Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bayesianism | Fraassen Vs Bayesianism | I 22 Bayes/Bayesians/Fraassen: typical for them is that they assume an "initial probability" (here: in a)). More traditional approaches only assume b). But that also requires H and H’ to provide certain probability. Important argument: if H’ is merely the negation of H, this is usually not the case! E.g. H says that the probability of E is ¾. Then the negation non-H says that it is a number other than ¾. But normally, it will not even contain this, because H will include other things as well. Solution/Bayesians: solve this problem of the "unattainability of probability" by assuming that everyone has a subjective probability (degree of belief) for any proposition they can formulate. In that case, all probabilities for E, H and H’ are attainable. The price for this is that they subjectivize all probabilities. FraassenVsBayes: they do not subjectivize all probabilities! I do not believe that the realism of subjective probability wants to be dependent on the existence of unobservable entities. I 36 Bayes/Putnam: Rationality requires that if two hypotheses have the same verifiable consequences, we should not accept the one that is a priori less plausible. But how do we obtain the a priori order? We obtain it ourselves, either as individuals or as a community: Plausibility/Accept/Theory/Hypotheses/Bayes: is neither an empirical judgment nor the assertion of a theorem of deductive logic, but a methodological cause. According to that, Rutherford and Vaihinger or Putnam and Duhem differ with respect to the a-priori implausibility. (of electrons or demons). FraassenVsBayes: This is supposed to be the position of any rational human? How disappointing! But that will not do. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Carnap, R. | Putnam Vs Carnap, R. | Goodman II Putnam Foreword V Carnap/Putnam: according to Putnam Carnap has the constant tendency to identify terms with their syntactic representations (> Putnam I (a) 48). Carnap suggested that a predicate can also be disjunctive or non-disjunctive in itself, PutnamVsCarnap: E.g. "logical sky" e.g. "is to tell us" e.g. "metaphysical pointer". >Disjunctive predicate. Lewis IV 85 Partial Interpretation/PutnamVsCarnap: theories with false observation consequences have no interpretation! Because they have no "model" that is "standard" with respect to the observation concepts. IV 85/86 Putnam: such interpretations are wrong then, not pointless! Sense/Theory/LewisVsPutnam: the theoretical concept are also not meaningless here, but denotation-less (without denotation): their sense is given by their denotation in those possible worlds in which the theory is uniquely implemented and thus has no wrong consequences there. They have a sense as well as the reference-less term "Nicholas". Putnam V 244 Pain/Physical Object/Putnam: It is difficult to understand that the statement that a table stands in front of someone is easier to accept than the statement that someone is in pain. Popper/Carnap: would respond: the methodological difference consists in that one of them is public and the other is private. PutnamVsPopper/VsCarnap: both exaggerate the extent to which observations of physical objects are always publicly verifiable. >Observability. V 250 Method/Science/PutnamVsCarnap: many philosophers believed (wrongly) that science proceeded by a method (e.g. Carnap). Putnam I (a) 42 Carnap/Putnam: (Logischer Aufbau der Welt) Final Chapter: brings a sketch of the relation between object language to sensation language which is not a translation! PutnamVsCarnap/PutnamVsPhenomenology: this amounts to the old assertion that we would pick out the object theory that is the "easiest" and most useful. There is no evidence as to why a positivist is entitled to quantify over material things (or to refer to them). Phenomenology/Putnam: after their failure there were two reactions: 1) theories were no longer to be construed as statements systems that would need to have a perfectly understandable interpretation, they are now construed as calculi with the aim to make predictions. I 43 2) Transition from the phenomenalistic language to "language of observable things" as the basis of the reduction. I.e. one seeks an interpretation of physical theories in the "language of things", not in the "sensation language". Putnam I (a) 46 Simplicity/Putnam: gains nothing here: the conjunction of simple theories need not be simple. Def Truth/Theory/Carnap: the truth of a theory is the truth of its Ramsey sentence. PutnamVsCarnap: this again is not the same property as "truth"! (I 46 +: Hilbert's ε, formalization of Carnap: two theories with the same term). I (a) 48 Language/Syntax/Semantics/PutnamVsCarnap: he has the constant tendency to identify concepts with their syntactic representations, e.g. mathematical truth with the property of being a theorem. I (a) 49 Had he been successful with his formal language, it would have been successful because it would have corresponded to a reasonable degree of probability over the set of facts; However, it is precisely that which positivism did not allow him to say! |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Empiricism | Husserl Vs Empiricism | I 23 HusserlVsEmpiricism: Vs empirical justification of laws: this adheres to them the character of vague rules: e.g. the principle of contradiction: could only be formulated as a conjecture. (> Degrees of probability). |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 |
| Hempel, C. | Lewis Vs Hempel, C. | V 232 Probability/Explanation/Hempel/Lewis: is also offered by him for the probabilistic case; but this is different from his deductive-nomological model. LewisVsHempel: two unwelcome consequences: 1. an improbable case cannot be explained at all 2. a necessity of a correct explanation: "maximal specificity" : relative to our knowledge, i.e. not knowing (a case of probability) makes an explanation, which is actually true, not true. Truth is only that not knowing makes the explanation look untrue. I prefer Peter Railton's model: probability/Explanation/Peter Railton/Lewis: "deductive-nomological model" "probabilistic explanation" (d.n.m.). We must distinguish this model from Fetzer's model: for both covering law/Raiton/Fetzer: universal generalizations about a single case are chances. Explanation/probability/FetzerVsRailton: as for Hempel: inductive, not deductive. Explanation: as an argument! LewisVsFetzer: but: a good explanation is not necessarily a good argument! LewisVsFetzer/LewisVsRailton: both want an explanation even if the event is very improbable. But in this case a good explanation is a very bad argument. V 233 Probability/Explanation/Covering Law Model/Railton:two parts: 1. one deductive-nomological argument which fulfills some conditions of the non-probabilistic case. Laws of probability may also be a part of its premises. 