Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Allport Lamiell Corr I 73/74
Allport/personality traits/Lamiell: Allport (1937)(1) argued that person characterization must somehow be possible outside of the framework of common traits. After all, he reasoned, psychologists working in non-research settings, e.g., as counsellors or clinicians, face daily the challenge of characterizing their clients in ways often peculiar to each one of them individually, and hence not necessarily on the basis of considerations about how that client compares with others along some pre-specified dimension(s) presumed applicable to all (‘common traits’). Within the mainstream, Allport’s arguments along this line were widely (and sometimes harshly) dismissed, e.g. LundbergVsAllport Lundberg 1941(2), p.383.
SarbinVsAllport: Sarbin 1944(3), p. 214. …“ Either they are making statistical predictions in an informal, subjective, and uncontrolled way, or else they are performing purely verbal manipulations which are unverifiable and akin to magic.”
LamiellVsTradition: see >Measurement/traits/Lamiell.
Corr I 79
Allport/Lamiell: Allport’s conjectures (…) might well merit the serious consideration they never received in his lifetime. The findings of several investigations carried out by the present author in collaboration with various colleagues offer substantial empirical support for this view (Lamiell and Durbeck 1987(4); Lamiell, Foss, Larsen and Hempel 1983(5); Lamiell, Foss, Trierweiler and Leffel 1983(6)).

1. Allport, G. W. 1937. Personality: a psychological interpretation. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston
2. Lundberg, G. A. 1941. Case-studies vs. statistical methods: an issue based on misunderstanding, Sociometry 4: 379–83
3. Sarbin, T. R. 1944. The logic of prediction in psychology, Psychological Review 51: 210–28
4. Lamiell, J. T. and Durbeck, P. 1987. Whence cognitive prototypes in impression formation? Some empirical evidence for dialectical reasoning as a generative process, Journal of Mind and Behaviour 8: 223–44
5. Lamiell, J. T., Foss, M. A., Larsen, R. J. and Hempel, A. 1983. Studies in intuitive personology from an idiothetic point of view: implications for personality theory, Journal of Personality 51: 438–67
6. Lamiell, J. T., Foss, M. A., Trierweiler, S. J. and Leffel, G. M. 1983. Toward a further understanding of the intuitive personologist: some preliminary evidence for the dialectical quality of subjective personality impressions, Journal of Personality 53: 213–35


James T. Lamiell, “The characterization of persons: some fundamental conceptual issues”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009 The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Concepts Allport Corr I 95/96
Concepts/personality traits/lexicon/lexical approach/Allport/Deary: worried that traits might be loaded with the conventional meanings of the words allocated to them and that ‘It would be ideal if we could . . . find our traits first and then name them’ (Allport 1931(1) p. 371). Of course he also stated that the words might actually represent the true traits but, on the other hand, the ‘conventional meanings . . . [might lead us] away from the precise integration as it exists in the given individual’ (1931, p. 371). DearyVsAllport: Allport wanted to have his lexical cake and eat it here, and also begs the most profound question. He explicitly seems to recognize that our likeliest road into traits is from language terms. However, he hints at but does not directly address how one might craft a research programme to get at ‘the precise integration as it exists in the given individual’. Cf. >concepts/psychological theories.


