Dictionary of Arguments

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Propositional attitudes, philosophy: A propositional attitude is the attitude of a person in relation to an object, often expressed in the form of a that-clause. Paul, for example, believes that Elmer believes the same as himself. For propositional attitudes, special identity conditions apply because one has to take into account what is known to the person and what language use they have. See also propositions, identity conditions, opacity.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Cresswell II 55
Causal role/Fodor/propositional attitudes/CresswellVsFodor: Fodor is interested in the causal role that belief and wishes play in behavior. This is understood in terms of manipulating formulas in a mental code.
Patricia ChurchlandVsFodor: (1980) does not do justice to half-conscious and unconscious attitudes.
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II 56
Causal role/CresswellVsFodor: what would that kind of entities be that would have to occur in a causal explanation? Example:
(3) Fodor believes that meanings are in the head.
Mentalese/CresswellVsFodor: Supposed that meanings are internal representations.
Problem: (3) can be said by different people on different occasions, but must then have the same meaning. If we do not accept this, there is no problem with propositional attitudes at all.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Churli II
Patricia S. Churchland
"Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-05-21
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