|Similarity: conformity of one or more - but not all - properties of two or more objects.|
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|Fodor IV 188
Condition/Equality/Similarity/Quality/Paul Churchland: Thesis: State space, similarity space, similarity metric.
E.g. "Anglophone hyperspace with logical relations on hypersurfaces." Should replace Chomsky's image.
((s) Hypersurface/Churchland/(s): something on that you can go up/down, right/left, and front/back, and that within a language. Is needed to describe objects and their relationships.)
Fodor/Lepore: that assumes that state spaces also reflect grammar.
Churchland: It also has in mind that a kind of representations reflect "contents" of neurological states.
Fodor: Thereby he's up to his neck in his intentionality.
Fodor IV 193
Similarity/Equality/Semantics/Paul Churchland/Fodor/Lepore: surprisingly begins with sensations, not with intentionality (such as with propositional attitudes or concepts).
Thesis: if we had an adequate access to sensations, this could be generalized to a general mental representation.
Churchland: the qualitative character of our sensations is generally considered to be inaccessible as neurobiological reduction.
But even so, we find that a determined attempt to find an order here, reveals a considerable amount of explicit information.
E.g. color dice with frequencies.
Fodor/Lepore: Churchland actually assumes here that this is an access to the sensations (via frequencies!), not only to the discriminatory ability of the nervous system.
Churchland: so the inexpressible can be expressed. The "unspeakable pink" can be grasped by frequency. So maybe the everyday language can also be replaced.
Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: how plausible is this story in terms of sensations? Does it provide a robust concept of equality in general?
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992