Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Actualism Dennett I 143
Actualism/Dennett: only that what is real is possible - The mind can only be regarded as an activity, not as a substance.
I 163
Determinism/actualism/Dennett: some authors: if determinism is correct, actualism must also be correct. Or the other way around. If actualism is wrong, indeterminism would have to be right - DennettVs: this is wrong! E.g. This oxygen atom can combine with two hydrogen atoms. So something is possible which is not real now, therefore determinism is wrong. DennettVsActualism: it is wrong, regardless of the truth or falsity of determinism. >Determinism.
I 249
Actualism/DennettVsNietzsche: he did not believe in any variants, but in exact repetition. Therefore he was a follower of actualism.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Actualism Dennett Vs Actualism I 162
Determinism/Actualism/Dennett: some authors: if the determinism is correct, the actualism must also be right. Or the other way around. If the actualism was wrong, indeterminism would have to be right.   DennettVs: that’s wrong. E.g. This oxygen atom can combine with two hydrogen atoms. So something is possible which is not real now, so the determinism is false. >Determinism.
  DennettVsActualism: it is wrong, regardless of the truth or falsity of the determinism.
I 249
DennettVsNietzsche: he did not believe in any variants, but in exact repetition. Therefore, he was a follower of actualism.
I 360
Dennett: we reject actualism, but how may we not go so far in the other direction as to assert that the space of the real possibilities is more densely occupied than is the case.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Actualism Lewis Vs Actualism Stalnaker I 6
Possible Worlds/Existence/Stalnaker: Dilemma: a) Realism: one can say that there is a variety of worlds.
b) Actualism: one can say that only one - our real world - is actual, the rest is only possible.
Then actualism contradicts realism.

Actualism/realism/possible worlds/Stalnaker: Both positions say it can be explained as a misunderstanding.
Realism/Stalnaker: According to him, the misunderstanding can be found in the realm of the quantifier: if it is unlimited, then the statement that there are many possible worlds is true. But the quantifier is often limited to a subset of what exists, and if interpreted as such, the statement is false.
I 7
Actualism/Stalnaker: This explanation is not at his disposal because he says that the actual concurs with the real, so that both limited and unlimited quantification concur. For him the misunderstanding is embedded in the term "world". When we are talking about the actual world, we are talking about the state of something.
Existence/to exist/Instance/to be instantiated/Stalnaker: There are, however, many different modes of how a world can be and these modes are presently existing.
But only one of those modes is instantiated. And only one universe is instantiated.
Possible worlds/Stalnaker: It would not be true to say that there is a number of possible worlds. It would, however, be true to say that there is number of modes.
Possible worlds/Stalnaker: It could be said that they can exist without having instances.
Ersatz world/Ersatzwelt/LewisVsStalnaker/LewisVsActualism: This is what Lewis calls "ersatz worlds": in the same vein: a current king of France would be an "ersatz king". >Ersatz world/Lewis.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Actualism Wittgenstein Vs Actualism Wittgenstein I 306
Possibility/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Comparisons "logically possible" with "chemically possible". Not any possible connection must exist VsActualism. (Act: "Only the real is possible"). E.g. also a compound HO2 in reality cannot less correspond to something, as no connection.


W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Determinism Dennett Vs Determinism I 162
Determinism/actualism/Dennett: some authors: if determinism is true, also the actualism must be true. Or vice versa. If actualism is false, indeterminism must be true. >Actualism.   DennettVs: this is wrong! E.g. This oxygen atom can combine with two hydrogen atoms. So something is possible, which is not real now, so determinism is false.
  DennettVsActualism: is wrong, regardless of the truth or falsity of determinism.

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005