Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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David Chalmers
I 314
Definition Strong Artificial Intelligence/Searle/Chalmers: Thesis: There is a non-empty class of computations so that the implementation of each operation from this class is sufficient for a mind and especially for conscious experiences. This is only true with natural necessity, because it is logically possible that any computation can do without consciousness, but this also applies to brains.
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I 320
A computational description of a system provides a formal description of the causal organization of this system.
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I 321
Invariance principle: every system with conscious experiences, which has the same functional organization as another system with conscious experiences, will have qualitatively identical conscious experiences. There may be corresponding causal relations between electronic components like there is between neurons in the brain.
Fading Qualia/dancing Qualia: we can use these kinds of qualia for arguments for the strong artificial intelligence.
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I 322
If there were two organizationally identical systems, one of which had conscious experiences, and the other not, one could construct a system with fading or dancing qualia that lay between these two systems. That would be implausible. If fading and dancing qualia are excluded, the thesis of the Strong Artificial Intelligence applies. (> Qualia/Chalmers).
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I 329
VsArtificial Intelligence/Goedel/Chalmers: in a consistent formal system which is expressive enough for a certain kind of arithmetic, one can construct a sentence which is not provable in this system. Contrary to the machine, the human being can see that the sentence is true.
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I 330
Therefore the human has an ability which the formal system does not have.
ChalmersVsVs: there is no reason to believe that the human is aware of the truth of the sentence. At best, we can say that if the system is consistent, the sentence is true. We cannot always determine the consistency of complex systems.
PenroseVsArtificial Intelligence/Chalmers: (Penrose 1994) brings an argument on a lower level: it may be that not all physical processes are computable. ChalmersVsVs: But this is based on the above mentioned Goedel argument. Nothing in physical theory itself supports it.
VsArtificial Intelligence/VsSimulation/Chalmers: what if consciousness processes are essentially continuous, but our simulations are discrete?
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I 331
ChalmersVsVs: there are reasons to assume that absolute continuity is not essential for our cognitive competence. However, it might be that a system with unlimited precision (achieved by continuity) has cognitive abilities that a discrete system does not achieve.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-28