1. Allport, G. W. 1931. What is a trait of personality?. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 25: 368–72

Ian J. Deary, “The trait approach to personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
de dicto Searle II 249
De dicto: only concerning the mental contents - de re: relationships between people and objects - SearleVsQuine, VsPutnam: all beliefs are de dicto.
---
II 261
De dicto/belief/SearleVsAll: all beliefs are de dicto - de re beliefs are a subclass - QuineVs: irreducible belief de re: is between the believer and the objects - in addition to the de dicto beliefs - (much stronger thesis). - >Brains in a vat: purely de dicto - SearleVsQuine: if the world would change, the beliefs would change, even if everything stays the same in the head. ---
II 262
General desire for a sailing boat: de dicto - for a more specific: de re. ---
II 263
SearleVsQuine: Then in the general case allegedly context free but: BurgeVsQuine: contextually bound beliefs cannot be characterized completely by their intentional content (not only as a relation between concept and object) - de dicto/Burge: E.g. red hat in the fog, "there is a man who ..." -Searle: that is enough to individuate any de re- counterpart - the same man can belong to >satisfaction conditions for very different perceptions. ---
II 268
Thesis, there are forms of >intentionality that are not conceptual, but also not de re.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Person Lamiell Corr I 72
Person/Variables/personality psychology/psychological theories/LamiellVsTradition/Lamiell: notions like “school”, “work”, “personal relationships” on one hand and “nature”/”nurture” on the other hand have long been the objects of the mainstream research and still are. Unfortunately, this entire enterprise has been predicated on the notion that our scientific understanding of the behaviour/psychological functioning of individuals can be advanced through the systematic investigation of variables representing individual differences (Lamiell 1987(1);1997(2);2003(3)) Tradition/Lamiell: mainstream thinkers still stubbornly refuse to acknowledge the mistakenness of this notion (see e.g., recent articles by McAdams and Pals 2006(4); and by McAdams 2007(5); also Hofstee 2007(6)). LamiellVsMcAdams, LamiellVsPals, LamiellVsHofstee.
Person characterization/Lamiell: what, exactly, do statements about the personality characteristics of an individual entail? What is implied when someone is called “highly” extraverted?
For the variables “school”, “work”, “personal relationships” on one hand and “nature”/”nurture” on the other hand see Epstein 1983(7).
LamiellVsEpstein. See also LundbergVsAllport, SarbinVsAllport: >Allport/Lamiell.
LamiellVsTradition: see >Measurement/traits/Lamiell.


1. Lamiell, J. T. 1987. The psychology of personality: an epistemological inquiry. New York: Columbia University Press
2. Lamiell, J. T. 1997. Individuals and the differences between them, in R. Hogan, J. Johnson and S. Briggs (eds.), Handbook of personality psychology, psychology, pp. 117–41. New York: Academic Press
3. Lamiell, J. T. 2003. Beyond individual and group differences: human individuality, scientific psychology, and William Stern’s critical personalism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications
4. McAdams, D. P. and Pals, J. L. 2006. A new Big Five: fundamental principles for an integrative science of personality, American Psychologist 61: 204–17
5. McAdams, D. P. 2007. On grandiosity in personality psychology, American Psychologist 62: 60–1 (comment)
6. Hofstee, W. K. B. 2007. Unbehagen in individual differences: a review, Journal of Individual Differences 28: 252–3
7. Epstein, S. 1983. Aggregation and beyond: some basic issues in the prediction of behaviour, Journal of Personality 51: 360–92, p. 381.


James T. Lamiell, “The characterization of persons: some fundamental conceptual issues”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Personality Allport Corr I 4
Personality/Allport: Gordon Allport (1937)(1) defined personality as ‘the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to the environment’ (Allport 1937,p.48).
I 5
McAdamsVsAllport/PalsVsAllport: A definition that gives a modern twist to this personological integration is offered by McAdams and Pals (2006)(2), who define personality as ‘an individual’s unique variation on the general evolutionary design for human nature, expressed as a developing pattern of dispositional traits, characteristic adaptations, and integrative life stories complexly and differentially situated in culture’ (McAdams and Pals 2006(2), p. 212). The emphasis on dynamics and development in these two personological definitions reminds us that some theories emphasize function and change, in contrast to the typically more static trait emphasis on description.

1. Allport, G. W. 1937. Personality: a psychological interpretation. New York: Holt, p. 48.
2. McAdams, D. P. and Pals, J. L. 2006. A new Big Five: fundamental principles for an integrative science of personality, American Psychologist 61: 204–17

Susan Cloninger, “Conceptual issues in personality theory”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.



Corr I 43
Personality/Allport/AsendorpfVsAllport: Allport (1937) owed most of his ideas to Stern (1911) (1)
1. Stern, W. 1911. Die Differentielle Psychologie in ihren methodischen Grundlagen [Methodological foundations of differential psychology]. Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth


Jens B. Asendorpf, “Personality: Traits and situations”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.



Corr I 380
Personality/Allport/Saucier: Allport (1937)(1): ‘personality is the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment’ (1937, p. 48). Saucier: Allport called this a ‘biophysical’ conception. It focused on ‘what an individual is regardless of the manner in which other people perceive his qualities or evaluate them’ (1937, p. 40). Phrasings like ‘within the individual’ and ‘systems that determine’ reveal an emphasis on the underlying mechanisms behind behaviour.


