Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Supervenience, philosophy of mind: supervenience is an expression for a restricted dependency between areas. Elements of a region B are dependent on changes of elements of an area A, but not vice versa. Supervenience is used by some authors to explain the relationship between mental and physical processes. The assumption of a supervenience serves to circumvent more powerful assumptions like, e.g. the identity theory. See also covariance, dependency, identity theory, materialism, reductionism.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
Chalmers I 88
Supervenience/Horgan/Blackburn/Chalmers: Question: (Blackburn 1985), Horgan (1993): How do we explain the supervenience relation itself?
Primary Intension/Chalmers: For logical supervenience on primary intensions, we simply need to present a conceptual analysis, together with the determination that the reference about possible worlds is preserved (or is rigid). The supervenience conditional is thus an a priori conceptual truth.
I 89
Secondary Intension: here, the logical supervenience can be explained by saying that the primary intension of the concept extracts a referent of the actual world, which is projected unchanged to other physically identical worlds (by rigidifying operations). Such facts are contingent. (FN 51/C 2)
Natural Supervenience/Chalmers: is - as opposed to the logical - contingent for its part. This is ontologically expensive, so we can be glad that logical supervenience is the rule.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Horg I
T. Horgan
Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology (Representation and Mind) Cambridge 2009

Horg II
T. Horgan
The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content 2010

Cha I
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-05-27