Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 26 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Austin (laut Hungerland,. Grice/Meggle):
Austin/Prinzip: Keine Modifikation ohne Abweichung.
Meg I 290
Hungerland VsAustin: anderer Sinn von "normal". Bsp "Ich sitze ganz normal im Stuhl" Hier läßt sich weder sagen , daß ich absichtlich, noch daß unabsichtlich auf dem Stuhl saß. VsAustin: Wir verwenden Modifikatoren, wenn es einen Grund gibt, eine Norm zu beschwören, einen Maßstab, eine Skala.

Austin I
John L. Austin
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Austin II
John L. Austin
"A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3
German Edition:
Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Assertibility Stroud I 60ff
Assertibility/Stroud: for assertibility but not for truth relevance of reasons plays a role. - Skepticism/Descartes/Stroud: has to do with truth conditions - not to do with assertibility conditions. - StroudVsAustin: he would have to show that a wrong usage of "knowledge" is present, not merely a redefinition.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

Assertibility Conditions Searle VII 101
Searle: assertibility conditions are not the same as truth conditions: e.g. the use of "voluntarily" (> Ryle-Austin-Searle-Hare-Cavell-Fodor; see SearleVsAustin). - VsUse Theory: use is too vague - circumstances are beyond the language.
VII 96
Intention/Searle: Thesis: The strangeness or deviation that is a condition for utterance "X was done intentionally", at the same time provides a reason for the truth of the utterance of
"X wasn't done on purpose."
Condition of assertiveness: it is the condition of utterance for one assertion precisely because it is a reason for the truth of the others.
>Truth conditions/Searle, >Conditions of satisfaction/Searle, >Assertibility.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Communicative Action Habermas III 128
Communicative action/Habermas: the concept refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who enter into an interpersonal relationship (by linguistic or non-linguistic means). The actors seek an understanding to coordinate their plans and thus their actions. Language is given a prominent status here.
III 143
Problem: there is a danger that social action will be reduced to the interpretive performance of the communication participants, action will be adapted to speech, interaction to conversation. In fact, however, linguistic communication is only the mechanism of action coordination, which brings together the action plans and activities of the ones involved.
III 157
In communicative action, the outcome of the interaction itself is dependent on whether the participants can agree among themselves on an intersubjectively valid assessment of their world-relationships.
III 158
Interpretation: Problem: for the understanding of communicative actions we have to separate questions of meaning and validity. The interpretation performance of an observer differs from the coordination efforts of the participants. The observer does not seek a consensus interpretation. But perhaps only the functions differed here, not the structures of interpretation.
III 385
Communicative Action/Habermas: here the participants are not primarily oriented towards their own success; they pursue their individual goals on the condition that they can coordinate their action plans on the basis of common situation definitions. In this respect, the negotiation of situation definitions is an essential component.
III 395
Communicative Action/Speech Acts/Perlocution/Illocution/Habermas: Strawson has shown that a speaker achieves his/her illocutionary goal that the listener understands what is being said without revealing his/her perlocutionary goal. This gives perlocutions the asymmetric character of covert strategic actions in which at least one of the participants behaves strategically, while deceiving other participants that he/she does not meet the conditions under which normally illocutionary goals can only be achieved. Therefore, perlocutions are not suitable for the analysis of coordination of actions, which are to be explained by illocutionary binding effects.
This problem is solved if we understand communicative action as interaction in which all participants coordinate their individual action plans and pursue their illocutionary goals without reservation.
III 396
Only such interactions are communicative actions in which all participants pursue illocutionary goals. Otherwise they fall under strategic action.
III 397
HabermasVsAustin: he has tended to identify speech acts with acts of communication, i.e. the linguistically mediated interactions.
III 400
Definition Understanding/Communication/Habermas: in the context of our theory of communicative action we limit ourselves to acts of speech under standard conditions, i.e. we assume that a speaker means nothing else than the literal meaning of what he/she says. Understanding a sentence is then defined as knowing what makes that sentence acceptable.
III 457
Communicative action/Rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only if we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday actions and the formation of subsystems for procedural rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies.
IV 223
Communicative Actions/HabermasVsSystem theory/Habermas: Communicative actions succeed only in the light of cultural traditions - this is what ensures the integration of society, and not systemic mechanisms that are deprived of the intuitive knowledge of their relatives.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Conventions Strawson II 257
Convention/StrawsonVsAustin: does not create truth: Relation between the Prime Minister and the expression "the Prime Minister" is conventional, but those who use the expression speak no truth without the context - II 260 VsAustin: confuses semantic conditions with what was stated - II 268 E.g. the fact that a statement is exaggerated does not depend on a convention, but on a difference to a fact - II 269 existential statements and limited general statements do not make use of conventions
II 257
Truthmaker/Strawson: E.g. language with "plate" (Wittgenstein, PU) would be just as conventional, but those alleged pseudo-entities that make statements true (facts), would not be among the non-linguistic correlates - (s) but the world would be more empty because of it

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Correspondence Theory Austin Horwich I 185
Correspondence Theory / Austin: purified version: thesis: a proposition is true; 0 a speech (episode) is conventionally based on something outside itself - Correspondence / Austin:. Always conventional - StrawsonVsAustin: eliminate Corr-Th.! - StrawsonVsAustin. we cannot always equate statements with events (episodes) - Possibility of an event is enough.(1)

1. John L. Austin, "Truth, (1950) " Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24: 111–128, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994

Austin I
John L. Austin
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Austin II
John L. Austin
"A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3
German Edition:
Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Correspondence Theory Prior I 23
Correspondence theory / Austin: pro: facts are "in the world" - not only characters, but truth-makers - StrawsonVsAustin: no facts in addition to objects!

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Correspondence Theory Searle III 163
Realism/Searle: should not be confused with correspondence theory. Realism is not at all a truth theory and does not imply any truth theory.
III 211
Correspondence/Searle: we need a verb to name the variety of ways sentences refer to facts. And this verb is among others "corresponding". Correspondence theory/Searle: is not an attempt to define "true".
III 211
Correspondence theory/StrawsonVsAustin: Strawson is considered to have won this debate. Strawson: the correspondence theory does not have to be purified, it has to be eliminated.
III 212
It gave us a false picture of the use of the word "true" and the nature of facts: that facts are a kind of complex things or events or groups of things and that truth represents a special relationship of correspondence between statements and these non-linguistic entities. (Goes back to the Tractatus image theory).
III 215
StrawsonVsCorrespondence Theory: it makes the false assertion that facts are non-linguistic entities.
III 216
Deflationist truth theory/deflationism/minimalist truth theory: "true" is not a property or relation. The entire content of the concept of truth consists in quoting. Def redundancy theory: there is no difference between the statements "p" and "it is true that p". (SearleVs Redundancy Theory). >Deflationism, >redundancy theory.
III 217
These two theories are usually considered incompatible with correspondence theory.
III 220
Correspondence theory/citation cancellation: because of the definitory connections between fact and true statement, there can be no incompatibility between the correspondence criterion of truth and the citation cancellation criterion. The citation simply indicates the form of what makes any statement true, simply by repeating the statement. (Tarski). We do not need additional correspondence as confirmation.
Slingshot Argument/Searle: originally by Frege, used by Quine against modal logic, revived by Davidson against correspondence theory. >Slingshot argument.
III 230
Slingshot argument: if a true statement corresponds to a fact, then it corresponds to any fact. Therefore, the concept of correspondence is completely empty. Example final form: "the statement that snow is white corresponds to the fact that grass is green. SearleVs: this is ultimately irrelevant.
III 235
Slingshot argument: Searle: Conclusion: it does not refute the correspondence theory.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Events Vendler Vendler Die Linguistik und das a priori
in Grewendorf/Meggle Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
I 264
Event/fact/VendlerVsAustin: assimilates both - Vendler: "collapse of the empire" - fact: can be contradicted - Event: can happen quickly or slowly - from the ambiguity does not follow that some facts are events.

Vendler II
Z. Vendler
Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967

Vendler I
Zeno Vendler
"Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Facts Austin I 231
Fact / Austin: "fact" is just another term for "true statement" (pro Brandom, VsAyer) - to each true statement, there is one and only one and exactly corresponding fact.. (Ayer: but for every fact there are many (Davidson: infinitely many) true statements - but Brandom: T = true statement (in the sense of "aserted") (Brandom I 841) - AyerVsAustin AyerVsBrandom.

