Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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I 19f
Zombies/Perceptive faculty/Stalnaker: you cannot say that there are possible worlds with zombies that are conceivable but metaphysically impossible. - General Picture: consciousness: refers to a property that we find in us, and that we probably know, because we have it - but the fact that we are conscious does not provide special access to the nature of this property.
I 239
Zombie/Materialism/Stalnaker: simple argument Vsmaterialism: that Zombies are conceptually impossible - then there would be two possible worlds that are physically indistinguishable, but can be distinguished in terms of qualitative experiences and consciousness that can be had inside them - then the consciousness does not supervene on the physical.
I 242
MaterialismVsVs: must accept that there could be zombies in the real world, but assert that there are none.
I 251
Materialism must be compatible with the having of consciousness.
I 241
Zombie/Stalnaker: z-World: is a world in which there is nothing, except that which supervenes on the physical - the absence of consciousness is not mentioned - but it is possible that there are zombies - otherwise the z-world is like the w-world. - later: a-world: additionally has consciousness, qualia, and so on - ((s) that is not explicitly denied for the z-world).
I 244
Zombie/Theoretical weight/Theory-laden/Stalnaker: if consciousness is theory-laden, it is built into the meaning of what the theory assumes about it - then the word is no longer innocent - then we might learn something new about it.
I 245 -
Example if water turned out to be a collective term for all manner, then we would say "It is not water" (because it were no element) - on the other hand: innocent use: corresponds to the whatever-. - ((s), the concept of role then denies theory ladenness?).
I 252
Zombie/Conceivability/Stalnaker: conceivability as an argument for possible existence:. Limited sense of conceivability: if it’s conceivable that we live in an a-world, then it is conceivable in this restricted sense that there are zombies there - Materialism: if he’s right and we live in a z-world, then there is no possible worlds that could be described correctly as a zombie world. - Conceivability: in a restricted sense is not an argument Vsmaterialism. - One would have to assume beforehand that materialism is wrong.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-27