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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Acts of Will | Nietzsche | Danto III 136 Will/Nietzsche/Danto: If it is true that Nietzsche tries to escape the usual distinction between mental and material, then the will to power must seem contradictory. After all, "will" is an expression concerning the mental. (See Causality/Nietzsche, I, Ego, Self/Nietzsche, Subject/Nietzsche). Danto: That is not true. As with Schopenhauer, we have to combine connotations in Nietzsche concerning the usual and mental with the concept of "will" in the metaphysical sense. The will to power is not limited to the mental. If we do not respect this, we cannot understand Nietzsche. NietzscheVsActs of Will: Nietzsche attacks the "Acts of Will", which are not only accepted by philosophers. Danto III 137 Acts of Will/Danto: Acts of Will behave to actions like causes to effects. Hume/Danto: Hume rejected the idea that we could have an experience that corresponds to our idea of the causal nexus, how our will becomes active through our body parts or thoughts. Hume: we have absolutely no idea how the will works. Nevertheless, Hume accepts acts of will. >Regress. NietzscheVsHume: is more radical, there is simply nothing that can be proven to be linked to our actions. Danto III 138 Thinking/Certainty/Subject/NietzscheVsDescartes: Nietzsche disproves the Cartesian thought that our own mental processes are immediately transparent to us, that we know about our way of thinking. He disproves it by setting up a series of interlinked thoughts and letting them "freeze": When Descartes talks about his doubts about reality being at least certainly his own doubts, he drags a lot of tacit assumptions with him. NietzscheVsDescartes: if his argumentation boils down to an "It is thought", our belief in the concept of substance is already assumed and a subject is accepted.(1) >Reality/Nietzsche, >Subject/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 577. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Will | Nietzsche | Danto III 136 Will/Nietzsche/Danto: If it is true that Nietzsche tries to escape the usual distinction between mental and material, then the will to power must seem contradictory. After all, "will" is an expression concerning the spiritual. (See Causality/Nietzsche, I, Ego, Self/Nietzsche, Subject/Nietzsche). Danto: That is not true. As with Schopenhauer, Nietzsche's usual connotations concerning the spiritual are combined with the concept of "will" in the metaphysical sense. The will to power is not limited to the mental. If we do not respect this, we cannot understand Nietzsche. NietzscheVsActs of Will: Nietzsche attacks the "Acts of Will", which are not only accepted by philosophers. Danto III 137 Acts of Will/Danto: behave to actions like causes to effects. Hume/Danto: Hume rejected the idea that we could have an experience that corresponds to our idea of causal nexus, just how our will becomes active through our body parts or thoughts. Hume: we have absolutely no idea how the will works. Nevertheless, Hume accepts acts of will. NietzscheVsHume: is more radial, there is simply nothing that can be proven to be linked to our actions. Danto III 138 Thinking/Certainty/Subject/NietzscheVsDescartes: Nietzsche disproves the Cartesian thought that our own mental processes are immediately transparent, that we know about our way of thinking. He disproves it by setting up a series of interlinked thoughts and letting them "freeze": When Descartes talks about his doubts about reality being at least certain that these are his own doubts, he drags a lot of tacit assumptions with him. NietzscheVsDescartes: if his argumentation boils down to an "It is thought", our belief in the concept of substance is already assumed and after that a subject is assumed.(1) Danto III 140 Will/NietzscheVsSchopenhauer/Nietzsche/Danto: The philosophers tend to talk about the will as if it were the most known thing in the world; yes, Schopenhauer suggested that the will alone was known to us.(2) DantoVsSchoepenhauer: in reality this is not the case. There is no simple, self-identifiable mental operation that would be recognized as an act of will and intuitively grasped. Nietzsche: There is no 'will': this is just a simplistic conception of the mind.(3) Danto III 141 Will/Nietzsche: Perhaps the worst of all these fallacies is the conclusion that 'wanting is enough for action'.(4) Danto III 143 Will/Nietzsche/Danto: The will does not move any more, therefore it does not explain anything - it merely accompanies processes, it can also be missing.(5) Danto: if there is no will, there is no free or unfree will.(6) Freedom of will/Nietzsche/Danto: This conclusion is hasty: the doctrine of free will does not depend at all on a psychological theory about the will as a mental phenomenon; 'free' is applied to actions, but not to the will. Nietzsche mostly puts the argument about free will on ice, the idea of free will is due to "logical emergency breeding". 1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 577. 2. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.,2 S.25. 3. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 913. 4. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.,2 S.27. 5. F. Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, KGW VI,3 S. 85. 6. Vgl. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 913. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tradition | Ryle Vs Tradition | Lanz I 275 Ryle: psychological statements are hypothetical statements. They are also verifiable from the perspective of the third person. It is not about causes, but about criteria and standards for skills and achievements. I 276 They denote behavioral dispositions and non-internal events that would be the causes of behavior. Intelligence/Tradition: intelligent action: rule or method knowledge, so to know a set of positions. That is, intelligent action would be action with an intelligent cause. (RyleVs). Intelligence/Ryle: there are many examples of intelligent action without consideration: E.g. quick-witted replies, spontaneously correct deciding (fast chess) practically clever behavior in games, in sports and others. I 277 RyleVsTradition: Regress: if intelligent action was the application of intelligence, then this application would again be an action for which intelligence would be necessary, ad infinitum. Definition Intelligence/Ryle: action with a certain level, with a certain quality. The actor possesses corresponding ability and uses them. Ryle I 373 Memory/Presentation/RyleVs trace theory: their followers should try to imagine the case in which someone has a melody stuck in his head. Is this a reactivated trace of auditory sensation, or a series of reactivated traces of a series of auditory sensations? Ryle I 66 Mental state/mind/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: even if there were the mythical inner states and activities assumed by some, one could not draw any likelihoods of their occurrence among others. --- I 84 VsVolition/VsActs of will/act of will/Ryle: both voluntary and involuntary