1. Allport, G. W. 1937. Personality: a psychological interpretation. New York: Holt


Gerard Saucier, „Semantic and linguistic aspects of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Robbers Cave Experiment Psychological Theories Haslam I 153
Robbers Cave Experiment/Sherif/Psychological theories: Sherif and his colleagues were able to create psychologically meaningful groups (e.g., with a history, norms and internal status relations) and to demonstrate systematically the profound impact that variations in relationships both within and between the groups had on psychology and behaviour. Tajfel: behaviour. In so doing, they were ‘able to recreate many phenomena … usually associated with long-term complex social and historical developments’ (Tajfel, 1978(1): 435).
Conclusions from the experiments (Sherif and Sherif 1969(2):
A.
Groups: have a material reality including roles and status relationships
Relationships: will vary dynamically with the nature of intragroup members identifying with the group
Groups: have a psychological validity, with members identifying with the group
Intergroup attitudes: are psychological meaningful outcomes of the nature of intergroup relations
Competition: intergroup competition for limited resources causes negative intergroup impressions
Cooperation: between groups for compelling superordinate goals will have a cumulative effect in reducing intergroup hostility
Contact: intergroup contact alone ist not sufficient to reduce intergroup hostility.
Haslam I 154
TraditionVsSherif: psychological theories prior to Sherif’s studies had assumed that groups in fact do not exist. E. g., Groups/Allport: Thesis: the only material reality lies at the level of the individual (Allport 1924)(3).
SherifVsAllport/SherifVsTradition: the Boys’ Camp studies demonstrated unequivocally the presence and importance of social-psychological variables that exist only at the conceptual level of the group. >Robbers Cave Experiment/Sherif, >Social groups/Sherif.
B.
Members: groups have substantive psychological meaning and significance for their members. The boys in the studies identified strongly with their groups. These groups were psychologically real, engaging and self-defining.
Haslam I 157
(…) since Sherif developed his theoretical analysis, researchers have gone on to clarify its ability to explain such things as rapid changes in the onset and dissipation of intergroup discrimination, and the process by which ingroup love evolves into outgroup hate (Brewer, 1999(4); Brown et al., 1986(5); Struch and Schwartz, 1989(6)).


1. Tajfel, H. (ed.) (1978) Differentiation Between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. London: Academic Press.
2. Sherif, M. and Sherif, C.W. (1969) Social Psychology. New York: Harper & Row.

3. Allport, F.H. (1924) ‘The group fallacy in relation to social science’, Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, 19: 60–73.
4. Brewer, M.B. (1999) ‘The psychology of prejudice: Ingroup love or outgroup hate?’, Journal of Social Issues, 55: 429–44.
5. Brown, R.J., Condor, S., Mathews, A., Wade, G. and Williams, J.A. (1986) ‘Explaining intergroup differentiation in an industrial organization’, Journal of Occupational Psychology, 59: 273–86.
6. Struch, N. and Schwartz, S.H. (1989) ‘Intergroup aggression: Its predictors and distinctness from in-group bias’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56: 364–73.



Michael W. Platow and John A. Hunter, „ Intergroup Relations and Conflicts. Revisiting Sherif’s Boys’ Camp studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Social Groups Psychological Theories Haslam I 154
Social groups/psychological theories: psychological theories prior to Sherif’s studies (>Robbers Cave Experiment/Sherif, Sherif and Sherif (1969)(1) had assumed that groups in fact do not exist. E. g., Groups/Allport: Thesis: the only material reality lies at the level of the individual (Allport 1924)(2).
SherifVsAllport/SherifVsTradition: the Boys’ Camp studies (>Group behavior/Sherif) demonstrated unequivocally the presence and importance of social-psychological variables that exist only at the conceptual level of the group. >Robbers Cave Experiment/Psychological theories, >Social groups/Sherif.
Prejudice/discrimination/Tradition: Prior to the publication of the Boys’ Camp studies, psychologists had typically explained stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination in terms either of some form of biological factor, individual psychological (decontextualized) characteristic, or intragroup property (see Sherif and Sherif, 1969(1), for a review). Moreover, this pursuit continued even after the publication of these studies (e.g., Hamilton and Gifford, 1976(3); Sibley and Duckitt, 2008(4)).



1. Sherif, M. and Sherif, C.W. (1969) Social Psychology. New York: Harper & Row.
2 .Allport, F.H. (1924) ‘The group fallacy in relation to social science’, Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology, 19: 60–73.
3. Hamilton, D.L. and Gifford, R.K. (1976) ‘Illusory correlation in interpersonal perception: A cognitive basis of stereotypic judgments’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 12: 392–407.
4. Sibley, C.G. and Duckitt, J. (2008) ‘Personality and prejudice: A meta-analysis and theoretical review’, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12: 248–79.


