Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Adorno Habermas IV 490
Adorno/Horkheimer/Rationalization/Modernism/Habermas: Horkheimer and Adorno had disclosed the theory of class consciousness. They address the problem of linking the phenomena of the rationalization of life orders and the institutionalization of purpose-rational action (see Purpose Rationality/Weber) with the reification of consciousness (see Reification/Lukács) with the criticism of instrumental reason. This is a vision of an administered, totally reified world in which purpose rationality and rule merge. The theory has the advantage of focusing on the systemically induced deformation of communicatively structured life contexts.
HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsHorkheimer: the weakness of its theory lies in the fact that it attributes the erosion of the lifeworld to the magic of a purpose rationality demonized to instrumental reason. Thus the criticism of instrumental reason falls into the same error as Weber's theory, and it also loses the fruits of its approach, which is nevertheless directed towards systemic effects. (See Instrumental Reason/Habermas).
IV 558
Adorno/Horkheimer/Marcuse/Society Theory/Method/Habermas: Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse stick to Freudian drive theory and reckon with the dynamics of an inner nature that reacts to social pressure but remains resistant to the power of socialisation at its core. (1) (AdornoVsFromm, HorkeimerVsFromm: See I/Fromm.)


1. This position has not changed later: vgl. TH.W. Adorno, Soziologie und Psychologie, in: Festschrift Horkheimer, Frankfurt 1955; H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, Boston, 1955, der, Verhalten der Psychoanalyse, in: ders, Kultur und Gesellschaft 2, Frankfurt 1965, S. 85ff.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Art Adorno Grenz I 49
Art/Adorno: "Art is infinitely difficult, too, in the fact that it must transcend its concept [...] but that it adapts itself to the reification in which it is similar to realities, against which it protests ... (Ästhetische Theorie, p. 159). Art/Sense/Adorno: The abandonment of art to the category of meaning drives it into the arms of positivism (it is still a synonym for assimilated consciousness). (Ästhetische Theorie, p. 231).
---
Grenz I 104
Art/HabermasVsAdorno: Adorno's theory of the autonomy of art, which he sees represented in hermetic art, is a 'defensive' theory. (Habermas, making aware or rescuing criticism. The topicality of Walter Benjamin (1972)).
In: Jürgen Habermas: Politik, Kunst und Religion. Essays über zeitgenössische Philosophen. Reclam, Stuttgart 1978 (aktuelle Neuauflage 2006) ISBN 3-15-009902-1, S. 48–95)
---
Grenz I 108
Abstract/art/Adorno/Grenz: the abstractness of the reference of the works of art to the psychological nominalism, existing before them, on which Adorno insists, are the consequences of the theorem of the ahistorical-ness of the ideological superstructure. ---
Grenz I 186
Art/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno separates between the social content of the works of art and their monolithically-viewd suchness. AdornoVs aesthetics effects: Adorno adheres to the objectification character of the works of art.
---
I 187
Either a work of art is communicative, but then it is at the same time, 'crude propaganda', or it is true as a critique of the communication system. But then it is socially ineffective. ---
I 188
Art/Adorno: art is a practice as "formation of consciousness" (Ästhetische Theorie, p. 361).

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974


A X
Friedemann Grenz
Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984
Critical Theory Arendt Brocker I 363
Critical Theory/ArendtVsAdorno/ArendtVsMarcuse/ArendtVsHorkheimer/Arendt: Arendt takes a critical perspective on modern mass society. However, she rejects the basic assumption of the Critical Theory that modern society has led to de-individualization on a large scale (cf. Horkheimer/Adorno 1944 (1); Marcuse 1967 (2)). In her view, the opposite is the case: it is only the democratic mass society that creates individualism in a constitutive way.

1. Horkheimer, Max/Adorno, Theodor W., Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente, Amsterdam 1944.
2. Marcuse, Herbert, Der eindimensionale Mensch. Studien zur Ideologie der fortgeschrittenen Industriegesellschaft, Neuwied/Berlin 1967.


