Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
Chalmers I 142
Knowledge how/Qualia/primary/secondary intension/LoarVsJackson/LoarVsMaterialism/Loar/Chalmers: Loar (1990) goes deeper in his critique than Horgan (1984b), Tye (1986), Churchland (1985), Papineau (1993), Teller (1992), McMullen (1985): the examples with water/H2O, Superman/Clark Kent etc. still allow the physical and/or phenomenal concepts to have different primary intensions. For example, heat and e.g. average kinetic energy designate the same property (secondary intension), but simultaneously introduce different properties (primary intensions)! But this is not known a priori.
N.B.: then Mary's knowledge about the phenomenal qualities of colors...
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I 143
... was already a knowledge of physical or functional properties, but they could not connect the two before.
VsJackson/Chalmers: further objections: (Bigelow/Pargetter (1990)): BigelowVsJackson, PargetterVsJackson: even for an omniscient being there is a gap between physical and indexical knowledge (for example, Rudolf Lingens with memory loss reads his own biography in the library).
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I 144
ChalmersVsBigelow/ChalmersVsPargetter/ChalmersVsLoar: the lack of phenomenal knowledge is quite different from the lack of indexical knowledge.
Knowledge/Indexicality/Nagel/Chalmers: (Nagel 1983): there is an ontological gap here.
ChalmersVsNagel: we can argue more directly: there is no imaginable world in which the physical facts are as in our world, but in which the indexical facts differ from ours.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29