acts of will are absurd. If my act of will is voluntary in the sense of theory, another act of will must have preceded it, ad infinitum (regress) It has been proposed for the avoidance that the act of will can be neither described as voluntary nor as involuntary. "Act of will" is a term that cannot accept predicates such as "virtuous", "vicious", "good" or "wicked," which may embarrass those moralists who use the acts of will as the emergency anchor of their systems. I 85 In short: the theory of acts of will is a causal hypothesis, and the question of voluntariness is a question of the cause. I 86 RyleVsTradition: some well-known and truly occurring events are often confused with acts of will: people are often in doubt what to do. The final choice is sometimes referred to as an act of will. But equality is untenable, for most voluntary actions do not come from a state of indifference! Weakness of will/akrasia/Ryle: it is also known that someone can decide, but the action is not carried out becacuse of weakness of will. Or he does not carry it out because of new circumstances. RyleVsTradition: Problem: According to the theory of acts of will, it would be impossible for them to sometimes not lead to results. Otherwise all new executed operations would have to be postulated which explains that voluntary actions are sometimes actually carried out. If a choice was called voluntary, it must have been preceeded by another choice, ad infinitum. Ryle I 87 If the action is not carried out, according to the theory (tradition) there is also no act of will. Ryle I 182 Introspection/Attention/RyleVsTradition: In the case of an inspection, one would have to ask again whether it is attentive or inattentive. (Regress) Vs: That also pretends that there is a difference in having an irritation of the throat and the statement that one has it. Not only is attention far from being a kind of inspection or listening, but inspecting and listening are themselves specific ways of exercising attention. Whether metaphorically or literally, a viewer can always be attentive or inattentive. To do something with attention is not to link an activity with a bit of theorizing, exploring, inspecting, or knowing. Otherwise, any action done with attention would involve an infinite number of activities. VsIntellectualist tradition: as if the exercise of theory is the essential function of mind and contemplation the essence of this activity. Ryle I 215 Consciousness/Tradition/Ryle: According to the traditional theory, soul processes are not aware in the sense that we can report about them later, but that the opening up of their own incident is a feature of these incidents and cannot come after them. I 216 Tradition/Ryle: these alleged revelations would be expressed in the present and not in the past, if they were dressed in words at all. At the same time as I discover that my watch stands still, I also discover that I discover it. RyleVsTradition: this is a myth! 1. We usually know what we are doing. No "phosphorescence" theory is necessary. 2. That we know it does not imply that we are constantly thinking about it. 3. It does not imply that when we know something about ourselves, we encounter some ghostly phenomena. RyleVsTradition: The basic objection against the traditional theory which claims that the mind must know what it does because mental events are consciously or metaphorically "self-luminous" is that there are no such events. I 217 There are no events that take place in a world of any other kind. Consequently, there is also no need for such methods to make the acquaintance of inhabitants of such a world. RyleVsTradition/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: No one would ever want to say that he had gained some knowledge "out of his consciousness". It is a grammatical and logical abuse of the word "knowing" that the consciousness of my mental states is that I know them. It is nonsense to say that someone knows this thunderstorm, this colored surface or this act of concluding. This is just the wrong accusative for the verb "to know". The metaphor of light does not help here. Ryle I 388 Intellect/mind/use of symbols/Ryle: in practice, we do not regard every expression as an intellectual, but only the one understood as work. Border problems do not pose a problem for us. Some problem solving is intellectual, searching for the thimble is not, bridge is in the middle. Thinking/mind/intellect/RyleVsTradition/Ryle: for us, this is important: it means that both theories are wrong, the old with the special, occult organ, and the newer ones, which speak of particular intellectual processes such as judgments, conceptual perception, assumption, thinking through, etc. They pretend to have identification signs for things they cannot always identify in reality. Ryle I 391 Theory/Theories/Ryle: Nothing would be gained with the assertion that Einstein, Thucydides, Newton, and Columbus were concerned with the same activity. Sherlock Holmes's theories have not been constructed by the same means as those of Karl Marx. Both agreed, however, that they wrote theories in didactic prose. Theory/Tradition: To have a theory means to have learned one and not to forget it. To be at the place of destination. It does not mean doing something yourself. Theory/RyleVsTradition: Having a pen is to be able to write with it. Having a theory or a plan means being ready to communicate or apply it when the opportunity arises. Difference: the intelligent listener then acquires a theory, if he is wise, has understood it, he does not have to accept it at all. But we do not set up a theory primarily to be able to put it into words. Columbus did not go on journeys to increase the material for geographic studies. Definition having a theory/Ryle: is the ability to solve additional tasks. To be a Newton follower would not only mean saying what Newton had said, but also to do the same and say what he had said. --- Flor I 263 Can, to be able to/RyleVsTradition: "Legend": that an action can only be carried out intelligently if it is based on or accompanies a theoretical, intellectual performance. (Dualistic). Division in private, theoretical part of the activity and a practical, public. Can, to be able to: (know-how): cannot be determined by theoretical insight! (Knowing that this or that applies). Theoretical insight is itself a form of practice and cannot itself be intelligent or not intelligent! It is not plausible that any action, in which intelligence or its deficiency can be demonstrated, should include the consideration of theoretical statements, norms, or rules. There are also many actions for which there are no formulated rules or criteria for intelligent executio Flor I 264 Regress/Ryle: according to the dualistic notion, an intelligent action presupposes that there has been a theoretical consideration of statements, norms, or rules by which the activity is then carried out. This consideration, however, is itself an action that can be more or less intelligent. This leads to regress. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
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