2. does not belong to the argument: The finding that the event took place. If the premises say that certain events took place, then those are sufficient if taken together - given the laws - for the actual event or for the probability. Problem: a subset - given only a part of the laws- can be sufficient as well in explaining parts of the events, and in creating a number of remains which are still sufficient under the original laws. This is why there must be two conditions for the explanation: 1. certain events are sufficient when taken together for the event of the explanandum (under the prevailing laws) 2. only some of the laws are used to guarantee that the conditions are sufficient LewisVsRailton: If we had covering law for causation, and our covering law for explanation, my approach would be reconciled with the c1-approach. But this cannot be achieved! V 233/234 An element of the d.n.m.'s sufficient reasons will in reality often be one of the causes. But this cannot be! The counterexamples are well-known: 1. an irrelevant reason can be a part of the sufficient subset, the requirement of minimality is not helping: We can create artificial minimality by taking weaker laws and disregarding stronger ones. e.g. Salmon: A man takes the (birth control) pill, and does not end up pregnant! The premise that nobody who takes the pill will not become pregnant cannot be disregarded! 2. An element of sufficient subset could be something that is not an event: e.g. a premise can assess that something as an extrinsic or highly disjunctive characteristic. But no true events can be specified. 3. An effect can be part of the subset if laws state that the effect can only be made to happen in a particular way. I.e.: the set could be conveniently minimal, and also be one of the events, but it would not be sufficient to make the effect the cause of its cause. 4. Such an effect can also be the sufficient subset for another effect, e.g. of a later effect of the same cause. E.g. an ad appearing on my TV is caused because of the same broadcast, like the same appearing on your TV. But one appearance is not the cause of the other ad, rather they happened due to the same cause. 5. an impeded potential cause may belong to a subset because nothing has overridden it. LewisVsRailton: This shows that the combined sufficient subset, presented by d.n.-arguments, is possibly not a set of causes. V 235 LewisVsRailton: It is a problem for my own theory if a d.n. argument does not seem to show causes, but still seems to be an explanation. (see above, paragraph III,I. Three examples VsHempel: refractive index, VsRailton: no non-causal cases in reality. RailtonVsLewis: If the d.n. model presents no causes, and thereby does not look like an explanation, then it makes it a problem for said model. Railton: This is why not every d.n. model is a correct explanation. V 236 Question: Can every causal narration be characterized by the information which is part of a deductive-nomological argument? It would be the case if each cause belongs to a sufficient subset, given the laws. Or for the probabilistic case: given the laws of probability. And is it that causes are included in them? Lewis: It does not follow from the counterfactual analysis of causality. But it could be true. (It will be true in a possible world with sufficiently strict laws.) If explanatory information is information about causal narration, then the informaation is given by deductive-nomological arguments. But there will still be something wrong! The deductive-nomological arguments are presented as being ideal, i.e. they have the right form, neither too much nor not enough. But nobody thinks that daily explanation fulfills this. Normally, the best we can do is to make existence assumptions. "Deshalb" Behauptung/Morton White: We can take it as existence assumptions. LewisVsRailton: correct deductive-nomological arguments as existence assumptions are still not a true explanation. They do not meet the standard on how much information is sufficient, simply because of their form. Lewis: There is always more to know if we collect deductive-nomological arguments, as perfect as they are. Deductive-nomological arguments only offer a profile of the causal narration. Many causes may be omitted. They could be the ones we are currently looking for. Maybe we would like to acquaint ourselves with the mechanism which were involved in particular traces of causal narration. V 238 Explanation/Lewis/VsRailton: a deductive-nomological argument can also be in the wrong form: to not give us enough of too much at the same moment. Explanation/Lewis: But we cannot actually say that we have a different conception of the explanation's unity. We should not demand a unity: An explanation is not a thing that one can have or fail at creating one, but something that one can have to a higher or lesser degree. Problem: The conception to have "enough" of an explanation: It makes us doubt our ancestors' knowledge. They never or rarely had complete knowledge about laws of nature. LewisVsRailton: i.e. so, they never or rarely had complete deductive-nomological arguments. Did they therefore have incomplete explanatory knowledge. I do not think so! They know much about the causes of things. Solution/Railton: (similarly to my picture): together with each explanandum we have a wide and complex structure. V 239 Lewis: For me those structures are linked because of causal dependence. Railton: For him they consist of an "ideal text" of arguments, like in mathematical proofs. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 |
| Induction | Popper Vs Induction | Schurz I 50 Induction/Schurz: 1) methodological induction: from observations. PopperVsInduction: induction is the central method of extraction of hypotheses and theories. Confusion of discovery and context of justification. How hypotheses are derived, perhaps even through guessing, is quite irrelevant for the context of justification. Therefore, methodical induction is dispensable. 2) Logical Induction/Carnap: not of the discovery but of the justification: method of determination of the degree of confirmation. II 51 PopperVs: one theory may prove to be closer to the truth than another, but that does not show that there is no third theory that is even closer to the truth. I.e. there is no claim to absoluteness for theories. Verisimilitude = probability. There is no limited space of linguistic possibility containing all possible alternative theories. This only applies for logical hypotheses! Empirical hypotheses: here it is possible to establish a finite list of all possible alternative hypotheses. Popper: competing theories can only be evaluated comparatively. I 52 3) Epistemic Induction/Musgrave/Schurz: if a theory was more successful so far, it is likely that it will be more successful in the future. This is not about object hypotheses, but about an epistemic meta-hypothesis on the degree of corroboration. The epistemic induction is indispensable. Without it, the Popperian method of practical tests would be meaningless. Past success would be irrelevant for future action. I 14/15 Criterion of Demarcation/Schurz: for metaphysics. Problem: principles which considered separately have no empirical consequences, can have new empirical consequences together with other theoretical propositions. I 15 Falsification/Asymmetry/Popper: applies with strict (unexceptional all-sentences): they cannot be verified by any finite set of observations, but falsified by a single counter-example. LakatosVsPopper: Theories are never discarded because of a single counter-example, but adapted. PopperVsInduction/Anti-Inductivism/Popper: Thesis: science can dispense with induction altogether. >Induction/Popper. