Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Sense, philosophy: sense is a property of statements which makes the determination of the truth value (true or false) possible, although not guaranteed. Even false statements make sense; otherwise their falsehood could not be established. What is meaningless, therefore, is what cannot be negated. Statements about the future allow an assessment of probabilities if they are sensible without having a truth value. Wishes and commands are sensible and understandable if they can be reformulated into negative statements. See also understanding, negation, truth values, verification, determination, indeterminacy, probability, Fregean sense.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item    More concepts for author
Adorno, Th.W. Sense   Adorno, Th.W.
Castaneda, H.N. Sense   Castaneda, H.N.
Cavell, Stanley Sense   Cavell, Stanley
Cresswell, M.J. Sense   Cresswell, M.J.
Dennett, Daniel Sense   Dennett, Daniel
Descartes, R. Sense   Descartes, R.
Dewey, J. Sense   Dewey, J.
Dummett, Michael Sense   Dummett, Michael
Evans, Gareth Sense   Evans, Gareth
Flusser, Vilem Sense   Flusser, Vilem
Frege, Gottlob Sense   Frege, Gottlob
Freud, Siegmund Sense   Freud, Siegmund
Hacking, Ian Sense   Hacking, Ian
Husserl, E. Sense   Husserl, E.
Kant, I. Sense   Kant, I.
Logic Texts Sense   Logic Texts
Luhmann, Niklas Sense   Luhmann, Niklas
Mates, B. Sense   Mates, B.
Maturana, H. Sense   Maturana, H.
McDowell, John Sense   McDowell, John
Meixner, Uwe Sense   Meixner, Uwe
Millikan, Ruth Sense   Millikan, Ruth
Minsky, M. Sense   Minsky, M.
Montague, R. Sense   Montague, R.
Perry, John R. Sense   Perry, John R.
Wessel, H. Sense   Wessel, H.
Wittgenstein, L. Sense   Wittgenstein, L.

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-26