Books on Amazon:
Zombies/Robots/Chalmers: zombies and robots are logically possible. There could be a twin of me, who is molecular identical with me, but without inner experience.
Zombie Identity/Chalmers: The identity between my zombie twin and I will insist on the following levels:
1. Functional: he will process the same information as I do.
2. Psychological: he will show the same behavior.
Phenomenal: the zombie will not be identical with me: he will not have the same inner experiences.
Zombies/Chalmers: it is not a matter of whether the assumption of their existence is plausible, but whether it is conceptually incoherent. In any case, there are no hidden conceptual contradictions.
Conceivability: since such a zombie is not conceptually excluded, it follows that my conscious experience does not logically follow from the functional constitution of my organism.
Conclusion: (phenomenal) consciousness does not supervene logically on the physical.
Zombies/Necessity a posteriori/VsChalmers: one could argue that a zombie world would be merely logical, but not metaphysically possible. There is also a distinction between conceivability and true possibility.
Necessary a posteriori/Kripke: For example, that water is H2O, this necessity is only a posteriori knowable. Then it is logical, but not metaphysically possible, that water is not H2O.
VsChalmers: it was unnatural to assume the same for zombies, and that would be enough to save materialism.
ChalmersVsVs: the notion of necessity a posteriori cannot bear the burden of this argument and is only a distraction maneuver. ((s) It is not brought into play by Kripke himself).
ChalmersVsVs: the argument against me would only have a prospect of success if we had used primary intensions (e.g. water and H2O), but we are dealing with secondary intensions (e.g. water and "wateriness"). Therefore, psychological/physical concepts a posteriori could pick out other things than what would correspond to the a priori distinction.
Zombie/Behavior/Explanation/Chalmers: since the relationships within my zombie twin are the exact reflection of my inner being, any explanation of his behavior will also count as an explanation of my behavior. It follows that the explanation of my assertions about consciousness is just as independent of the existence of consciousness as the explanation of the assertions of the zombies.
My zombie twin can adopt this argumentation, and complain about me as a zombie. It can mirror the whole situation.
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996
Constructing the World Oxford 2014