Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Fodor IV 189
Representation/Reality/Churchland: Thesis: The brain represents different aspects of reality through a position in a suitable state space.
Fodor/Lepore: we only need to be interested in the neurophysiological aspect here.
He refers to Quine's familiar picture of the theory as a network of beliefs: on the edge observation sets, easily revisable, in the center theoretical concepts and logical relations, not easily revisable. Nevertheless, the only fixed nodes are just the observation concepts. They are linked to the observation conditions, while the inferential conditions are linked to one another. (causal/associative).
IV 191
Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: also seems to be guilty of the illusion that ultimately there might be something empirical, so that conceptual relations could eventually be reduced to relations between concepts of observation.
Fodor IV 200
Representation/neurophysiological/mind/brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies.
The brain represents red things as red and aunts as aunts! (Not as objects with certain psychophysical properties).
Otherwise we could figure it all out with introspection.
Introspection/Fodor/Lepore: would work if the brain represented colors as frequencies, but it represents red things simply as red and aunts as aunts.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25