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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Assertibility | Lewis | V 139 Assertibility/conditional/semantics/: we assume assertibility instead of truth because of the probability. However, assertibility is best gained through truth conditions plus a sincerity condition. Adams: the other way around: there are truth conditions not for the entire conditional, but individually for antecedent and consequent "plus a rule that assertibility of the indicative conditional is possible with the conditional subjective probability of the consequent given by the antecedent. Lewis pro (>Adams Conditional). LewisVsAdams: means something different: he calls this "indicative conditional" what Lewis calls a "probability conditional". Adams: the probability of conditionals is not equal to the probability of truth. AdamsVsLewis: probability of conditionals does not obey the standard laws of probability. Solution/Lewis: if we do not mention truth, probability of conditionals obeys the standard laws. Then the indicative conditional has no truth value and no truth conditions, i.e. Boolean connections, but no truth-functional ones (not Truth Functional). V 142 Assertibility/conditional/Lewis: assertibility should correspond to the subjective probability (Lewis pro Grice). The assertibility is reduced by falsehood or trivial being-true. This leads to conditional probability. From this we have to deduct the measured assertibility from the probability of the truth of the truth-functional conditional (horseshoe, ⊃). |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Leibniz Principle | Adams | Millikan I 261 VsLeibniz' Principle/Law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: Thesis: the principle that is used when such symmetrical worlds are constructed, the principle that an individual cannot be distinguished from itself, so the two world parts of the world cannot be the same half. >Leibniz principle, Leibniz' law/VsVs/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of Hacking): the objections do not consider the fact that this could be about a curved space instead of a doubling. Curved Space/Hacking/Millikan: here one thing and the same thing emerges again, it is not a doubling as in the Euclidean geometry. >Space curvature. MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question. I 262 But there are still two interesting possibilities: >Indistinguishability. Leibniz' Law/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan: 1. symmetrical world: one could argue that there is simply no fact here that decides whether the space is curved or doubled. >Nonfactualism. N.B.: this would imply that Leibniz' principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention. 2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very well be a fact whether the space is curved or not. A certain given space cannot be both! N.B.: then Leibniz' principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary. N.B.: but in this case this is not a question of convention, but a real fact! MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong take that into account. Curved space/Millikan: here, what is identical is necessarily identical ((s) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if the one half had been different, then also the other. Here the space seems to be only doubled. >Counterfactual conditional, >Counterfactuals. Doubling/Millikan: if the space (in Euclidean geometry) is mirrored, then the identity is random, but not necessary. Here one half could change without changing the other half. ((s) No counterfactual conditional). Identity: is given if the objects are not indistinguishable because a law applies in situ, but a natural law, a natural necessity. >Natural laws. I 263 Then, in the second option, identity is derived from causality. (x)(y){[NN(F)Fx ⇔ Fy] ⇔ x = y} NN/Notation: nature-necessary under necessary circumstances. >Necessity, >Possible worlds. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Leibniz Principle | Millikan | I 259 Leibniz Principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Leibniz/Millikan: Thesis: I treat his principle so that it is an implicit assertion about grammatical categories. (x)(y)[(F)(Fx equi Fy) > x = y] Problem: what is the domain of the quantifier "(F)"? ((s) >second order logic). Here, there cannot simply elements of the domain be paired with grammatical predicates. The set of grammatical predicates may not be of ontological interest. E.g. neither "... exists" nor "... = A" nor "... means red" is paired with something which has the same meaning as "... is green" paired with a variant of a world state. Quantification/properties/2nd order logic/Millikan: perhaps we can say that the quantifier (F) is about all properties, but we must characterize this set differently than by pairing with grammatical predicates. Second order logic, >Quantification, >Properties. False: For example, the attempt of Baruch Brody's thesis: "to be identical with x" should be understood as a property of x "in the domain of the quantifier (F)" is quite wrong! ((s) "be identical with oneself" as a property). If so, then every thing that has all the properties of x would be identical with x. ((s) Even if it had additional properties). Problem: under this interpretation, property is not a coherent ontological category. How can we treat the Leibniz principle, and keep the notion of "property" so that it is ontologically coherent? I 260 Leibniz principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan: the Leibniz principle is usually regarded as a claim about the identity of