Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Features, philosophy: Features are fundamentally characteristics, however in the philosophical terminology according to Frege it has become natural to speak of (necessary) characteristics, but in objects of (contingent) properties. Objects do not have their properties necessarily, they can always be different. Concepts, on the other hand, have their characteristics necessarily. E.g. that circles are round is a necessary characteristic of the concept circle, but not a necessary property of drawn circles. It is, however, not the concept which has the characteristic itself, but the objects which fall under it._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Peter Gärdenfors on Features - Dictionary of Arguments
I 47 Feature/Feature Analysis/Linguistics/Gärdenfors: in the tradition of Fregean logic and Tarski's theory of truth, a different approach has emerged than the one I have pursued: the assumption that a set of features of a concept is necessary and sufficient to determine meaning. --- I 48 For this purpose see Jackendoff, 1983, p. 112(1); Goddard and Wierzbicka, 1994.(2) In particular Katz and Fodor (1963) (3), R. Lakoff (1971)(4), Schank, (1975) (5), Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976)(6). Group: GärdenforsVsFeature Analysis. Concept features/GärdenforsVsKatz/GärdenforsVsLakoff, R./GärdenforsVsFodor/GärdenforsVsFrege: Experimental results speak rahter for dimensional representations that are based on similarities than on representations of features. (See Rosch, 1978, Prototype theory).(7) Prototype theory/Rosch: thesis: objects are more or less typical examples of a category and there is a graduated containment in categories. 1. Jackendoff, R. (1983). Semantics and cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2. Goddard, C., & Wierzbicka, A. (1994). Semantic and lexical universals: Theory and empirical findings. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 3. Fodor, J. A., & Katz, J. J. (1963). The structure of a semantic theory. Language, 39, 170–210. 4. Lakoff, R. (1971). IFs, ANDs, and BUTs: about conjunction. In C. Fillmore & D. T. Langendoen (Eds.), Studies in linguistic semantics (pp. 114–149). New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 5. Schank, R. C. (1975). Conceptual information processing. New York: Elsevier Science. 6. Miller, G. A., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1976). Language and perception. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. 7. Rosch, E. (1978). Prototype classification and logical classification: The two systems. In E. Scholnik (Ed.), New trends in cognitive representation: Challenges to Piaget’s theory (pp. 73–86). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16