Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Altruism: In philosophy, altruism is a moral theory and ethical concept that advocates selfless concern for the well-being and interests of others, often at the expense of one's own self-interest.
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Altruism - Dictionary of Arguments
XIII 3 Altruism/Quine: altruism is the main stem of morality and the main purpose of moral principles. XIII 4 Rational argument: 1. The moral behaviour is in one's own interest. 2. We are all better off then. Fallacy: it is false to assume that the individual will then also be better off. Should we then say that selfishness is still a guarantee for altruism when we have institutionalised police and punishment? No we should not, for two reasons: 1. Punishment requires only moderate altruism and leaves the supererogatory untouched. 2. Self-interest also touches certain unaltruistic behaviour when the person sees chances of escaping the police. Altruism: the enlightened altruist recognizes that self-interest does not require a truly rational basis. Def Altruism/Enlightened/Quine: altruism simply praises the welfare of others as one's own. Vs: some moralists believe that morality is threatened by this lack of rationality. QuineVsVs: virtue is their own reward. XIII 5 Motive/Quine: there are simply other motives than self-interest, namely proper ones. Altruism/Evolution/Quine: evolution is sometimes explained by an interest in preserving the gene pool. QuineVs: Altruism is not always as abundant as we would like it to be, nor is it always reinforced by self-interest. Altruism/Quine: it is one thing to strengthen it in our less receptive contemporaries - another thing to expand its scope. Evolution explains altruism only in relation to the family. Problem: many of us also take care of animals, etc. The human heart is only satisfied when it encompasses the whole world. Moral/Ethics/Quine: we have no outstanding feature for them._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20