Antonia Grunenberg, „Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder Vom tätigen Leben“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Arendt I
H. Arendt
Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics. Civil Disobedience. On Violence. Thoughts on Politics and Revolution Boston 1972


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Horkheimer Habermas IV 490
Adorno/Horkheimer/Rationalization/Modernism/Habermas: Horkheimer and Adorno had disclosed the theory of class consciousness. They address the problem of linking the phenomena of the rationalization of life orders and the institutionalization of purpose-rational action (see Purpose Rationality/Weber) with the reification of consciousness (see Reification/Lukács) with the criticism of instrumental reason. This is a vision of an administered, totally reified world in which purpose rationality and rule merge. The theory has the advantage of focusing on the systemically induced deformation of communicatively structured life contexts.
HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsHorkheimer: the weakness of its theory lies in the fact that it attributes the erosion of the lifeworld to the magic of a purpose rationality demonized to instrumental reason. Thus the criticism of instrumental reason falls into the same error as Weber's theory, and it also loses the fruits of its approach, which is nevertheless directed towards systemic effects. (See Instrumental Reason/Habermas).
IV 558
Adorno/Horkheimer/Marcuse/Society Theory/Method/Habermas: Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse stick to Freudian drive theory and reckon with the dynamics of an inner nature that reacts to social pressure but remains resistant to the power of socialisation at its core. (1) (AdornoVsFromm, HorkeimerVsFromm: See I/Fromm.)


1. This position has not changed later: vgl. TH.W. Adorno, Soziologie und Psychologie, in: Festschrift Horkheimer, Frankfurt 1955; H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, Boston, 1955, der, Verhalten der Psychoanalyse, in: ders, Kultur und Gesellschaft 2, Frankfurt 1965, S. 85ff.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Humans Wiener II 94
Human/Wiener, Norbert: Thesis: the human is a message himself. The older notions of individuality were somehow linked to the concept of identity, whether it was the material substance of the animal or the mental substance of the human soul. Nowadays, we have to admit that individuality is related to the continuity of the scheme and consequently shares with it the essence of communication. (See Scheme/Wiener). (WienerVsAdorno). ---
II 99
Identity/Individual/Wiener: the physical identity of an individual is not based on the identity of the substance from which it is made. The metabolism causes a much stronger metabolism than was thought possible for a long time.

WienerN I
Norbert Wiener
Cybernetics, Second Edition: or the Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine Cambridge, MA 1965

WienerN II
N. Wiener
The Human Use of Human Beings (Cybernetics and Society), Boston 1952
German Edition:
Mensch und Menschmaschine Frankfurt/M. 1952

I, Ego, Self Fromm Habermas IV 558
I/Fromm/FrommVsHorkheimer/FrommVsAdorno/Habermas: In contrast to Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, Erich Fromm takes up suggestions from ego-psychology and transfers the process of ego development into the medium of social interactions that penetrate and structure the natural substrate of instictive movements.(1)

1.E. Fromm, Escape from Freedom, NY 1942, deutsch Frankfurt 1971.

Fromm I
Erich Fromm
Escape from Freedom New York 1942


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Instrumental Reason Habermas IV 490
Instrumental Reason/Habermas: the term suggests that the rationality of recognizing and acting subjects systematically expands into a higher-order purpose rationality. Thus the rationality of self-regulated systems, whose imperatives override the consciousness of their integrated members, appears in the form of a totalized purpose rationality. HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsHorkheimer: thus, the two authors confuse system and action rationality. Therefore, they cannot sufficiently differentiate between the rationalization of action orientation
IV 491
in the context of a (...) lifeworld on the one hand and the expansion of the control capacities of (...) social systems on the other. Autonomy/Spontanity: Therefore, they can only locate spontaneity, which is not yet captured by the reifying power of system rationalization, in irrational forces - in the charismatic force of leaders or the mimetic of art and love.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Mass Culture Adorno Habermas IV 558
Mass Culture/AdornoVsBenjamin/BenjaminVsAdorno/Habermas: on the question of the ideological character of mass culture, a front is formed between Adorno on the one hand and Benjamin on the other. While Adorno (with Löwenthal and Marcuse) irreconcilably contrasts the experience of authentic art with cultural consumption, Benjamin persistently sets his hopes on the profane illuminations that are supposed to emanate from a mass art stripped of its aura.

