Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Identity theory (philosophy of the mind): the thesis that mind states are nothing but states of the brain. Types of identity theory are the weaker assumption of a type-type identity and the stronger assumption of a token-token identity.
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Pauen I 188
Explanation gap/Identity Theory/Consciousness/Ontology/Pauen: Basically already recognized by Leibniz. Then Dubois Reymond, Nagel, Joseph Levine.
Explanation gap/Levine/Pauen: between scientific and psychological theories.
Chalmers: "Hard Problem of Consiousness":
I 189
Forces us to make enormous interventions in previously accepted conceptions and methods.
Identity theory: refers to the ontology.
Explanation gap argument: refers epistemically to our knowledge.
Context: if we accept identity theory we must expect that our respective knowledge can relate to each other.
I 191
Churchland: it would be a fallacy that we wanted to conclude from today's ignorance to the insolubility of the problem. ("Argument of ignorance")
VsChurchland: in the case of the explanation gap this must not be plausible.
Representatives do not rely on their own ignorance, nor do they lead the failure of previous research. They assume a fundamental difference between entities such as water and heat on the one hand and mental processes on the other.
Therefore, our methods must fail.
I 192
Causal characteristics play an important role in this difference.
In this way the representatives of the explanation gap arguments must be able to characterize our natural phenomena, which are characterized by everyday concepts, by such causal properties.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-26