Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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 Pierre (Londres-Example) - Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments
 
Pierre example: (from Saul Kripke, "A Puzzle about Belief", in N. Salmon and S. Soames, eds. “Propositions and Attitudes” (Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 124.) Pierre has learned that Londres is a beautiful city. He also believes at the same time that London is ugly. The problem is a special one here, as it is not about "capital of ...", but names, which are supposed to not change their referents. See also reference, propositional attitudes, de re, de dicto, thought objects, intensional objects, opacity.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
 
Author Item    More concepts for author
Chisholm, Roderick Pierre (Londres-Example)   Chisholm, Roderick
Cresswell, Maxwell J. Pierre (Londres-Example)   Cresswell, Maxwell J.
Dummett, Michael E. Pierre (Londres-Example)   Dummett, Michael E.
Searle, John R. Pierre (Londres-Example)   Searle, John R.
Stalnaker, Robert Pierre (Londres-Example)   Stalnaker, Robert

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