Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 297
Panpsychism/Chalmers: if we admit a thermostat experience (flashy information state changes), then perhaps there is consciousness or conscious states everywhere? Perhaps in a stone? But a stone does not correspond to a thermostat. We can say that the stone contains subsystems that are conscious.
I 298
Consciousness/Chalmers: if we assume that very simple systems have very simple phenomenology, it makes it less unintelligible to accept consciousness as a unified property of the universe.
Experience/Chalmers: can experiences arise in a static state? Intuitively, it seems necessary that a change of state is necessary for a system to have an experience.
Proto-phanomenal: we can call the "experiences" of a thermostat proto-phenomenal.
I 299
Panpsychism/Chalmers: The reason why I am not referring to my thesis as panpsychism is that it is misleadingly suggested that proto-phanomenal experiences are somehow basic and complex experiences are composed of them, which I do not believe. But I call my thesis of naturalistic dualism a variant of panpsychism.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Cha I
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-07-24