Michael W. Platow and John A. Hunter, „ Intergroup Relations and Conflicts. Revisiting Sherif’s Boys’ Camp studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Value Judgments Psychological Theories Corr I 394
Value Judgments/Psychological theories/Personality/Allport/Saucier: Allport and Odbert (1936)(1) argued that the science of personality would do well to ignore highly evaluative concepts, but they may be a vital part of the operation of mindset. SaucierVsAllport: Highly evaluative attribute-concepts (e.g., Good, Holy, Impressive, Evil) reference perceived competence with respect to consensual standards for proper behaviour. We tend to have contempt for those who disappoint us by showing deficits in such competence, who run askew of the standards of public culture.
Corr I 395
E.g., the Big Two Dynamism and Morality/Social Propriety dimensions may arise out of the relative independence of tendencies for others to be rewarding (those you would approach) or threatening (those you would avoid). And the single evaluative factor may be a simple combination of these two: attributes of people you would approach contrasted with attributes of people you would avoid.

1. Allport, G. W. and Odbert, H. S. 1936. Trait names: a psycho-lexical study, Psychological Monographs 47: Whole No. 211



Gerard Saucier, „Semantic and linguistic aspects of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Chisholm, R.M. Simons Vs Chisholm, R.M. Chisholm II 166
SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsBrentano: thesis: Chisholm inherited a mereological essentialism by Brentano with which I do not agree. But I will use these ideas to give a slightly different interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Wittgenstein himself was not so clear with respect to facts as it seems. Self-criticism: mess of facts and complexes.
There are worlds between the later Wittgenstein and Brentano, but there are contacts between Brentano and the Tractatus.
Simons I 1
Extensional Mereology/Simons: is a classical theory. Spelling: CEM.
Individuals calculus/Leonard/Goodman: (40s): another name for the CEM. This is intended to express that the objects of the part-whole relation belong to the lowest logical type (so they are all individuals, both a whole and a part are individuals).
VsCEM: 1. Claims the existence of sums as individuals for whose existence we have no evidence beyond the theory.
Vs: 2. The whole theory is not applicable to most things in our lives.
Vs: 3. The logic of the CEM has not the resources to deal with temporal and modal terms: e.g. temporal part, substantial part, etc.
Simons: these are all external critiques but there is an internal critique: that comes from the
Extensional mereology: thesis: objects with the same parts are identical (analogous to set theory).
Problem:
1. Flux: e.g. people have different parts at different times.
I 2
2. Modality/extensional mereology: problem: e.g. a man could have other parts than he actually has and still be the same person. (s) The extensionality would then demand together with the Leibniz identity that all parts are essential. This leads to:

Chisholm/mereological essentialism/Simons: Chisholm represents the mereological essentialism: Thesis: no object can have different parts than it actually has.
Vs: problem: to explain why normal objects are not modally rigid (all parts essential).
Solution/Chisholm: thesis: (appearing) things (appearances) ((s) everyday things) are logical structures made of objects for which the mereological essentialism applies.
Flux/mereology/Simons: problem/(s): after the CEM changing objects may not be regarded as identical with themselves.
1.
Solution/Chisholm: thesis: the actual are mereologically constant and the appearances again logical constructions of unchanging objects. SimonsVsChisholm: the price is too high.
2.
common solution: replacement of the normal things (continuants) through processes that themselves have temporal parts.
SimonsVs: hence the extensionality cannot be maintained. Such four-dimensional objects fail on the modal argument.

CEM/event/Simons: in the case of events the extensional mereology is applicable. Also in:
Classes/masses/Simons: these are non-singular objects for which the extensionality applies.
Part/Simons: is ambiguous, depending on whether used in connection with individuals, classes or masses.