Austin I
John L. Austin
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Austin II
John L. Austin
"A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3
German Edition:
Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Facts Strawson Horwich I 189
Facts/StrawsonVsAustin: Incorrect alignment of facts and things.
Horwich I 190
Fact/StrawsonVsAustin: should go beyond the "beyond" of the statement. - But there is nothing. - This comes from Austin's need for a "truth maker".
Horwich I 191
The fact that the cat is sick, is not made true by the cat, but at most by the fact that is expressed by the sentence. - Reference/Strawson: a statement: is the material corollary, not its fact. - I can possibly measure the corollary with the clock, issue etc. - Fact: pseudo-material correlate of the entire statement. - Fact: not a thing, not even a composite object.
Horwich I 192
It is what the statement notes, not what it is. - Facts are not "beyond".
Horwich I 193
Facts and statements are in accordance with each other, they are made for each other, if one eliminates one, then also the other. But the world will not be poorer through that.(1)
1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994
---
Seel III 104f
Fact/Strawson/Seel: if we call something a fact, we think it is real like the sentence says it. - A fact is nothing more than the contents of a true belief - the alleged facts are not even from this the world. ---
III 104/105
In contrast to actual processes facts are abstract objects - they relate to a real state, without being themselves an occurrence in the world. - E.g. the fact that Napoleon won the battle, is not the same as the battle - the images do not correspond with beings in the world. ---
Strawson II 20
Facts cannot burn, they do not wither - (timeless). ---
II 250
Fact/StrawsonVsAustin: equating fact and thing leads to equating of saying-something and relate-to-something. - Statement and sentence must not be equated. ---
II 253
Fact/thing/StrawsonVsAustin/StrawsonVsSpeech Act Theory: completely different types. - Fact: what is said. - Thing: about what something is said - VsAustin: believes, a statement would be something in the world - Confusion with the event of utterance (speech act). ---
II 254
Of course facts and statements correspond, they are made for each other - Facts, fact and situations are not seen but rather recorded or summarized. ---
II 255
E.g. being worried by facts, is not the same as being worried by a shadow. - He is worried because... . ---
II 259
Fact: already implies a discourse context - but we do not talk about this framework, also not with terms such as statement and true. ---
IV 150/51
Fact/Strawson: something to determine, nothing to be described. - There are always different descriptions possible.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Seel I
M. Seel
Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997

Seel II
M. Seel
Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000

Seel III
M. Seel
Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001
Knowledge Clarke Stroud I 67
Wissen/Behauptbarkeit/Wahrheit/Thompson Clarke/Stroud: Bsp Soldaten im Krieg sollen unter Zeitdruck fremde Flugzeuge von eigenen unterscheiden, anhand von Merkmalen: - wenn ein Flugzeug x,y und w hat ist es ein E, - x,y, und z: ein F. - Nur besonders geschulte Beobachter können am Boden durch ein weiteres Merkmal zwischen F und G unterscheiden. Skeptizismus: entspricht der Beobachtung vom Boden aus. - Kein echtes Wissen, aber Behauptbarkeit. - Statt Traum: wir wissen nicht immer, wenn wir zu wissen glauben.
Lösung/Stroud: Philosophie: legt bloß höhere Standards an.
StroudVsAustin: aber nicht zwei Begriffe von Wissen. - "Distanzierte Position": aus ihr können wir unsere eigene Beschränkung sehen.
I 80
Flugzeug-Bsp: kein objektives Wissen (solang das Flugzeug nicht am Boden ist) , aber Wissen relativ zum Handbuch. - Pointe: wenn das Handbuch nicht korrekt ist, wird er selbst sagen, dass er kein Wissen hat. - Und es ist nicht völlig korrekt!


Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Map Example Austin Horwich I 195
Map / Austin: is not "true" - Merely because the similarity of the landscape is not entirely conventional. Convention / StrawsonVsAustin: this is not the real reason: the relation between "the Minister" and the Minister is conventional, but nevertheless you always need the context. - Facts: for them the convention is not the problem, but the reification.(1)

1. John L. Austin, "Truth, (1950) " Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24: 111–128, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994

Austin I
John L. Austin
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Austin II
John L. Austin
"A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3
German Edition:
Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Negation Searle V 171
Negation/Searle: the philosophers have long abandoned the idea that there are irreducible negative sentences.
V 219
Negation/Searle: the negation of certain sentences such as "He doesn't know if he is in pain" are simply wrong, not as is sometimes assumed, neither true nor false. But if they are wrong, don't their negation have to be true?
IV 113
Negation/Metaphor/Searle: the negation is just as metaphorical!
VII 91
Negation/Searle: the negation of an A-word (for an activity that one can sensibly call "voluntary") is not again an A-word! For example I did not buy my car voluntarily, I was forced to do so.
I did not come voluntarily, I was dragged here.
He doesn't know if the object in front of him is a tree.
Considerable asymmetry between A words and their opposite or negation.
VII 95
SearleVsAustin: his thesis does not even go over sentences: making an assertion means committing oneself to something that is the case. If the possibility that the facts do not exist is excluded, it is pointless. Austin's slogan should be reformulated too:
"No remark that is not remarkable," or
"Not an assertion that's not worth asserting."
Negation/Searle: the opposite of a standard condition is not itself a standard condition.
Therefore, no A condition is required for the utterance of a negation of an A proposition. A-phrases mark standard situations, but their negations do not.
A-condition: normally a reason to assume that the negation of the A proposition is true. because generally only where there is a reason to assume that a standard situation could have been a non-standard situation, the remark that it is a standard situation makes sense. >Sensible/senseless, >truth value gaps.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Redundancy Theory Strawson II 264
Redundancy theory/StrawsonVsAustin: it is not true that with "true" something is said about a statement - (Strawson per redundancy theory).
II 265
Solution: simply checking if the cat is on the mat. (> ostension).

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Skepticism Austin Stroud I 41
AustinVsSkepticism: Descartes merely undertook a re-definition of "knowledge". - E.g. someone asserted there were no doctors in New York - in that, he performs a re-definition of "doctor": as someone who could cure within 2 minutes. StroudVsAustin: Descartes goes deeper. SomeVsDescartes: knowledge does not require what Descartes asserts: not dreaming and knowing that. - Knowledge/Stroud: if VsDescartes is right, then knowledge did not have to a) be entirely under logical consequence or b) penetrate all the logical consequences of our knowledge. (StroudVsVs)
Stroud I 45
AustinVsSkepticism: "Enough is enough": it is not necessary to prove everything at all times in order to be able to claim knowledge. - The skeptic only asserts a lack of information. - StroudVsAustin - Austin: a "real" goldfinch is no more than a goldfinch. - Stroud: it would be absurd to argue philosophically against our usual knowledge, but that is not true of Descartes. - Dream/Austin: There are recognized procedures for distinguishing it from wakefulness - otherwise we could not use the words.
I 47
Austin: it can be qualitatively distinguished whether you are actually being presented to the Pope, or just dreaming about it.
Stroud I 48
Strong Thesis/Skepticism/Terminology/Descartes: We cannot know that we are not dreaming. - Austin's central thesis: the questioning of knowledge is hardly ever permitted in everyday life (if we are dreaming) - there must be specific reasons. - Austin thesis: you cannot always fool everyone. - Then Weaker Thesis/Austin: there must be a reason to doubt that we are awake - stronger: we always have to doubt it.
I 57
Austin: E.g. what is considered inappropriate? -> Distinction truth/assertibility (because of the different conditions).
Stroud I 64/65
Skepticism/Descartes/Stroud: (deeper than the one disputed by Austin) - can neither accepted be in everyday life nor in science. - Emphasis on theory and practice. - Stroud: standards of justification vary from case to case - in the speech act there is no general instruction regarding what we need to consider.
Stroud I 74
Def "Paradigm-Case Argument"/Knowledge/Truth/Oxford/Terminology/Austin/Stroud: in the mid-50s it was thought the skeptic would have come to the conclusion that in certain situations both S and non-S apply. - StroudVsAustin: in order to question the concept of "knowledge" we have ask how and why it was used. - Airplane-E.g. "He does not know" is definitely correct before the aircraft is on the ground) - But that is not the distinction between knowledge and ignorance. - Therefore, we cannot draw a skeptical conclusion from our language use.

Austin I
John L. Austin
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Austin II
John L. Austin
"A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3
German Edition:
Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Social Theory Habermas III 460
Social Theory/Habermas: their main problems are: 1. the extension of the teleological concept of action, 2. the relativization of the purpose activity to a model of understanding that not only presupposes the transition from consciousness to the philosophy of language, but the communication-theoretical development and radicalization of language analysis itself. (See Speech Act Theory, See HabermasVsSpeech Act Theory, HabermasVsGrice, HabermasVsBennett, HabermasVsAustin, HabermasVsLewis.)

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Speech Act Theory Habermas III 374
Speech Act Theory/Habermas: means the first step towards formal pragmatics that extends to non-cognitive uses of linguistic expressions.
III 375
HabermasVsSpeech Act Theory: however, it remains bound to the narrow ontological prerequisites of truth semantics. Solution/Habermas: the inclusion of Karl Bühler's language model together with appeal and expression functions (possibly also Roman Jakobson's emphasis on the "poetic" function related to the means of representation themselves) of language. (1)
III 395
Speech Acts/HabermasVsAustin/Habermas: Austin's merit is to have worked out the interaction context of institutionally bound speech acts such as betting, baptism, appointment etc.. But he confuses the picture,
III 396
that he does not characterize such acts of speech as of any type other than perlocutionary acts. Perlocutionary acts themselves are not communicative.

