Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Ambrose, A. Stroud Vs Ambrose, A. I 89
Skepticism/Ambrose/Malcolm/Stroud: both think that skepticism - correctly understood - cannot be refuted empirically - by the senses. Skepticism/Ambrose: Thesis: Skepticism cannot even describe what kind of thing could be proof of "There are things in the outside world". There are no describable circumstances in which one could say that someone could be described as knowing that. So the sentence "Nobody knows whether things exist" cannot be falsified (A. p. 402). Skepticism argues for a logical impossibility of knowing from the outside world and not for an empirical fact.
Every sentence like "I don't know if there's a dollar in my pocket."
I 90
is "necessarily true" for the skeptic.
I 91
MalcolmVsMoore/AmbroseVsMoore/Stroud: they are directed against what Moore believes he is doing. He could not do it either! StroudVsAmbrose/StroudVsMalcolm: we will see that these two reviews fail, but for that we have to go a long way with Moore to see how he means his proof and that he even does what he believes, even if he achieves something else.
I 92
AmbroseVsMoore: for her, Moore is not in a position to do what he wants to do, which is to give direct empirical evidence. N.B.: Moore wants to point to things that differ from other things in their properties" But he cannot do that because the only things he can point to and intends to point to are "external things" and they all have the same property to be "external". That is, it has no contrast at all to other things, which it would have to have to say at all about external things in general. He can only point to some external things as opposed to other external things to show differences between them, but with that he cannot provide proof of existence for external things in general. (Circular)
Proof of Existence/Overview/General/Special/Solution: one can prove the existence of coins by pointing to a penny.
MooreVsAmbrose: (Moore p. 672): insists that his proof is empirical and that he proves the sentence "There are no external things" wrong.
I 93
For example, like pointing to a penny to prove that there is at least one outer thing. Moore admits that there are differences between the terms "outer thing" and "coin", but not with regard to the possibility of pointing to instances.
Pointing/MooreVsMalcolm/MooreVsAmbrose: you can certainly only point to outer things, but you can draw attention to inner objects. So the term "outer thing" probably has a significant contrast to other things that do not fall under this class: they are things you can point to.
"Outer Thing"/Moore: is like "coin" simply a more general term. But it is just as empirical as "coin.
Moore: the only refutation could be in his eyes that one shows that he has not proved that there is one hand here and another there.
Stroud: then the only objection would be that the premises are not really known. Wittgenstein seems to have this in mind in "On certainty":
Moore's Hands/Wittgenstein: "if you know there's a hand here, we will give you the rest". (On certainty, 1969, §1).
MooreVsAmbrose/Stroud: because Moore considers his evidence empirical, he ignores Ambrose's objection that he merely makes a recommendation for the use of language.
I 94
He sees himself as proving with one fact - here is one hand - he is proving another: - that there are external things. Language Use/Proof of Existence/Language/MooreVsAmbrose: I cannot have assumed that the fact that I have a hand proves anything about how the term "outer things" should be used. (Moore, 674)
Just as nothing is shown about the usage of e.g. "I know there are three misprints here" when I show that there are three misprints on this page. This is about nothing linguistic. Nothing about how words should be used follows from the premises.
MooreVsMalcolm/Stroud: then Malcolm's interpretation must also be wrong. That there's a hand here does not prove anything about how any expressions should be used.
MalcolmVsMoore: Malcolm believes that Moore did not reject him and actually agrees with him.
StroudVsMalcolm: But that cannot be if Moore does what he says.
MalcolmVsMoore: another argument: he could not have done what he wanted to do.
Skepticism/Language/MooreVsAmbrose: the skeptic may think he has a priori reasons for denying external things or knowledge about them.
I 96
But even then, that does not mean he cannot be empirically rejected. Suppose someone claims to have a priori reasons that there are no things in the outside world. Just then he can be refuted by simple empirical showing of such objects.
Moore/StroudVsMalcolm/StroudVsAmbrose: the reaction of Ambrose and Malcolm is still that Moore does exactly what he believes he is doing.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Austin, John L. Searle Vs Austin, John L. SearleVs Traditional Speech act analysis. (SearleVsAustin,SearleVsHare) Thesis: "Good", "true" mean the same in different acts. Ignored by the traditional speech act theory)
good/true/speech act theory/tradition: Hare: E.g. "Good" is used to recommend something.
Strawson: "True" is used to confirm or acknowledge statements.
Austin: "Knowledge" is used to provide guarantees. (SearleVs).
In principle: "the word W is used to perform the speech act A". >Speech act theory.

