Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

 
Property dualism: In contrast to classical dualism, which assumes two substances, the material and the mental substance (res extensa and res cogitans), the property dualism assumes two kinds of properties, the material and the spiritual, that are attributed to a single entity - the respective subject. See also dualism, monism, qualia, subjectivity, identity theory, properties, attribution.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
Chalmers I 130
Property Dualism/SearleVsProperty Dualism/SearleVsChalmers: Searle (1992) has a similar view as I do, but denies that this is a property dualism. Rather, the ontological status of consciousness is the same as that of physical properties, such as being liquid. This is not a mere terminological difference to my dualism. In Searle, basal physical facts do not cause the higher level ones, they constitute them. Constitution is a much closer relationship than causation. (FN 2/chapter 5).


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Property Dualism

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-24