1.J. Habermas, Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus, Frankfurt 1976.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Speech Act Theory Searle II 25
Sincerity condition: internal to the speech acts. ---
Husted IV 251
Speech act/Searle: rule-determined actions - has always constitutive (not regulatory) rules - Searle: speech act: is key to the meaning - VsSearle: controversial because language rules for e.g. singular term have fundamentally different nature than for actions.
J. Husted "Searle" in: Hügli/Lübke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993S. 251
---
V 68
Speech act is unequal game. - Explanation must presuppose rules - rules are not equal Convention: speaking rule-governed behavior - rules, not behavior is crucial.
V 207
Traditional speech act theory/Austin/Strawson/Hare: word W is needed to perform speech act A - then e.g. "good" recommends, "true" reaffirms, "knowledge" guarantees something - SearleVs: this only works with performative verbs such as "promise" but not with judgmental ones - does not satisfy the adequacy condition for semantic analysis: a word must mean in all grammatically different sentences the same - it cannot, if the meaning is supposed to be the execution of various acts.
V 213
Wrong: to assume that the conditions for the execution of a speech act follow from the meanings of the words. ( "fallacy of assertiveness") ---
IV 27
Speech act theory/SearleVsAustin: accepts verbs for acts - but one has to differentiate this - E.g. announcement of a command is not the command. ---
IV 78
Speech act theory/Searle: differs from other philosophical approaches in that it gives no set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the explicable phenomenon - (E.g. linguistics: structural rules).
IV 86
The illocutionary act is the function of the meaning of the sentence.
IV 86
Fiction/speech acts/Searle: fiction has no other speech acts but is a predetermined act - in literature, no other act than in newspaper - no semantic or syntactic property proves a text as fictional.
IV 204
Speech Act TheoryVsChomsky, VsRules, instead of semantics/pragmatics. ---
VII 99
Speech act/proposition/Searle: difference: from the propositional content does not follow that the assertion conditions are satisfied - the proposition rather implies that the speaker implies within the act that they are satisfied. ---
VIII 435
Speech act/Searle: is hold together by the semantic intentions of the speaker - VsChomsky: does not see the essential connection of meaning and speech acts.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Husted I
Jörgen Husted
"Searle"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted II
Jörgen Husted
"Austin"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted III
Jörgen Husted
"John Langshaw Austin"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted IV
Jörgen Husted
"M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993

Husted V
J. Husted
"Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993
Speech Act Theory Strawson II 272
StrawsonVsSpeech Act / StrawsonVsAustin: error: that we assert that the conditions are fulfilled by using the word "true" - "true" does not show some type of communication.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Speech Act Theory Hare Searle V 207
SearleVsTraditional speech act analysis. (SearleVsAustin, SearleVsHare) Thesis: "good" and "true" mean in different acts the same. They are not taken into account by traditional speech act theory) Good/True/Speech act theory/Tradition: Hare: E.g. "Good" is used to recommend something.
Strawson: "True" is used to reaffirm or acknowledge statements.
Austin: "Knowledge" is needed to give guarantees. (SearleVs).
In principle: "the word W is used to perform the speech act A".

Hare I
Richard Mervyn Hare
The Language of Morals Oxford 1991

Hare II
Richard M. Hare
Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Terminology Austin Grice I 292
Austin: No modification without deviation - HungerlandVsAustin: we use modifiers if there is a reason to call upon a norm, a scale. - E.g. a false clergyman is not a special kind of clergyman.

Austin I
John L. Austin
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Austin II
John L. Austin
"A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3
German Edition:
Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


Grice I
H. Paul Grice
"Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993

Grice II
H. Paul Grice
"Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle

Grice III
H. Paul Grice
"Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Grice IV
H. Paul Grice
"Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979
Truth Strawson Rorty VI 52
StrawsonVs "Make true": taunted "sentence-like things" ((s) Comparison of world with sentences is not possible in a non-linguistic way). ---
Ayer I 296
Truth/StrawsonVsAustin: "sure, we use the word 'true' if the semantic conditions described by Austin are satisfied - but by using this word, we do not say that they are fulfilled" (> Truth/Austin; (Austin I 230)). ---
Strawson II 261
Truth/StrawsonVsAustin: mistake: instead of asking, "how do we use the word "true" (use, convention) - he asks: "When ... "(conditions) - facts cannot be changed by changing the language conventions. ---
II 266
Truth is not property of a speech event.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Ayer I
Alfred J. Ayer
"Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ayer II
Alfred Jules Ayer
Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke

Ayer III
Alfred Jules Ayer
"The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Truthmakers Strawson Horwich I 194
Truthmaker / Strawson: if the situation is the subject, it is not the situation that makes the statement true. - Fact: is a non-linguistic term (therefore not subject).(1)
1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994

Strawson II 20ff
Truthmaker / Strawson: facts make assertions true, not things.
II 252
Truthmaker / VsAustin: that the cat has mange, is not made true by the cat (as a thing), but by the condition of the cat (the fact).
II 257
Truthmaker / Strawson: e.g. language with "plate" (Wittgenstein, PI) would be just as conventional, but those alleged pseudo entities that make the statements true (facts), would not be among the non-linguistic correlates. - ((s) the world wouldn’t be emptier.)

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Utterances Hungerland I 290
Utterances/Modification/Austin/Principle: No modification without deviation!
HungerlandVsAustin: there is another sense of "normal". E.g "I sit quite normally in the chair". Here I cannot say that I was sitting intentionally in the chair, or that I was sitting unintentionally in the chair.´
---
I 292
HungerlandVsAustin: We use modifiers when there is a reason to summon a norm, a benchmark, a scale. For example, a clergyman who is not a clergyman because he is a swindler is not a special kind of clergyman, he is not a clergyman at all.

Hungerland I
Isabel C. Hungerland
Contextual Implication, Inquiry, 3/4, 1960, pp. 211-258
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

World Strawson Danto I 259
World/Strawson/Danto: two main components: people and things. (particular). - to this, M-predicates correspond: E.g. "weighs 100 kg" - P-predicates: "thinks of fame" - Nothing is describable with P-predicates alone. - That would be different if there were really disembodied ghosts. - People are described by both predicate types. ---
I 263
Behaviorism: attempts to blur the distinction between P- and M-predicates. ---
Strawson I 35
World/Strawson: seems to be constructed of particulars and events. - Are also other images possible? - When someone mentions something outside of space and time, we believe that it does not exist. ---
II 256
World/StrawsonVsWittgenstein: Thesis: Only things and events are part of the world. - VsAustin: otherwise temptation to talk about situation as about things.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993


Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

The author or concept searched is found in the following 26 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Austin, John L. Ayer Vs Austin, John L. I 296
AyerVsAustin: descriptive/demonstrative conventions. Austin asserts that a statement is called true "if the historical fact, with which it is correlated through the demonstrative conventions, belongs to a type with which the sentence correlates through the descriptive conventions. AyerVsAustin: not all meaningful statements relate explicitly to something! General and vague statements may well be expressed by sentences in which no ostensive signs appear at all. VSVs: it could be countered that the truth of such statements always depends on the truth of other statements. But: AyerVsAustin (with Strawson): Whenever one refers to a statement as true, one accepts a semantic version of the conditions under which it has a meaning at all. Austin himself criticizes the semanticists, because they make truth a property of sentences.

Ayer I
Alfred J. Ayer
"Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ayer II
Alfred Jules Ayer
Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke

Ayer III
Alfred Jules Ayer
"The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Austin, John L. Derrida Vs Austin, John L. Rorty IV 106
DerridaVsAustin/Rorty: he is someone who accepts the traditional notion that meaning is something that is communicated "in a homogeneous element" "in which the unit, the integrity of the sense, would not be substantially affected". RortyVsDerrida: this is an unwarranted assumption. Austin says about language, though not about philosophy, the same as Derrida.

Derrida I
J. Derrida
De la grammatologie, Paris 1967
German Edition:
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Austin, John L. Dummett Vs Austin, John L. I 165
When Ryle s book was published, it was the basis for discussion for a long period of time. Dummett: Ryle s influence was not so positive, I was also strongly VsAustin.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982
Austin, John L. Lewis Vs Austin, John L. IV 222
Performative/Performatives/Lewis: It is not clear whether we should construe them as declarative sentences (declaratives)! If not, we can split sentence meanings in claiming and non-claiming (sentence meanings) with the latter being represented by commands and questions.
LewisVsAustin: but I would prefer to classify performative sentences as declarative sentences, and then this distinction is purely syntactic, concerning the surface structure.
 IV 224
Performative/Austin: Have no truth value. Neither true nor false, because statements are like bets in normal circumstances. Performative/LewisVsAustin: they can still have it. E.g. "I bet sixpence that it will rain tomorrow": is true on this occasion, because he betted.
Performatives/Austin: No truth value. They are neither true nor false, because statements are like bets in normal circumstances.
Lewis: granted, but why should the statement not be true then?
per Austin: could it be said that performative statements can just hardly do anything else, but be true! E.g. "I claim": it is then simply true that I claim something.
E.g. "I speak" is always true when I speak!
And yet, it is possible!
It is no wonder that the truth values are obscured by assertion performances:
E.g. "I claim that the earth is flat", here, of course, someone has claimed something, so the ((s) overall sentence) is true.
But you might be tempted to say that he said something wrong, because the embedded sentence is wrong.
LewisVsRoss: therefore, I do not propose to conceive normal assertions as paraphrased performative sentences like Ross. That would make the truth conditions wrong.
If there are syntactic reasons for Ross' proposal, I would semantically view it as one version of the method of sentence radicals.
IV 225
Truth Value: I propose a single truth value for sentences like e.g. "I order you to be late". Vs: you could say that this allows an ambiguity, because the sentence can be used in two ways:
a) paraphrase of "be late!" this is true, simply because it was said
b) as description of my own actions, then no paraphrased imperative, because it is hard to give a command awhile saying what I'm doing!
But it does not follow that there are two meanings here!
E.g. I am talking in trochaic hexameter
In hexameter trochaic am I talking
Only the latter can be used to speak in trochaic hexameters and is true at every opportunity.
The former is wrong on the occasion when it is emphasized correctly.
Nevertheless, both are obvious paraphrases.
Whether a sentence can be used to speak in hexameters is not a matter of its meaning. The distinction between hexameter use and not using hexameter is one thing.
Another thing is the distinction between performative and self-descriptive use. But the parallel is interesting:
A differentiation of use does not need to lead to a distinction of meaning. (>Use theory).