IV 17
illocutionary act/Austin: five categories: verdictive, expositive, exercitive, conductive, commissive) speech acts/SearleVsAustin: Distinction between illocutionary role and expression with propositional content:
R(p).
The various acts performed in different continua! There are at least 12 important dimensions.
IV 18
1. Differences in joke (purpose) of the act. (However, not to every act a purpose has to belong).
IV 19
The illocutionary joke is part of the role, but both are not the same. E.g. a request may have the same joke as a command. 2. Differences in orientation (word to the world or vice versa).
Either, the world needs to match the words, or vice versa.
IV 20
Example by Elizabeth Anscombe: Shopping list with goods, the same list is created by the store detective.
IV 21
3. Differences in the expressed psychological states E.g. to hint, to regret, to swear, to threaten. (Even if the acts are insincere).
Def sincerity condition/Searle: You cannot say, "I realize that p but I do not believe that p." "I promise that p but I do not intend that p"
The mental state is the sincerity condition of the act.
IV 22
These three dimensions: joke, orientation, sincerity condition are the most important. 4. Differences in the strength with which the illocutionary joke is raised.
E.g. "I suggest", "I swear"
5. Differences in the position of speaker and listener
E.g. the soldier will make not aware the general of the messy room.
IV 23
6. Differences of in which the utterance relates to what is in the interest of speaker and listener. E.g. whining, congratulating
7. Difference in relation to the rest of the discourse
E.g. to contradict, to reply, to conclude.
8. Differences in propositional content, resulting from the indicators of the illocutionary role
E.g. report or forecasts
IV 24
9. Differences between those acts that must always be speech acts, and those that can be carried out differently. E.g. you need not to say anything to classify something, or to diagnose
10. Differences between those acts, for which the extra-linguistic institutions are needed, and those for which they are not necessary
E.g. wedding, blessing, excommunication
IV 25
11. Differences between acts where the illocutionary verb has a performative use and those where this is not the case E.g. performative use: to state, to promise, to command no performative: "I hereby boast", "hereby I threaten".
12. differences in style
E.g. announcing, entrustment.
IV 27
SearleVsAustin: the list does not refer to acts but to verbs. One must distinguish between verb and act!
E.g. one can proclaim commands, promises, reports but that is something else, as to command, to announce or to report.
A proclamation is never merely a proclamation, it also needs to be a determination, a command or the like.
IV 30
Searle: E.g.iIf I make you chairman, I do not advocate that you chairman
IV 36
Def Declaration/Searle: the successful performance guarantees that the propositional content of the world corresponds. (Later terminology: "institutional facts) Orientation: by the success of the declaration word and world match to each other () No sincerity. Overlapping with assertive:... The referee's decisions. SearleVsAustin: Vs Distinction constative/performative.

