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Conceivability/Idea/Chalmers: when two worlds resemble each other in terms of all micro-physical conditions, there is no room for the notion that they differ in terms of higher-level properties such as biological phenomena.
This unimaginability is not caused by any cognitive limitations. It is rather logically impossible that these worlds differ.
Imagination/Conceivability/argument/proof/VsChalermers: some may argue that conceivability is not an argument - there may always be details which have not been taken into account.
ChalmersVsVs: but then one would have to specify somehow which details these are.
Chalmers: the only way in which conceivability and possibility are disjointed is connected to necessity a posteriori: e.g. the hypothesis that water is not H2O seems conceptually coherent, but water is probably H2O in all possible worlds.
Necessity a posteriori/Chalmers: however, necessity a posteriori is irrelevant to the problem of whether our conscious experience is explainable.
Conceivability/Chalmers: one might think that one could imagine a situation in which Fermat's last sentence is wrong. But it would turn out that the situation was described wrongly. As it would turn out, the terms were misapplied.
Idea/Conceivability/VsDescartes/Chalmers: Descartes' argument from the mere conceivability is considered as rejected. From the fact that it is conceivable that A and B are not identical does not follow that they are not.
VsChalmers: Is that not true to the same extent for the zombies' example?
ChalmersVsVs: the difference is that it is not about identity here, but about supervenience! If one can imagine the existence of all physical properties without the existence of conscious properties, then it is simply that the physical facts do not exhaust everything. This is something completely different. Supervenience is also much more fundamental here.
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996
Constructing the World Oxford 2014