Object of thought/intentional identity/Gärdenfors: example by Peter Geach (1967) (1): the three farmers Cob, Hob and Nob believe that a witch is bothering them, and they wonder if she is the same witch who has done different things. Problem: since there is no witch, there is only one object of thought. Question: is it the same object that the three farmers think of? See also Edelberg (2006) (2) and Jacot (2012) (3).
Prototype/Jacot/Gärdenfors: "a witch" is under-determined. Solution: Prototypes.
Fixed point/Gärdenfors: is reached, if e.g. one refers to the with with index words and pronomina. However, this fixed point is fragile, which becomes apparent when additional properties are added that are possibly incompatible.
Solution: if there is a "meeting of minds", the same conclusions should be drawn.
Gärdenfors: such a theory can be called sociocognitive.
(1) Geach, P. (1967). Intentional identity. Journal of Philosophy, 64, 627–632.
(2) Edelberg, W. (2006). Intrasubjective intentional identity. Journal of Philosophy, 103, 481–502.
(3) Jacot, J. (2012). Do we speak of the same witch? How minds can meet on intentional identity. Lund: Department of Philosophy, Lund University._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014