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Austin, John L. Putnam Vs Austin, John L. Hacking I 179
AustinVsMoore: there is an independent opportunity to pick out facts: ostension. Then we put on assertions by combining referring expressions and names for properties and relations. PutnamVsAustin: he must now accept that this approach of Austin is scuppered by >Löwenheim because there is no possibility of independent reference.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996
Austin, John L. Quine Vs Austin, John L. II 114
Austin's: "How to do Things with Words" afterthought at the end of the book: finishing off a) the true/false fetish b) the values/facts fetish.
QuineVsAustin: the whole book would have been different if Austin had been more open-minded in terms of Tarski's concept of truth.

Quine: there are two ways to react to problems:
a) to wreck your mind over disturbances (for example, planetary motions before Einstein);
b) to explain it away with faults in the observation instruments.

Austin's attitude was of the negative type, method of overcoming metaphysics.
II 115
According to Tarski's theory of truth what is considered true is language.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Austin, John L. Searle Vs Austin, John L. SearleVs Traditional Speech act analysis. (SearleVsAustin,SearleVsHare) Thesis: "Good", "true" mean the same in different acts. Ignored by the traditional speech act theory)
good/true/speech act theory/tradition: Hare: E.g. "Good" is used to recommend something.
Strawson: "True" is used to confirm or acknowledge statements.
Austin: "Knowledge" is used to provide guarantees. (SearleVs).
In principle: "the word W is used to perform the speech act A". >Speech act theory.

IV 17
illocutionary act/Austin: five categories: verdictive, expositive, exercitive, conductive, commissive) speech acts/SearleVsAustin: Distinction between illocutionary role and expression with propositional content:
R(p).
The various acts performed in different continua! There are at least 12 important dimensions.
IV 18
1. Differences in joke (purpose) of the act. (However, not to every act a purpose has to belong).
IV 19
The illocutionary joke is part of the role, but both are not the same. E.g. a request may have the same joke as a command. 2. Differences in orientation (word to the world or vice versa).
Either, the world needs to match the words, or vice versa.
IV 20
Example by Elizabeth Anscombe: Shopping list with goods, the same list is created by the store detective.
IV 21
3. Differences in the expressed psychological states E.g. to hint, to regret, to swear, to threaten. (Even if the acts are insincere).
Def sincerity condition/Searle: You cannot say, "I realize that p but I do not believe that p." "I promise that p but I do not intend that p"
The mental state is the sincerity condition of the act.
IV 22
These three dimensions: joke, orientation, sincerity condition are the most important. 4. Differences in the strength with which the illocutionary joke is raised.
E.g. "I suggest", "I swear"
5. Differences in the position of speaker and listener
E.g. the soldier will make not aware the general of the messy room.
IV 23
6. Differences of in which the utterance relates to what is in the interest of speaker and listener. E.g. whining, congratulating
7. Difference in relation to the rest of the discourse
E.g. to contradict, to reply, to conclude.
8. Differences in propositional content, resulting from the indicators of the illocutionary role
E.g. report or forecasts
IV 24
9. Differences between those acts that must always be speech acts, and those that can be carried out differently. E.g. you need not to say anything to classify something, or to diagnose
10. Differences between those acts, for which the extra-linguistic institutions are needed, and those for which they are not necessary
E.g. wedding, blessing, excommunication
IV 25
11. Differences between acts where the illocutionary verb has a performative use and those where this is not the case E.g. performative use: to state, to promise, to command no performative: "I hereby boast", "hereby I threaten".
12. differences in style
E.g. announcing, entrustment.
IV 27
SearleVsAustin: the list does not refer to acts but to verbs. One must distinguish between verb and act!
E.g. one can proclaim commands, promises, reports but that is something else, as to command, to announce or to report.
A proclamation is never merely a proclamation, it also needs to be a determination, a command or the like.
IV 30
Searle: E.g.iIf I make you chairman, I do not advocate that you chairman
IV 36
Def Declaration/Searle: the successful performance guarantees that the propositional content of the world corresponds. (Later terminology: "institutional facts) Orientation: by the success of the declaration word and world match to each other () No sincerity. Overlapping with assertive:... The referee's decisions. SearleVsAustin: Vs Distinction constative/performative.

VII 86
Cavell: "Must we mean what we say?" defends Austin and adds: The deviation can be "really or allegedly" present.
Austin: it is neither true nor false that I write this article voluntarily, because if there is no deviation, the concept of free will is not applicable.
SearleVsAustin: that's amazing.
VII 88
SearleVsAustin: Five theses to see Austin in a different light: 1. Austin exemplifies an analysis pattern that is common today as it is also used at Ryles' analysis of "voluntarily".
Ryle thesis of "voluntary" and "involuntary" can be applied only to acts, "you should not have done." Again, it is absurd to use it in an ordinary use.
VII 89
Neither true nor false: Wittgenstein: e.g. that I "know that I am in pain" E.g. that Moore knows he has two hands. etc. (> certainty).
Austin: E.g. it is neither true nor false, that I went out of free will to the session.
VII 90
The use of "voluntary" required certain conditions are not met here. Words in which they are not met, we can call "A-words", the conditions
"A-Conditions". We can create a list.
2. the conditions that are exemplified by the slogan "No modification without deviation", penetrate the whole language and are not limited to certain words.
E.g. The President is sober today.
Hans breathes. etc.
VII 91
3. Negation/Searle: the negation of an A-word is not in turn an A-word! E.g. I bought my car not voluntarily, I was forced to.
I did not volunteer, I was dragged here.
He does not know whether the object in front of him is a tree.
Considerable asymmetry between A-words and their opposite or negation.
VII 92
SearleVsAustin: according to him, in both cases a deviation is required. 4. A deviation is generally a reason to believe that the claim that is made by the statement to the contrary is true, or could have been, or at least could have been held by someone as true.
An A-condition is simply a reason to believe that the remark could have been false.
SearleVsAustin: his presentation is misleading because it suggests that any deviation justifies a modification.
E.g. if I buy a car while strumming with bare toes on a guitar, which is indeed a different way to buy a car, but it does not justify the remark "He bought his car voluntarily."
VII 93
SearleVsAustin: we can come to any list of A-words, because if word requires a deviation, will depend on the rest of the sentence and on the context. Then Austin's thesis is not about words but about propositions.
VII 94
Standard situation/circumstances/SearleVsAustin: notice that there is a standard situation, is to suggest that this fact is remarkable and that there is reason to believe that it could also be a non-standard situation.
VII 95
SearleVsAustin: his thesis even is not on propositions: to make an assertion means to specify that something is the case. If the possibility that the situation does not exist, is excluded, it is meaningless. Austin's slogan should be formulated to:
"No comment, which is not remarkable" or
"No assertion that is not worth to be claimed".
VII 96
SearleVsAustin: this one has seen it wrong. This is connected with the concept of intention: Intention/Searle: Thesis: the oddity or deviation which is a condition for the utterance
"X was deliberately done" represents, at the same time provides a reason for the truth of the statement by
"X was not done intentionally".
assertion condition/utterance condition: it is the utterance condition of an assertion precisely because it is one reason for the truth of the other.
SearleVsAustin: the data must be explained in terms of the applicability of certain terms. So my view is simple and plausible.
(VII 98): In Austin's slogan "No modification without deviation" it is not about the applicability of these terms, but rather about conditions for putting up claims generally.
Negation/SearleVsAustin: then the negations of the above, are not neither true nor false, but simply false!
E.g. I did not go voluntarily to the meeting (I was dragged). etc.
VII 98
Example The ability to remember ones name is one of the basic conditions ...