individual substances. Substances in which it is useful to attribute to them place and time. That is, "x" and "y" go over individuals. Quantifier: (F) is generally understood in the way that it only goes via "general properties". Or via "purely qualitative properties". Purely qualitative properties: i.e. that they are not defined with regard to certain individuals: e.g. the property "to be higher than Mt. Washington" N.B.: but: "the property of being higher than something that has these and these properties and which are the properties of Mt. Washington". Individual related properties/Millikan: are normally excluded because they would allow properties like "to be identical to x". That would lead to an empty reading of the Leibniz principle. MillikanVs: but it is not at all the case that "is identical to x" would not correspond to any reasonable property. Leibniz principle/Millikan: however, the principle is mostly examined in the context of the domain of general properties in relation to... I 261 ...the domain of things that have these properties. Thus there ist the question: do we have to postulate a domain of such things beyond the domain of these general properties, or can we define the self-identity of an individual in purely qualitative expressions? Leibniz principle/Millikan: in this context, the relation to a particular individual ((s) and thus of the thing to itself) appears to be an impure or mixed ontological category. VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Indistinguishable/Millikan: the classic objection VsLeibniz is to point out the possibility that the universe could be perfectly symmetrical, whereby then a perfectly identical (indistinguishable) individual would be in another place. >Identity, >Indistinguishability. ((s) That is, there is something of x that is indistinguishable, which nevertheless is not identical with x, against the Leibniz principle). (See also Adams, below). Variants: For example, a temporal repetitive universe, etc. e.g. two identical water drops, two identical billiard balls at different locations. ((s) Why then identical? Because the location (the coordinates) does not have influence on the identity!) Property/Leibniz: Thesis: a relation to space and time leads to a property which is not purely qualitative. Millikan: if one ignores such "impure" properties ((s) thus does not refer to space and time), the two billiard balls have the same properties! VsLeibniz Principle/Law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: Thesis: the principle that is used when such symmetrical worlds are constructed, is the principle that an individual cannot be distinguished (separated) from itself, so the two world halfs of the world cannot be one and the same half. Leibniz principle/VsVs/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of hacking): the objections do not consider that this could be a curved space instead of a doubling. Curved Space/Hacking/Millikan: here the same thing emerges again, it is not a doubling as in the Euclidean geometry. MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question. I 262 But there are still two interesting possibilities: >indistinguishability. Leibniz Principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan: 1. Symmetrical world: one could argue that there is simply no fact here that decides whether the space is curved or doubled. ((s) > nonfactualism). N.B.: this would imply that the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention. 2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very well be a fact whether the space is curved or not. A certain given space cannot be both! N.B.: then the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary. N.B.: but in this case this is not a question of convention, but a real fact! MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong take that into account. Curved space/Millikan: here, what is identical is necessarily identical ((s) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if the one half were different, then also the other. Here the space seems to be only double. Doubling/Millikan: if the space (in Euclidean geometry) is mirrored, the identity is a random, not a necessary one. Here one half could change without changing the other half. ((s) No counterfactual conditional). Identity: is then given when the objects are not indistinguishable because a law applies in situ, but a natural law, a natural necessity. I 263 Then, in the second option, identity from causality applies. (x) (y) {[NN (F) Fx equi Fy] equi x = y} Natural necessary/Notation: natural necessary under natural possible circumstances. Millikan: this is quite an extreme view, for it asserts that if there were two sets of equivalent laws that explain all events, one of these sets, but not the other, would be true, even if there was no possibility to find out which of the two sets it is that would be true. This would correspond to the fact that a seemingly symmetrical world was inhabited. Either the one or the other would be true, but one would never find out which one. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Possible Worlds | Adams | Stalnaker I 32 Possible worlds/Robert Adams: if there are true propositions that speak of the existence of nonactual possible worlds, they must be able to be reduced to sentences in which only things from the actual world are mentioned which are not identical with non-actual possibilities. >Possible worlds, >Actuality, >Actual world, >Possibility, >Counterfactuals. StalnakerVsAdams: I do not see why this should be necessary. Possible worlds/Stalnaker: Two questions: 1. Are they really so obscure? I 33 2. Does the belief in possible worlds and the indexical analysis of actuality oblige us to extreme realism? Certainly not. >Centered worlds. World stories/world-story/Possible worlds/Robert Adams: Thesis: a world-story is a maximally consistent set of propositions. The concept of a possible world can be given in a contextual analysis in terms of world stories. Proposition/Truth/Adams/Stalnaker: a proposition is true in some or all possible worlds if it is an element of some or all of the world-stories. StalnakerVsAdams: in his approach, there are three undefined terms: Proposition, consistent, and contradictory. >Propositions, >Consistency, >Contradiction. Proposals/Adams/Stalnaker: proposals can be presented as language-independent, abstract objects. They have truth values. >Truth value, >Abstract objects. Consistency/Adams/Stalnaker: consistency is a property of sets of propositions. >Consistency. One can define them in terms of possible worlds in which all propositions are true. I 34 Two conditions for consistency: (W1) The set of all true propositions is consistent (W2) Each subset of a consistent set is consistent. Contradiction/Adams/Stalnaker: contradiction could be defined in terms of consistency: A and B are contradictory, iff. {A, B} is not consistent And for each consistent set of propositions Γ is either Γ U {A} or Γ U {B} consistent. The theory presupposes: (W3) Each proposition has a contradiction. Proposition/Adams/Stalnaker: this is a minimal theory of propositions. It does not impose any structure on propositions, except for what is needed for compatibility, implication, and equivalence. And to ensure that e.g. the right kind of implication is present. E.g. implication: Definition Implication/Proposition/Stalnaker: (here): A implies B iff. a set consisting of A and a contradiction of B is not consistent. (W1) and (W2) ensure that our implication has the right properties. Stalnaker I 36 Proposition/Possible World/Stalnaker: an analysis of propositions as worlds provides definitions of consistency, etc., in concepts of set-theoretical relations between sets of worlds. World Story Theory/Adams/Stalnaker: the theory of world stories is weaker because it leaves open questions that clarify the analysis of propositions as worlds. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. The following two theses are consequences of the possible-worlds-theory but not of the world-story theory: (W5) Seclusion condition: For any set of propositions G there is a proposition A such that G implies A and A implies every element of G. Stalnaker: i.e. that for any set of propositions there is a proposition which says that every proposition in the set is true. Proposition/Seclusion/Stalnaker: whatever propositions are, if there are any, there are also sets of them. And for any set of propositions, it is definitely true or false that all their elements are true. And of course this is a proposition. So I assume that the world-story theorist wants to add (W5) to his theory. (W6) Equivalent propositions are identical. Problem: the problems of (W6) are known. ((s)> hyperintensionalism/hyperintentionality: sentences that are true in the same worlds are indistinguishable, equivalence of "snow is white" to "grass is green", etc.). >Hyperintensionality, >Semantics of Possible Worlds. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Qualia | Adams | Rorty VI 405 Historism/Rorty: it is no coincidence that the historicity of philosophy today is questioned above all by the authors, who stress that it is necessary to recognize the "existence of the unspeakable". E.g. Robert Adams: Thesis: only the existence of God can explain the interrelationship between brain and qualia. Qualia/Robert Adams: Qualia is not analysable, therefore it is not traceable to elementary particles. Reductionism "can be disproved by seeing red or tasting onions." RortyVsAdams: this refutation is a typical "invocation to the unspeakable". An invocation to a kind of knowledge that cannot be questioned by any re-description. For here it is not a question of knowledge of descriptions, but of knowledge by direct acquaintance. ((s) Non-transferable) >Knowledge by acquaintance, >Description. Rorty VI 406 RortyVsAdams: a lot has to be established already in the language before a plausible invocation to the taste of onions is possible at all. Rorty VI 413 Sense qualities/Nagel: sense qualities have invariant conditions. (Also Robert Adams). >Sensory impressions, >Qualities. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Qualia | Rorty | VI 153 Qualia/Wittgenstein/Sellars/Rorty: the awareness of qualia is nothing more than to learn how to formulate judgments about qualia - that presupposes a relationship between qualia and non-qualia. >Judgments, >Experience, >Perception, >Sensory impression. VI 405f Robert Adams: only the existence of God could explain the correlation between brain and qualia. Qualia/Robert Adams: cannot be analyzed, therefore not traceable to elementary particles. Reductionism "can be refuted by the fact that one sees red or tastes onions". RortyVsAdams: this refutation is a typical "citing of the unspeakable". A reference to a kind of knowledge that cannot be questioned by any new description. For this is not knowledge by description, but knowledge by direct acquaintance. ((s) It cannot be transferred.) >Knowledge by acquaintance, >Redescription/Rorty. RortyVsAdams: a lot must be provided in the language before a plausible reference to the taste of onions is possible at all. See also Sellars: Rorty I 206 Language/Sellars/Rorty: the peculiarity of language is not that it "changes the quality of our experience" or "opens up new perspectives for consciousness". Rather, its acquisition gives us access to a community whose members justify their assertions to each other. >Wilfrid Sellars, >Robert Adams. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Adams, R. | Stalnaker Vs Adams, R. | I 32 Possible Worlds/Poss.W./Robert Adams: if there are true sentences in which the existence of non-actual possible worlds is mentioned, it must be possible to reduce them to sentences in which only things from the actual world are mentioned that are not identical with non-actual possibilities. StalnakerVsAdams: I do not see why that should be necessary. World Stories/Possible Worlds/Robert Adams: Thesis: a world story is a maximum consistent quantity of propositions. The concept of a possible world can be given in a contextual analysis in terms of world stories. Proposition/Truth/Adams/Stalnaker: a proposition is true in some or all possible worlds if it is an element of some or all of the world stories. StalnakerVsAdams: in his approach, there are three undefined terms: Proposition, consistent and contradictory. Propositions/Adams/Stalnaker: can be language-independent, abstract objects. They have truth values. Consistency/Adams/Stalnaker: is a property of sets of propositions. They can be defined in terms of possible worlds in which all propositions are true. I 34 Two conditions for consistency: (W1) The set of all true propositions is consistent (W2) Every subset of a consistent set is consistent. Contradiction/Adams/Stalnaker: could be defined in terms of consistency: A and B are contradictory, iff {A,B} is not consistent and for each set of consistent propositions Γ either Γ U {A} or Γ U {B} is consistent. The theory assumes: (W3) Every proposition has a contradiction. Proposition/Adams/Stalnaker: this is a minimal theory of propositions. It does not impose any structure on the propositions except what is needed for the sake of compatibility, implication and equivalence. And to ensure, for example, that the right kind of implication exists. E.g. implication: Def Implication/Proposition/Stalnaker: (here): A implies B iff a set consisting of A and a contradiction of B is not consistent. (W1) and (W2) ensure that our implication has the right properties. This minimal theory is suited to support the view of Adams: Possibility/Robert Adams: Thesis: possibility is rather holistic than atomistic, in the sense that what is possible only exists as part of a possible completely determinate world. ((s) there are no isolated possibilities). Stalnaker: so far, our considerations do not imply that every consistent set of propositions is a subset of a world story. For the following (W4) does not follow from them, but must be added as an addition: (W4) Every consistent set is a subset of a maximum consistent set. I 36 Proposition/Possible World/Stalnaker: in contrast, an analysis of propositions as possible worlds provides definitions of consistency and so on in terms of set-theoretic relations between sets of possible worlds. World Stories Theory/Possible World/Adams/Stalnaker: the theory of the world stories is weaker, because it leaves open questions that are clarified by the analysis of propositions as possible worlds. The following two theses are consequences of the possible world theory, but not of the world stories theory: (W5) Closure Condition: For each set of propositions Γ there is a proposition A such that G implies A and A implies every element of G. Stalnaker: i.e. for each set of propositions, there is a proposition that says that every proposition in the set is true. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Millikan Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 261 VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz' law/principle/identity/indistinguishability/the indistinguishable/Millikan: the classic objection VsLeibniz is to point out the possibility that the universe might be perfectly symmetrical, in which case there would be a perfectly identical ((S) indistinguishable) individual at another place. ((S) That is, there would be something indistinguishable from x, which would still not be identical to x, against Leibniz principle). Variants: Ex a time-repetitive universe etc. Ex two identical drops of water, two identical billiard balls at various locations. Property/Leibniz: thesis: a reference to space and time leads to a property that is not purely qualitative. Millikan: if one disregards such "impure" properties ((S) does not make a reference to space and time), the two billiard balls have the same properties! VsLeibniz' principle/law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: thesis: the principle that is used when constructing such symmetrical worlds, is the principle that an individual can not be distinguished (separated) from themselves, therefore, the two halves of the world can not be one and the same half. Leibniz' law/VSVS/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of Hacking): The objections do not respond to the fact that there could be a curved space instead of a duplication. Curved space/Hacking/Millikan: here emerges one and the same thing again, there is no duplication as in Euclidean geometry. MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question. I 262 But there are still two interesting options: Leibniz' law/principle/identity/ indistinguishability/Millikan: 1. symmetrical world: it could be argued that there is simply no fact here, which determines whether space is curved or doubled. ((s)> Nonfactualism). Pointe: this would imply that Leibniz's principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention. 