|Existence, philosophy, logic: the fact that there is something to which properties can be attributed. That does not mean that something has to be given immediately or can be perceived by the senses. See also ontology, properties, predicates, existence statements, realism, quantification, ascription.|
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|Taureck I 85
Existence/Gorgias/Sophist/Taureck: Thesis: "It is nothing". (There are not even fragments of Gorgias handed down).
According to Sextus Empiricus, Gorgias wants three things:
1. It is nothing.
2. If there is something, it is not recognizable.
3. But if there is something and if it is also recognizable, it is not to be made clear to others.
Existence/Parmenides: Thesis: only beings can exist and be thought.
Gorgias: ad 1. ("There is nothing"): "If the non-existence is non-existence, both the non-being is non-existent, and the being is existend, so that nothing more is than the things."
Taureck: If one says of non-existence, that it is non-existence, then non-existence belongs to the realm of beings!
"Nothing is" can also mean that neither non-being nor being is. But why is it to be conceded that non-existence is? ("Is" must be understood here as "means").
Gorgias: ad 2. ("If there is something, it is not recognizable"): "If non-existence is, then existence is nothing but its opposite.
Therefore nothing should be, if it is not the same to be and not to be.
Taureck: If there are only two mutually exclusive ways, the affirmation of non-existence would have to include the denial of existence.
Gorgias: ad 3. ("If, however, something is and if it is also recognizable, it is not to be made clear to others."): equates being and non-being: both, not the non-being and the being, for it is indeed the same as the non-being.
Taureck: here he has changed a premise: previously it applied: the non-existence has the property of existence. Now this is not the opposite.
Existence/Gorgias: from the argumentation of the becoming/un-becoming:
Either a singular something has become or has not become. Now it can be shown that it is neither one nor the other, so it does not exist.
If something has not become, it is unlimited, but it cannot be anywhere. So it is not. (Here Gorgias refers to Zenon and Melissos).
Gorgias: ad 2. ("If there is something after all, it is not recognizable"): If the merely thought already refers to existent, then only the imagined would rotten on existence. From the point of view of the imagined, however, we know that it is not true. (No criteria for really existent).
Gorgias: ad 3. ("If, however, something is and is also recognizable, it is not to be made clear to others."): What one saw, how should one utter this through speech? How could this be clear to the listener, where he does not see it? Just as seeing does not recognize sounds, in the same way the hearing does not hear colors.
Taureck: Perceptions cannot represent each other.
Logos is here only speech, no longer the described thing itself.
Gorgias, however, already knows the concept of the sign (semeio).
B. H.F. Taureck
Die Sophisten Hamburg 1995