Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Kripke's Wittgenstein: Interpretation by Saul A. Kripke of a problem by L. Wittgenstein in connection with the rule series. Kripke extends Wittgenstein's doubts about the security with which we judge our own opinion. If we only believe to follow rules, we do not know for sure what we mean by addition. From a finite series of cases in the past, no certainty about future cases can be gained. The core of the problem is, according to Kripke, that there are no facts that determine the importance of our own beliefs.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item    More concepts for author
Cavell, Stanley Kripke’s Wittgenstein   Cavell, Stanley
Esfeld, Michael Kripke’s Wittgenstein   Esfeld, Michael
Katz, Jerrold J. Kripke’s Wittgenstein   Katz, Jerrold J.
Nagel, Thomas Kripke’s Wittgenstein   Nagel, Thomas
Putnam, Hilary Kripke’s Wittgenstein   Putnam, Hilary
Schiffer, Stephen Kripke’s Wittgenstein   Schiffer, Stephen
Schulte, J. Kripke’s Wittgenstein   Schulte, J.
Wright, Crispin Kripke’s Wittgenstein   Wright, Crispin

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-29