VII 86
Cavell: "Must we mean what we say?" defends Austin and adds: The deviation can be "really or allegedly" present.
Austin: it is neither true nor false that I write this article voluntarily, because if there is no deviation, the concept of free will is not applicable.
SearleVsAustin: that's amazing.
VII 88
SearleVsAustin: Five theses to see Austin in a different light: 1. Austin exemplifies an analysis pattern that is common today as it is also used at Ryles' analysis of "voluntarily".
Ryle thesis of "voluntary" and "involuntary" can be applied only to acts, "you should not have done." Again, it is absurd to use it in an ordinary use.
VII 89
Neither true nor false: Wittgenstein: e.g. that I "know that I am in pain" E.g. that Moore knows he has two hands. etc. (> certainty).
Austin: E.g. it is neither true nor false, that I went out of free will to the session.
VII 90
The use of "voluntary" required certain conditions are not met here. Words in which they are not met, we can call "A-words", the conditions
"A-Conditions". We can create a list.
2. the conditions that are exemplified by the slogan "No modification without deviation", penetrate the whole language and are not limited to certain words.
E.g. The President is sober today.
Hans breathes. etc.
VII 91
3. Negation/Searle: the negation of an A-word is not in turn an A-word! E.g. I bought my car not voluntarily, I was forced to.
I did not volunteer, I was dragged here.
He does not know whether the object in front of him is a tree.
Considerable asymmetry between A-words and their opposite or negation.
VII 92
SearleVsAustin: according to him, in both cases a deviation is required. 4. A deviation is generally a reason to believe that the claim that is made by the statement to the contrary is true, or could have been, or at least could have been held by someone as true.
An A-condition is simply a reason to believe that the remark could have been false.
SearleVsAustin: his presentation is misleading because it suggests that any deviation justifies a modification.
E.g. if I buy a car while strumming with bare toes on a guitar, which is indeed a different way to buy a car, but it does not justify the remark "He bought his car voluntarily."
VII 93
SearleVsAustin: we can come to any list of A-words, because if word requires a deviation, will depend on the rest of the sentence and on the context. Then Austin's thesis is not about words but about propositions.
VII 94
Standard situation/circumstances/SearleVsAustin: notice that there is a standard situation, is to suggest that this fact is remarkable and that there is reason to believe that it could also be a non-standard situation.
VII 95
SearleVsAustin: his thesis even is not on propositions: to make an assertion means to specify that something is the case. If the possibility that the situation does not exist, is excluded, it is meaningless. Austin's slogan should be formulated to:
"No comment, which is not remarkable" or
"No assertion that is not worth to be claimed".
VII 96
SearleVsAustin: this one has seen it wrong. This is connected with the concept of intention: Intention/Searle: Thesis: the oddity or deviation which is a condition for the utterance
"X was deliberately done" represents, at the same time provides a reason for the truth of the statement by
"X was not done intentionally".
assertion condition/utterance condition: it is the utterance condition of an assertion precisely because it is one reason for the truth of the other.
SearleVsAustin: the data must be explained in terms of the applicability of certain terms. So my view is simple and plausible.
(VII 98): In Austin's slogan "No modification without deviation" it is not about the applicability of these terms, but rather about conditions for putting up claims generally.
Negation/SearleVsAustin: then the negations of the above, are not neither true nor false, but simply false!
E.g. I did not go voluntarily to the meeting (I was dragged). etc.
VII 98
Example The ability to remember ones name is one of the basic conditions ...

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Chomsky, N. Searle Vs Chomsky, N. SearleVsChomsky: he went a step too far: he should deny that the speech organ has any structure that can be described as an automaton. So he became a victim of the analytical technique.
Dennett I 555
Language/SearleVsChomsky: One can explain language acquisition this way: there is actually an innate language acquisition device. Bat that will ad nothing to the hardware explanation assuming deep unconscious universal grammatical rules. This does not increase the predictive value.   There are naked, blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness. There is nothing else. ((s) otherwise regress through intermediaries).

Searle I 273
SearleVsChomsky: for universal grammar there is a much simpler hypothesis: there is indeed a language acquisition device. Brings limitations, what types of languages can be learned by human being. And there is a functional level of explanation which language types a toddler can learn when applying this mechanism.
By unconscious rules the explanatory value is not increased.

IV 9
SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsRyle: there are neither alternative deep structures nor does is require specific conversations potulate.
IV 204
Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: it is often said folllowing Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms).
IV 205
This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Their unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we go from sounds to files.

