Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Empathy | Neurobiology | Corr I 334 Empathy/Neurobiology: Agreeableness seems likely to be supported by brain systems that are involved in social information-processing. >Agreeableness, >Information processing. Brain regions associated with these forms of social information-processing include the medial prefrontal cortex (Seitz, Nickel and Azari 2006)(1), superior temporal sulcus (Allison, Puce and McCarthy 2000)(2), temporal-parietal junction (Saxe and Powell 2006)(3), and the mirror neuron system that includes inferior frontal gyrus and rostral posterior parietal cortex (Iacoboni 2007(4); Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004)(5). (Mirror neurons respond similarly when watching another agent perform a task and when performing it oneself.) Several fMRI studies using trait measures of empathy have reported findings that are directly relevant to the link between Agreeableness and social information-processing. In these studies, empathy was positively associated with activity in the mirror neuron system, medial prefrontal cortex, and/or superior temporal sulcus during observation and imitation of others’ actions (Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh and Keysers 2006(6); Kaplan and Iacoboni 2006)(7) or during perception of others’ emotional expressions (Chakrabarti, Bullmore and Baron-Cohen 2007(8); Schulte-Rüther, Markowitsch, Fink et al. 2007)(9). >Mirror neurons, >Theory of Mind. Other brain regions, beyond those typically identified as involved in social information-processing, have also been associated with trait measures of empathy. One study (Chakrabarti, Bullmore and Baron-Cohen 2007)(8) demonstrated that viewing different emotional expressions led to correlations of empathy with activity in brain regions functionally relevant to the specific emotion in question. 1. Seitz, R. J., Nickel, J. and Azari, N. P. 2006. Functional modularity of the medial prefrontal cortex: involvement in human empathy, Neuropsychology 20: 743–51 2. Allison, T., Puce, A. and McCarthy, G. 2000. Social perception from visual cues: role of the STS region, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4: 267–78 3. Saxe, R. and Powell, L. J. 2006. It’s the thought that counts: specific brain regions for one component of theory of mind, Psychological Science 17: 692–9 4. Iacoboni, M. 2007. Face to face: the neural basis of social mirroring and empathy, Psychiatric Annals 37: 236–41 5. Rizzolatti, G. and Craighero, L. 2004. The mirror-neuron system, Annual Review of Neuroscience 27: 169–92 6. Gazzola, V., Aziz-Zadeh, L. and Keysers, C. 2006. Empathy and the somatotopic auditory mirror system in humans, Current Biology 16: 1824–9 7. Kaplan, J. T. and Iacoboni, M. 2006. Getting a grip on other minds: mirror neurons, intention understanding and cognitive empathy, Social Neuroscience 1: 175–83 8. Chakrabarti, B., Bullmore, E. and Baron-Cohen, S. 2007. Empathizing with basic emotions: common and discrete neural substrates, Social Neuroscience 1: 364–84 9. Schulte-Rüther, M., Markowitsch, H. J., Fink, G. R. and Piefke, M. 2007. Mirror neuron and theory of mind mechanisms involved in face-to-face interactions: a functional magnetic resonance imaging approach to empathy, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 19: 1354–72 Colin G. DeYoung and Jeremy R. Gray, „ Personality neuroscience: explaining individual differences in affect, behaviour and cognition“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Empathy | Educational Psychology | Upton I 104 Empathy/Educational psychology/Upton: Although clearly a cognitive skill, theory of mind is also a social skill that plays an important role in our ability to get on with others (Liddle and Nettle, 2006)(1). >Theory of Mind, >False Belief Task. If you have theory of mind, you are able to put yourself in somebody else’s shoes, to imagine what it is they are feeling. In this way, theory of mind is a part of empathy – our ability to understand and identify identify with another person’s feelings. Empathy is also believed to play an important role in fostering pro-social behaviour and social competence (Eisenberg and Fabes, 1998(2); Hoffman, 2000(3)), both of which are important for good peer relationships during the school years. >Peer Relationships, >Other minds, >Intersubjectivity, >Social Behavior, >Socialization. 1. Liddle, B and Nettle, D (2006) Higher-order theory of mind and social competence in school-age children. Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology, 4: 231–46. 2. Eisenberg, N and Fabes, RA (1998) Prosocial development, in Eisenberg, N (ed.) Handbook of Child Psychology, Vol. 3: Social, emotional, and personality development. New York: Wiley. 3. Hoffman, ML (2000) Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for caring and justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
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| Analogy | Nagel Vs Analogy | Frank I 150 Objectively/Experience/Appear/Nagel: why should experiences have an objective nature at all? For this question, the brain can be completely ignored. Does it make any sense to ask how my experiences really are as opposed to how they appear to me? Proposal: Shouldn't we try perhaps to bridge the gap between the subjective and the objective in a completely different way? At present we are completely unequipped to think about the subjective nature of experience without taking the perspective of the subject. I 151 Couldn't we try to form new concepts, an objective phenomenology which is independent of empathy? NagelVsAnalogies: E.g. that red is something like the sound of the trumpet has to appear absurd to everyone who ever heard a trumpet and saw something red. Objective/Nagel: whatever is said of physical things must be objective. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Various Authors | Goodman Vs Various Authors | I 81 GoodmanVsIntrinsic/Extrinsic: this does apparently not work: because in every classification of properties in extrins./intrins. each image or each object has both internal and external poperties. II Preamble Putnam IX GoodmanVsFormalism for the Sake of Formalism. GoodmanVsIdea of an ontological basement independent from our theorizing II 10 It is not true that science could do without unreal conditional clauses. The tendency to dismiss the problems of unr. conditional clauses as a pseudo-problem or unsolvable is understandable considering the great difficulties (GoodmanVs.) If you drop all problems of disposition, possibility, scientific law, confirmation, etc., then you are in fact giving up the philosophy of science. II 67 The argument that one should better dispense with the definition of an expression if it was not usually defined by scientists or laymen, is similar to the argument that philosophy need not be systematic, because the reality described by it is not systematic (VsAdorno). You might as well say that philosophy should not be in German, because the reality is not written in German. II 70 (s) SalmonVsGoodman: Objects do not need to appear at all times, but places must be there at all times! ((s) GoodmanVs: Description dependence for him does not only refer to objects, but to the whole of reality. (VsKant)) Kant: space and time are not reality, but the condition for the possibility to experience reality. III 67 Presentation/Empathy/GoodmanVsEmpathy Theory: Gestures do not need to have features in common with music. III 81 Metaphor: the general question: What does a metaphor say and what makes it true? GoodmanVsMetaphor as abridged comparison: sometimes we say a metaphor is elliptically designed and the metaphorical truth was simply understood as the literal truth of the extended statement. But the comparison cannot just result in the image of the person being similar in one respect or another. In this way, everything is similar to everything. III 224 GoodmanVs"Special Aesthetic Emotion" - GoodmanVs Theory that it does not depend on the pleasure that one has, but on a certain "objectified pleasure": Goodman: Then the pleasure would be something that the object must have, and indeed rather without causing it; ultimately it would therefore probably have to feel this pleasure itself. III 228 GoodmanVsDichotomy between the Cognitive and the Emotional. It blocks the insight that emotions work cognitively in the aesthetic experience. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
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