stroud: das führt uns auf die Tiefe und Wichtigkeit des Skeptizismus. Es geht um viel mehr als darum zu entscheiden, ob man etwas über die Welt um einen herum weiß, es geht um unsere Praxis (Handlungen) und Reflexion unseres Wissens (Selbst-Wissen). Können wir hier eine distanzierte Position einnehmen?
I 82
Skeptizismus/Quelle/Stroud: These die Quelle des philosophischen Problems der Außenwelt liegt irgendwo in unserem Begriff einer objektiven Welt oder unserem Wunsch, nach einem Verstehen unserer Relation zur Welt.
Truth Austin, J.L.
 
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Horwich I 185
Truth / Austin: to say that a proposition is true, is to say that a particular speech act (episode) is conventionally based on something in the world outside of irself.  StrawsonVsAustin: this is unsatisfactory. The correspondence theory does not need cleaning, it must be eliminated.

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Truth Predicate Austin, J.L.
 
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Horwich I 187
wahr/Austin: wird Sprechakten zugeschrieben. (Episoden). StrawsonVsAustin: wenn er recht hat, muß es möglich sein, Behauptungen, in denen wir über Aussagen im nicht-episodischen Sinn reden, zu reduzieren, auf solche, in denen wir Episoden selbst Wahrheit zuschreiben.
Aussage/Austin: derselbe Satz kann gebraucht werden, um verschiedene Aussagen zu machen.
Bsp von Jones: "Er ist krank" zu Jones: "Du bist krank", Jones: "Ich bin krank".
I 188
Strawson: wir können nicht nur verschiedene Sätze mit derselben Bedeutung, sondern auch denselben Satz mit verschiedenen Bedeutungen gebrauchen.

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Truth Maker Strawson, P.F.
 
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Horwich I 191
Truth-maker / StrawsonVsAustin: they do exist, but only as the equivalent of the descriptive part, not the referring part of a statement.   Fact / truth Make / StrawsonVsAustin: his thesis that a statement is true if a speech episode is correlated conventionally, on a referent beyond description, is a logical error of types.

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994