Extensionality/mereology/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, we are dealing with continuants.
I 3
continuants/Simons: may be in flux. Extensionality/Simons: if it is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore several different objects can be at the same time in the same place.
I 175
Temporal part/continuants/mereology/SimonsVsalle/SimonsVsChisholm: thesis: also continuants can have temporal parts! That means that they are not mereologically constant but mereologically variable. continuants/Simons: thesis: do not have to exist continuously. This provides us with a surprising solution to the problem of the Ship of Theseus.
I 187
SimonsVsChisholm: if he is right, most everyday things, including our organism, are only logical constructions.
I 188
strict connection/separateness/SimonsVsChisholm: the criterion for strict connection is unfortunately so that it implies that if x and y are strictly connected, but not in contact, they can be separated by the fact that a third object passes between them what per se is not a change, also not in their direct relations to each other. Problem: when this passing is only very short, the question is whether the separated sum of the two which was extinguished by the third object is the same that exists again when the third object has disappeared. If it is the same, we have a discontinued existing sum.
Chisholm: himself asks this question for the example a castle of toy bricks will be demolished and built again with the same bricks.
I 189
Chisholm Thesis: it is a reason to be dissatisfied with the normal ontology, because it just allows such examples. SimonsVsChisholm: but Chisholm's own concepts just allowed us the previous example.
Topology/Simons: yet there is no doubt that it is useful to add topological concepts such as touching or to be inside of something to the mereology.
I 192
Def succession/Chisholm:
1.
x is a direct a-successor of y to t ' = Def (i) t does not start before t’
(ii) x is an a to t and y is a y to t’
(iii) there is a z so that z is part of x to t and a part of y to t’ and in every moment between t’ and t including, z is itself an a.
Simons: while there will be in general several such parts. We always choose the largest.
w: be in it the common part e.g. in altering a table
SimonsVsChisholm: problem: w is not always a table!
ChisholmVsVs: claims that w is indeed a table: if we cut away a small part of the table, what remains is still a table.
Problem: but if the thing that remains is a table because it was already previously there then it was a table that was a real part of a table!
I 193
SimonsVsChisholm: the argument is not valid! Example Shakespeare, Henry IV, Act IV Scene V: Prince Hal considers: if the king dies, we will still have a king, (namely myself, the heir). But if that person is a king, then, because he had previously been there, then he was a king who was the eldest son of a king. ((s) contradiction because then there would have been two kings simultaneously).
Simons: this point is not new and was already highlighted by Wiggins and Quine (not VsChisholm).
I 194
Change/transformation/part/succession/SimonsVsChisholm: it seems, however, that they are not compatible with the simple case where a at the same time wins and loses parts. E.g. then a+b should be an A-predecessor of a+c and a+c an A-successor of a+b. But that is not allowed by the definition, unless we know that a all the time is an A, so that it connects a+b and a+c in a chain. But this will not usually be the case.
And if it is not the case, a will never ever be an A!
SimonsVsChisholm: so his definitions only work if he assumes a wrong principle!
Succession/entia successiva/SimonsVsChisholm: problem: that each of the things that shall "stand in" (for a constant ens per se to explain the transformation) should themselves be an a in the original sense (e.g. table, cat, etc.) is counterintuitive.
Solution/Simons: the "is" is here an "is" of predication and not of constitution.(>Wiggins 1980, 30ff).
mereological constancy/Simons: thesis: most things, of which we predict things like e.g. "is a man" or "is a table" are mereologically constant. The rest is easy loose speech and a play with identity.
E.g. if we say that the man in front of us lost a lot of hair in the last year we use "man" very loosely.
Chisholm: we should say, strictly speaking, that the man of today (stand for) who today stands for the same successive man has less hair than the man who stood for him last year.
SimonsVsChisholm/WigginsVsChisholm: with that he is dangerously close to the four-dimensionalism. And especially because of the following thesis:
I 195
To stand in for/stand for/entia successiva/Chisholm: thesis: this is not a relation of an aggregate to its parts. Sortal concept/Simons: the question is whether sortal concepts that are subject to the conditions that determine what should count at one time or over time as a thing or several things of one kind are applicable rather to mereologically constant objects (Chisholm) or variable objects (Simons, Wiggins).
SimonsVsChisholm: seine These hat zur Folge dass die meisten Menschen meist ihre meisten Begriffe falsch gebrauchen, wenn das dann nicht überhaupt immer der Fall ist.
I 208
Person/body/interrupted existence/identity/mereology/Chisholm/Simons: our theory is not so different in the end from the Chisholm's, except that we do not accept matter-constancy as "strictly and philosophically" and oppose it to a everyday use of constancy. SimonsVsChisholm: advantage: we can show how the actual use of "ship" is related to hidden tendencies to use it in the sense of "matter-constant ship".
Ship of Theseus/SimonsVsChisholm: we are not obligated to mereological essentialism.
A matter-constant ship is ultimately a ship! That means that it is ready for use!
interrupted existence/substrate/Simons: there must be a substrate that allows the identification across the gap.

