Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstraction | Geach | I 223 Abstraction/FregeVsAbstraction: mere abstraction of differences does not create (identical) properties. Geach: E.g. Def "surmen" are identical if their surnames are identical. - So that is actually a subset of people, but the same set when abstracted from differences. Problem/Geach: that would not explain the word "surman". Solution/Quine: "Tangibility": properties had little sense when you used "red" etc. only as names of properties. GeachVsQuine: then we get all the problems with classes: E.g. "The property, to be a property that does not apply to itself" - would be parallel to Russell’s antinomy. >Russell's Paradox, >Properites, >Sets, >Subsets, >Set theory, >Distinctions, >Equality, >Predicates, >Predication. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Abstraction | Prior | I 64 "Extensional abstraction"/Prior: Extensional abstraction says that it is not about real entities but only surrogates. - E.g. identity of "nothing φ-es" with "everything that φ-es is not identical with itself." >Non-existence, >Identity, >Extensionality, >Extensions. I 133 PriorVsAbstraction: it is not certain whether the vernacular requires a.: E.g. Cook Wilson: instead of "Jones is musically talented": what is predicted, is musicality. >Everyday language, >Predication, >Attribution. PriorVs: "-ty" or "-ness" is always just a trick. Vsuniversals; > |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Conceptualism | Armstrong | Place I 25 Def Conceptualism/Place: (PlatoVs, Aristotle pro, Place pro). Everything belongs to one of these 4 categories: 1) concrete particular 2) property of a particular 3) situation 4) property of a situation (II 31 also property of a property e.g. syntactic relations within a sentence are relations between words. >Universals, >Property, >Situation, >Particulars. Def words: consist in certain formal properties either of an event (of vocal expression) or particular: (characters). >Words. II 26 Conceptualism/Armstrong: i.e. there are no abstractions such as numbers, sets or laws of nature (as states in the world, only as formulas that describe something. Universals/Conceptualism: exist in two respects: 1) in the sense in which its instances exist (they really occur) 2) in the sense that living organisms are predisposed to classify particulars, and that the classifications are represented in the semantic conventions of natural language - i.e. as abstractions due to similarities between particulars. Place II 49 ConceptualismVsAbstractions/Place: VsNominalization of "fragility" in subject position - VsPossible Worlds. >Possible worlds, >Abstraction. II 56 Conceptualism/Place: but conceptualism does not deny universals. Place III 110 Conceptualism/Similarity/Place: (pro like Martin): there must be a sense in which two things are similar, so that they can be "of the same kind" - in this sense they cannot be "inexactly" similar U/Species/Conceptualism/Place: U not in addition to the similarities between their instantiations - solution: "species", "U": viewed from the perspective of the object: which properties do the particulars need to have - "concept", "intention": affect the disposition of the mind for classification. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Conceptualism | Place | Place I 25 Def Conceptualism/Place: (PlatoVs, Aristotle pro, Place pro). Everything belongs to one of these 4 categories: 1) concrete particular 2) property of a particular 3) situation 4) property of a situation (II 31 also property of a property e.g. syntactic relations within a sentence are relations between words. >Universals, >Property, >Situation, >Particulars. Def words: consist in certain formal properties either of an event (of vocal expression) or particular: (characters). >Words. Armstrong II 26 Conceptualism/Armstrong: i.e. there are no abstractions such as numbers, sets or laws of nature (as states in the world, only as formulas that describe something. Universals/Conceptualism: exist in two respects: 1) in the sense in which its instances exist (they really occur) 2) in the sense that living organisms are predisposed to classify particulars, and that the classifications are represented in the semantic conventions of natural language - i.e. as abstractions due to similarities between particulars. Place II 49 ConceptualismVsAbstractions/Place: VsNominalization of "fragility" in subject position - VsPossible Worlds. >Possible worlds, >Abstraction. II 56 Conceptualism/Place: but conceptualism does not deny universals. Place III 110 Conceptualism/Similarity/Place: (pro like Martin): there must be a sense in which two things are similar, so that they can be "of the same kind" - in this sense they cannot be "inexactly" similar U/Species/Conceptualism/Place: U not in addition to the similarities between their instantiations - solution: "species", "U": viewed from the perspective of the object: which properties do the particulars need to have - "concept", "intention": affect the disposition of the mind for classification. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Semantics | Black | II 166 "General Semantics"/nominalism/Alfred Korzybski/Black: educational movement U.S. after World War 1 - VsLogic. E.g., distortions call on diseases - "cow" should be replaced by "Bessie". VsGeneral terms; VsAbstraction. >General terms, >Generalization, >Generality, >Abstraction, >Abstractness. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstraction | Berkeley Vs Abstraction | Ber I 233 BerkeleyVsAbstraction: if one erroneously assumes mental objects were physical or if one refines real things to general abstract terms or splits simple things with metaphysical craftsmanship into diverse parts. Where will this lead? But when I ask a simple person regarding the free will, they agree immediately. And I agree with them because of what I find inside me. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
| Abstraction | Prior Vs Abstraction | I 132 Thinking/Grammar/Prior: Othello thinks of Desdemona that she ...becomes ...thinks that... Difference: whether the gap for the verb is filled, but not that for the name. Nominalization: ("old game"): instead of "Desdemona is faithful": "It is true of Desdemona that she is faithful." (Introduction of "that"). That-Sentences: pronouns are almost always through abstracta (quasi-names). (>Cook Wilson): Subject/Predicate/Wilson: E.g. "Jones's musical": here it is not predicated "is musical", or "that he is musical," but "musicality". I 133 PriorVsWilson: but the difference is not very large. Moreover, the true relation is that between "Jones" and "he". Better. Attribution of musicality. The introduction of abstractions such as "ness", etc. is always a trick. Verb/Prior: is like a sentence: its job is to make names of sentences. A verb is a sentence with one or more gaps. Verbs can be composed in the same way as sentences. Every composition of a sentence is ipso facto a composition of the verbs it contains. I 134 PriorVsAbstraction: it is not certain whether the formal presentation of ordinary language sentences requires abstraction. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
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