Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 125
Property Dualism/Consciousness/Chalmers: from the lack of a logical supervenience of consciousness from the physical follows that conscious experiences imply the properties of an individual that are not implied by the physical properties of that individual. It is not about a separate "substance".
Consciousness is a feature, a property of the world, beyond the physical facts.
Property Dualism: there is a weaker kind of property dualism, according to which biological fitness is not implied by physical facts. Such a property dualism would be compatible with materialism.
This variety is not to be confused with our present one.
Consciousness/Chalmers: consciousness can result, according to our variety, from property dualism of physical properties without being implied by them.
I 126
This view is completely naturalistic and compatible with our scientific knowledge.
I 128
Definition Naturalistic Dualism/Chalmers: I call my variety of dualism naturalistic dualism, according to which properties of the phenomenal consciousness supervene on physical facts in a still to be determined manner, although not logically.
What could happen in the future would be what happened with Maxwell's equations: known laws could be extended as far as their scope of application is concerned. There could be a psychophysical theory, as there is an electromagnetic theory.
This dualism is naturalistic because it proceeds from the validity of all known laws. It is closer to materialism than many other forms of dualism by negating any transcendental elements.
I 129
My dualism, by the way, can still turn out as a kind of monism if it should be shown that the phenomenal and the physical are two aspects of an overlapping kind, as it turned out to be the case with matter and energy. I have a certain sympathy for this view. But this could not be a materialistic ((s) eliminative) monism.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Cha I
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-07-24