Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 133
Centered World/Indexicality/Chalmers: if a centered world is once determined, i.e. if the localization of the center (e.g., I) is established, then a primary intension (e.g., water and H2O) provides a perfect non-indexical property.
Concepts: now one could assume that the term zombie would simply not be used in a zombie-centered world.
ChalmersVs: the situation is more complicated: primary intensions do not require the presence of the original concept. This suggests that a posteriori necessity is not necessary for my arguments with regard to consciousness.
Intensions: the falling apart of primary and secondary intensions causes an uncertainty with regard to water: something watery does not have to be H2O. But that does not apply to consciousness. If something feels like a conscious experience, then it is conscious experience, no matter in which world.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25