VIII 411
Grammar/language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's students (by Searle called "Young Turks") pursue Chomsky's approach more radically than Chomsky. (see below). Aspects of the theory of syntax/Chomsky: (mature work, 1965(1)) more ambitious targets than previously: Statement of all linguistic relations between the sound system and the system of meaning.
VIII 412
For this, the grammar must consist of three parts: 1. syntactic component that describes the internal structure of the infinite number of propositions (the heart of the grammar)
2. phonological component: sound structure. (Purely interpretative)
3. semantic component. (Purely interpretive),.
Also structuralism has phrase structure rules.
VIII 414
It is not suggested that a speaker actually passes consciously or unconsciously for such a process of application of rules (for example, "Replace x by y"). This would be assumed a mix of competence and performance. SearleVsChomsky: main problem: it is not yet clear how the theory of construction of propositions supplied by grammarians accurately represents the ability of the speaker and in exactly what sense of "know" the speaker should know the rules.
VIII 420
Language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's conception of language is eccentric! Contrary to common sense believes it will not serve to communicate! Instead, only a general function to express the thoughts of man.
VIII 421
If language does have a function, there is still no significant correlation with its structure! Thesis: the syntactic structures are innate and have no significant relationship with communication, even though they are of course used for communication.
The essence of language is its structure.
E.g. the "language of the bees" is no language, because it does not have the correct structure.
Point: if one day man would result in a communication with all other syntactic forms, he possessed no language but anything else!
Generative semantics/Young TurksVsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is the semantics. Even terms such as "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! E.g. "He called him a Republican and insulted him".
ChomskyVsYoung Turks: Mock dispute, the critics have theorized only reformulated in a new terminology.
VIII 422
Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a proposition.
Searle: when the generative semantics is right and there is no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes all the more interesting, we then can systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection!).
VIII 426
Innate ideas/Descartes/SearleVsChomsky: Descartes has indeed considered the idea of a triangle or of perfection as innate, but of syntax of natural language he claimed nothing. He seems to have taken quite the contrary, that language is arbitrary: he assumed that we arbitrarily ascribe our ideas words!
Concepts are innate for Descartes, language is not.
Unconscious: is not allowed with Descartes!
VIII 429
Meaning theory/m.th./SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsQuine: most meaning theories make the same fallacy: Dilemma:
a) either the analysis of the meaning itself contains some key elements of the analyzed term, circular. ((s) > McDowell/PeacockeVs: Confusion >mention/>use).
b) the analysis leads the subject back to smaller items, that do not have key features, then it is useless because it is inadequate!
SearleVsChomsky: Chomsky's generative grammar commits the same fallacy: as one would expect from the syntactic component of the grammar that describes the syntactic competence of the speaker.
The semantic component consists of a set of rules that determine the meanings of propositions, and certainly assumes that the meaning of a propositions depends on the meaning of its elements as well as on their syntactic combination.
VIII 432
The same dilemma: a) In the various interpretations of ambiguous sentences it is merely paraphrases, then the analysis is circular.
E.g. A theory that seeks to explain the competence, must not mention two paraphrases of "I went to the bank" because the ability to understand the paraphrases, just requires the expertise that will explain it! I cannot explain the general competence to speak German by translating a German proposition into another German proposition!
b) The readings consist only of lists of items, then the analysis is inadequate: they cannot declare that the proposition expresses an assertion.
VIII 433
ad a) VsVs: It is alleged that the paraphrases only have an illustrative purpose and are not really readings. SearleVs: but what may be the real readings?
Example Suppose we could interpret the readings as heap of stones: none for a nonsense phrase, for an analytic proposition the arrangement of the predicate heap will be included in the subject heap, etc.
Nothing in the formal properties of the semantic component could stop us, but rather a statement of the relationship between sound and meaning theory delivered an unexplained relationship between sounds and stones.
VsVs: we could find the real readings expressed in a future universal semantic alphabet. The elements then stand for units of meaning in all languages.
SearleVs: the same dilemma:
a) Either the alphabet is a new kind of artificial language and the readings in turn paraphrases, only this time in Esperanto or
b) The readings in the semantic alphabet are merely a list of characteristics of the language. The analysis is inadequate, because it replaces a speech through a list of elements.
VIII 434
SearleVsChomsky: the semantic part of its grammar cannot explain, what the speaker actually recognizes when it detects one of the semantic properties. Dilemma: either sterile formalism or uninterpreted list.
Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: Solution: Speech acts have two properties whose combination we dismiss out of the dilemma: they are regularly fed and intentional.
Anyone who means a proposition literally, expresses it in accordance with certain semantic rules and with the intention of utterance are just to make it through the appeal to these rules for the execution of a particular speech act.
VIII 436
Meaning/language/SearleVsChomsky: there is no way to explain the meaning of a proposition without considering its communicative role.
VIII 437
Competence/performance/SearleVsChomsky: his distinction is missed: he apparently assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more a theory of performance than one of competence. He does not see that competence is ultimately performance skills. ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: Chomsky seems to suspect behaviorism behind the speech act.


1. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge 1965

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Derrida, J. Putnam Vs Derrida, J. III 96 ff
However, the typical representatives of relativism paradoxically believe they had made something like a metaphysical discovery. Deconstructivism/Derrida/Putnam: he completes step from relativism to nihillism. This concept of truth is incoherent and belongs to a "metaphysics of presence" (Derrida). Derrida, allegedly: "the concept of truth is inconsistent, but absolutely essential!"
PutnamVsDerrida: What do you mean, every use of the word "true" contains a contradiction?
III 97
The failure of a number of mutually exclusive philosophical explanations of the concept of truth is something completely different from the failure of the concept of truth itself! LL Wittgenstein: the failure of a number of philosophical analyses of certainty is something other than the failure of the normal concept of certainty.
PutnamVsDerrida: but the collapse of a particular worldview is far from being a collapse of the concepts of representation and truth. Because if we equate this metaphysical tradition with our lives and our language, we would be giving metaphysics an entirely exaggerated importance.