2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but rather the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very much be a fact, whether the space is curved or not. Because a certain given space can not be both! Pointe: then the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary. Pointe: but in this case this is then no matter of convention, but a real fact! MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong consider that. Curved space/Millikan: what is identical is then necessarily identical ((S) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if one half would have been different, then the other one, too. Here space generally seems to be double. Duplication/Millikan: when the space is mirrored (in Euclidean geometry) the identity is random, not necessary. Here one half could change without the other half changing. ((S) No counterfactual conditional). Identity: is given when the objects are not indistinguishable because a law in situ applies, but a law of nature, a naturally necessary agreement. I 263 Then identity of causality applies in the second option. (X) (y) {[NN (F) ⇔ Fx Fy] ⇔ x = y} Natural necessity/notation: naturally necessary under naturally possible circumstances. MillikanVsVerifikationismus: if my theory is correct, it must be wrong. Truth/world/relationship/Millikan: thesis: ultimately, meaningfulness and truth lie in relations between thought and the world. I 264 Therefore, they can not be in the head, we can not internalize them. I 268 Properties/Millikan: thesis: Properties (of one or more parts) that fall into the same area, are properties that are opposites of each other. Certainly, an area can contain another area. Ex "red" includes "scarlet" instead of excluding it and Ex "being two centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" includes "being 2.05 centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" rather than excluding this property. The assumption that two properties may be the same only if the complete opposite regions from which they come coincide, implies that the identity of a property or property area is linked to the identity of a wider range from which it comes, and therefore is bound to the identity of their opposites. Now we compare Leibniz' view with that of Aristotle: Identity/Leibniz/Millikan: all single properties are intrinsically comparable. However, perhaps not comparable in nature, because God has just created the best of all possible worlds - but they would be metaphysically comparable. complex properties/Leibniz/Millikan: that would be properties that are not comparable. They also include absences or negations of properties. They have the general form "A and not B". ((S) Comparison/comparability/comparable/Millikan/(S): composite properties are not comparable Ex "A and not B".) Of course, it is incompatible with the property "A and B". Pointe: thus the metaphysical incompatibility rests on the logical incompatibility. That is, on the contradiction. I 269 Necessity/Leibniz/Millikan: then God has first created logical necessity and later natural necessity. ("In the beginning…"). opposite properties/opposite/property/Leibniz/Millikan: according to Leibniz opposite properties are of two kinds: 1. to attribute both contradictory properties to one thing then would be to contradict oneself ((S) logically) or 2. the contradiction between the properties would lie in their own nature. But that would not lie in their respective nature individually but would be established by God, which prevented the properties from ever coming together. MillikanVsLeibniz. Identity/Properties/Aristotle/Millikan: opposite properties: for Aristotle, they serve to explain that nothing can be created from nothing. Def opposite property/Aristotle: are those which defy each others foundation, make each other impossible. The prevention of another property is this property! Alteration/transformation/change/Aristotle/Millikan: when a change occurs, substances acquire new properties, which are the opposites of the previous properties. Opposite/Aristotle is the potentiality (possibility) of the other property. Then, these opposites are bound at the most fundamental level (in nature) to each other. Millikan pro Aristotle: he was right about the latter. In Aristotle there is no "beginning" as in Leibniz. Properties/Opposite/Leibniz/Millikan pro Leibniz: was right about the assertion that two opposite properties that apply to the same substance is a contradiction. But this is about an indefinite negation, not the assertion of a specific absence. Or: the absence is the existence of an inconsistency. Ex Zero/0/modern science/mathematics: is not the assertion of nothing: Ex zero acceleration, zero temperature, empty space, etc. Zero represents a quantity. Non-contradiction/law of non-contradiction/Millikan: then, is a template of an abstract world structure or something that is sufficient for such a template. Epistemology/epistemic/Leibniz/Aristotle/Millikan: the dispute between Leibniz and Aristotle appears again at the level of epistemology: I 270 Ex the assertion "x is red" is equivalent to the statement "x looks red for a standard observer under standard conditions". Problem: from "x is red" follows that "x does not look red for ... under ...". ontologically/ontology: equally: not-being-red would be an emptiness, an absence of red - rather than an opposite of red. But it is about "x is non-red" being equivalent to "x does not look red under standard conditions" is either empty or incorrect. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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