Dictionary of Arguments

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Knowledge-how, philosophy: the knowledge how it is to be in a certain state, or how something feels. This type of knowledge is distinguished from the so-called knowledge-that which refers to situations, states, and facts shared by different people. The philosophical discussion deals with the question of the difference between the types of knowledge and the possibility or impossibility of sharing phenomenal knowledge, i.e. the knowledge-how. See also privileged access, private language, knowledge, propositional knowledge, intersubjectivity, qualia.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Chalmers I 142
Knowledge how/Qualia/primary/secondary intension/LoarVsJackson/LoarVsMaterialism/Loar/Chalmers: Loar (1990)(1) goes deeper in his critique than Horgan (1984b)(2) Tye (1986)(3), Churchland (1985)(4), Papineau (1993)(5), Teller (1992)(6), McMullen (1985)(7): the examples with water/H2O, Superman/Clark Kent etc. still allow the physical and/or phenomenal concepts to have different primary intensions. For example, heat and e.g. average kinetic energy designate the same property (secondary intension), but simultaneously introduce different properties (primary intensions)! But this is not known a priori.
N.B.: then Mary's knowledge about the phenomenal qualities of colors...
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I 143
... was already a knowledge of physical or functional properties, but they could not connect the two before.
VsJackson/Chalmers: further objections: (Bigelow/Pargetter (1990)(8)): BigelowVsJackson, PargetterVsJackson: even for an omniscient being there is a gap between physical and indexical knowledge (for example, Rudolf Lingens with memory loss reads his own biography in the library).
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I 144
ChalmersVsBigelow/ChalmersVsPargetter/ChalmersVsLoar: the lack of phenomenal knowledge is quite different from the lack of indexical knowledge.
Knowledge/Indexicality/Nagel/Chalmers: (Nagel 1983)(9): there is an ontological gap here.
ChalmersVsNagel: we can argue more directly: there is no imaginable world in which the physical facts are as in our world, but in which the indexical facts differ from ours.



1. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108
2. T. Horgan, Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 1984: pp. 147-83
3. M. Tye, The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95, 1986: pp. 1-17
4. P. M. Churchland, Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy 82, 1985: pp. 8-28
5. D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford 1993
6. P. Teller A contemporary look at emergence. In: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim (Eds) Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin 1992
7. C. McMullen, "Knowing what it's like" and the essential indexical. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 211-33
8. J. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, Acquaintance with qualia. Theoria 56, 1990: pp. 129-47
9. Th. Nagel, The objective self. In. C. Ginet and S. Shoemaker (eds) Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essayys. New York 1983.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-04-21
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