Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Chalmers I 88
Supervenience/Horgan/Blackburn/Chalmers: Question: (Blackburn 1985), Horgan (1993): How do we explain the supervenience relation itself?
Primary Intension/Chalmers: For logical supervenience on primary intensions, we simply need to present a conceptual analysis, together with the determination that the reference about possible worlds is preserved (or is rigid). The supervenience conditional is thus an a priori conceptual truth.
I 89
Secondary Intension: here, the logical supervenience can be explained by saying that the primary intension of the concept extracts a referent of the actual world, which is projected unchanged to other physically identical worlds (by rigidifying operations). Such facts are contingent. (FN 51/C 2)
Natural Supervenience/Chalmers: is - as opposed to the logical - contingent for its part. This is ontologically expensive, so we can be glad that logical supervenience is the rule.

Horg I
T. Horgan
Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology (Representation and Mind) Cambridge 2009

Cha I
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-26