DerridaVsSaussure: approves this, he criticized Saussure only in that he did not go further and abandoned the concept of the character altogether.
III 163
PutnamVsDerrida: Derrida overlooks here that Saussure's way of thinking was based on a utopian project. It had been hoped that a a stringent scientific explanation of the concept of meaning could be given. This hope has failed, but we are not forced to the absurd view that nobody could understand a language other than their own idiolect. Even Derrida himself does not go that far. He recognizes the indispensability of translations indeed.
III 164
Solution/Putnam: the alternative to Saussure's view is that retaining the concept of "meaning equality", while realizing that it must not be interpreted in the sense of self-identity of objects called "meaning" or "significate".
III 165
Can it be that Derrida makes the same mistake as Jerry Fodor? He does not even consider the possibility that the kind of "meaning equality" aimed at in translation could be an interest-relative (but still very real) relationship, which presupposes a normative judgment, i.e. a judgment about what is reasonable in the individual case.
III 168
Derrida/Putnam: his attitude is much harder to pin down. (DerridaVsLogocentrism.) Derrida himself emphasizes that the logocentric quandary was no "pathology" for which he had a cure to offer. We must fall into this quandary by fate. >Logocentrism.
By his leftist supporters Derrida has often been interpreted as if this justified even a consistent rejection of the idea of ​​the rational justification.
Forgery/Bernstein: "You cannot falsify just anything."
Richard BernsteinVsDerrida: what do the texts by Derrida have about them that permits, or even demands this double interpretation? It is ultimately true that "not just anything can be falsified".
III 171
PutnamVsDerrida: Derrida's quandary is one in which those fall who, albeit not wanting to be "irresponsible", also want to "problematize" the concepts of reason and truth by teaching that these concepts have failed. His steps amount to the fact that the concepts "rationale", "strong reason", "justification", etc. correspond to repressive practices more than anything. And this view is dangerous indeed, because it offers help and comfort to all sorts of left and right extremists.

I (a) 22
PutnamVsDerrida: its criticism of "logocentrism" is not only wrong, but dangerous.
I (k) 266
Deconstruction/PutnamVsDerrida: is right in that a certain philosophical tradition (for example, binary logic) is simply bankrupt. But identifying this tradition with our lives and our language is to give metaphysics a completely exaggerated importance. Meaning Equality/PutnamVsDerrida: is actually an interest-relative one! It contains a judgment about what is reasonable in each case.
I (k) 273
PutnamVsDerrida: deconstruction without reconstruction is irresponsibility. >Deconstructionism.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Descartes, R. Wittgenstein Vs Descartes, R. Frank I 514
I/Body/Descartes: our I-thoughts leave the possibility open that we might be nothing more but mind. I/WittgensteinVsDescartes: a) Object use: E.g. "My arm is broken", "I have a bump on my forehead",
b) subject use: E.g. "I hear so and so"
meaningless: to ask. "Are you sure that you are in pain?" (> Certainty).
But: the statement, "I am in pain" is no more a statement about a particular person, as a groan.
But the reference is clear, it refers to the speaker.
Frank I 523
WittgensteinVsDescartes/oral/Evans: when someone says "I think it will rain soon, therefore I am" then I do not understand him.

Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell,
Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266
---
Wittgenstein II 226
I/WittgensteinVsDescartes: the word "I" is one of several symbols with practical use, and if it was not necessary for language practice, you could drop it. It does not take any prominent position among the other words. Unless we begin to use it as Descartes did. I have just tried to demonstrate convincingly the opposite of Descartes' emphasis on the 'I'.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Malcolm, N. Rorty Vs Malcolm, N. Frank I 610
Knowledge/Certainty/MalcolmVsIncorrigibility: (a propos Wittgenstein's "certainty"): we cannot claim any knowledge, e.g. in cases of pain. It is pointless to say, "I know that I am in pain." RortyVsMalcolm: intends to maintain incorrigibility. >Certainty, >incorrigibility.