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Austin, John L. Strawson Vs Austin, John L. Ayer I 296
StrawsonVsAustin: surely we use the word "true" when the semantic conditions described by Austin are met. But by using this word, we do not say that they are met.
Searle III 211
Correspondence theory/StrawsonVsAustin: (Debate over 40 years ago. It is generally agreed that Strawson won this debate.) Strawson: the correspondence theory must not be cleaned, it must be eliminated.
III 212
It gave us a false picture of the use of the word "true" and the nature of the facts: that facts are a kind of complex things or events or groups of things and that truth constitutes a special relationship of correspondence between statements and these non-linguistic structures. (Traces back to the copy theory of the Tractatus).
Strawson II 248
Speech act theory/StrawsonVsAustin: if he was right that we ascribe the predicate "true" substantially to speech acts it should be possible to "reduce" assertions about the truth of statements in a not to speech acts related sense on assertions about the truth of speech acts. Austin: you can make different statements with the same proposition.
Strawson: you can also make the same statment with different propositions.
II 249
Example about Jones: "He is sick." to Jones: "You are sick." (Even different meaning). Def "true"/Strawson: fallacy: we could say that different people then make the same statement if the words they use in their specific situation must either preserve all or lead all to false statements. But if we say that we use "true" to clarify the expression "the same statement".
II 252
Fact/"to make true"/world/Strawson: but the said fact is not something in the world. It is not an object! By this it is of course not denied that there is something in the world about which a statment of this kind is, to which it relates, which it describes and which corresponds to the description. StrawsonVsAustin: he seems to overlook the fact that "fact" and "thing" belong to completely different types. The thing, the person, etc., to which the statements refer are the material correlate of the referring part of the statements. The condition or property is the pseudo physical correlate. The fact is the pseudo physical correlate of the statement as a whole.
II 253
Fact/Strawson: is closely associated with "that"-propositions. Facts are known, be asserted, believed forgotten, overlooked, commented, notified or noticed. Facts are what statements assert; they are that of which something is asserted! It is wrong to equate facts with true statements. Nevertheless, their roles overlap.
Fact/StrawsonVsAustin: he believes a statement and a fact are something in the world.
II 254
E.g. but I cannot think of any occasion in which I would neglect the difference between the fact that my wife Mia bore me twins (at midnight) and what I say (10 minutes later), namely that my wife bore me twins. Correspondence/Austin: there is no theoretical limit to what could be truthfully said about the things in the world but there are very significant practical limits to what people can actually say about them.
Statement/fact/StrawsonVsAustin: but what could better correspond to the fact that it is raining than the statement that it is raining? Of course, statements and facts correspond. They are made for each other.
If one removes the statements from the world one would also remove the facts from the world. But the world would not be poorer by this. By this you do not get rid of the world of which something is asserted. (> World/Strawson).
A symptom of Austin's uncertainty is his preference for the terms "situation" and "issue". Neither situations nor issues (just as facts) can namely be seen or heard, but rather are summarized or detected at a glance.
II 255
Fact/Strawson: e.g. to be worried by a fact is not the same as to be as frightened by a shadow. It means to be worried because....
II 256
World/Strawson/Strawson: why should we insist that only things and events are part of the world? Why can we not also ascribe situations and facts to the world? Answer: the temptation to talk about situations in a way that is appropriate for things and events, is overwhelming.
StrawsonVsAustin: Austin does not resist it: he smuggles the word "feature" as a synonym for "fact" in. Justification: maps are not in the same way "true" as statements because they are not entirely conventional, photographs not conventional at all.
II 260
StrawsonVsAustin: when he says that the relationship between a statement and the world is purely conventional then there are two confusions between: a) the semantic conditions and b) what is asserted. It is as absurd to say that someone who confirmed a statement confirmed that semantic conditions are fulfilled as if to say that the speaker would have said that.
II 261
Conditions/use/Strawson: by using a word we do not say that the conditions are fulfilled. StrawsonVsAustin: mistake: instead of asking: how do we use the word "true"? he asks When do we use it?

II 267
StrawsonVsAustin: "exaggerated" is not a relation between a statement and some of these different things in the world. (Too simple).
II 268
Then the difficulties of correspondence occur again. Austin would not say that it e.g. corresponds to a relation between a glove and a hand that is too big. He would speak of a conventional relationship. But the fact that the statement that p, is exaggerated, is not conventional in any sense! (It is perhaps the fact that 1200 people and not 2000 were there. The criticism of an exaggeration requires a previous statement.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Ayer III
Alfred Jules Ayer
"The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Austin, John L. Verschiedene Vs Austin, John L. Grice I 290
Austin / Principle: No modification without deviation. HungerlandVsAustin: the other meaning of "normal". E.g. "I am sitting on the chair as usual" here we can not say that I intentionally nor unintentionally that sat on the chair.
I 292
VsAustin: We use modifiers if there is a reason to summon a norm, a scale. E.g. A clergyman, who is not a clergyman, because he is a swindler, is not a special kind of priest, he is no priest!





Grice I
H. Paul Grice
"Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993

Grice II
H. Paul Grice
"Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle

Grice III
H. Paul Grice
"Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Grice IV
H. Paul Grice
"Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979
Austin, John L. Schiffer Vs Austin, John L. I 266
Austin: the expression : "the meaning of a word" is almost always a dangerous nonsense. (1961, 24, also Wittgenstein 1953 Ryle 1957) so all VsFrege. DavidsonVsSchiffer/DavidsonVsAustin/DavidsonVsWittgenstein : speaks of an entity that is designated by the "that" as in for example "that snow is white". (Davidson 1968).

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Austin, John L. Brendel Vs Austin, John L. I 56
Sachverhalt/Wahrheit/VsAustin/wahr/Brendel: andere Autoren nehmen an, dass eine Proposition wahr ist, wenn der entsprechende Sachverhalt (SV) besteht.

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Austin, John L. Vendler Vs Austin, John L. I 264
Event/Fact/Austin: has a tendency to assimilate both on the basis of "what can be said": For example, the "collapse of the German Reich" can be both a fact and an event.
Vendler: only the transformation grammar can show here that "collapse of the German Reich" is ambiguous
I 265
either incomplete or a fully nominalised sentence. Fact: that the empire has collapsed. (Can be denied).
Event: the collapse. (Can go fast or slow).
Fact/Event/VendlerVsAustin: from the ambiguity does not follow however that then, certain facts are events! Austin overlooks that!

Vendler II
Z. Vendler
Linguistics in Philosophy Ithaca 1967

Vendler I
Zeno Vendler
"Linguistics and the a priori", in: Z. Vendler, Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca 1967 pp. 1-32
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Ayer, A. J. Russell Vs Ayer, A. J. VI 85
Description/sentence/Russell: occurs an (certain) identification in a sentence, this sentence does not have a constitutive element, which corresponds to the labeling as a whole. ---
VI 86
Example Three parts: "Scott," "is" "the author". Here "the author" is not a constitutive part of the sentence. reason: Usefully is a sentence which can be negated.
E.g. useful: "The unicorn does not exist", "the largest finite number does not exist".
But one could not say if the unicorn would be a constitutive part of the sentence.
Russell: Then the unicorn cannot be part of any fact.
So statements are no facts. (VsAustin, VsAyer, VsBrandom).

Russell I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

Russell II
B. Russell
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
German Edition:
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

Russell IV
B. Russell
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
German Edition:
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

Russell VI
B. Russell
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
German Edition:
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993

Russell VII
B. Russell
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996
Brandom, R. Strawson Vs Brandom, R. Horwich I 193
Fact/statement/StrawsonVsAustin/StrawsonVsBrandom: it is never irrelevant to distinguish between a fact and a corresponding true statement. Example of the fact that my wife bore me at midnight twins and the statement that I made 10 minutes later about this birth. Statement/Strawson: there are natural, practical limits to the ability to produce statements.
Correspondence: what is more natural to correspond to the fact that it is raining than the statement that it is raining? ((s) Interestingly, Strawson does not say it reversely! He wants to avoid that facts appear as necessary postulates).
Fact/Strawson: Z of course they correspond to each other: they are made for each other. If one removes statements from the world one also removes the facts. But by this the world is not poorer.(1)

1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Correspondence Theory Strawson Vs Correspondence Theory Horwich I 196
StrawsonVsCorrespondence theory: he problem with it is not that the corresponding relations are conventional but that the facts which are the referents are considered to be things or objects. Fact/statement/StrawsonVsAustin: e.g. 1. the description of a chess position can not be moved or jumbled.
2. there is no event of the determination (statement) about the chess position that represents an object which would be equivalent to the chess position itself e.g. that you could spill coffee over it.(1)

1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994

Strawson IV 112/113
StrawsonVsCorrespondence theory: the majority of our conviction is not at all based on personal experience with reality. Most do not even come from second hand.
E.g. when the fuel gauge reads zero my ability to make this observation depends on many things outside the situation for which this situation provides absolutely no clue. (>Convention/Strawson).
IV 114/115
Correspondence theory/Strawson: reality includes the possession of experience.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Descartes, R. Austin Vs Descartes, R. Stroud I 42
AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes/Stroud: (Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, 1962, 4-5) Thesis: the source of Descartes' skeptical conclusion is obtained by uncovering a series of misunderstandings and (especially verbal) errors and fallacies.
---
I 43
StroudVsAustin: Descartes goes much deeper than the example doctors in New York with its simple redefinition. It is also not about linguistic errors concerning the meaning of the terms dream and knowledge. But: Suppose that Descartes was wrong and there was no need to know that you were not dreaming to know that you know something about the world:
Problem: how could we know that this is true? What would show that Descartes is misunderstood?
Knowledge/VsDescartes/Stroud: if his critics are right that the term "knowledge" does not require what Descartes claims (not to dream and to know that),
then
A) Knowledge is not "closed under logical consequence", or
B) The word "knowledge" does not penetrate all the logical consequences of what we know, or
C) It does not penetrate to what we know as logical consequences (of our knowledge) or even
D) To what we know, what the logical consequences of this are in turn.
---
I 44
Stroud: But how are these assertions supported? ---
I 47
Method/Verification/Skepticism/StroudVsAustin: Austin does not say much about these "procedures", he seems satisfied with the idea that they must exist because otherwise our language usage could not always differentiate between the terms ("here" always "words"). ---
I 64
StroudVsAustin: The accusation AustinVsSkepticism (AustinVsDescartes) that the meaning of "knowledge" in everyday use would have been distorted can only be raised if it can be shown that a certain linguistic usage, a certain concept, and the relation between them was misunderstood. This would be much more than reproaching a simple "redefinition" of a single concept, namely, of knowledge.
Stroud: Thesis: that's what I meant by the fact that the source of Descartes' demand reveals something deep and important.
---
I 74
... .Stroud: something similar could be applied to Austin's question: "How should we use the words "wakefulness" and "sleep" if we have unrecognized methods to say in certain situations that we are not dreaming?" StroudVsAustin: that fails because it does not take into account how and why these terms are used in these situations. (Why question).
Dream/StroudVsAustin: there could be easily distinguishable characteristics for different situations and we could apply a term or its negation due to these characteristics.
Stroud pro Skepticism/StroudVsAustin: N.B.: (analog to the plane-example): if there are widespread but untested methods (like the manual of the soldiers) then it could be that the distinction we make is not the distinction between situations in which S is true in those in which it is not true. Then again we have no knowledge.
Correctness/Plane-Example: "He does not know it" is definitely correct.
---
I 75
But this distinction was not between knowledge and non-knowledge. Because even the careful spotter can be wrong, "he knows it is an F" is wrong as long as he did not see the plane on the ground. Conclusion/skepticism/usage theory/StroudVsAustin: we cannot draw an anti-skeptical conclusion from the mere fact that we use the terms "I know ..." and "I do not know ..." as we use them. ((s) It does not follow from the language use that we know when we know something (>plane-example), because we can still have information without knowing that they are missing).
---
I 76
Platitudes/StroudVsAustin/N.B.: if one would disprove skepticism by arguing that it changes the meaning of the term "knowledge" must show that the most common platitudes are false, and these appear to be obvious truths. (... + ...) Moore's hands/Stroud: so Moore's proof gains philosophical importance and power.