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Mass Culture Arendt Brocker I 363
Mass Culture/ArendtVsAdorno/ArendtVsMarcuse/Arendt: Arendt takes a critical perspective on modern mass society. However, she rejects the basic assumption of the Critical Theory that modern society has led to de-individualization on a large scale (cf. Horkheimer/Adorno 1944(1); Marcuse 1967(2)). In her view, the opposite is the case: it is only the democratic mass society that creates individualism in a constitutive way. Question: 1. What are the material and spiritual conditions underlying the phenomenon that modern mass society is a community of isolated job-holders whose carriers have lost their relationship to their common world - the human conditionality? 2. What is or what is the standard for social coexistence? See Society/Arendt.



1. Horkheimer, Max/Adorno, Theodor W., Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente, Amsterdam 1944.
2. Marcuse, Herbert, Der eindimensionale Mensch. Studien zur Ideologie der fortgeschrittenen Industriegesellschaft, Neuwied/Berlin 1967.


Antonia Grunenberg, „Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder Vom tätigen Leben“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Arendt I
H. Arendt
Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics. Civil Disobedience. On Violence. Thoughts on Politics and Revolution Boston 1972


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Materialism Adorno Grenz I 116
Materialism/Adorno/Grenz: Thesis: Materialism would be secularized theology. BlochVsAdorno/Grenz: Bloch has attacked this very sharply. (Bloch, Das Prinzip der Hoffnung III, pp. 1602ff).
---
Grenz I 127
Dialectical Materialism/Alfred Schmidt/Grenz: "Like all materialisms, the dialectically one recognizes that the laws and movements of external nature exist independently and outside any consciousness. This in-itself, beomes however, [and thus the dialectic modifies the general materialism] only relevant insofar as it becomes a for-us, that is, insofar as nature is involved in human-social purposes." (A. Schmidt, Der Begriff der Natur, p. 151). ---
Adorno XIII 171
Materialism/Adorno: materialism has a certain trait of the polemic, which differs fundamentally from the affirmative trait of all idealistic philosophies. ---
XIII 174
It is the attitude which opposes naturalness to every manifestation of the mind and ultimately leads to represent the necessity of living as that which decides at all. ---
XIII 175
He does not only recourse to the subject through the recognition and through reality constituted through recognition, but he refers directly to reality itself from the protest against the illusionary moment in the mind. ---
XIII 219
Materialism/Adorno: in his monistic as well as in his Marxist-dialectical form, he placed the concept of development in the center, for obvious anti-theological reasons. If neither a creatio ex nihilo nor an eternally self-identical and unchanging being is accepted, the concept of development receives a strong accent. This is surprisingly also found in > Epicurus.