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz Vs Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz I 31 Personal identity/SchwarzVsLewis: his criterion is not accurate and provides in interesting cases no answer. E.g. continuity after brain surgery, etc. But Lewis does not want that. Our (vague) everyday term should only be made explicitly. Beaming/Teleportation/Doubling/Lewis: all this is allowed by his theory. Schwarz I 60 Identity/Lewis/Centered world/Possible world/Schwarz: my desire to be someone else, does not refer to the whole world, but only to my position in the world. E.g. Twin Earth/Schwarz: one of the two planets is blown tomorrow, the two options (that we are on the one or the other) do however not correspond to two possible worlds! Detailed knowledge would not help out where we are, because they are equal. ((s) so no "centered world"). Actually, we want to know where we ourselves are in the world. (1979a(1),1983b(2),1986e(3):231 233). SchwarzVsLewis: says too little about these perspective possibilities. It is not enough here to allow multiple counterparts (c.p.) in a world. It should not just be possible that Humphrey is exactly as the actual Nixon, he should also to be allowed to be different. Humphrey may not be a GS of himself. (> Irreflexive counterpart relation,> see below Section 9.2. "Doxastic counterparts". Similarity relation. No matter what aspects you emphasize: Nixon will never be more similar to Humphrey than to himself. Schwarz I 100 Fundamental properties/SchwarzVsLewis: this seems to waver whether he should form the fE to the conceptual basis for the reduction of all predicates and ultimately all truths, or only a metaphysical basis, on which all truths supervene. (>Supervenience, >Reduction). Schwarz I 102 Naturalness/Natural/Property/Content/Lewis: the actual content is then the most natural candidate that matches the behavior. "Toxic" is not a perfectly natural property (p.n.p.), but more natural than "more than 3.78 light years away" and healthy and less removed and toxic". Naturalness/degree/Lewis: (1986e(3):, 61,63,67 1984b(4):66): the naturalness of a property is determined by the complexity or length of their definition by perfectly natural properties. PnE: are always intrinsically and all their Boolean combinations remain there. Problem: extrinsic own sheep threaten to look unnatural. Also would e.g. "Red or breakfast" be much more complicated to explain than e.g. "has charge -1 or a mass, whose value is a prime number in kg. (Although it seems to be unnatural by definition). Naturalness/Property/Lewis: (1983c(5), 49): a property is, the more natural the more it belongs to surrounding things. Vs: then e.g. "cloud" less natural than e.g. "table in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant or clock showing 7:23". Schw I 103 Naturalness/Properties/Lewis: (1983c(5): 13f): naturalness could be attributed to similarity between characteristics: E.g. a class is more natural, the more the properties of its elements resemble each other. Similarity: Lewis refers to Armstrong: similarity between universals 1978b(6),§16.2,§21, 1989b(7): §5.111997 §4.1). Ultimately LewisVs. Naturalness/Lewis/Schwarz: (2001a(8):§4,§6): proposing test for naturalness, based on similarity between individual things: coordinate system: "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" axis. A property is then the more natural, the more dense and more compact the appropriate region is. Problem: 1. that presupposes gradual similarity and therefore cannot be well used to define gradual naturalness. 2. the pnE come out quite unnatural, because the instances often do not strongly resemble each other. E.g. if a certain mass property is perfect, of course, then all things with this mass build a perfectly natural class, no matter how dissimilar they are today. SchwarzVsLewis: it shows distinctions between natural and less natural properties in different areas, but does not show that the distinction is always the same. Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: could also depend on interests and biological expression. And yet, can in various ways the different types of natural - be determined by perfect naturalness. That is not much, because at Lewis all, by definition, by the distribution of p.n.p. is determined. ((s)>Mosaic). Schwarz I 122 Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: not reasonable to assume that it was objectively, regardless of how naturally it appears to us. Lewis introduced objective naturalness as a metaphysical basis for qualitative, intrinsic similarity and difference, as some things resemble each other like eggs and others do not. (see above 5.2). Intrinsic Similarity: also qualitative character and duplication: these terms are intended to be our familiar terms by Lewis. SchwarzVsLewis: but if objective naturalness is to explain the distinction of our opinions about similarity, one cannot ask with sense the question whether the distinction serves exactly this. So although there are possible beings (or worlds) whose predicates express relatively unnatural properties and therefore are wrong about natural laws, without being able to discover the error. But we can be sure a priori that we do not belong to them. Problem: the other beings may themselves believe a priori to be sure that their physical predicates are relatively natural. Solution: but they (and not we) were subject to this mistake, provided "natural" means in their mouth the same as with us. ((s) but we also could just believe that they are not subject to error. Respectively, we do not know whether we are "we" or "they"). Schwarz: here is a tension in our concept of natural law (NL): a) on the one hand it is clear that we can recognize them empirically. b) on the other hand they should be objective in a strong sense, regardless of our standards and terms. Problem: Being with other standards can come up with the same empirical data to all other judgments of NL. Schwarz I 134 Event/SchwarzVsLewis: perhaps better: events but as the regions themselves or the things in the regions: then we can distinguish e.g. the flight from the rotation of the ball. Lewis appears to be later also inclined to this. (2004d)(9). Lewis: E.g. the death of a man who is thrown into a completely empty space is not caused by something that happens in this room, because there is nothing. But when events are classes of RZ regions, an event could also include an empty region. Def Qua thing/Lewis/Schwarz: later theory: “Qua-things” (2003)(10): E.g. „Russell qua Philosoph“: (1986d(9a),247): classes of counterpieces – versus: LewisVsLewis: (2003)(10) Russell qua Philosoph and Russell qua Politician and Russell are identical. Then the difference in counterfactual contexts is due to the determined by the respective description counterpart relation. These are then intensional contexts. (Similar to 1971(11)). counterfactual asymmetry/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis' analysis assumes similarity between possible worlds. HorwichVsLewis: (1987(15),172) should explain why he is interested in this baroque dependence. Problem/SchwarzVsLewis: so far, the analysis still delivers incorrect results E.g. causation later by earlier events. Schwarz I 139 Conjunctive events/SchwarzVsLewis: he does not see that the same is true for conjunctive events. Examples A, B, C, D