I 274
SimonsVsChisholm: according to his principle, there is no real object, which is a table, because it can constantly change its microstructure ((s) win or lose atoms). Chisholm/Simons: but by this not the slightest contradiction for Chisholm is demonstrated.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Grice, P.H. Loar Vs Grice, P.H. I 1
Language/everyday language/concept/theory/explanation/pragmatic/Loar: all pragmatic concepts are ultimately based on belief.
Loar: Thesis: my approach (chapter 9) is reductionist:
1. Semantic characteristics are based on beliefs and desires. (Similar to Grice).
LoarVsGrice: my approach is not only communication theoretical:
LoarVsAll: the theories of beliefs can serve as a basis for the semantic theory of "language of thought" (most authors: the other way around!)
2. My explanation of belief and desires is not based on
I 2
Propositions or semantic concepts. Meaning/Loar: propositional attitudes can therefore serve non-circularly as a basis for meaning.
Belief/Conviction/Wish/Desire/Loar: Thesis: can be explained without assuming everyday semantics.
Thinking/Language/Loar: but this should not assume thinking without language, i.e. language as a mere vehicle of communication:
Belief/Loar: Thesis: is not a linguistic state.
Content/Loar: even if belief were a linguistic state, its content could be analyzed independently of its linguistic aspects.
Solution/Loar: explanation through behaviour and perception.

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981

Loar II
Brian Loar
"Two Theories of Meaning"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Psycho-Functionalism Pro Pauen I 135
Psychofunktionalismus: reagiert auf die Unzulänglichkeiten der Alltagssprache bei der Bestimmung mentaler Zustände. Da die Bindung an die Alltagssprache gar nicht notwendig ist, kann sie aufgegeben werden.
Andererseits kann die funktionale Beschreibung beliebig weit getrieben werden, praktisch bis zum einzelnen Neuron.
Es können alle Eigenschaften berücksichtigt werden, je nach Zielsetzung.
I 137
Auch Meßinstrumente können eingesetzt werden. Problem: Simulation zu erkennen: ist prinzipiell nicht unlösbar.
Vertreter: Dennett. (DennettVsAlltagspsychologie: Simulation nicht zu erfassen) (Lager).
I 138
Dennett: in Konfliktfällen neurowissenschaftliche Daten den Vorzug vor Selbstzuschreibung der ersten Person! Wir haben keinen direkten Zugang zu unseren mentalen Zuständen (wie semantischer Funktionalismus und eliminativer Materialismus).

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Continuant Chisholm, R. Simons I 187
Continuant/ChisholmVsAll: Thesis: is mereologically constant!
I 188
Chisholm: he asks himself this question through the example of a castle made of toy stones being torn down and rebuilt from the same stones.
I 189
Chisholm's thesis: it is a reason to be dissatisfied with normal ontology because it enables just such examples.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
de dicto Searle, J.R. II 261
De dicto/belief/SearleVsall: all beliefs are de dicto - de re beliefs are a subclass - QuineVs: irrducible beliefs de re: between the believer and the objects - in addition to the de dicto-belief (much stronger thesis) Brains in a vat: only pure de dicto. SearleVsQuine: "when the world changed, beliefs change, even if everything in the head remains the same".
II 262
General desire for a sailboat: "de dicto" for a special: "de re"
II 263
SearleVsQuine: then in the general case allegedly context-free but: BurgeVsQuine: contextually bound belief cannot be completely characterized by their intentional content. (as not only relative between term and object)
De dicto/Burge: Example: red cap in the fog: "there is a man who..." - Searle: that's enough to individuate every "de re" counterpart. "The same man may, at the conditions of fulfillment, belong to quite different perceptions."
II 268
Thesis: "there are forms of intentionality that are not conceptual, but also not de re".
Continuant Simons, P. I 175
Temporal Part/continuuants mereology/SimonsVsall/SimonsVsChisholm: Thesis: continuants can also have temporal parts! I.e. they are not mereologically constant, but mereologically variable. Continuants/Simons: Thesis: do not have to exist continuously. This provides us with a surprising solution to the problem of the Theseus' ship.
I 351
Continuant/Existence/Simons: whether a continuant exists (E!) stands and falls with the question whether there are events that come together in the form of a life story. Gene Identity: is itself not sufficient for the existence of a continuant via integration of events into a story. It can only underline the union.
Continuant/Simons: thesis: has ontological priority over life.