Austin I
John L. Austin
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Austin II
John L. Austin
"A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3
German Edition:
Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Descartes, R. Quine Vs Descartes, R. I 56
The truth attributions are in the same boat as the true propositions themselves. QuineVsDescartes: Even if we are in the midst of in philosophizing, we retain and use - unlike Descartes - our present beliefs until we improve them here and there because of the scientific method.

Stroud I 227
Deception/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: the concept of illusion itself is based on science, because the quality of deception is simply in the departure from external scientific reality. (Quine, Roots of reference, 3) Illusions only exist relative to a previously held assumption of real objects.
Given Facts/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: This may be the reason to assume a non-binding given fact. (SellarsVsQuine).
QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: Important Argument: then it might seem impossible to refer to the possibility of deception, because a certain knowledge of external reality is necessary to understand the concept of illusion!
Stroud: We have treated arguments of this form earlier (see above >distortion of meaning). Violation of the conditions necessary for the application of certain concepts.
Quine/Stroud: he could now be answered in line with StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin, but Quine will not make these mistakes.
Language/Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: his approach to the language (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) leaves him no way to refer to what the meaning of a particular term is.
StroudVsQuine: but if he thinks that the scientific origins do not lead to skepticism, why does he think that because the "skeptical doubts are scientific doubts"
I 228
the epistemologists are "clearly" entitled to use empirical science? The question becomes even more complicated by Quine's explicit denial that:
Skepticism/Quine: I'm not saying that he leaves the question unanswered, he is right in using science to reject science. I merely say that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts.
TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: this is important for the defense of the traditional epistemologist: if it is not a logical error to eventually disprove doubts from the science itself so that at the end there is certainty, what then is the decisive logical point he has missed?
StroudVsQuine: if his "only point" is that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, then epistemology becomes part of science.
SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: but the skeptic might respond with a "reductio ad absurdum" and then epistemology would no longer be part of science:
"Reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: either
a) science is true and gives us knowledge or
b) It is not true and gives us no knowledge. Nothing we believe about the external world is knowledge.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Hare, R.M. Searle Vs Hare, R.M. V 207
SearleVsTraditional speech act analysis: (SearleVsAustin,SearleVsHare) Thesis: "Good" and "true" means the same in different acts. This was ignored by the traditional speech act theory). good/true/speech act theory/tradition: Hare: E.g. "Good" is used to recommend something. Cf. >statements/Hare.
Strawson: "True" is used to confirm or acknowledge statements. Cf. >speech ac theory/Strawson.
Austin: "Knowledge" is used to provide guarantees. (SearleVsSpeech act theory).

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Ordinary Language Dummett Vs Ordinary Language Dummett (e) III 185
Oxford Philosophy/Dummett: strongest influence: by Ryle. RyleVsCarnap: false methodology VsHeidegger: Laughing stock - Ryle: influence of Husserl.
III (e) 196
Particularism/Utility Theory/Oxford/Dummett: supposedly, the UT could only explain each sentence. The philosopher should not want to discover a pattern where there is none. DummettVs: we do not learn language sentence by sentence, either!
However, right: It is the sentences and not the words which have a "use" in the general sense.
III (e) 196/197
Everyday language: here the Oxford philosophy could not contribute anything (because of their anti systematic approach) to the better understanding of those principles on the basis of which we obviously learn the language so quickly. (> Chomsky). DummettVsOxford: continuously used psychological and semantic terms that a theory of meaning must not assume but explain! E.g. "Express an attitude" "reject a question", etc. (DummettVsAustin).
Likewise "truth" and "falsehood" were constantly used unexplained.
III (e) 198
DummettVsParticularism: disregarded the distinction semantic/pragmatic. Anyone who is not in the claws of theory would initially tend to distinguish what a sentence literally says from what one might try to communicate with it in special circumstances.
According to the "philosophy of everyday language" only the latter term is considered to be legitimate. "literal meaning" was considered an illegitimate byproduct.
III (e) 199
DummettVsOxford, DummettVsStrawson: artificially introduced new concepts such as "presupposition" or "conversation implicature" or DummettvsAustin: the distinction between "illocutionary" and "perlocutionary" acts (DummettVsSpeech act theory) took the place of the general semantic concepts, and without anyone noticing the "normal language" (everyday language) ceased to exist.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982
Ordinary Language Positivism Vs Ordinary Language Fodor II 118
PositivismusVsOrdinary Language/PositivismVsOxford: the philosophy of ordinary language has no system. A representation of natural language, which does not specify its formal structure, cannot comprehend the production principles for the syntactic and semantic properties.
II 123
FodorVsOrdinary Language: that forces the philosophers of ordinary language to seek refuge more and more with the intuitions.
II 124
In particular, he will claim to detect anomalies intuitively and to say that a philosophical problem is solved if anomalies are detected. (Cavell asserts that!). FodorVsCavell: Contradiction: so he thinks that in philosophical practice it is important not to use words wrongly, and at the same time he thinks that he can decide with the help of intuition when a word is misused.
Even though it may be clear intuitively when a word is abnormal, it is not enough for philosophical purposes to know that it is abnormal, it may be abnormal for many reasons, some of which are not faulty!
E.g. If you accuse a metaphysicist that he uses language wrongly, he will answer rightly: "So what?"
Moreover, we cannot demand of a theory of meaning that any expression which is called abnormal by a theoretically untrained speaker is also evaluated as such by the theory.
II 125
The theory should rather only determine semantic violations.
II 126
FodorVsIntuitions: decisions about unusualness (anomalies) cannot be extrapolated in any way if they are based only on intuitions. Then we have no theory, but only overstretched intuitions. OxfordVsFodor/Ordinary LanguageVsFodor: could counter that we have ignored the principle of treating similar cases with similar methods.
FodorVsVs: that is beside the point: specifying relevant similarity means precisely to accurately determine the production rules.
III 222
Ordinary Language/Cavell: here there are three possible types to make statements about them: Type I Statement: "We say..., but we do not say...." ((s) use statements)
Type II Statement: The supplementation of type I statements with explanations.
Type III Statement: Generalizations.
Austin: E.g. we can make a voluntary gift. (Statement about the world).
Cavell: conceives this as "substantive mode" for "We say: 'The gift was made voluntarily'". (Statement about the language).
Voluntary/RyleVsAustin: expresses that there is something suspicious about the act. We should not have performed the act.
Cavell Thesis: such contradictions are not empirical in any reasonable sense.
III 223
Expressions of native speakers are no findings about what you can say in a language, they are the source of utterances. ((s) data). Also without empiricism we are entitled to any Type I statement that we need to support a Type II statement.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Prosentential Theory Verschiedene Vs Prosentential Theory Horwich I 344
Quote/VsProsentential Theory/Camp, Grover, Belnap/VsCGB: one accuses the prosentential theory of ignoring cases where truth of quotes, i.e. names of sentences is stated. Example (27) "Snow is white" is true.
CGB: we could say here with Ramsey that (27) simply means that snow is white.
CGBVsRamsey: this obscures important pragmatic features of the example. They become clearer when we use a foreign-language translation. Example
(28) If „Schnee ist weiß“ is true, then…
Why (28) instead of
If it’s true that snow is white, then
Or
If snow is white, then…
CGB: there are several possible reasons here. We may want to make it clear that the original sentence was written in German. Or it could be that there is no elegant translation, or we do not know the grammar of German well enough. Or example: "Snow is white" must be true because Fritz said it and everything Fritz says is true.
I 345
Suppose English* has a way of formally presenting a sentence: E.g. „Betrachte __“ („Consider____").
(29) Consider: Snow is white. This is true.
CGB: why should it not work the same as "snow is white is true" in normal English?
VsCGB: you could argue that it requires a reference to sentences or expressions because quotation marks are name-forming functors.
Quotation marks/CGB: we deviate from this representation! Quotation marks are not name-forming functors. ((s) not for CGB).
Quote/CGB: should not be considered as a reference to expressions in normal English. But we do not want to follow that up here.
I 346
VsCGB: one has accused the prosentential theory of tunnel vision: Maybe we overlooked certain grammatically similar constructions? Example (30) John: there are seven legged dogs
Mary: that's surprising, but true.
(31) John: the being of knowledge is the knowledge of being
Mary: that is profound and it is true.
Ad (30): of course the first half is "that is surprising" in no way prosentential. It is a characterization!
VsCGB: Ad (31) "is profound" expresses a quality that Mary attributes to the sentence. Why shouldn't "true" be understood in the same way?
CGB: it makes sense to take "this" here as referring to a sentence. But that would make things more complicated because then we would have to treat "that" and "it" differently in "that's true" and "it's true".
CGBVsVs: 1. it is just not true that the "that" in "that's surprising" refers to an utterance (in the sense of what was said, or a proposition).
What is surprising here? Facts, events or states of affairs.
Statement/Surprise/CGB: a statement can only be surprising as an act.
I 347
The surprising thing about the statement is the fact reported. ((s) But then the content rather than the act of testimony.)
CGBVs(s): it is not the fact that there are seven legged dogs claimed to be true in (30), because that fact cannot be true!
Proposition/CGB: (ad (31) Propositions are not profound. Acts can be profound. For example insights or thoughts.
Truth/Act/Action/Statement/CGB: but statements in the sense of action are not what is called true. ((s) see also StrawsonVsAustin, ditto).
Reference/Prosentential Theory/CGB: even if we consider "that's surprising, but it's true" as referring, the two parts don't refer to the same thing! And then the theory is no longer economic.
Reference/Prosentential Theory/CGB: are there perhaps other cases where it is plausible that a pronoun refers to a proposition? Example
(32) John: Some dogs eat grass.
Mary: You believe that, but it's not true.
Proposition: is often understood as a bearer of truth, and as an object of belief. (CGBVs).
I 348
However, if "that" is understood here as a referencing pronoun, then the speaker must be a proposition. CGBVs: we can interpret "that you believe" also differently: as prosentential anaphora (as above in the example "that is wrong", with preceding negation prefix). Then we have no pronominal reference.
N.B.: the point is that no property is attributed. Truth is not a property.
VsCGB: another objection: it is also a "tunnel vision" that we only have "that is true" but not "that is right" in view. Or the example "exaggerated" by Austin.
Example: a child says
I've got 15 logs
That is right.
I 349
Question: should this (and e.g. "This is an exaggeration!") be understood prosententially? CGBVsVs: "that is right" is here the statement that the child counted right, that it did something right. Sometimes this can overlap with the statement that a statement is true. The overlap must exist because there is no clear boundary between language learning and use.
I 349
Anaphora/Prosentential Theory/VsCGB: could not one split the prosody and take the individual "that" as an anaphora? CGBVsVs: then one would also have to split off "is true" and no longer perceive it as referencing, but as characterizing ((s) And thus attributing it as property).
CGBVs: then we would have to give up our thesis that speech about truth is completely understandable without "carrier of truth" or "truth characteristic".
Moreover:
Reference/CGB: it is known that not every nominalization has to be referencing ((s) E.g. Unicorn).
Predication/CGB: also not every predication has to be characterizing.
Divine Perspective/outside/PutnamVsGod's point of view/Rorty: Putnam amuses himself like James and Dewey, about such attempts.
Rorty: But he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: it smells too reductionist, too positivist, too "behaviorist" ("transcendental skinnerism").
Truth/Putnam: when a philosopher says truth is something other than electricity because there is room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory,
I 456
and that knowledge of the truth condition is all that could be known about truth, then he denies that truth is a property. So there is also no property of correctness or accuracy ((s) >Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover.) PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions are assertions.
Theory/Existence/Reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam here assumes that the only reason to deny is that you need a theory for an X is to say that the X is "nothing but Y" ((s) eliminative reductionism).
PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that claims can be reduced to sounds. Then the field linguist would have to reduce actions to movements.
Davidson/Rorty: but this one does not say that claims are nothing but sounds.
Instead:
Truth/Explanation/Davidson: other than electricity, truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained by the fact that a sentence that claims it is true).





Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Quine, W.V.O. Stroud Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 183
Internal/external/Carnap/StroudVsQuine: in Carnap's distinction there must be something else. The fact that it can be answered as an internal question but not as an (identical) external one shows that the two must not be confused. Language/Carnap/Stroud: therefore Carnap distinguishes different "languages" or "systems". These answer only internal questions.
Expressiveness: that a "philosophical" (external) question is then meaningless is not only due to the terminology.
I 184
The terminology is always meaningful. For example, within mathematics, "There are numbers" makes sense.
I 223
Knowledge/Skepticism/Quine: if all knowledge is put to the test at the same time, no part of it can be invoked. ((s) > Example "Everything he said is true"). Empiricism/knowledge/solution/Quine: this is the reason why knowledge must be justified on the basis of sensory experience.
Psychology/knowledge/explanation/justification/Quine: a surrender of epistemology to psychology leads to circularity. ((s) Because psychology itself goes beyond the mere detection of stimuli).
StroudVsQuine/StroudVsNaturalised Epistemology: is also a surrender of epistemology to psychology. And thus just as circulatory!
Epistemology/Stroud: can it be that the traditional epistemology has been refuted, but not Quine's naturalized epistemology itself? Is the solution the relation between the two?
Quine: sometimes suggests that the two points of view (NaturalizedVsTraditional Epistemology) differ: the "doctrinal" question should be put aside as false hope.
Consciousness/knowledge/tradition/knowledge theory/justification/Stroud: the traditional epistemology insists on the isolation of certain objects of consciousness in order to identify undoubted information.
Consciousness/QuineVsTradition: we can bypass the question of consciousness and simply try to explain,
I 224
how our rich output arises from the events that occur on our sensory surface (nerve endings). N.B.: this can be approached scientifically.
Then one can distinguish two types of events in the observable physical world, and that is the scientific goal.
StroudVsQuine: it looks like Quine just changed the subject. Skepticism then still threatens. And Quine does not want that.
"Liberated epistemology" (roots of reference, 3): is not the same as empirical psychology, it is rather an "enlightened persistence" (enlightened) of the traditional epistemic problem.
Empiricism/knowledge/justification/reason/circle/Quine: (see above) Tradition: our knowledge cannot be empirically justified, otherwise it is circular.
QuineVsTradition: this fear of circularity is unnecessary logical shyness.
"Enlightenment/"liberated" epistemology/Quine: the insight into the fact that skepticism arises from science itself. And to fight it, we are entitled to bring in scientific knowledge.
QuineVsTradition: did not recognize the strength of its position at all.
I 225
Knowledge/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: Traditional epistemology has not recognized that the challenge of knowledge originated from knowledge itself. Thesis: the doubts about its reliability have always been scientific doubts. Consciousness/Quine: the confusion was based on the concentration on consciousness.
Introspection/Tradition: thought that facts about our "lean" input would be brought to light through introspection.
QuineVsIntrospection: the reasons for finding the input lean come from science.
I 227
Deception/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: the concept of illusion itself is based on science, because the quality of deception simply consists in deviating from external scientific reality. (Quine, Roots of reference, RR 3) Illusions exist only relative to a previously accepted assumption of real bodies.
Given/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: this may be the reason to assume a non-binding given. (SellarsVsQuine).
QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: N.B.: then it might seem impossible to invoke the possibility of deception because some knowledge of external reality is necessary to understand the concept of illusion!
Stroud: we have dealt with arguments of this form before (see above >Distortion of meaning). Violation of the necessary conditions for the use of certain terms.
Quine/Stroud: it could now be answered analogously to StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin, but Quine does not make these errors.
Language/Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: his approach to language (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) leaves him no possibility to invoke what lies within the meaning of a particular term.
StroudVsQuine: but if he thinks that the scientific origins do not lead to skepticism, why does he think that because the "skeptical doubts are scientific doubts"
I 228
the epistemologist is "clearly" entitled to use empirical science? The question is made even more difficult by Quine's explicit denial that:
Skepticism/Quine: I'm not saying he leaves the question unanswered, he is right to use science to reject science. I am simply saying that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts.
TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: this is important for the defense of the traditional epistemologist: if it is not a logical mistake to refute doubts from science itself, so that in the end there is certainty, then what is the crucial logical point that he has missed?
StroudVsQuine: if his "only point" is that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, then epistemology becomes part of science.
SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: but the skeptic could answer with a "reductio ad absurdum", and then epistemology would no longer be part of science:
"Reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: either
a) Science is true and gives us knowledge, or
b) It is not true and gives us no knowledge. Nothing we believe about the outer world is knowledge.
I 230
Moore/Stroud: Moore should not be slandered either. According to Kant and Carnap, what he says is completely legitimate. Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: N.B.: the results of an independent scientific study would be in the same boat as e.g. Moore's hands. They would be "scientific" versions of Moore's argument with the common sense.

Philosophy/Science/Quine: both merge continuously.