are arbitrary events, so that A caused B and C caused D. If there is an event B&C, which exactly occurs when both B and C happen, then A is the cause of D: without A, B would not have happened, neither B&C. Likewise D would not have happened without B&C. Because causation is transitive, thus any cause causes any effect. Note: according to requirement D would not happen without C, but maybe the next possible world, in which B&C are missing, is one in which C is still taking place? According to Lewis the next possible world should however be one where the lack of cause is completely extinguished. Schwarz: you cannot exclude any conjunctive events safely. E.g. a conversation or e.g. a war is made up of many events and may still be as a whole a cause or effect. Lewis (2000a(13), 193) even used quite unnatural conjunctions of events in order to avoid objections: E.g. conjunction from the state of brain of a person and a decision of another person. Absence/Lewis/Schwarz: because Lewis finds no harmless entities that are in line as absences, he denies their existence: they are no events, they are nothing at all, since there is nothing relevant. (200a, 195). SchwarzVsLewis: But how does that fit together with the Moore's facts? How can a relationship be instantiated whose referents do not exist?. Moore's facts/Schwarz: E.g. that absences often are causes and effects. Something to deny that only philosopher comes to mind. I 142 Influence/SchwarzVsLewis: Problem: influence of past events by future. Example had I drunk from the cup already half a minute ago, then now a little less tea would be in the cup, and depending on how much tea I had drunk half a minute ago, how warm the tea was then, where I then had put the cup, depending on it the current situation would be a little different. After Lewis' analysis my future tea drinking is therefore a cause of how the tea now stands before me. (? Because Ai and Bi?). Since the drinking incidents are each likely to be similar, the impact is greater. But he is not the cause, in contrast to the moon. Schwarz I 160 Know how/SchwarzVsLewis: it is not entirely correct, that the phenomenal character must be causal effect if the Mary and Zombie pass arguments. For causal efficacy, it is sufficient if Mary would react differently to a phenomenally different experience ((s) >Counterfactual conditional). Dualism/Schwarz: which can be accepted as a dualist. Then you can understand phenomenal properties like fundamental physical properties. That it then (as above Example charge 1 and charge 1 switch roles in possible worlds: is possible that in different possible worlds the phenomenal properties have their roles changed, does not mean that they are causally irrelevant! On the contrary, a particle with exchanged charge would behave differently. Solution: because a possible world, in which the particle has a different charge and this charge plays a different role, is very unlike to our real world! Because there prevail other laws of nature. ((s) is essential here that besides the amended charge also additionally the roles were reversed? See above: >Quidditism). SchwarzVsLewis: this must only accept that differences in fundamental characteristics do not always find themselves in causal differences. More one must not also accept to concede Mary the acquisition of new information. Schwarz I 178 Content/Individuation/Solution/LewisVsStalnaker: (1983b(2), 375, Fn2, 1986e(3), 34f), a person may sometimes have several different opinion systems! E.g. split brain patients: For an explanation of hand movements to an object which the patient denies to see. Then you can understand arithmetic and logical inference as merging separate conviction fragments. Knowledge/Belief/Necessary truth/Omniscience/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsFragmentation: Problem: even within Lewis' theory fragmentation is not so easy to get, because the folk psychology does not prefer it. Schwarz I 179 E.g. at inconsequent behavior or lie we do not accept a fragmented system of beliefs. We assume rather that someone changes his beliefs or someone wants to mislead intentionally. E.g. if someone does not make their best move, it must not be the result of fragmentation. One would assume real ignorance contingent truths instead of seeming ignorance of necessary truths. Fragmentation does not help with mathematical truths that must be true in each fragment: Frieda learns nothing new when she finally finds out that 34 is the root of the 1156. That they denied the corresponding proposition previously, was due to a limitation of their cognitive architecture. Knowledge/Schwarz: in whatever way our brain works, whether in the form of cards, records or neural networks - it sometimes requires some extra effort to retrieve the stored information. Omniscience/Vs possible world/Content/VsLewis/Schwarz: the objection of logical omniscience is the most common objection to the modeling mental and linguistic content by possible worlds or possible situations. SchwarzVsVs: here only a problem arises particularly, applicable to all other approaches as well. Schwarz I 186 Value/Moral/Ethics/VsLewis/Schwarz: The biggest disadvantage of his theory: its latent relativism. What people want in circumstances is contingent. There are possible beings who do not want happiness. Many authors have the intuition that value judgments should be more objective. Solution/Lewis: not only we, but all sorts of people should value under ideal conditions the same. E.g. then if anyone approves of slavery, it should be because the matter is not really clear in mind. Moral disagreements would then in principle be always solvable. ((s)>Cognitive deficiency/Wright). LewisVsLewis: that meets our intuitions better, but unfortunately there is no such defined values. People with other dispositions are possible. Analogy with the situation at objective probability (see above 6.5): There is nothing that meets all of our assumptions about real values, but there is something close to that, and that's good enough. (1989b(7), 90 94). Value/Actual world/Act.wrld./Lewis: it is completely unclear whether there are people in the actual world with completely different value are dispositions. But that does not mean that we could not convince them. Relativism/Values/Morals/Ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis however welcomes a different kind of relativism: desired content can be in perspective. The fate of my neighbor can be more important to me than the fate of a strangers. (1989b(14), 73f). Schwarz I 232 Truthmaker principle/SchwarzVsLewis: here is something rotten, the truth maker principle has a syntax error from the outset: we do not want "the world as it is", as truth-makers, because that is not an explanation, we want to explain how the world makes the truth such as the present makes propositions about the past true. Schwarz I 233 Explanation/Schwarz: should distinguish necessary implication and analysis. For reductive metaphysics necessary implication is of limited interest. SchwarzVsLewis: he overlooks this when he wrote: "A supervenience thesis is in the broader sense reductionist". (1983,29). Elsewhere he sees the difference: E.g. LewisVsArmstrong: this has an unusual concept of analysis: for him it is not looking for definitions, but for truth-makers ". 