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974


A X
Friedemann Grenz
Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984
Philosophy Habermas Rorty III 142
HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsFoucault: their polemic against the Enlightenment turns the back on the social hopes of liberal societies. ---
III 143
Habermas shares with the Marxists the assumption that the true meaning of a philosophical opinion exists in its political implications.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Rationalization Habermas III 22
Rationalization/Sociology/Habermas: Understanding rational action orientations becomes the point of reference for understanding all action orientations. For sociology, this means the following relationship between meta-theoretical and methodological level:
a) At the metatheoretical level, it chooses basic concepts that are tailored to the increase in rationality of modern life.
b) At the methodological level, the understanding of rational action orientations becomes a reference point for the understanding of all action orientations (>Theory of Meaningful Understanding). This is about internal relationships between meaning and validity.
III 209
Rationalization/HabermasVsMarx/VsAdorno/VsHorkheimer/VsWeber/Habermas: the concept of rationality of these authors is too narrow to grasp the comprehensive social rationality they have in mind. The term would have to be used at the same level as the productive forces, the subsystems of functional rational action, the totalitarian bearers of instrumental reason. That is not happening. The concept of action of these authors is not complex enough for this. In addition, basic concepts of action and system theory must not be confused: LuhmannVsMarx, LuhmannVsWeber, LuhmannVsAdorno: the rationalization of action orientations and lifeworld structures is not the same as the increase in complexity of action systems. (1)
III 457
Communicative action/rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only when we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday actions and the formation of subsystems for procedural rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies.
III 459
Rationalization/Habermas: the paradox of rationalization, of which Weber spoke, can be understood abstractly in such a way that the rationalization of the world allows a kind of system integration ((s) of subsystems with non-linguistic communication media such as money and power) that competes with the integration principle of ((s) linguistic) understanding and under certain conditions has a disintegrating effect on the world of life.
IV 451
Rationalization/Modernism/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: Weber could not classify the problems of legitimacy that a positivistically undermined legal rule raises within the pattern of rationalization of modern societies, because he himself remained imprisoned by legal-positivist views. Solution/Habermas: Thesis: (p) The emergence (...) of modern societies requires the institutional embodiment of moral and legal concepts of a post-traditional nature, but
(q) capitalist modernization follows a pattern according to which cognitive-instrumental rationality penetrates beyond the realms of economy and state into other, communicatively structured areas of life and takes precedence there at the expense of moral-practical and aesthetic-practical rationality.
(r) This causes disturbances in the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld.
IV 452
Problem: a progressively rationalised lifeworld is simultaneously decoupled and made dependent on increasingly complex, formally organised areas of action such as economics and state administration. This takes sociopathological forms of internal colonization. To the extent that critical imbalances can only be avoided at the cost of disturbances in the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld (i.e. of "subjectively" experienced crises or pathologies threatening identity).
IV 486
Paradoxically, rationalization releases both at the same time - the systemically induced reification and the utopian perspective from which capitalist modernization has always inherited the stigma that it dissolves traditional forms of life without saving their communicative substance.

1.N. Luhmann, Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität, Tübingen 1968.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981


