Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||
|
| |||
| Identity theory (philosophy of the mind): the thesis that mind states are nothing but states of the brain. Types of identity theory are the weaker assumption of a type-type identity and the stronger assumption of a token-token identity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Item | Excerpt | Meta data |
|---|---|---|---|
Books on Amazon: Patricia Churchland |
II Patricia Smith Churchland Die Neurobiologie des Bewusstseins - Was können wir von ihr lernen? In Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993 472 Identity Theory/Brain/Consciousness/Searle: Vs Identification of conscious states with brain states. Instead: the brain causes these states. Correlations can be an indication of causality, but they are not a reference to identity. ChurchlandVsSearle: he does not see why scientists advocate identity: depending on the data situation, it is more plausible than the assumption that a is caused by a different b. (But Searle is not a dualist). Identity instead of causation: e.g. Identity: Current is electron flow, it is not the causation of this flow. E.g. genes are not caused by base pairs of DNA, they are these base pairs._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 |
|
> Counter arguments against Churchland
> Counter arguments in relation to Identity Theory
> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-09-25