1. David Lewis [1979a]: “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”. Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. 2. David Lewis [1983b]: “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”. Philosophical Review, 92: 3–32. 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 5. David Lewis [1983c]: “New Work for a Theory of Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. 6. David M. Armstrong [1978b]: Universals and Scientific Realism II: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 7. David M. Armstrong [1989b]: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press 8. David Lewis [2001a]: “Redefining ‘Intrinsic’ ”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 381-398 9. David Lewis [2004d]: “Void and Object”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 277–291 9a. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 10. David Lewis [2003]: “Things qua Truthmakers”. Mit einem Postscript von David Lewis und Gideon Rosen. In Hallvard Lillehammer und Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Hg.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor, London: Routledge, 25–38. 11. David Lewis [1971]: “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies”. Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. 12. David Lewis [1987]: “The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 12: 81–97. 13. David Lewis [2000a]: “Causation as Influence”. Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–197. Gekürzte Fassung von [Lewis 2004a] 14. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137. 15. Paul Horwich [1987]: Asymmetries in Time. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Popper, K. | Kuhn Vs Popper, K. | Hacking I 400 Messen/KuhnVsPopper: It almost never happens that theories are contradicted by precise measurements. Ex. Cavendish has not tested the theory of gravity but determines the value of G. Experiments are generally rewarded when the approximate numbers which were previously assumed come out. Kuhn I 90 Falsification/KuhnVsPopper: In the history of science, no example of falsification because of a comparison with nature! For those who decided to use Newton's theory, his second law is a purely logical statement that cannot be contradicted by observations. I 157 KuhnVsPopper: Anomalous experiences cannot be compared with falsified ones! I believe that the latter do not exist at all! If every single mismatch would be a reason for rejecting a theory, all theories would always need to be rejected. If, on the other hand, only a serious discorrespondency were to count, Popper's followers would need a "criterion of improbability "or the "degree of falsification". I 158 KuhnVsPopper: Falsification: Is a later and separate process, which could very well be called verification, since it represents the triumph of a new paradigm over an older one. Correspondence theory: For historians at least there is no much sense in the statement that verification is determining the correspondence between facts and theory. All historically significant theories corresponded to those facts, however only up to a certain point!(> Theory/Kuhn). However, it is quite reasonable to ask which of two competing theories fits better with the facts. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Popper, K. | Schurz Vs Popper, K. | I 115 Principal Principle/PP/Statistics/Schurz: the subjective probabilities must agree with them when the objective probabilities are known. Lewis: (1980): singular principal principle: subjectivist. Here "objective" singular propensities are simply postulated. SchurzVsPropensity/SchurzVsPopper: it remains unclear which property a singular propensity should correspond to at all. Solution/de Finetti: you can also accept the objective probability concept at the same time. Conditionalization/Statistics/Schurz: on any experience date E(b1...bn) about other individuals b1,...bn it is important to derive two further versions of the principal principle: 1. Principal Principle for random samples used for the subjective justification of statistical likelihood intuition 2. The conditional principal principle, for the principle of narrowest reference class and the inductive statistical specialization conclusion is subject. Principal Principle: w(Fa I p(Fx) = r u E(b1,...bn)) = r Principal Principle for random samples: w(hn(Fx) = k/n I p(Fx) = r) = (nk) rk mal (1 r)n-k. Conditional Principal Principle: w(Fa I Ga u p(Fx I Gx) = r u E(b1,…bn)) = r. Principal Principle: is only useful for subjective a priori probabilities. I.e. belief degrees of a subject who has not yet had any experience. Actual Belief degree/Belief degree: the principle does not apply generally for it: for example if the coin is already showing head (=Fa) the belief degree of it is of course = 1, while one knows that p(Fx) = ½. Apriori probability function: here all background knowledge W must be explicitly written into the antecedens of a conditional probability statement w( - I W). actual: = personalistic. apriori probability: connection with updated probability function: Strict Conditionalization/Schurz: w0 is the a priori probability or probability to t0 and w1 the current probability. I 116 Wt is the knowledge acquired between t0 and t1. Then for any A applies: Wt(A) = w0(A I Wt). Narrowest reference class/n.r.c./Principle/Schurz: can be justified as follows: for a given event Fa, the individual can belong to a great many reference classes that assign very different probabilities to Fx. Then we got contradictory predictions. Question: but why should the appropriate reference class be the narrowest? Because one can prove that it maximizes the frequency value of true predictions. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Quantum Mechanics | Verschiedene Vs Quantum Mechanics | Kanitscheider II 108 Quantum ChemistryVsQuantum Mechanics: Weak point of orthodox quantum mechanics: v. Neumann's traditional Hilbert-Space formulation (1929) is limited to closed systems with finite degrees of freedom, which means the neglect of the environment of the quantum system. Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 208 Completeness/Quantum Mechanics/QM: the quantum mechanics is complete in the sense that more cannot be said about the locations of the particles than the probability distributions of the quantum mechanics permit. Problem: how can it be that Gretel's unsuccessful search not only creates the reality that it is not with her, but also the reality that it is in Hänsel's area? Einstein-Podoski-Rosen/EPR: that is impossible! She cannot instantly create reality in the distant territory. Reality must have existed before the first experiment. EPRVsQM: incomplete as it does not take into account existing realities. Instead, we need a theory that is real, local and causal. It should only concern properties of measurable physical objects. John Gribbin Schrödingers Kätzchen Frankfurt/M 1998 III 135 Quantum Electrodynamics/QED: (best confirmed theory of all times) provides information about the interaction of electrons with electromagnetic radiation. It explains everything except gravity and the behaviour of atomic nuclei (e.g. radioactive decay). III 137 Feynman: we only have three things to take care of: 1. the probability with which a photon moves from one place to another. 