The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Adorno, Th.W. Rorty Vs Adorno, Th.W. V 80
Rorty sAdorno: hardly contributes anything new to the familiar pre-Freudian opinion that if people had more education, more leisure and more money, we would have to deal less with slave-drivers.
V 110
Democracy/Rationality/Adorno/Rorty: Prognosis: the self-destruction of rationality will lead to failure of the liberal democracies.
V 111
RortyVsAdorno: this collapse would not be convincing proof for the assertion that human communities can only survive if there is agreement on the last things in them.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Foucault, M. Rorty Vs Foucault, M. Rorty III 142
HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsFoucault: their polemics against enlightenment turns the back on social hopes of liberal societies.
III 143
Habermas shares with the Marxists belief that the true meaning of a philosophical opinion consists in its political implications.
V 8
Foundation/Final Justification/RortyVsHabermas: I distrust the remaining fundamentalism, striving for "universality". Habermas celebrates democracy, but he does not justify it. If HabermasVsFoucault alleges relativism and challenges him to disclose its "normative standards". >Ultimate Justification. Rorty: here I stand on the side of Foucault, who shrugs and says nothing.
RortyVsFoucault: distrust him when he projects his desire for private Nietzschean autonomy in the public sphere. In this mood he rejects the democratic institutions.
V 20
Cultures/Rorty: have no axiomatic structures. That they have institutionalized norms, actually means the same as Foucault's thesis that knowledge and power can never be separated. If at a certain time at a certain place you do not believe in certain things, you'll probably have to pay for it.
V 21
RortyVsFoucault: but these standards are not "rules of language" or "criteria of rationality". They have the look of officials and policemen. Whoever disagrees, commits the
Def Cartesian fallacy/Rorty: he sees axioms where nothing but shared habits reign.
R. Rorty
I Rorty Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt/M 1997
II Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt 2000
III Rorty Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität, Frankfurt,1992
IV Rorty Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart (Reclam)1993
V Rorty Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
VI Rorty Wahrheit und Fortschritt, Frankfurt 2000
Various Authors Goodman Vs Various Authors I 81
GoodmanVsIntrinsic/Extrinsic: this does apparently not work: because in every classification of properties in extrins./intrins. each image or each object has both internal and external poperties.
II Preamble Putnam IX
GoodmanVsFormalism for the Sake of Formalism. GoodmanVsIdea of ​​an ontological basement independent from our theorizing
II 10
It is not true that science could do without unreal conditional clauses. The tendency to dismiss the problems of unr. conditional clauses as a pseudo-problem or unsolvable is understandable considering the great difficulties (GoodmanVs.) If you drop all problems of disposition, possibility, scientific law, confirmation, etc., then you are in fact giving up the philosophy of science.
II 67
The argument that one should better dispense with the definition of an expression if it was not usually defined by scientists or laymen, is similar to the argument that philosophy need not be systematic, because the reality described by it is not systematic (VsAdorno). You might as well say that philosophy should not be in German, because the reality is not written in German.
II 70
(s) SalmonVsGoodman: Objects do not need to appear at all times, but places must be there at all times! ((s) GoodmanVs: Description dependence for him does not only refer to objects, but to the whole of reality. (VsKant)) Kant: space and time are not reality, but the condition for the possibility to experience reality. III 67 Presentation/Empathy/GoodmanVsEmpathy Theory: Gestures do not need to have features in common with music.
III 81
Metaphor: the general question: What does a metaphor say and what makes it true? GoodmanVsMetaphor as abridged comparison: sometimes we say a metaphor is elliptically designed and the metaphorical truth was simply understood as the literal truth of the extended statement. But the comparison cannot just result in the image of the person being similar in one respect or another. In this way, everything is similar to everything.
III 224
GoodmanVs"Special Aesthetic Emotion" - GoodmanVs Theory that it does not depend on the pleasure that one has, but on a certain "objectified pleasure": Goodman: Then the pleasure would be something that the object must have, and indeed rather without causing it; ultimately it would therefore probably have to feel this pleasure itself.
III 228
GoodmanVsDichotomy between the Cognitive and the Emotional. It blocks the insight that emotions work cognitively in the aesthetic experience.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997
Various Authors Luhmann Vs Various Authors Habermas I 436
VsParsons: simply reproduces the classical model through systems. (Social system = action system). Luhmann instead: human as part of the environment of society. This changes the premises of all questions. Methodical anti-humanism.
Habermas I 440
LuhmannVsHumanism: "Cardinal Error". A fusion of social and material dimensions.
Reese-Schäfer II 28
LuhmannVsDualism: of observer and object. Universality/Vs: the total view, the universality had to be given up and was replaced by "critique", with which the subject's point of view on universality is rounded up again". Foundation/Luhmann: there is no last stop. (Like Quine, Sellars, Rorty).
Reese-Schäfer II 42
VsMarx: rejects the speech of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly aspire to the same good. Contradiction/Luhmann: arises only from the self-reference of sense. Not as in Marx.
Contradictions/Legal System: does not serve for the avoidance, but for the regulation of conflicts.
Reese-Schäfer II 78
Freedom of Value: (Max Weber): the renunciation of valuations is, so to speak, the blind spot of a second level observation.
Reese-Schäfer II 89
Vs Right Politics: here there is no theory at all that would be able to read other theories. There is only apercus or certain literary guiding ideas. Reese-Schäfer II 90/91
VsGehlen: we do not have to subordinate ourselves to the institutions.
Reese-Schäfer II 102
VsAction Theory: a very vague concept of individuals that can only be defined by pointing at people. Thus language habits are presented as language knowledge: because language requires us to employ subjects. LL. Language.
Reese-Schäfer II 103
Reason/VsAdorno: one should not resign oneself (dialectic of the Enlightenment) but ask whether it does not get better without reason!
Reese-Schäfer II 112
Overstimulation/LuhmannVsTradition: cannot take place at all. For already the neurophysiological apparatus drastically shields the consciousness. The operative medium sense does the rest.
Reese-Schäfer II 138
Human/Gehlen: tried to determine the human from its difference to the animal. (LuhmannVs).
AU Cass. 3
VsParsons: Terminology limited by structural functionalism: one could not ask about the function of structures, or examine terms such as inventory or inventory prerequisite, variable or the whole methodological area. Limitation by the fact that a certain object was assumed as given. There were no criteria for the existence of the object - instead the theory must be able to contain all deviance and dysfunction. (not possible with Parsons) - Question: in which time period and which bandwidths is a system identifiable? (e.g. Revolution: is society still the same society afterwards?) Inventory criteria Biology: Definition by death. The living reproduces itself by its own means. Self-reference (important in modern system theory) is not possible within the framework of the Parsons' model. Therefore we need interdisciplinary solutions.