Rorty I 238
MalcolmVsChomsky/Rorty: internalized control system is a typical error of the traditional "theory of ideas". It is wrong to assume that a person must be guided when speaking. But no explanations are to be found here.
I 239
RortyVsMalcolm/Rorty: Fallacy (goes back to Wittgenstein): 1) meaning cannot be explained by internal ostension but only by behavior.
I.e. applies
2) psychology can only be dealing with empirical correlations between behavioral dispositions and external circumstances. VsRyle/Rorty: this is wrong, as critics of Ryle have shown; too operationalist. There may also be a plethora of equally necessary "internal" conditions.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Moore, G.E. Wittgenstein Vs Moore, G.E. VI 212
"On Certainty"/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the book goes back to the confrontation with the remark Moore's "I know that I have two hands" or: "This is a material object" and others. E.g. Moore: "The earth has long existed before I was born". (> "Moore's hands")
WittgensteinVsMoore: one can only say that this sentence has a clearer sense than "it exists in the last 5 minutes".
Wittgenstein: E.g. But why should a king have not been brought up to believe that the world started with him?
Knowledge/certainty/WittgensteinVsMoore/Schulte: Moore justifies knowledge by specifying contingent empirical propositions.
Wittgenstein (PU, BPP): we see in knowledge often the highest level of a hierarchy of attitudes to objects of knowledge.
---
VI 213
From this ranking, we too easily conclude that sentences that are fixed indubitable, are sentences at the same time, whose contents one knows. E.g. 1 + 1 = 2 can one really say, you "knew" things like this?
Thesis: if doubts are excluded, the use of the term "knowledge" is not appropriate.
E.g. I am simply in pain, has nothing to do with "knowing that".
---
VI 216
E.g. At maximum, after an accident I can reassure myself that I still have my hands. ---
VI 222
WittgensteinVsMoore/Schulte: E.g. "I never went far from the surface of the earth": it is difficult to classify the sentence into a context. Therefore, it is also not clear what one might call error here. Moore's sentences can hardly be assigned to a language game, a spokesperson cannot be fixed.
---
VI 233
Certainty/WittgensteinVsMoore/Schulte: sentences that exclude doubts and mistakes, stand on a dead track.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Wittgenstein Davidson Vs Wittgenstein I (a) 6ff
Many philosophers under the influence of Wittgenstein: recognition of the mind of another person: difference in the way we recognize our own mind and how we recognize the one of another person. In the first case there is no evidence needed, in the second case: the behavior must be observed. (not own behaviour) Davidson: As regards the use of these concepts of the mental, I agree with this distinction. But: DavidsonVsWittgenstein:
 The description of our practice does not constitute a solution to our original problem.
 Our practice has never been in doubt. Two questions: 1) Why should evidence-based knowledge not have greater certainty?
   2) boils down to: we have no reason to believe that we are dealing only with a single concept.
 Why should one believe the other one has the exact same mental states as he himself?

Rorty I 230
Truth Function/ Wafu / extension / intension / DavidsonVsQuine / Rorty: truth-functional vocabularies are characterized not in a particular way of reproducing the "true and ultimate structure of reality", do not in the intensional vocabularies this. (DavidsonVsTractatus). The distinction extensional / intensional is not more interesting than between nations and people. She’s just apt to evoke emotions reductionist.

Rorty I 230
Truth function/tr.-fnc./Extension/Intension/DavidsonVsQuine/Rorty: truth-functional vocabularies do not stand out by reproducing the "true and ultimate structure of reality" in a particular way in which intensional vocabularies do not do this. (DavidsonVsTractatus). The distinction extensional/intensional is not more interesting than that between nations and people. It is only apt to evoke reductionist emotions.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Wittgenstein Turing Vs Wittgenstein Wittgenstein VI 122/123
Contradiction/TuringVsWittgenstein/Schulte: a practical calculation with a "hidden contradiction" can have fatal consequences, therefore the fear of it is not unfounded. Wittgenstein/Schulte: makes concessions.
However, he maintains that one should not think that one should never rely on one's bills as long as the objection is not excluded by evidence.
False idea of an "absolute certainty" of mathematics. A good angel will always be necessary so that we are on the right path.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Positivism Pro Bezzel Wittgenstein (where?)
HabermasVsWittgenstein: Wttg. positivist.
  WittgensteinVsDescartes: "Game of doubt already presupposes certainty.
  WittgensteinVs: behaviorism, metaphysics, ostensive definition, "second-order language," progressive thinking of natural science, (western philosophy)
Skepticism Versus Bezzel Wittgenstein (where?)
  WittgensteinVsDescartes: "Game of doubt already presupposes certainty.
  WittgensteinVs: behaviorism, metaphysics, ostensive definition, "second-order language," progressive thinking of natural science, (western philosophy)

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Ultimate Justification Sellars, W. I IX
Ultimate justification / Fundamental sentences / certainty / Wittgenstein: Thesis: doubts end in sentences like - "I know that this is my foot" - "LW is my name" - these sentences build the foundation.