2. the probability with which an electron changes location, 3. the probability with which a photon is absorbed or emitted by an electron. III 138 Feynman realized that we had to take into account every possible route (Fig III 138). A lot of convolutions on the way from A to B. (Feynman diagrams). In the double-split experiment, we added the probabilities with which the light passed one of the columns. III 139 Feynman: why not cut more slits in the screen until there is no obstacle at all, since all the "slits" now overlap. Now that the screen has disappeared, we have to add all probabilities of all possible paths. For the complicated paths, the probabilities are very small and usually cancel each other out. Feynman showed with a mirror that their influence is still noticeable! III 140 The light chooses the most time-saving path. III 141 Gribbin: it actually happens that the light continues to travel at a different, flatter angle at the same time, other photons hit the eye perpendicularly... That we do not observe this is solely due to the fact that the paths in the vicinity of the shortest path are on the one hand more probable, and on the other hand mutually reinforce each other. But that is not the end of the story! III 142 Measurements show that reflected photons actually arrive from the far corner of the mirror, although they cancel each other out! III 142/143 Although neighboring parts of the mirror corner cancel each other out, you can still find mirror strips where the probabilities add up. How large the distance between the strips must be depends on the wavelength of the light: this is a nice confirmation of the wave particle dualism, since we consider the light here as photons. (diffraction grid). III 145 Similarly, all optical phenomena can be interpreted as the addition of probabilities, including lenses, diffraction and deceleration of light entering water, Poisson's spot, double-split experiment. III 150 VsQuantifier-Electrodynamics/VsQED: it is not completely flawless: difficulty in moving an electron: it would cause an endless addition of probabilities, the results would grow into infinity, that would be nonsense. III 145 Def magnetic moment of the electron: measure of the interaction of an electron with a magnetic field. III 147 Nature/Physics/Feynman: "The enormous diversity of nature can be derived from the monotonous repetition of the combination of only three basic processes" (see above). III 148 Feynman-Diagram: bizarre: two electrons interact by exchanging a photon, but we may just as well say that the second electron emits the photon "in the future" and this goes backwards in time so that it is absorbed by the first electron "in the past". It is well known that an electron can change into a pair of particles with positrons. The corresponding equations are symmetrical as usual. III 149 Feynman now realized that the whole interaction can be described with reference to a single electron: an electron moves from one place to another and interacts with a high-energy photon. Through this interaction, the electron is sent backwards in time until it interacts with another high-energy photon, becoming "reversed" and travelling again into the future. Three things seem to be involved in both interactions: positron, electron, photon. Similar to when a ray of light bounces off a mirror: two rays of light forming the appropriate angle and the mirror itself. Analogy: But just as in reality there is only one ray of light reflected back into space, there is also only one electron. Photons can act as "time mirrors" for electrons. Def Re-Normation: Method to get rid of the infinite. One divides both sides of the equation by infinity. Feynman: "Crazy". Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VII 275 Re-Normation: unfortunately also has to be applied to the vacuum, because the QED tells us that here the energy density is infinite. If you include the relativity theory, the situation gets even worse: there are still infinite quantities, but they cannot be renormalized anymore. Twistor Theory/Penrose: Try to explain both the particles and the long empty distances within an object with the same theory. Measure/Length Unit: a universal length unit is obtained by combining the gravitational constant, Planck's Constant and the speed of light: "quantum of length". VII 276 Planck's Length: about 1035. Planck's time, etc. It is pointless to speak of a time or length that is shorter. Quantum Foam/Wheeler: quantum fluctuations in the geometry of space are completely negligible on the level of atoms, even particles, but on this very fundamental level one can imagine space itself as a foam of quantum fluctuations. >Twistor Theory/Penrose: Thesis: then one could imagine that all matter particles are no more than twisted fragments of empty space. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Hintikka Vs Quine, W.V.O. | II 184 Intentionality/Hintikka: if it is to be defined by the need to explain it with possible worlds, we have to examine possible counterexamples. Counterexample/(s): shall be something that also requires possible worlds without being intentional. However, the thesis was not that intentionality is the only thing that requires possible worlds. Possible counter-examples to the thesis that intentionality is essentially possible-world based: 1) E.g. physical modalities: E.g. causal necessity really does not seem to be intentional. II 185 Vs: but this is deceptive: Solution: Hume has shown that causality is what the mind adds to regularity. To that extent, causality is quite intentional. It points to something behind the perception. 2) E.g. logical (analytical) modalities. They are certainly objective and non-psychological. Nevertheless, they are best explained by possible worlds. I 186 Solution: Meaning/Intentionality/Quine/Hintikka: Quine has shown that meanings are indeed intentional, in that they are dependent on the beliefs (convictions) of the subject. Thesis: According to Quine, we must always ask what are the beliefs of a person are to understand what are their meanings are. DavidsonVsQuine. QuineVsDavidson: belief and meaning cannot be separated. Quine/Hintikka: for meanings what Hume was for causality. 3) E.g. probability/probability Theory/de Finetti/L.J.Savage/Hintikka: according to the two authors all probability is subjective. Def probability/Prob/Mathematics/Hintikka: measure in a sample space. Samples: are "small possible worlds". II 187 Possible Worlds/Dana Scott: "Is there life in possible worlds?". Intentionality/Hintikka: if probability can only be subjective (Thesis: there is no objective probability), this corresponds, in the turn, to what Hume says regarding causality and Quine in relation to meanings. probability/Prob/Hintikka: is then not a real counterexample to the thesis that intentionality is possible-world based, because even probabilities are in a way intentional. (If probability is possible-world based, in any case). Gradually/degree/Yes-No/Explanation/Method//Definition/Hintikka: Thesis: seemingly dichotomous concepts can often be better explained if they are conceived as gradual. Definability/Rantala/Hintikka: Rantala: Thesis: we do not begin by asking when a theory clearly specifies a concept, but how much freedom the theory leaves the term. II 188 Determinacy/Hintikka: is a gradual matter, and definability sets in when the uncertainty disappears. This is an elegant equivalence to the model theory. Qualitative/Comparative/Hintikka: by assuming that a property is gradual, a qualitative concept can be transformed into a comparative one. Then we no longer only deal with yes-no questions. Intentionality/Hintikka: thesis is a gradual matter. This is obvious, given that in case of intentionality we must always consider unrealized possibilities. "Ontological Power"/Hintikka: the greater the ontological power of a mind, the farther you can go beyond the real world. degree of Intentionality/Hintikka: is measured by the distance to the actual world. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Millikan Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 215 descriptive/referential/denotation/classification/Millikan: you can force a descriptive denotation to work referentially, Ex "He said that the winner was the loser." Ex (Russell) "I thought your yacht was larger than it is." I 216 Solution: "the winner" and "larger than your Yacht" must be regarded as classified according to the adjusted (adapted) sense. On the other hand: "The loser" probably has only descriptive of meaning. "Your Yacht" is classified by both: by adjusted and by relational sense, only "your" is purely referential. Quine: (classic example) Ex "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua." MillikanVsQuine: according to Quine that's not obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational sense in that context. referential/descriptive/attribution of belief/intentional/Millikan: there are exceptions, where the expressions do not work descriptively, nor purely referential, but also by relational sense or intension. Ex "the man who us drove home" is someone the speaker and hearer know very well. Then the hearer must assume that someone else is meant because the name is not used. Rule: here the second half of the rule for intentional contexts is violated, "use whichever expression that preserves the reference". This is often a sign that the first half is violated, "a sign has not only reference but also sense or intension, which must be preserved. Why else use such a complicated designation ("the man who drove us home"), instead of the name? Ortcutt/Ralph/spy/Quine/Millikan: Ex there is a man with a brown hat that Ralph has caught a glimpse of. Ralph assumes he is a spy. a) Ralph believes that the man he has caught a glimpse of is a spy. I 217 b) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. Millikan: The underlined parts are considered relational, b) is more questionable than a) because it is not clear whether Ralph has explicitly perceived him as wearing a brown hat. Quine: In addition, there is a gray-haired man that Ralph vaguely knows as a pillar of society, and that he is unaware of having seen, except once at the beach. c) Ralph believes that the man he saw on the beach is a spy. Millikan: that's for sure relational. As such, it will not follow from a) or b). Quine: adds only now that Ralph does not know this, but the two men are one and the same. d) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is not a spy. Now this is just wrong. Question: but what about e) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. f) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. Quine: only now Quine tells us the man's name (which Ralph is unaware of). Millikan: Ex Jennifer, an acquaintance of Samuel Clemens, does not know that he is Mark Twain. I 218 She says: "I would love to meet Mark Twain" and not "I'd love to meet Samuel Clemens". language-dependent: here, "Mark Twain" is classified dependent on language. So also language bound intensions are not always irrelevant for intentional contexts. It had o be language-bound here to make it clear that the name itself is substantial, and also that it is futile to assume that she would have said she wanted to meet Samuel Clemens. Ralph/Quine/Millikan: Quine assumes that Ralph has not only two internal names for Ortcutt, but only one of them is linked to the external name Ortcutt. Millikan: Description: Ex you and I are watching Ralph, who is suspiciously observing Ortcutt standing behind a bush with a camera (surely he just wants to photograph cobwebs). Ralph did not recognize Ortcutt and you think: Goodness, Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy ". Pointe: in this context, the sentence is true! ((S) Because the name "Ortcutt" was given by us, not by Ralph). referential/Millikan: Solution: "Ortcutt" is classified here as referential. referential/Millikan. Ex "Last Halloween Susi actually thought, Robert (her brother) was a ghost." ((S) She did not think of Robert, nor of her brother, that he was a ghost, but that she had a ghost in front of her). MillikanVsQuine: as long as no one has explicitly asked or denied that Tom knows that Cicero is Tullius, the two attributions of belief "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" and "... Tullius ..." are equivalent! Language-bound intension/Millikan: is obtained only if the context makes it clear what words were used, or which public words the believer has as implicit intentions. Fully-developed (language-independent) intension/Millikan: for them the same applies if they are kept intentionally: I 219 Ex "The natives believe that Hesperus is a God and Phosphorus is a devil." But: Pointe: It is important that the intrinsic function of a sentence must be maintained when one passes to intentional contexts. That is the reason that in attribution of belief one cannot simply replace "Cicero is Tullius" by "Cicero is Cicero". ((S) trivial/non-trivial identity). Stabilizing function/statement of identity/Millikan: the stabilizing function is that the listener translates "A" and "B" into the same internal term. Therefore, the intrinsic function of "Cicero is Cicero" is different from that of "Cicero is Tullius". Since the intrinsic function is different one can not be used for the other in intentional contexts. Eigenfunction: Ex "Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy": has the Eigenfunkion to be translated into an internal sentence that has a subject and two predicates. No record of this form can be found in Ralph's head. Therefore one can not say that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy you. I 299 Non-contradiction/Millikan: the test is also a test of our ability to identify something and whether our concepts represent what they are supposed to project. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. It is not the problem to decide how an exclusive class should be split up. I 300 Ex deciding when red ends and orange begins. Instead, it's about learning to recognize Ex red under different circumstances. Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: for Quine a criterion for right thinking seems to be that the relationship to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction? Agreement/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what agreement in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If you do not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree. Solution/Millikan: agreement is to say the same about the same. Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted. One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" as a sentence. He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer. Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra). Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree to a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in nature (natural necessity). I 309 Thesis: lack of Contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. agreement/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they fail to recognize the importance of the agreement in the judgment. agreement: this is not about two people getting together, but that they get together with the world. agreement/mismatch/Millikan: are not two equally likely possibilities ((s) > inegalitarian theory/Nozick.) There are many more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong, than for the same sentence to be true. Now, if an entire pattern (system) of coinciding judgments appears that represent the same area (for example color) the probability that each participant reflects an area in the world outside is stupendous. ((s) yes - but not that they mean the same thing). Ex only because my judgments about the passage of time almost always matches with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to classify my memories correctly in the passage of time. Objectivity/time/perspective/mediuma/communication/Millikan: thesis: the medium that other people form by their remarks is the most accessible perspective for me that I can have in terms of time. I 312 Concept/law/theory/test/verification/Millikan: when a concept appears in a law, it is necessary I 313 to test it along with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain rules of inference. Concept/Millikan: because concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested. Test: does not mean, however, that the occurrence of sensual data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine). Theory of sensual data/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be, thesis: that neither an internal nor an external language actually describes sensual data, except that the language depends on the previous concepts of external things that usually causes the sensual data. I 314 Forecast/prediction/to predict/prognosis/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: we project the world to inhabit it, not to predict it. If predictions are useful, at least not from experiences in our nerve endings. Confirmation/prediction/Millikan: A perceptual judgment implies mainly itself Ex if I want to verify that this container holds one liter, I don't have to be able to predict that the individual edges have a certain length.That is I need not be able to predict any particular sensual data. I 317 Theory/Verification/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition says that not just a few, but most of our concepts are not of things that we observe directly, but of other things. Test/logical form/Millikan: if there is one thing A, which is identified by observing effects on B and C, isn't then the validity of the concepts of B and C tested together with the theory that ascribes the observed effects onto the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A? Millikan. No! From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts, that govern B and C, is tested when the concept that governs A is tested and vice versa. Namely, it does not follow, if A is a specific denotation Ex "the first President of the United States" and it also does not follow, if the explicit intention of A represents something causally dependent. Ex "the mercury in the thermometer rose to mark 70" as intension of "the temperature was 70 degrees." I 318 Concept/Millikan: concepts are abilities - namely the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: Ex my ability to make a good cake is completely independent of my ability to break up eggs, even if I have to break up eggs to make the cake. Objectivity/objective reality/world/method/knowledge/Millikan: we obtain a knowledge of the outside world by applying different methods to obtain a result. Ex different methods of temperature measurement: So we come to the conclusion that temperature is something real. I 321 Knowledge/context/holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: doesn't all knowledge depend on "collateral information", as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we test individual concepts independently from the rest? Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: ~ "Our findings about the outside world do not stand individually before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body." Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction. Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs never stand before the tribunal of experience. I 322 Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other beliefs. Confirmation: single confirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my attitudes. From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well. Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Ramsey, F. P. | Schurz Vs Ramsey, F. P. | I 114 Probability Theory/Schurz: Problems: b) subjective probability: justification problems. For what reasons should rational degrees of belief fulfill the Kolmogorov axioms? What role should degrees of belief play for the goal of finding real truths? Solution/Ramsey/de Finetti: Bet. Bet/Bet Odds/Ramsey/Schurz: Thesis: fair odds of a person fulfill the Kolmogorov axioms A1 - A3 exactly when they are coherent, i.e. there is no system where a total loss is possible. VsRamsey/Vs Bet/Schurz: a bet is not a rational behaviour in the sense of a search for truth! They are not truth-oriented, because the definition of the fair odds only refers to the subjective degrees of belief, not to objective probability. The real frequency of success is not touched at all. For example, suppose a subjectivist enthusiastically accepts a bet of 1 : 1 that he rolls a six. He is fair if he is willing to accept the opposite bet, 1:1 that he does not roll a six. Problem: he remains coherent and fair even if he has lost all his fortune. He will only be surprised that no one will accept the counter bets he has accepted as fair. He cannot explain it as long as he is not allowed to consider the objective frequencies. This shows that the axioms A1 - A3 are at best a minimum condition. But this is too weak to exclude irrational behaviour. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Negation | Field, Hartry | II 308 "Reject"/Field: perhaps there is a sense of "reject" in which you reject everything and also the disjunction. "Reject"/Stronger/Lower/Field: this sense must be weaker than the sense of "accepting negation". But it must again be stronger than "not accepting". Solution: Def "reject p": as "accept that it is not the case that determines p". FieldVs: this proves my thesis in the section that moderate non-classical logic needs a det-operator. But the actual thesis was that he needs it just as much as classical logic does. Vs: later argued that the det-operator for classical logic is not fundamental, thesis: fundamental are rather non-classical degrees of belief. ((s) But this is about non-classical probability theory, not about non-classical logic). Because one explains acceptance with high and rejections with low degrees of belief. |
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