VsAction Theory: the concept of action is not suitable because an actor is assumed! But it also exists without an observer! In principle, an action can be presented as a solitary thing without social resonance! - Paradox/Luhmann: the procedure of the dissolution of the paradox is logically objectionable, but is constantly applied by the logicians themselves: they use a change of levels. The only question that must not be asked is: what is the unity of the difference of planes?
(AU Cass. 4)
VsEquilibrium Theories: questionable today; 1. from the point of view of natural science: it is precisely the imbalances which are stable, equilibrium is rather metaphor.
(AU Cass. 6)
Tradition: "Transmission of patterns from generation to generation". Stored value patterns that are offered again and again and adopted by the offspring. However, these patterns are still the same. VsTradition: Question: Where does identity come from in the first place? How could one talk about selfhood without an external observer? That will not be much different either with the assumptions of a reciprocal relationship with learning. Luhmann: instead: (Autopoiesis): Socialization is always self-socialization.
AU Cass 6
Information/Luhmann: the term must now be adapted to it! In the 70s one spoke of "genetic information", treated structures as informative, the genetic code contained information.
Luhmann: this is wrong, because genes only contain structures and no events!
The semantic side of the term remained unexplained for a long time, i.e. the question of what information can choose from.

Reese-Schäfer II 76
LuhmannVsMarx/Reese-Schäfer: rejects the talk of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly strive for the same good.
AU Cass 11
Emergence/Reductionism/System Theory/Luhmann: this does not even pose the actual question: what actually distinguishes an emergent system? What is the characteristic for the distinction from the basal state? What is the criterion that enables emergence? Will Martens: (Issue 4, Kölner Zeitschrift f. Sozialforschung): Autopoiesis of social systems.
It deals with the question following the concept of autopoiesis and communication.
Communication/Luhmann: Tripartite structure:
Information,
Communication, Understanding (not action sequences). (Comes from linguistics, but also antiquity!).
Martens: this tripartite division is the psychological foundation of communication. Communication must first be negotiated in the individual head, I must see what I assume to be unknown and what I want to choose, and my body must also be in good shape.
Marten's thesis: sociality only comes about in the synthesis of these three components.
Social things arise when information, communication and understanding are created as a unit with repercussions on the participating mental systems, which must behave accordingly.
The unity is only the synthesis itself, while the elements still have to be described psychologically or biologically etc. Without this foundation it does not work.
LuhmannVsMartens: I hope you fall for it! At first that sounds very plausible. But now comes the question:
What is communicated in the text by Martens? Certainly not the blood circulation! There is also no blood in the text! The editors would already fight this off, there is also no state of consciousness in the text! So I cannot imagine what the author was thinking! I can well imagine that he was supplied with blood and sat in front of the computer. And that he wanted to take part in the discussion.
Luhmann: these are all constructions which are suggested in communication, but which are not actually present in communication. (>Interpenetration).
Communication/LuhmannVsMartens: Question: what is actually claimed in the text, and does it not actually refute it itself?
Paradox: the text that tells of blood and thoughts claims to bring blood and thoughts, but it only brings letters and what a skilled reader can make of the text. That is communication. That is all I can actually see!
Communication/Luhmann: if you think realistically and operatively, you cannot see more in the text. We have to put the words together from the letters ourselves.
When psychic systems respond to communication, they change their internal states accordingly.
Communication/Luhmann: if one has received this message (from Martens), one can say: everything is actually correct, one could describe a communication completely on the basis of physical or psychological facts. Nothing would be missing, with the exception of autopoiesis itself.
Question: we have to explain how communication maintains itself without incorporating psychological and physical operations!
Luhmann: this reproduction of communication through communication goes only through total exclusion from physical, psychological, etc. operations.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992
German Edition:
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Reese-Schäfer II
Walter Reese-Schäfer
Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001