Stroud: Descartes and other traditional philosophers could agree with that.
StroudVsQuine: Problem: then maybe we have no scientific knowledge at all. We have no more reason to believe in it than we do not believe in it. No scientific investigation could provide clarity here.
I 231
Nor would any challenge be conceivable "from the inside". So skepticism would follow.
I 233
Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: but whether it is correct or not is not something that will be decided by future experience or experiments! If the epistemological question is correctly asked - as Quine asks it - then we already know how future experience will be! We will always be confronted with the question of the surplus of our rich output over lean input. Certainly, if we are confronted today with an experience that undermines our belief, skepticism will be justified today. But: N.B.: the same was already justified in 1630!
I 234
Naturalism/StroudVsQuine: will not be enough if skepticism argues with the reductio ad absurdum. We just have to rebuild the ship on the high seas. The traditional epistemologist can saw (identify!) the piece out of the ship that represents the lean input.
I 240
Knowledge/StroudVsQuine: even if I blamed the "meager" input for accepting a "projection," that would not be an explanation of his knowledge or true belief.
I 245
Knowledge/knowledge theory/explanation/projection/StroudVsQuine: assuming that I assume with Quine that all my beliefs are just "overflowing output from lean input" (i.e. projection), that doesn't mean that I cannot think I have true beliefs, in the sense that there's nothing to stop my beliefs from being true. Problem: even if they were all true, I would not be in a position to explain, or even understand, how a knowledge theory should explain and understand them. I cannot explain how my true belief contributes to knowledge.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Redundancy Theory Austin Vs Redundancy Theory I 19
AustinVsRedundancy theory: a statement has other functions than just being true or false. Statements, not propositions (as in Tarski), are candidates for the predicates "true" and "false". "Is true" describes a satisfactory relationship between words and the world. (StrawsonVs). ---
I 234
AustinVsRedundancy theory: it has been argued that saying that an assertion is true is not another assertion. It is logically redundant. Austin: but that’s not true. DAdA refers to the world outside of dAdA. That is, to everything except this statement itself! DAdAW refers to the world including dAdA, although the statement itself, i.e. dAdAW, in turn is excluded! DadAW is appropriate only if one imagines that dAdA is already made and verified.
---
I 236
AustinVsRedundancy theory: a statement that says that it is true is just as absurd as one with the content that it is wrong itself! The crreation of hierarchies formation is not a solution either. ---
Strawson II 263
AustinVsRedundancy Theory: AustinVsRamsey and StrawsonVsRamsey: we contradict the thesis that the expression "is true" is logically superfluous. "True" has its own tasks. When we use it, we do not simply assert that something is so, we assert it as we could not do it if certain conditions were not fulfilled. We can also grant, deny, confirm something etc. StrawsonVsAustin: but that does not mean the assumption of the thesis that we assert something about a statement by the use of "true". It is not a new assertion at all!
II 265
By looking ((s) by pointing) one can also determine whether a statement is true without the performative use of "true". E.g. someone reported, "he saw that the statement was true". What does he report? He reports that I've seen a cat on the mat. But only in certain circumstances. This also means that one has heard such a statement.

Austin I
John L. Austin
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 24 (1950): 111 - 128
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Austin II
John L. Austin
"A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 57, Issue 1, 1 June 1957, Pages 1 - 3
German Edition:
Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, Grewendorf/Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Ryle, G. Dummett Vs Ryle, G. I 165
When Ryles’ book was published, it was the basis for discussion for a long time to come. Dummett: Ryles’ influence not so positive, I was also very VsAustin.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982
Strawson, P. F. Prior Vs Strawson, P. F. I 23
Correspondence Theory/Austin/Prior: Austin defended it in the 50s: These facts are "in the world", not only signs, so communication can take place. There must be something else in addition to the signs! True-Making/Austin: if a statement is to be true, then there must be something beyond this statement ("in the world"), which makes it true.
StrawsonVsAustin: "in the world" are only objects to which our statements refer ("about which they are") and not also "facts" (like Geach, camp).
Facts/Strawson: are what statements (if true) find, they are not "about what" statements (sentences) are.
The only plausible candidate as truthmaker of statements is the fact that states them, but this fact is nothing in the world. It is not an object.
Strawson/Prior: seems to say with this that the facts are logical constructions. So far so good, but there still seems to be more that is not clear: he means:
Strawson: of course statements and facts go together. They were made for each other: if we (prise) eliminate the statements from the world (prise), then (prise) we also eliminate the facts from the world. It would not become poorer because of this!
PriorVsStrawson: that seems to imply that there are no facts without statements, or that there would be no facts without statements, and if that is the case, then it is
a) certainly wrong,
b) not the result of facts being logical constructions (Chapter 2).
And there is certainly a close relationship between a fact, and its being in the world!
Reality/Realism/Prior: idioms like "in the world" get their strength from the confrontation with "all in the head" or "only in Homer".
I 24
It suggests the idea of ​​different boxes, in which this could be sorted. That should not be taken too seriously: "In Homer" means that Homer says that such and such is a fact.
To say that gods exist only in the mind, means that it is merely a thought that they exist.
And saying that something is a fact in the world, simply means omitting all these prefixes and saying that it is a fact. (That it is the case).
Facts/Wittgenstein: are the world! Not in the world.
Nor are they "in" sentences.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Wittgenstein Strawson Vs Wittgenstein Horwich I 195
Fact/situation/VsStrawson: it could be argued that they (because they are connected to that-sentences) are used as placeholders for yet to be specified expressions. Just as E.g. "thing" for nouns E.g. "event " for certain verbs, etc. StrawsonVsVs: the answer is twofold:
World/StrawsonVsWittgenstein: the world is the totality of things, not of the facts. All the charm of these expressions like "situation", "state" (state of affairs), "fact", etc. is that we look at them as things or quantities of things. (StrawsonVs).
StrawsonVsAustin: this urge is overwhelming. Austin does not resist it. He needs for concealment "feature" (feature) as a substitute for "fact".
Definition feature/feature/Strawson: E.g. nose can be a feature of a face. E.g. a mountain feature a landscape.(1)

1. Peter F. Strawson, "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950, in: Paul Horwich (ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994
---
Strawson II 265
StrawsonVsWittgenstein: the world is the totality of things, not of the facts. ---
Wittgenstein VI 172
StrawsonVsWittgenstein/Schulte: actually one should only talk in very specific cases of the meaning of names: E.g. "Peter" (Pierre) means "stone". Schulte: that is quite foreign to Wittgenstein.

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Facts Versus Prior I 23
StrawsonVsAustin: "in the world" are just objects to which our statements relate ("through which they are") and not also "facts", additionally. (Geach ditto).

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Statement Austin, J.L. Horwich I 189
Statement/Austin: every statement involves both. Reference ("demonstration") and characterisation ("description"). StrawsonVsAustin: it is questionable that all statements do so, even if some certainly do.
The thesis roughly corresponds to that that all statements are subject-predicate statements, or involve them.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Vs Skepticism Austin, J.L. Stroud I 42
AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes/Stroud: (Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, 1962, 4-5) one arrives at the source of Descartes' skeptical conclusion by uncovering a series of misunderstandings and (especially verbal) errors and fallacies.
I 44
Knowledge/Philosophy/Everyday/Austin/Stroud: (Austin Other Minds, (Phil.Papers 1961,45) These typical philosophical investigations are carried out from our normal (everyday) practice.
I 45
Austin Thesis: "enough is enough": i.e. not everything has to be said. It is not always necessary to prove that this goldfinch is not a stuffed bird. (OM 52).
I 48
Dream/AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes: it is about Descartes' strong thesis that we cannot know if we are not dreaming. Without it, skepticism would be disarmed. Austin's nuclear thesis
Method/Everyday Language/AustinVsDescartes: can it be shown ((s) >Manifestation) that Descartes with his strong thesis violates the normal standards or conditions for knowledge?
I 51
Misconception/Deception/Austin: thesis "you cannot always deceive all people".
I 64
StroudVsAustin: the accusation of AustinVsSkepticism (AustinVsDescartes) that the meaning of "Knowledge" has been distorted in everyday use can only be raised if it can be shown that a certain usage of language, a certain concept and the relation between them has been misinterpreted. Stroud: that is what I meant by the fact that the source of Descartes' demand reveals something deep and important.
I 76
Stroud: this leads us to the depth and importance of skepticism. It is about much more than deciding if you know something about the world around you, it is about our practice (actions) and reflection of our knowledge (self-knowledge). Can we take a distant position here?
I 82
Skepticism/Source/Stroud: Thesis: The source of the philosophical problem of the outside world lies somewhere in our notion of an objective world or our desire to understand our relation to the world.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Truth Austin, J.L. Horwich I 185
Truth / Austin: to say that a proposition is true, is to say that a particular speech act (episode) is conventionally based on something in the world outside of irself.  StrawsonVsAustin: this is unsatisfactory. The correspondence theory does not need cleaning, it must be eliminated.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Truth Predicate Austin, J.L. Horwich I 187
True/Austin: is attributed to speech acts. (Episodes). StrawsonVsAustin: if he is right, it must be possible to reduce claims in which we talk about statements in the non-episodic sense to those in which we attribute truth to episodes themselves.
Statement/Austin: the same sentence can be used to make different statements.
Example: from Jones: "He is sick" to Jones: "You are sick", Jones: "I am sick".
I 188
Strawson: we can use not only different sentences with the same meaning, but also the same sentence with different meanings.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Truth Maker Strawson, P.F. Horwich I 191
Truth-maker / StrawsonVsAustin: they do exist, but only as the equivalent of the descriptive part, not the referring part of a statement.   Fact / truth Make / StrawsonVsAustin: his thesis that a statement is true if a speech episode is correlated conventionally, on a referent beyond description, is a logical error of types.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994